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Shades of Green: The Use of Force Debate in the German Green Party, 1990--2002

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SHADES OF GREEN

THE USE OF FORCE DEBATE IN THE GERMAN GREEN PARTY, 1990-2002

by

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
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ABSTRACT

SHADES OF GREEN THE USE OF FORCE DEBATE IN THE GERMAN GREEN PARTY, 1990-2002

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Old Dominion University, 2007
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Utilizing an heuristic model that incorporates aspects from several theoretical perspectives this dissertation examines the German Green Party debate on the use of military force from 1990-2002. From the absolute rejection of any use of force to evict Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War in 1991, the Greens evolved over the course of a decade to support the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This dissertation argues that this evolution was the result of a conscious will to govern by German political leaders in particular and external shocks—Srebrenica, Kosovo, and 9/11. It also incorporates two factors that enabled this change—the end of the international system at the end of the Cold War combined with the rising German international responsibilities and a dynamic Party leadership to foster internal debate.

The shocks of the dire humanitarian crises first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo empowered the internalized Green norm of “never again Auschwitz” that sought to protect human rights and in turn challenged the other internalized norm of “never again war.” As more leaders saw the preeminence of the former idea, it in turn functioned as a facilitating norm that withered the Green idea of pacifism. Building on the evolutions among key Party leaders during the Bosnian crisis, the later pressure inherent in the will to govern, both before and during their tenure in government forced a strategic choice to

either govern and support the deployment of German forces to Kosovo or remain true to traditional pacifist values. The choice by both political leaders and the Party's grass roots to govern rather than remained wedded to traditional values illustrated the desire to at first gain and then later maintain the influence on German policy. By 2002, even after the rejection of the Iraq war, the Green version of pacifism had been drastically altered into a new security identity with clearly established limits.

“We make our world significant by the courage of our questions and the depth of our answers.”

Carl Sagan, *Cosmos*

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Finally, I would like to give special acknowledgement to the late Dr. John Maxwell of West Virginia University. Though he passed away in 1996, it was at his insistence that I learned German. He would be proud to know that a decade later, I had put that skill to such tremendous good use.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After Germany's unification and its decision to support Operation Desert Storm financially instead of with troops, few commentators would have fathomed that eleven years later, over 10,000¹ German troops would have been deployed in international operations and Germany would have contributed to active combat operations in Kosovo and in the war against terrorism. Nor would they have imagined that then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in a campaign speech at an SPD Party Day in 2002 would claim that Germany was a self-confident land on its new "German way." With the era of "check book diplomacy" at an end, he noted Germany's willingness to support military actions, yet avoid "adventures" that were not in the country's interest.² Over the course of a decade, Germany moved from a divided state haunted by its past to one that had become a responsible partner in European, and indeed, global affairs.

Germany has evolved considerably in security politics and in its position toward

This paper follows the format requirements of *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations* 6th edition by Kate L. Turabian.

¹ That number has since been reduced to 6882 as of November 2007, with the majority in the Kosovo and Afghanistan missions. See the Bundeswehr website at <http://www.bundeswehr.de>, accessed 10 November 2007.

² Gerhard Schröder, "Rede von Bundeskanzler Schröder zum Wahlkampfauftritt," 5 August 2002, <<http://www.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1019519/Schröder%20Rede%20WahlkampfauftrittHannover.pdf>> accessed 10 August 2002. Many commentators focused not on the strong, confident language emanating from Schröder's party, but rather on the use of a possible war in Iraq as a campaign issue by the SPD to separate itself from the CDU/CSU, who at the time argued that Germany should support the US in a move against Iraq if it fell under a UN mandate. The SPD was trailing considerably in the polls at the time and Schröder's stance on the Iraq crisis was seen by many as critical in his eventual victory in the September 2002 elections. Schröder's approach to Iraq would receive considerable criticism from the internal opposition as well as foreign governments during the remaining months of 2002 and would lead many to question the goals and reliability of German foreign policy. See Georg Paul Hefty, "Der Kanzler setzt sich ab," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 September 2002, 14; "Schröder will keinen neuen Konflikt definieren," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 August 2002, 4.

the deployment of its military since the Gulf War, moving from a rather strong anti-military impulse, during which even the rhetoric of using military force was largely taboo, to a greater focus on its international responsibility in the military and security realm. From the baby steps that began with the deployment of mine sweepers after the Gulf War in 1991 and humanitarian deployments in Cambodia in 1992 and Somalia in 1993, more active participation with Bosnian peacekeepers in 1995 and a combat deployment for Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001 have followed. By the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, German support of peacekeeping operations has become accepted among almost all political parties, as the deployment and continued support of the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate. Moreover, the recent and continued support for the deployments of combat forces in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the continued stationing of peacekeepers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan continue to suggest German evolution.

This dissertation will focus exclusively on the Green Party's internal debate about the legitimacy of the use of military force between 1990 and 2002 and ask the fundamental question: Why did the German Greens change their perspective on the use of force over the course of a single decade? The results of this study demonstrates that a mixture of both external and internal factors played important roles in this evolution. The hypothesis for this dissertation is as follows: Facilitated by external shocks, the conscious will to govern led the Green Party to relax its absolute resistance to the use of force.

Why examine the German Greens? Within Germany, all the major political

parties have had their debates on the use of the military, leading to a clear policy in the CDU and the FDP. The SPD, like the Greens, had elements of pacifism, but they had a foundation that rested instead on social issues, leaving their debate on the use of force far from existential. For the Greens though, the debate on the use of force challenged one of their fundamental beliefs—pacifism—that remained steadfast even past the fall of the Berlin Wall, meaning that challenging such a belief for the Greens meant an existential crisis. Unlike the other political parties in Germany, and indeed most other political parties in the West, the Greens offer the opportunity to study change as a new dynamic challenged the very core of a political party.

Moreover, the Green Party³ has been perhaps the most fascinating and clear reflection of transformation on the use of force debate within Germany's domestic sphere. Of all the major political parties in Germany, they were the last to actively engage in the debate on the use of force. In addition, of all of the political parties' debates, theirs was by far the most acrimonious, in the end threatening the very existence of the party and even the early collapse of the Red-Green coalition. Examining the Greens will provide considerable insight into the drive toward "finality" of Germany's debate about its international responsibility with respect to the use of force. From its rock throwing and protest days of the early 1980s, the Green Party in Germany had made headlines with its strong anti-military stance, only to have their values challenged to the core after 1995 amid the violence in Bosnia. Over the course of six years, the Party tore itself asunder every time the potential use of force became an issue, yet it also continued

³ Though often referred to simply as the "Greens," the party that sits in the Bundestag is in fact an amalgamation of the West German Green Party and the East German Bündnis 90 (Alliance 90) Party. In this dissertation, the term "Greens" will encompass the entire alliance. See the chapter III on the Greens for more detailed information.

to adapt and develop its ideas anew.

Perhaps more important is what an examination of the Greens can do to inform the larger study of European politics. Though pacifism had been an important principle in European politics during the Cold War, the German Greens had often been seen as one of the primary purveyors of that concept in the political realm. The evolution away from their strict adherence to pacifism amid the violence in the Balkans and their desire to govern offer important perspectives on how a party steeped in pacifism reacts as they grasp for power. As this dissertation will show, the German Greens in fact were unable to hold on to their strict pacifism in the face of Germany's international responsibilities and the new violence of the 1990s and 2000s. This perspective offers important insights into the limitation of pacifism as a viable political approach in modern times.

For the Greens, foreign and security policy had always been a "difficult relationship,"⁴ though it is one that has been transformed considerably over the past decade. Different scholars have usually focused on specific events to elucidate clear impacts on the intraparty debate. Nina Philippi argues that Srebrenica was the "decisive turning point" for the party. Stephanie Bauer sees Kosovo as the culmination of the evolution of the Green Party's debate on the use of force.⁵ In fact, however, the change over time has been one of fits and starts, with a series of events from varying axes occurring over the course of a decade. That change has had numerous influences and continues even today, adapting to the situations the Party encounters. As Christoph Egle argues, this evolutionary process over this decade can best be characterized as "learning

⁴ Ludger Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik—Ein schwieriges Verhältnis* (Münster: Verlag Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1998).

⁵ Nina Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 1997); Stephanie Bauer, "Die Haltung von Bündnis

under stress.”⁶

The dynamic change of the Greens’ position at the leadership and grass roots from 1990 to 2002 can also easily be illustrated through minimal comparisons. There can be no clearer exemplification of this change than the comparison of their stance on the Gulf War after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks—from an absolute rejection of any military usage to supporting the deployment of 3900 German forces to Afghanistan. Similarly, during the initial reaction to the Srebrenica massacre, Fischer had argued for a military intervention in the name of the UN, though at the same time decried an intervention of the type from the Gulf War; for this argument, he was strongly criticized by his peers.⁷ Yet, six years later he argued before the Party Day for a military action, Operation Enduring Freedom, that was more similar to the Gulf War than operations in Bosnia or Kosovo and received significant support from the Party. With the codification of the acceptance of the use of military force in the 2002 Base Program and the gain by a few percentage points votes in the September 2002 election suggests that among the base there was also an acceptance, if a bit hesitantly, to see military force as a final, last resort in a newly-defined preventive foreign and security policy.

Over the course of four years as part of the ruling Government in Berlin from 1998 to 2002,⁸ the Greens stood behind five different major deployments of the German

90/Die Grünen zu militärischen Interventionen,” Master’s thesis, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, 2000.

⁶ Christoph Egle, “Lernen unter Stress: Politik und Programmatik von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” in *Das Rot-Grüne Projekt: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder, 1998-2002*, eds. Christoph Egle, Tobias Ostheim and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), 93-116.

⁷ Joschka Fischer, “Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit: Eine öffentliche Antwort auf den Offenen Brief von Kerstin Müller, Claudia Roth, Jürgen Tritten, Ludger Volmer an unsere Partei,” 27 November 1995, Bestand B.I.10, Akte Nr. 312, “Bosnia und Kosovo,” Archive Grünes Gedächtnis, Berlin, Germany (AGG).

⁸ The Green Party along with the SPD was voted out of office in September 2005, to be replaced by a CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition. Though the Greens adamantly rejected any use of force against Iraq in

military, the Bundeswehr. With their support of active combat roles in Kosovo and in the Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT, along with peacekeeping roles in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and now in ISAF in Afghanistan, the German Greens appear to have lost significant portions of their pacifist, oppositional basis and have moved more toward the mainstream of German politics.⁹ Indeed, in a 2002 article looking back on four years of Red-Green foreign policy, one commentator cited the “loss of meaning of the pacifists” as one of the principle results of those past four years. However, the Greens decisively rejected the Bush Administration’s efforts to link the war in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) to the GWOT, because the Party saw the US’ preemptive doctrine being used to justify the war in Iraq as illegitimate. Treated separately in this dissertation, a brief discussion of the months prior to the invasion of Iraq will illustrate the limits of the Green Party’s adaptation on the use force.

This dissertation incorporates two distinct independent variables—international shocks and, primarily, the Greens’ will to govern—along with two enabling factors—the end of the Cold War with a developing concept of German international responsibility and the role of the Party’s leadership and Joschka Fischer as a dynamic leader. A thorough explanation requires an understanding of what opened the door to change (the end of the Cold War and evolving German responsibility), the actual mechanisms of change (shocks and a will to govern), and the inclusion of an enabling leadership element (Fischer and the Party leadership).

The nexus of two independent variables and two enabling factors that lead to

the three years between 2002 and 2005, as they perceived the US action there to be based on great power interests, they continued to support the annual vote for the continuation for the mandate for the deployment of German forces in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force and some forces as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

change combine to form an heuristic approach that incorporates both the politics of ideas and Hobbesian self-interests. The impact of the first variable, external shocks, led to a conscious reexamination of the Party leaders' individual viewpoints on the necessity of using military force as part of the reaction to the particular event. Over the course of the late 1990s, many in the party would choose to support "never again Auschwitz" over "never again war." Joschka Fischer in particular was personally moved by the events in Srebrenica enough to reconsider his historical prohibitions on the use of force. Others reacted to the increasing violence three years later during the Kosovo conflict and dropped their opposition to the deployment of German forces. Given the very personal nature of pacifism within the Party, this conscious introspection after a shock was a vital element of change. The choice of predominance of "never again Auschwitz" or "never again war" could only be made by the individual; it could not be sanctioned by a general Party perspective and pushed on the larger group. Throughout this dissertation, the debate among individuals and between the base and leadership of the Party would remain a constant feature. Indeed, this debate would be a fundamental part of the Green Party's challenging decision making process, from leadership opinions to Party Days that brought together large portions of the Party.

The second variable, the conscious will to govern, was the most important reason for change; however, it must be seen in the context of Germany's internal political dynamics. To become a member of the governing coalition with the SPD, who had mandated continuity with the evolved German international responsibility, the Greens were forced to accept the use of force as a part of Germany's security policy. The shocks

⁹ See Eckart Lohse, "Kampfeinsätze und die Ost-Erweiterung, Ein Rückblick: Rot-grüne Außenpolitik und der Bedeutungsverlust der Pazifisten," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 August 2002, 3.

had only led a portion of the Party to adjust their perspectives on the use of force; for others, the desire to be a part of the governing coalition led to an individual choice between government and “never again war.” At the individual Party leader level now and even later for the Party as a whole, this conscious will to govern, and in turn have an influence on German policy, led in many respects to a reordering of normative priorities that in turn helped to change the very security identity of the Party. That shift in identity in turn led to the incorporation of new Green elements into Germany’s foreign and security policy, such as preventative politics and limiting the use of German forces in Afghanistan. In the late 1990s, remaining true to pacifism and being in the government were mutually exclusive given the internal German dynamic.

Though the conscious will to govern is the mechanism without which the Greens’ change simply would not have occurred, the value of the external shocks cannot simply be seen as significantly less important. In fact, there is an intersection of these two independent variables that intertwines them. The shocks of Srebrenica, Kosovo, and 9/11 clearly had an impact on many within the Party, but they were not enough alone to have changed the Party completely, as the status of the Party on the verge of the Kosovo crisis clearly demonstrated. By the same token, a will to govern alone would not have been enough to overcome the ingrained pacifist tendencies of the Party without the shock of Srebrenica in particular. Moreover, their temporal relationship is also critical. The appearance of external shocks first set the stage for change; a will to govern in the environment of 1990s Germany would not have been enough for change alone.

Both of these variables—the shocks and the will to govern—worked together to shatter the perspective of “never again war” within the Greens. While during the Cold

War the ingrained ideals of “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz” had been harmonious, after the fall of the Berlin Wall the absolutist nature of “never again war” was withered first by the continued adherence to the dictum “never again Auschwitz” amid the Srebrenica massacre and then later by the conscious will to govern. As the empirical realities of the post Cold War era and the domestic goals of the party collided with its opposition based, anti-establishment history, the Party rushed headlong into a debate that would shatter its earlier security identity.

Those two variables worked in concert with the two enabling values that, while difficult to precisely measure, provided the background for change—the end of the Cold War coupled with an expanding German responsibility and a dynamic party leadership that shepherded the evolution of the debate and provided a champion for change in the person of Joschka Fischer. Without the first variable, it is quite doubtful that this Green debate would have even occurred, as the Party would likely have remained wedded to its traditional pacifism that rejected any use of the military amid the nuclear armed world. The unification of Germany, moreover, was not enough to change the Green Party, as Germany’s place in a new international realm had little resonance on the Party’s early post Cold War values. As the early years of the Bosnian crisis would demonstrate, the Greens remained aloof to the early phases of a developing rhetoric on German international responsibility.

Similarly, without a champion for change, the debate within the Party would have likely been one of only words, rather than actions given the strong interpersonal relationships within the Greens. Fischer’s decisive leadership role and his ability to guide debates, both after the Srebrenica massacre and on the eve of joining the governing

coalition in 1999, provided a spark that helped to move the debate forward at critical junctures. The debate at the federal level similarly helped to push the grass roots, which became particularly evident at critical Party Days after the Bundestag votes to deploy German forces amid the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises. Both of these enabling variables set the stage, in the case of the former, and worked in the background, in the case of the latter, of the Green debate. Though they were not elements of change within the Party, they are fundamental enablers of the overall change.

Over the course of the 1990s, the Greens essentially moved from a “peace movement” party to one of “peace politics” (*Friedenspolitik*). As the Green Member of the Bundestag Winfried Nachtwei, who was neither a strict pacifist nor one who unconditionally supported the use of force, noted in 2002, “unconditional” adherence to pacifism was no longer a “practical” alternative for the Greens.¹⁰ After the tumultuous decade of the 1990s, pacifism has clearly lost power in the Green Party, though its followers and lingering persuasive influence remain. Though the Greens continue to be very supportive of the use of the military for strictly peacekeeping operations and are now more amenable to its use to prevent genocide and in support of self-defense, they remain very suspicious of the goals of states, in particular those of the US, and critical of specific methods of warfare, such as the use of cluster bombs. They are loathe to use military force in more traditional realist based power moves, as the case in Iraq clearly demonstrates.

Given this considerable evolution and the inclusion of a conscious desire to

¹⁰ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Bundestagsfraktion, “Von der Friedensbewegung zur Friedenspolitik: Element einer neuen Weltinnenpolitik,” December 2002, <<http://www.gruene-fraktion.de/themen/sicherheit/011205friedenpolitik.pdf>> accessed 2 January 2003, 2; Nachtwei, “In a Changing World,” 3.

govern as one of the intervening variables, it will also be very useful to examine Green policies since the end of the Red-Green coalition in 2005 to determine the resonance of this change. If the Greens still continue to accept some of the ideals and policies developed during this debate that would suggest an element of internalization if not permanency of the change. Contrarily, if these values were more fleeting, a return to the opposition would suggest a return to a more traditional pacifist approach and in turn suggest that the requirements of government were the reasons for only a temporary change. A short review of Green policies since the return to the opposition can offer strong evidence that changes in the Green Party were real and not just short-term political considerations.

As will be discussed over the course of the ensuing chapters, specific events and the pressure of being in government, led in particular by a dynamic leadership, pushed the debate a bit further each time; a direct leap from opposing the use of any military force during the Gulf War to supporting the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom would simply not have been possible. Pacifism as a defining paradigm for the Greens was no longer credible amid the new security challenges in the post Cold War world, in particular the humanitarian crises in the Balkans. Indeed, without the shocks of Srebrenica and Kosovo (to include Racak) and the 9/11 attacks in particular along with the combination of the Green involvement in the government in the case of Kosovo and Afghanistan, there is little reason to believe that the Party as a whole would have grown to accept the deployment of German combat forces.

To study the interaction of these variables, this dissertation will focus on four

major case studies—the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. It will also briefly examine the Greens approach to the deployment of the Bundeswehr to Macedonia in 2001 and the diplomatic crisis during 2002 surrounding the run-up to the Iraq War. Examining all of these particular case studies not only will demonstrate evolution over time, but also both the direct causal roles and collaborative impact of the independent variables. The return of the Greens to the opposition in 2005, moreover, provides an excellent opportunity to examine as part of the conclusion whether the changes that occurred between 1990 and 2002 have an element of permanency or were rather only fleeting, based on short-term political desires.

In essence then, this dissertation suggests that the Greens have jettisoned their pure “Greenness” and instead taken on new shades of green, the oft mentioned Army “olive green,” into their identity. From a party steeped in the dictums of pacifism, the issue of using military force remains a significantly complex decision for the Greens. The rejection of the war in Iraq by the Greens demonstrated the threshold for Green support of military operations; future operations now have requirements they must meet before the Greens will support or accept them. And even then, it will never be a unanimous decision. The four primary factors of change examined here—the change in the international system, external shocks, the will to govern, and the strong leadership element in the Greens—all had significant impacts on the change over the course of a decade. This evolution traced out in one political party can also offer considerable value for scholars examining areas other than the German Green party. Importantly, it explains how a political party steeped in pacifism reacts when it achieves a new level of political responsibility. Moreover, the variables laid out here can be tested with other pacifist

political parties, especially in Western Europe, to test their general viability.

This dissertation seeks to add to the burgeoning literature on the use of force debate in Germany. Unlike the majority of the works in this area, which focused on the general evolution of the government policy and Germany's position on the European and global stage, this work looks at the transformation of one political party—the Greens. The literature on Germany's general debate on the use of force is quite well developed, though studies of the German Left (SPD, Greens, and PDS) have remained absent for the most part. Given the critical role the Greens played in the decisive post Cold War era, understanding their evolution is critical.

Unlike most works, this dissertation provides a detailed study of the concept and mechanisms of change in a political party. By studying the specific impact of foreign security crises, especially the impact of clear shocks, the role of the ingrained desire to protect human rights as a facilitator of change, and the role of a conscious aim to participate in the governing coalition on change, this dissertation offers a depth of understanding not achieved elsewhere.

Most studies that include an interrelationship between the international realm and domestic actors includes some element of congruity between them that helps to facilitate change. However, when those belief structures are so diametrically opposed to each other, as in the case here, how will the domestic actor react? One important contribution here is the use of shocks to lead to guiding principles of a political party. This study examines how some ingrained ideals can actually function as facilitating norms to change a group's defining identity by changing the relative importance of one over the other. In the case of the Greens, the ideal of “never again Auschwitz” actually helped to wither the

adherence to “never again war.”

This study also highlights the pull of the international sphere on a political party. Most studies look at the impact of the international environment’s ability to change a state actor, but the conscious desire of a domestic entity to change in order to *become* a part of the government remains largely understudied. With continuity of German foreign policy such a defining aspect of its foreign policy, being part of a governing coalition in Germany necessitates an acceptance of and willingness to act on the state’s international responsibilities. The impact of the German idea of *Regierungsfähigkeit* injected a strategic element to the Party’s change—leaders were now forced to choose between principles and governance. Thus, the potential to have any influence for a political party becomes inexorably linked to its ability to adapt to the requirements of the international sphere.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

The process of change within the Green Party in the debate on the use of force during the 1990s and early 2000s was a constant struggle, influenced by a multitude of factors. To explain the shift in Green perspectives on using military force requires a multi-variant approach that incorporates the complexity of actual events. Domestic factors and international influences combine to create a nexus of catalysts that continually spurred the Party to react and develop new policies and perspectives. Without an integration of the two independent variables—external shocks and a will to govern—and the two enabling factors—the systemic change with the end of the Cold War and the dynamic leadership in the Party—change with the Greens would have been impossible. This chapter defines the heuristic approach and is divided into three sections. Part one outlines the independent variables. The second section outlines the enabling factors. The final portion briefly discusses the mechanism of change drawing on psychological literature.

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Of the two independent variables responsible for the change in the Greens, the conscious will to govern clearly had the most decisive impact. Without it, the Greens would not have made the significant shifts as a whole to accept the use of force. But to say simply that this factor alone changed the Greens belies the complexity of the

situation. The other independent variable—the external shocks—likewise had a very direct impact on the Green debate. Coming temporally before the will to govern really began to exert its influence, these shocks both set the stage and in fact drove the debate to the position where the influence of the will to govern could even have an impact. Without the early reaction to the shocks and the resulting detailed debates, the will to govern alone could not have pushed the Greens to accept the use of force.

External Shocks

At the most basic level, external shocks were direct facilitators of change as they illustrated a clear break with the past and offer the greatest impetus for a quick reevaluation of philosophy. A quick empirical examination of the Green Party's evolution demonstrates their role. These events, such as the massacres at Srebrenica in 1995 and Racak in 1999 or the 9/11 terrorist attacks, provided a necessary reactive quality that galvanized both political leaders and generated personal reflection from both leaders and regular grass root members alike. The result was the furious debate that raged within the Greens in the mid 1990s. These shocks helped to press for clarity and even a redefinition of commonly held ideals within the Greens.

Borrowing from sociological literature on cultural trauma, shocks must be sudden, radical, and have an external source. Perhaps most important they must be perceived within a particular mental frame, meaning that the event will then be viewed as shocking, unexpected, or repulsive.¹ Shocks can come in many varieties—as wars, single attacks, genocide, mass murder, or economic failures—and, much like systemic changes, often

¹ Piotr Sztompka, "Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change," *European Journal of Social Theory* 3, no. 4 (2000): 452.

create a new, fluid environment in which changes in guiding philosophies are possible. Over the past decade, the massacres in Srebrenica in Bosnia and Racak in Kosovo, the genocide in Rwanda, the terrorist attacks against the US in September 2001, or the revelations of torture at the Abu Ghayb prison in Iraq have all moved political elites. These shocks, however, differ from systemic changes, to be discussed in more detail below, in that they are decisively more sudden and often grisly. Moreover, they are often compact in time and have more limited, shorter duration effects.² In response to security shocks, such as the 9/11 attacks, responses are often much quicker given the need to counter the often immediate changes.

Amid these shocks, policies and politics remain fluid, which creates an environment that is more conducive for persuasion of, and by, political elites. As Jeffrey Checkel has argued, a persuadee in a new environment, such as after a shock, is forced to cognitively analyze the new situation as the previous beliefs and guiding ideas are called into question.³ With external shocks more political elites can embrace a new ideal, either through persuasion from others or through their own conscious reevaluation. In many respects this is the backbone of the transformation process. Indeed, interviews and discussions conducted for this dissertation with German foreign policy elites lends considerable credence to this argument.

Throughout the Green Party debate on the use of force, there were three primary shocks that impacted the debate—Srebrenica, Kosovo (Racak), and 9/11. Initially, the

² An excellent example of this is the internal American reaction to the September 2001 attacks. Within a month, the US Congress had passed aggressive anti-terrorism legislation known as the USA PATRIOT Act. With only one detractor at the time, the legislation ran into considerable opposition four years later amid civil-liberty concerns when it was up for renewal. As the shock faded, the normalcy of politics returned.

³ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," *International Organization* 55, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 562.

massive humanitarian catastrophes in Bosnia, Rwanda, and even Somalia, shattered the perception that all the world's problems had been solved with the end of the Cold War and ushered in the era of humanitarian crises as a security issue. The July 1995 massacre in Srebrenica would be the first spark in a fierce debate within the Green Party and would firmly define the main perspectives on the use of force debate within the Party. The humanitarian catastrophe in the Serbian province of Kosovo in late 1998 and the January 1999 civilian massacre in Racak similarly affected the German population and members of the Green Party.⁴ Finally, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC on 11 September 2001 clearly shocked many in Germany. The video of the attack on and the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers made the reality of the events very personal to many in Germany.

All of these shocks galvanized even some of the most ardent pacifists to rethink their views toward the use of force.⁵ They also created clear impetuses for a need to either act or respond, especially when the Greens were part of the governing coalition. The necessity of action in turn brought in the possibility of the use of force in general and in the case of the latter two shocks, the possibility of the deploying German combat forces. Though these events caused most to rethink their views on the use of force, it does not mean that their views were changed completely.

At the most basic level, these external shocks also created conflicts between two already ingrained perspectives for the Greens—"never again war" and "never again Auschwitz." Whereas they two ideas had long defined the Green foreign and security

⁴ Günter Joetze, *Der letzte Krieg in Europa? Das Kosovo und die deutsche Politik* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001).

⁵ Winfried Hermann, Member of the Bundestag, interview by author, 10 December 2002. The German Green Party, Berlin, Germany.

policy and mutually co-existed,⁶ they would be diametrically opposed in the 1990s. This dissonance would be a crucial aspect to the change in the Greens.

Scholars have widely recognized that Germany's historical experiences have created a normative political culture⁷ that helps define its actions in the international arena, in both a positive and negative way, which can in turn have constructive or destructive effects. Germany's disastrous defeat in the Second World War "dealt a lethal blow" to those in German society who favored military practices and created a sense of malleability to redefine German attitudes. The historical narrative of a disdain for war and its genocidal results became thoroughly ingrained in the German identity.⁸ At the same time, faced with division and a common enemy represented in the Soviet Union, Germany turned toward western integration.⁹ The unparalleled successes of security and economic institutions in western Europe, primarily NATO and the European Community, brought Europe to a stable plateau never before seen in European history that essentially

⁶ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 129-32, 438-46; Joachim Raschke, *Die Grünen: Wie sie wurden, was sie sind* (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1993), 114-17; Roland Vogt, "Politik ohne Gewalt: Das Postulat der Gewaltfreiheit bei den Grünen," 1997, Y093, AGG, 152-53; Ludger Volmer, Member of the Bundestag and Undersecretary of State, interview by author, 18 December 2002. The German Green Party, Berlin, Germany.

⁷ Also presented as identity, social norms, or strategic culture, political culture can be defined as "those cultural beliefs and values that shape a given society's orientation toward politics. See Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner, "Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory," in *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 123; Arthur Hoffman and Kerry Longhurst, "German Strategic Culture in Action," *Contemporary Security Policy* 20, no. 2 (August 1999): 31-49; Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia House, 1996), 325.

⁸ See for example Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, *The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Berger, 317-56; Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999); Christina Hacke, "Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime für die Außenpolitik Deutschlands," in *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Band 3: Interessen und Strategien*, ed. Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996), 5; John Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 776.

⁹ Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed*, 177.

changed history's ways.¹⁰ Over the course of forty years of the Cold War and western integration, the common historical memory of "never again war," "never again Auschwitz," and western integration led to certain approaches on self-defense issues.

These same scholars suggest that historical culture exerts a continual and largely unchangeable impact on modern policy—the view of history in the present cannot change. As Markovits and Reich believe, the "collective memory" of a state, the "lens through which the past is viewed," provides a means of interpreting the present and determining policy. These memories are the "foundation stones for contemporary ideologies." The constant effect of history on German contemporary politics is usually viewed as a "restraint." Germany's past continues to "cast a large, inescapable shadow" over current actions.¹¹ Others, such as Arthur Hoffman and Kerry Longhurst do go a bit further, suggesting that political culture both constrains and facilitates German security policy.¹²

However, as this dissertation will outline and also highlighted by Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen in *Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement*, political culture and history are indeed quite dynamic. As Dalgaard-Nielsen importantly notes, concepts of change can come from within a concept of security culture and not just from outside.¹³ Change occurs from a reinterpretation of history and its interpretation as new events challenge current perceptions.

¹⁰ Simon Serfaty, "European Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policies: Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance," testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, United States, House of Representatives, November 10, 1999.

¹¹ Markovits and Reich, xiii, 2' Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior," 801; John Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 6; Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed*; Berger, 355.

¹² Hoffman and Longhurst.

¹³ Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement: Europe in Change* (Manchester:

Applied to the events of the 1990s, the role of internalized normative perspectives offer important insights to understand the mechanism of change within the Greens. While the ideals of “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz” had previously worked harmoniously together, the genocide in Bosnia in particular caused many to rethink the prevalence of one over the other. With the shocks of the humanitarian catastrophes in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the ingrained perspective of supporting and protecting human rights, “never again Auschwitz,” became a magnet that helped to pull many away from their steadfast rejection of the use of force. Indeed amid the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the German government often used the developing international norm of humanitarian intervention to help justify increased involvement by contextualizing military force as a reaction to prevent humanitarian disasters.¹⁴

In essence, the belief that human rights should be protected in order to prevent an occurrence of the Nazi genocide became a “facilitating norm”¹⁵ in the overall transformation of the previously ingrained norm of pacifism within the Green Party. At the most basic level, the prevalence of “never again Auschwitz” withered the absolute value of the “never again war,” leading to an evolution away from the absolute and toward a bifurcated perspective on the uses and roles of military forces. The very concept of “never again war” thus became largely diluted within the Party over the course of this

Manchester University Press, 2006), 11.

¹⁴ Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” 153-85, in *The Culture of National Security*; Sven Chojnacki, “The Times they are a-Changin’: Prevention and Humanitarianism,” Discussion Paper P01-308, Wissenschaft Zentrum Berlin, Arbeitsgruppe: International Politik, October 2001; Philipp, “Civilian Power and War: The German Debate about Out-of-Area Operations, 1990-99,” in *Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, eds. Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 63; Hans Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force,” in *Germany as a Civilian Power?*, 57-60; Adrian Hyde-Price, “Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?” in *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*, ed. Douglas Weber (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 22.

¹⁵ I am indebted to Thomas Risse of the Freie Universität in Berlin, Germany for helping me clarify and expand this concept.

evolution. Both during the Bosnian and Kosovo debates, this concept would be critical.

An important part of the facilitating concept is the roles of clash and divergence between competing perspectives. When ideas complement each other and no external stimulus arises to challenge an ideal, there is little impetus to change. For example, in their formative years, the Greens had seen pacifism and the prevention of genocide as two sides of the same coin. Contrarily, when defining philosophies begin challenging one another in the context of an external stimulus, that harmony becomes impossible to hold. Change in one form or another becomes inevitable. Through political negotiation in both the private and public sphere, political leaders could emphasize the facilitating ideal in an attempt to move away from an ingrained philosophy. Thus, Green leaders who supported the necessity for the use of force could appeal to other more hesitant Party members by invoking an element familiar to all Greens.

The Will to Govern

The second, and most important, independent variable that led to change within the Green Party was its conscious will to govern that emerged in the mid to late 1990s. Like the impacts of international shocks, the desire to become a part of the governing coalition directly facilitated evolution through an internal desire to change measured by a reordering of individual Party leader priorities. Encapsulated in the German term *Regierungsfähigkeit*, this desire to govern forced the Party to choose between the chance to be in and, more importantly, remain in the governing coalition and the values of pure pacifism. Indeed, this will to govern clearly played a large role during the Kosovo crisis and was decisive during the November 2001 linkage of a vote of confidence with the

deployment of the Bundeswehr, as that very dichotomy was put to a vote in the Bundestag.

The idea of *Regierungsfähigkeit*, loosely translated as capability to govern,¹⁶ in a general sense refers to the capacity of a political party to act responsibly within the proscribed requirements of the German government. Given the SPD's desire to maintain continuity with the Kohl government's international responsibilities, a *regierungsfähig* Green Party required the acceptance of the already established German place in the international realm. As the unified Germany developed further through the late 1990s and early 2000s, accepting that international responsibility, including the role of the German military in the numerous security challenges, would be a primary measurer of a party's *Regierungsfähigkeit*.

Germany's perception of responsibility (*Verantwortung*) as a prominent guidepost for German security policy, emerged principally out of the developed German interest of remaining embedded in Western institutions. The fear among German leaders of the consequences of a *Sonderweg*, or special path of unilateralism, led to the absolute rejection of any unilateral action as a means of policy. By the 1980s, there was a broad political consensus in Germany on the adherence to multilateralism and continued cooperation with Western institutions.¹⁷ This in turn developed into one of the defining aspects of German foreign policy—the need to be seen as a reliable and calculable partner—by accepting international responsibilities.¹⁸ Rejecting such responsibility

¹⁶ For this dissertation, the German term will be used both as a noun (*Regierungsfähigkeit*) and adjective (*regierungsfähig*).

¹⁷ Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed*, 3, 167; Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, "Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?," *International Affairs* 72, no. 1 (January 1996): 12; Hacke, 541; Adrian Hyde-Price, *Germany & European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), 222.

¹⁸ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 43; Rudolf Scharping, "Deutsche Außenpolitik muss berechenbar

would wither the alliances, which would run counter to German interests.¹⁹ Indeed, in the early post-unification years Chancellor Kohl often spoke openly of Germany's desire to be seen as a reliable partner.²⁰ Such concepts are now so ingrained in the German political memory that changes in government no longer bring major foreign policy shifts with them.²¹

Germany's desire to be seen as reliable emerges out of an examination of the influences of both institutions and the impact of norms within an international society. By creating linkages of cooperation and assuring that states cannot cheat through a system of reciprocity, institutions can help to create paths of cooperation.²² International norms, also referred to as commonly held beliefs or constructed rules, will often provide an understanding of what is important and what the appropriate and legitimate means are to obtain these goals. Moreover, as states interact within an institutionalized system, they create a collective identity that strengthens the influence of an international logic of appropriate action upon the domestic sphere.²³ These internalized international rules

Sein." *Internationale Politik* 8 (1995): 38-44; Michael Mertes, "A 'German Way'?" *Internationale Politik, Transatlantic Edition* 4, no. 3 (Winter 2002): 11-16. Mertes argues that Gerhard Schröder's "German Way" amid the rhetoric in the Iraq crisis does not represent a German *Sonderweg*. Indeed, he suggests that Germany has no energy for such unilateral actions.

¹⁹ Ole Diehl, "UN Einsätze der Bundeswehr: Außenpolitische Handlungszwänge und innenpolitischer Konsensbedarf," *Europa-Archiv* 8 (1993): 220; Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 173; Nina Philippi, "Civilian Power and War," 60; Michael Stürmer, "Wohin die Bundeswehr: Über Diplomatie, Strategie, und Bündnistreue," *Internationale Politik* 4 (1995): 31.

²⁰ Helmut Kohl, "Deutschlands Verantwortung in einer veränderten Welt," speech on 18 April 1994, *Bulletin* 37 (28 April 1994): 330. The desire to be seen as a reliable partner is linked to Germany's past. As the Cold War ended, Germany's neighbors were often suspicious of its actions. Remaining embedded in institutions as well as ensuring the predictability and reliability as a partner became important watchwords. See Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 66..

²¹ Regina Karp, "The New German Foreign Policy Consensus." *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2005-06): 75.

²² Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 49-50; Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 743.

²³ Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-396.

create “patterns of behavior,”²⁴ and guidelines for “proper conduct”²⁵ that when viewed within the qualities of a specific system, develop into levels of appropriate action. The system thus begins to define the limits of legitimate action and in turn helps to provide a sense of direction for a state.²⁶ Learned through a process of interaction, these logics can impose pressure on a member state to help persuade it to accept a more common ideal throughout that system. This logic of appropriate action in turn translates into the concept of responsibility at the domestic level.

Over the course of the German debate on the use of force, the “rhetoric of responsibility,” especially from the CDU but later also from the SPD and the Greens, was used to pave the way for significant evolutions in the debate on the use of force.²⁷ As early as the end of 1990, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was already noting the rising German responsibility for international security. In a 1991 speech in the German Bundestag, Kohl noted that it was “correct” that others awaited a stronger German engagement. As the situation worsened in Bosnia, he argued that Germany could no longer stand idly by as others acted. By 1994, he was arguing that Germany “wants and must accept responsibility alongside our partners and friends” and must reform the Bundeswehr to permit action outside the confines of self-defense.²⁸ Indeed, the move to a greater

²⁴ Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 130.

²⁵ Frank Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment,” *European Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 1 (March 2000): 109.

²⁶ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 4 (1997): 477. Martha Finnemore, “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations’ Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Social Policy,” in Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, eds. *International Institutions: An International Organization Reader* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 92-3; Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, 15, 28.

²⁷ Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, “Germany and the Use of Force: ‘Total War’, The ‘Culture of Restraint’, and the Quest for Normality,” in *New Europe, New German, Old Foreign Policy?*, 72.

²⁸ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 19; Helmut Kohl, “Unsere Verantwortung für die Freiheit,” speech on 30 January 1991,

German responsibility was one of the main arguments used by the government in presenting its case before the German Constitutional Court in 1994.²⁹

As Chancellor Schröder assumed power in 1998, the well developed air of German responsibility in international affairs remained, embodied in his notion of continuity and represented by his support for NATO operations in Kosovo. He argued that Germany had “come of age” and was ready to assume responsibilities without hesitation. Moreover, he echoed Kohl when he spoke of Germany’s desire to “remain a reliable partner.”³⁰ One month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Schröder clarified the new German responsibility, arguing Germany must be prepared to undertake responsibilities outside of Europe.³¹ Even amid the Iraqi crisis, Schröder still spoke of a “responsibility for peace,” noting Germany’s continued deployment of troop in support of the war against international terrorism, while at the same time aiming for a peaceful solution in the Gulf.³²

The idea of *Regierungsfähigkeit* had its most direct impact through this mechanism to push for conformity. Political parties that wished to be part of a ruling coalition would be guided by the logic of appropriate action at the international level, especially in the case of security policy. Those that do not support that international position would be incapable of being a part of the governing coalition. Thus, any party

Bulletin 11 (31 January 1991): 61-76; Helmut Kohl, “Deutschlands Verantwortung in einer veränderten Welt,” 330; Helmut Kohl, “Vierzig Jahre Bundeswehr–Fünf Jahre Armee der Eineheit,” speech on 27 October 1995, *Bulletin* 88, 31 October 1995,” 854.

²⁹ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 208.

³⁰ Baumann and Hellmann, 76.

³¹ Gerhard Schröder, “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder zur aktuellen Lage nach Beginn der Operation gegen den internationalen Terrorismus in Afghanistan,” 11 October 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_59425_1499.htm> accessed 12 October 2001.

³² Gerhard Schröder, “‘Unsere Verantwortung für den Frieden,’ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zur aktuellen internationalen Lage am 13. Februar 2003,” 13 February 2003, <<http://www.bundesregierung.de/Nachrichten/Regierungserklaerungen-8674.466959/Unsere-Verantwortung-fuer-den-.htm>> accessed 3 June 2003.

whose ideals were contrary to those goals would need to change if it wanted to be a part of the governing coalition in Germany. The Green Party's potential to govern would those be decisively linked to its ability to conform to Germany's responsibilities

For many in the Green Party in the mid to late 1990s, *Regierungsfähigkeit* became an important watchword. In order to gain the legitimacy of a major political party and increase their support base, the Greens, like any other political party, had to accomplish the goals and programs laid out in the party platforms or risk political extinction.³³ As such, becoming a part of the governing coalition became an important prerequisite for the party's further development. Indeed, many Green politicians, especially Joschka Fischer, made it a goal to prepare the party for being part of the ruling coalition.³⁴ Since the Greens could never hope to gain the votes to become the plurality or majority partner, they were forced to focus on becoming a coalition partner. Given the political makeup of Germany, the SPD was the only viable option, meaning that it would play a significant role in the Green Party's transformation during the 1990s.

In practical terms, in order to become a part of the ruling coalition in a parliamentary system and remove itself from the rules that guide an opposition setting, a political party must release itself from a strictly domestic setting. In so doing, its domestic politics will become intermixed with the international level, making its nexus of goals and actual policy profoundly more complex. The domestic agenda, and the potential to make progress as a party, becomes linked with the party's ability to function and uphold the role of the state at the international level. To become a part of the government, the Greens had to govern "correctly" and "normally," yet at the same time

³³ Raschke, *Die Grünen*, 822.

³⁴ Karsten Voigt, Member of the Bundestag and German-American Coordinator, interview by author, 17

be unique in order to maintain the basis for their identity.³⁵ Doing so made the party *regierungsfähig* while at the same time ensuring the continued support of its constituent base.

At the most basic level, for the Greens to become *regierungsfähig* required a clear strategic decision between governance and pacifism. The evolving German responsibilities in the international realm, including the deployment of its military, and a pledge by the SPD to continue this German policy, meant the desire to govern as a minority party with the SPD would require a shift, if not outright rejection of the traditional pacifist argument by the majority of the Party. As this dissertation will show, that choice was not easy, as acrimony and debate would be the watchwords of pacifism and responsibility collided. Indeed, as *The Economist* noted in 1999, accepting NATO's bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo crisis was the "most wrenching recent compromise" the Party pacifists had to accept.³⁶ Such a strategic choice would again appear in 2001, when the pacifists were forced to choose between preserving the Red-Green coalition and rejecting their pacifist values by accepting the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan.

THE ENABLING VARIABLES

Though the already identified independent variables were the primary purveyors of change, two additional factors—the end of the Cold War coupled with an increasing German international responsibility and the dynamic leadership of the Party—provided

December 2002. The Germany Foreign Ministry, Berlin, Germany.

³⁵ Raschke, *Die Grünen*, 823.

the precursor for change in the former case and a champion of change in the latter. Both provided a background for change. Unlike the independent variables these enabling factors did not directly cause the change within the Green Party, but rather enabled it.

It is quite clear empirically that the end of the Cold War and German unification did not suddenly change the Green Party's perspective on the use of force. However, the end of the Cold War and its systemic change provided the most basic permissive element for evolution in the Green Party. Had the US-Soviet struggle continued, in particular with the continued potential for a nuclear catastrophe, there is no reason to believe that the Greens would have relinquished their pacifist values. The new regional conflicts and developing German responsibility that developed amid its ashes provided the overall context for the Green evolution.

Only with a real change in the international system could the necessary impetuses for change emerge. International systems, which are "institutional environment[s] structured by intersubjective cognition and norms" that views rationality as "constructed" or "context bound,"³⁷ are open to change.³⁸ When such changes at a systemic level occur the ideals that define them also evolve. As state interests and strategies remain unclear during such changes political relations at the domestic level become fluid. There is then a necessity for both the state and its constituent political parties to develop new

³⁶ "Greens Grow Up," *The Economist*, 7 August 1999.

³⁷ Finnemore, *National Interests*, 28; Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Actions, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 58.

³⁸ Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International System* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 13. The reasons for such changes are largely beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it is useful to note that one possible cause for systemic change would be wars followed by the emergence of a new order. See John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 283-315.

perspectives and ideas to address the transformations.³⁹ An excellent example here is the adaptation of NATO to the new strategic environment of the 1990s, in particular its incorporation of out of area operations into its mission.

Importantly, this change in international systems with the end of the Cold War also helped lead to the acceptance of German responsibility. By the early 1990s, remaining aloof from international security problems was no longer consistent with German foreign policy.⁴⁰ As foreign minister Klaus Kinkel (CDU) noted in a speech prior to sending German humanitarian peacekeepers to Somalia: "Let us make our country into the capable (*handlungsfähig*) and responsible partner that the world community and we ourselves want to see in us."⁴¹ As noted above, this evolved concept of responsibility would play a critical role in the evolution of the Greens, given their will to govern.

The second enabling factor was the impact of a dynamic and evolving leadership element within the Party, especially that of Joschka Fischer. Unlike the impact of the end of the Cold War and Germany's evolving responsibility, this factor is much more difficult to measure. Still, there are a number of references to the importance of Party leaders, especially Fischer, that point to its role.

This leadership element also brought with it clear goals for the Party and in the end offered a push for change. There is strong, though often anecdotal, agreement that

³⁹ Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, eds. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 26.

⁴⁰ John Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 239-40; Baumann and Hellmann, 71-72; Winrich Kühne, "Multinationale Friedensmissionen und Nationale Interessen," in *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Band III*, 15.

⁴¹ Helmut Kohl, "Die Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands," speech on 6 February 1993, *Bulletin* Nr. 13, 10 February 1993, 101-06; Klaus Kinkel, "Erklärung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithilfe bei Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen," speech on 21 April 1993, *Bulletin* Nr. 32, 23 April 1993, 280.

Joschka Fischer was the primary player for the Greens. Frank Pfetsch for example argues that Fischer's "convincing speeches and impressive arguments" led the Greens to change their general position.⁴² Fischer's opinion figured prominently in all of the points of change for the Party and he was one of the primary proponents of foreign and security policy evolution for the Greens. Indeed, Otto Schily, a former Green Member and later SPD Interior Minister in the Red-Green coalition, argued in 2007 that the Green Party's success was primarily due to Fischer.⁴³

While Fischer's exact role may be challenging to measure, the role of the Green leadership in setting the tone and nature of the debate is quite clear. From Bosnia through 9/11 the Party's leadership led the debate; they were always one step ahead of the grass roots level. Their interaction with the international community, building on the Putnam model described in more detail below, even as members of the opposition and especially as part of the governing coalition, in effect brought them closest to the two intervening variables that brought change in the Party. Without this strong leadership, in particular Fischer's, it is doubtful the Greens would have changed their perspective on the use of force as rapidly as they did.

THE MECHANISM OF CHANGE

Whereas the heuristic approach above outlined the major reasons for the Green Party's change, it is also useful here to understand some of the mechanisms for how they

⁴² Frank R. Pfetsch, "Die rot-grüne Außenpolitik," *Das Rot-Grüne Projekt: Eine Bilanz der Regierung Schröder, 1998-2002*, 391.

⁴³ Otto Schily, "Ziemlich viel 'Ich' in Joschkas Buch," *Die Welt*, 5 October 2007, www.welt.de/kultur/article1237524/Ziemlich_viel_Ich_in_Joschkas_Buch.html> accessed 5 October 2007.

evolved. Explaining the method of change has been a gaping hole in the literature on the German Green Party and in international relations in general. Though this discussion here is not intended to be a portrayal of the exclusive mechanism of change, it does set out some of the major mechanisms of change, especially in the individual determinations to select protecting human rights over pacifism and later in choosing governance over pacifism.

The Harvard psychologist Howard Gardner in *Changing Minds* presents a number of reasons why an individual or even a state can change their perspective. He defines “changing minds” as the “situation where individuals or groups abandon the way in which they have customarily thought about an issue of importance and henceforth conceive of it in a new way.”⁴⁴ These are thus significant conscious changes, based on identified forces.

Gardner identifies seven factors that help influence a change in one’s mind: reason, research, resonance, representational re-descriptions, resources and rewards, real world events, and resistances. For the purposes here, only five of the seven need be discussed. Reason involves a rational, logic based approach that weighs a number of critical factors. Resonance reflects the extent to which an idea or view “feels right” to a person given the current situation. Both reason and resonance are significantly influenced by the rhetoric of the time, suggesting in this case the importance of leadership and the press in affecting a decision. Rewards, as the name suggests, correlates to a tit-for-tat type, reciprocal strategy—one action is rewarded with another, forcing an individual to realign their position on a specific subject. Real world events are

⁴⁴ Howard Gardner, *Changing Minds: The Art and Science of Changing Our Own and Other People’s Minds* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2004), 2.

in essence shocks—such as wars, hurricanes, terrorist attacks, or depressions—and particularly effects entire societies.

While all of these elements help to facilitate change in perspective, one factor—resistance—actually helps to limit change. As we age, our views become hardened and more difficult, though not impossible, to change. Thus, Gardner concludes, minds can be changed as the facilitating factors act upon an individual strongly, while there is relatively weak resistance.⁴⁵

While factors affecting individual change are clear, those impacting a society also bring forth new elements, in particular the role of leaders. Here the stories that leaders tell and the lives they lead help to create a resonance that can be transferred to others. As Gardner noted, England's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, given her past of hard work and "cleverness," which she could then impart on the general population, was the individual that could bring about change in England of the 1980s.⁴⁶ In essence, the more an individual leader's life and actions relate and in turn resonate with a population, the more influence he has and the more he can be a champion of change. As this dissertation will clearly demonstrate, Gardner's concept would play a critical role in the Green Party's evolution.

The primary drivers and working arbiters of change in the Greens were the political elites. As Robert Putnam has noted, political elites sit at both the domestic and international tables and must react to both domestic and international requirements.⁴⁷ As such, political elites are caught between the evolving international system in which they

⁴⁵ Gardner, 15-18.

⁴⁶ Gardner, 69-77.

⁴⁷ Bockle, Rittberger, and Wagner, 113; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 432.

must act, and in at times distinctly different domestic environment they must gain support from if they are to remain in power. This linkage is a critical factor for the individual, personal reflections that proved to be so important in the evolution of the Greens.

Indeed, Elizabeth Bomberg suggests in general terms that a green party's involvement in a broad European forum "has accelerated the mellowing of Green ideology and 'professionalization' of Green Party politics." Moreover, this trend can be "intensified" when a minister must make decisions for the state rather than the party, a trend which can often be seen in foreign and security policy. These different positions can in turn lead to strong divergences between the Party leadership and its rank and file.⁴⁸ She, moreover, recognizes that the interaction is two way—the system affects the party and vice versa. Indeed becoming a part of a government in order to have an impact was indeed a common theme suggested by Volmer throughout his book.⁴⁹

Though political elites may be the drivers of transformation, a political party must also reflect this change if it is to gain legitimacy on a larger scale.⁵⁰ Given the strong role of the grass roots of the Green Party, to be discussed in the next chapter, a debate between Party elites, who act within the international realm, and general Party members that are often outside the direct influence of the international arena often ensues when international events challenge domestic principles. Thus the defining ideals of the party that provide a general framework for its domestic actions can collide with the regulative principle of international responsibility that comes with involvement in the government.

⁴⁸ Elizabeth Bomberg, "The Europeanization of Green Parties: Exploring the EU's Impact," *West European Politics* 25, no. 3 (July 1996): 29, 37-39.

⁴⁹ Bomberg, 32; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 585-96.

⁵⁰ Checkel, "Why Comply?," 564.

As this dissertation will clearly show, the dissonance between the leadership and the grass roots would be a constant theme throughout this decade of change.

CONCLUSION

The heuristic approach presented here brings in two distinct arbiters and two enablers of change. Put succinctly, in the wake of significant systemic change, strong shocks caused political elites to reevaluate their ingrained ideals and in turn engaged a dynamic leadership element that when combined with a strategic choice to govern led to change on the Green position on the use of force. Though the will to govern clearly resounds as the primary arbiter of the Greens' shift, no single variable can explain the complexity of change. A brief discussion of how the Greens changed, especially the roles of facilitating principles, provides insight into the complexity of this evolution.

CHAPTER III

THE CONTEXT OF THE GREEN DEBATE

Since their formation in Karlsruhe in January 1980 the Green Party has occupied a rather unique position in the history of postwar Germany's political system. From the party built around rejecting the power of the government, it has embraced it and from 1998-2005 jointly governed the Federal Republic. Though this dissertation focuses on the evolution of the Party's perspective on the use of force, it is useful to provide some context for understanding this evolution. This chapter will first provide a short synopsis of Germany's overall debate on the use of force. Second it will discuss some of the aspects of the Greens that influenced their debate on the use of force. Third, it will contextualize the Party's evolution of pacifism by highlighting the Party's overall evolution in security affairs.

UNDERSTANDING GERMANY'S EVOLUTION

During the Cold War, the West German military was designed solely to repel a Soviet invasion. Its defensive posture, in stark contrast to the offensive military actions waged by Nazi Germany, became the soul of the German viewpoint on the use of force. The rapid changes with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, and the collapse of the Soviet Empire ushered Germany into a new environment. The rules and ideas of the Cold War did not always correspond to the realities of the Post Cold War era.

Since Germany's unification in 1990, Germany has had to adapt and redefine its

policies to operate in this new environment. According to Rafael Biermann, this evolution was an “*ad hoc*” improvisation, in large part because it was an entirely new concept in German postwar history.¹ Indeed, as Hans-Ulrich Seidt argues the move from the euphoria of the end of the Cold War to the acceptance of the harsher realities of the post Cold War era was a long and “difficult” period.² Fifteen years after unification, the new consensus in German foreign and security policy is a product of both its unique historical experiences and an adaptation to its new environment.³

Tracing an History of Change

As the realities of the Post Cold War era crystallized, in particular that of intervention in internal ethnic conflict, Germany’s stance on the use of military force progressed as well. This evolution emerged out of the reaction to the war in the Balkans, a paradigm change within Germany, and the shift of NATO away from a focus on self-defense to including out of area operations.⁴ From its “checkbook diplomacy” of the first Gulf War to its deployment of 3,900 troops in support of the war against international terrorism following the September 2001 attacks, Germany’s evolution in the use of force question has been a series of small steps.⁵

Its choice to “pay instead of fight” in the Gulf War of 1991 was the “point of

¹ Rafael Biermann, “Deutsche Mitwirkung an der Konfliktbewältigung auf dem Balkan–Versuch einer Zwischenbilanz,” in *Deutsche Konfliktbewältigung auf dem Balkan: Erfahrungen und Lehren aus dem Einsatz*, ed. Rafael Biermann (Baden Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002), 315.

² Hans-Ulrich Seidt, “Führung in der Krise? Die Balkankriege und das deutsche Konfliktmanagement,” in *Deutsche Konfliktbewältigung auf dem Balkan*, 40.

³ Karp, 61-82.

⁴ Rainer Meyer zum Felde, “Die Deutsche Mitwirkung an den Friedensmissionen in Bosnien und Herzegowina nach Dayton aus militärpolitischer Sicht,” in *Deutsche Konfliktbewältigung auf dem Balkan*, 58-62.

⁵ For more detailed examination of these small steps, see Duffield, *World Power Forsake*, 173-221; Philipp, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*. For an internal military perspective, see also Peter Goebel, ed., *Von Kambodscha bis*

change” according to Nina Philippi, as increased pressure focused on Germany’s necessity to participate.⁶ After that decision Germany became increasingly involved, first by sending humanitarian peacekeepers with no combat capability to Cambodia and Somalia. Amid the horrors of the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia in particular, discussions among political elites on the potential of German participation in out of area operations sharpened. The conflict in that shattered state became a “point of pressure” (*Druckkulisse*) that led to change.⁷ However, the German Basic Law was somewhat ambiguous on the deployment of troops for purposes other than defense.

Limited by the law, politicians took the issue to the German Constitutional Court. In making the case for allowing out of area operations, German leaders focused in particular on its growing international responsibility, while also linking its own domestic security to that outside its borders. Indeed, then German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel stated that “peace, stability, and our own security depend even more on the management of crises outside the alliance area.”⁸ Germany’s leaders were now distinctly linking its own interests to acting outside of its traditional area of security.

The German Constitutional Court’s July 1994 judgment recognized the legality of German participation in out of area operations within a collective security system, to include the UN and significantly NATO. It left the decision on the particulars of participation, however, to the German Bundestag, whose simple majority was required to approve a deployment. With this verdict the discussion moved from its legal framework to a political debate, thus sharply changing the character of the debate by incorporating

Kosovo: Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr (Frankfurt am Main: Report Verlag, 2000).

⁶ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 68.

⁷ Christian Schmidt, “Der Bundestag als Feldherr: Die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei Einsätzen der

the interests of political parties.⁹

As NATO posture sharpened with the worsening events in Bosnia, so too did the political debate within German. When NATO requested eight Tornado aircraft in late 1994, the ruling parties of the government could not even agree to support this request, and creatively sidestepped it. Yet, within the next half a year, Germany's leaders offered assistance to assist NATO in stopping the war, though they remained adamant that such forces should not be used for combat operations. The primary reasons for the change in perspective rested on several axes—a desire to assert more responsibility, the desire to prevent a total collapse of the UN mission in Bosnia to protect its credibility, and a want to maintain any chance for the future of NATO.¹⁰

With the end of the war ushered in by the Dayton Peace Accord, Germany was again faced with the issue of whether to participate with the Implementation and later Stabilization Force. Unlike earlier arguments for the operation, which were still echoed here, a new argument also arose—the German deployment was to prevent a new war, not wage one. This new perspective for the first time resonated with opposition SPD and to an extent Green leaders, for the desire to bring peace to the region was constant within almost all German parties. In the end, the Bundestag supported the deployment with a majority of 543-107, with eighty percent of the SPD and fifty percent of the Greens accepting the legislation.¹¹ Both SFOR and IFOR were “key phases” in the “process of normalization” of Germany's security policy. Indeed, the following three years were “critical” in Germany's development, as successes in suppressing further violence in the

Bundeswehr in der Praxis,” in *Deutsche Konfliktbewältigung auf dem Balkan*, 104.

⁸ Cited in Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 208.

⁹ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 207-11; Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 52-58.

Balkans gave rise to a tacit acceptance of the usefulness of the military for other than self-defense.¹²

Several years later, the specter of conflict again rose in the troubled region, forcing Germany to consider again its position on the use of force amid a second ethnic clash. This time, however, the decisions would be made during the transition from a CDU led to government to the SPD-Green coalition. Germany's decision to deploy combat forces to stop the genocide and later other forces for the Kosovo Force was an "important step," rather than a sudden break, in the evolution of attitudes toward the use of force, particularly for the SPD and the Greens. Even absent a UN mandate, it was not a departure from Germany's tradition of a civil power that had guided it since the end of the Cold War. In many respects, though, Germany's decision to participate was a manifestation of the priorities of "solidarity" with NATO and protecting human rights.¹³

The November 2001 decision by Schröder's SPD-Green government in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US to send 3900 combat troops in support of Operation Enduring Freedom was perhaps the largest step forward in the German evolution in the out of area debate. Within the Bundestag there was a large body of support across party lines, a fact that was obscured by the vote of confidence Schröder used to bring members of his own party and the Greens into line.¹⁴ Karl Kaiser, the

¹⁰ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 214-15.

¹¹ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 216; Baumann and Hellmann, 75.

¹² Meyer zum Felde, 58, 61.

¹³ Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'," *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 56, 61; Rainer Baumann, "German Security Policy within NATO," in *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 174; Nina Philippi, "Civilian Power and War," 65.

¹⁴ Sebastian Harnisch and Wolfgang Brauner, "The German Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks: A Shift in the Domestic Political Debate and Party Politics?" *Newsletter: German Foreign Policy in Dialog* 5, 23 November 2001, <<http://www.deutsche-Außenpolitik.de/publications/newsletter/issue5.html>> accessed 12 December 2001; "Der Terror und die Folgen: Rot-grüne Regierung und Opposition sind sich einig in der Unterstützung der USA," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20 September 2001, 13.

former Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, believes that events of 9/11 led to the third “great reorientation of postwar Germany,” and Germany’s assumption of responsibility in the “context of global strategies.” It was “at last stepping out of the shadows of World War II and assuming its role as a functioning democracy with global responsibilities.”¹⁵

The significant advance forward represented by the deployment in support of the war against terrorism did not, however, mean a blanket support for all international military actions, as the 2002-2003 crisis before the US led invasion of Iraq demonstrated. Chancellor Schröder’s “unlimited solidarity” of 11 September 2001 quickly withered in view of what he perceived as American “adventures.”¹⁶ Schröder remained adamant about his “absolute no” to participation in a war against Iraq, though members of the CDU/CSU remained more open for a time to supporting the war.¹⁷ The Iraq case was in fact an exemplification of the limits in Germany’s support of the use of force. As Regina Karp suggests, Germany’s perception on the use of force has been clearly solidified with the 2002 debate, with a willingness to support it as a last resort and then only in support of international interests as opposed to raw national interests.¹⁸

The Internal Political Debate

The German evolution was mirrored by a debate among German’s political elites, with the primary divisions between the CDU and FDP on the right and the SPD and

¹⁵ Karl Kaiser, “German Perspectives on the New Strategic Landscape after September 11,” 2002, <<http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/Kaiser.pdf>> accessed 4 June 2002, 4.

¹⁶ Gerhard Schröder, “Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers zu den Terroranschlägen in den USA,” 11 September 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_55734.htm> (12 December 2001); Schröder, “Rede von Bundeskanzler Schröder zum Wahlkampfauftritt.”

¹⁷ Angela Merkel, “Schroeder Doesn’t Speak for All Germans,” *The Washington Post*, 20 February 2003, A39.

Greens on the left. In general, the right was much more open to using force, while the left remained considerably more hesitant, if not completely opposed to its use. Still there was unanimity in general that the kind of raw power driven violence endemic of the Nazis had no place in modern Germany. For the debate on the use of force, the debate thus focused on how and when to use limited military force.

Though a small minority on the right favored a more assertive foreign policy even early after unification in which Germany would take on more responsibility, especially in the use of military force in multilateral operations,¹⁹ most German leaders eventually realized a strong continuity to the past with a recognition of and adaption to current challenges provided the guide for Germany's foreign policy. For a "normal" power, by this logic, force had to be used on some occasions. As such, Germany would act in a multilateral environment, but with its own interests in mind.²⁰ Indeed, in a November 1999 speech, then German foreign minister from the Green Party Joschka Fischer argued that based on Germany's past, continuity and reliability were the cornerstones of German foreign policy. Though Germany had undertaken new responsibilities in international politics, they represented the idea of "mediating [German] interests through international fora."²¹ That a Green foreign minister would make such an argument suggests the broad evolution of all of Germany's major political parties.

In the out of area debate, the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) was by far the most aggressive in leading the way for German participation

¹⁸ Karp, 73.

¹⁹ Dirk Peters, "The Debate about a New German Foreign Policy after Unification," in *German Foreign Policy Since Unification*, 11-32.

²⁰ Peters, 18-19, 21; Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause, "Vorwort," in *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Band III*, xviii.

²¹ Joschka Fischer, "Berlin's Foreign Policy," *Internationale Politik, Transatlantic Edition* 1 no. 1 (Spring 2000), <<http://www.dgap.org/english/tip/tip1.fischer.htm>> accessed 9 April 2001.

in international military operations, believing Germany should participate in the “full range” of military operations that could be authorized by the UN. Furthermore, they supported early-on the possibility that Germany could participate in military operations authorized by a European organization, such as NATO. The appearance of new challenges to European security, a new German responsibility in the wake of unification, and a desire for influence in international politics were the oft quoted reasons for this view.²² In hindsight it is quite clear that the Kohl government was one of the key influences driving the overall evolution in the German stance on out of area operations. For the CDU/CSU there was little evolution in their stance on the use of force, but rather calculated attempts to change German policy.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP), like the CDU/CSU, recognized the need for rethinking German foreign policy given the changes since the end of the Cold War and indeed offered similar reasons. Unlike their more powerful partners, the FDP was more hesitant on German participation in out of area operations for political and legal reasons. As such, the FDP was the leading figure in the movement to change the German law to permit out of area operations with the approval of the German Parliament.²³ The FDP while desiring a more involved German foreign policy wanted that integrated into a strict multilateral framework.

On the other side of the spectrum, left leaning intellectuals and political parties have generally argued Germany should actively engage in a foreign policy to civilize other states. As such, German foreign policy should seek to constrain the use of force in

²² Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 83; Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 182-83.

²³ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 101-02; Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 184.

international politics, promote individual freedom, and address inequalities in the world. From their perspective, Germany's foreign policy tradition of the Cold War already contained elements of civility, which in turn created a "particular responsibility" for the post Cold War era.²⁴ As such, they were considerably more hesitant, if not hostile, towards an assertive foreign policy and the use of military force.

The Social Democratic Party (SPD) supported a much broader perspective of security, encapsulating an approach focusing on integration and diplomacy rather than military force. Yet the SPD was also conscious to remain a reliable partner in a broad multilateral framework, given their desire to lead the government. Except for the Greens the SPD had the most controversial debate on the use of force. Their evolution from a Party that supported only strict UN Chapter VI peacekeeping operations to a broader acceptance of out of area operations was fraught with sharp debate.²⁵ Though not as adamant as the Greens, the SPD clearly sought to limit the use of force in international relations and provide security through other means. Indeed, the clear differences between the policies of the Kohl government and those of Schröder provide an excellent illustration of this phenomenon.

The Greens, who will be the focus of this work, have largely adhered to the idea of civilizing foreign policy; the Party has never been able to come to a consensus on the use of the military in general. The crux of their debate focused along the axis of principles over strategy. The less influential ultra left wing PDS has unanimously rejected any form of German assertion, particularly in military matters.

The public has been largely much more hesitant on accepting the use of force as a

²⁴ Peters, 24, 27-30.

²⁵ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 66, 77-78; Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und*

method of German security policy. In the early 1990s, there was at most a 25% - 33% level of support among the German population for the use of German troops in out of area operations.²⁶ Strict peacekeeping operations, on the contrary, have received considerable backing since the mid 1990s. Indeed, the measure of support among the population for these operations rose from 71% to 93% between 1997 and 1999.²⁷

Supporting combat operations, however, has elicited a more differentiated response. At the onset of the Kosovo bombing campaign, there was a clear majority in favor of the bombing, in large part because of a lack of a viable alternative. Interestingly, by the end of April 1999, a full month into the bombing campaign, 70% of Germans believed that the allied attack should continue as long as was necessary.²⁸ Public opinion surrounding the German support on the war against terrorism returned to the trend of hesitancy. A 57% majority of Germans opposed German participation in Operation Enduring Freedom just before the Chancellor announced his decision to send German troops, suggesting the population was not as willing as the German leadership.²⁹

That tentativeness among the population has remained strong even up to 2002, as a joint Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States survey demonstrated. Only 68% supported the use of troops to uphold international law, while 62% supported using such troops to destroy a terrorist camp. Interestingly, only 58% supported using such troops to "bring peace" to a civil war torn region, such as Kosovo. In all of these cases, German support for such operations was

sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland, 112- 27.

²⁶ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 210.

²⁷ Klaus-Peter Schöppner, "So dachten die Deutschen in April, weiter so Deutschland," *Umfrage & Analyse*, no. 5/6 (1999).

²⁸ Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force," 64; Schöppner, 32.

²⁹ *Umfrage & Analyse*, no. 1/2 (2002).

significantly lower than that in other European countries.³⁰ In general, though support has risen over the course of the last decade, Germans remain much more hesitant to use force than other states.

THE UNIQUE GREEN PARTY

Relative to Germany's other political parties, the Greens were not only younger, but also significantly different. Their varied outlook on policies and how to act as a political party would have definitive impact on their debate on the use of force. An ingrained perspective of being an oppositional and anti-establishment Party, their internal divisions, and how they made decisions would all be hurdles impeding their overall evolution. Still, the Greens, like other political parties, had dynamic leaders, notably Joschka Fischer, that we able to guide debates and move the Party forward.

One of the founders of the Greens, Petra Kelly, often used the descriptions "anti-party" and "anti-party party" to describe one of the primary guiding principle of the Greens. In the 1980 election platform, which brought the Greens for the first time into the West German Parliament, the Greens described themselves as the "alternative to the conventional Parties."³¹ They were an anti-establishment party, representing the antithesis of others. In their policies, their attitudes, and even their appearance the Greens rebelled against the established tradition in German politics. Their essence was a

³⁰ German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Worldviews 2002: European Public Opinions and Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC, 2002, 15. The other European countries surveyed were France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland.

³¹ Richard Stöss, "Macht und Identität: Das Dilemma der Bündnisgrünen vor der Bundestagswahl 2002," 31 January 2002, Y 126, AGG, 6; Raschke, *Die Grünen*, 33.

critique of most of what had defined West Germany.³²

As Party delegates attended their first session of the West German Parliament after the 1980 election, they wore tennis shoes and carried plants, hardly the norm for Members of Parliament. To bring attention to their policies, members of the Greens often publicly demonstrated in the streets. Indeed, Germany's later Green foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, at one time took part in violent street demonstrations, a photo of which would eventually cause a political stir. The Greens understood themselves as a "pressure group," whose role was to bring critical theories into everyday politics.³³

The Green Party's dislike of the establishment was particularly reflected in a general suspicion of governmental power. During the early years of its existence, power for the Greens brought forth a negative connotation. Instead of governmental power, they often referred to a softer term, "discourse," to reflect their involvement in the creation of policy.³⁴ Early Green leaders preferred to remain aloof from governmental participation, but did recognize that participation would be possible if, according to Petra Kelly, the "right conditions were created."³⁵

This distrust of power also played out within the Party, as the Greens worked hard to ensure the decentralization of power and include a significant role for the grass roots in defining the direction of the Party. A product of their opposition to the establishment status, this diffusion of control would make it harder, though not impossible, for one person to control the direction of the Party. It would also make it much more difficult to define a coherent policy, especially on the use of force, given the numerous levels of

³² Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, *The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 275.

³³ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 128.

³⁴ Stöss, 9; Raschke, *Die Grünen*, 34.

involvement in the decision making process.

The desire to prevent any one person could gain too much power within the Party played out in the so-called “*Amt* versus *Mandat*” debate that separated government and Party roles. After joining the government in 1998, the debate intensified as some leading federal leaders wanted to drop the division to further the move away from the anti-party basis of the Greens, while other more traditional, anti-establishment Greens wanted to maintain the distinction, believing it had been successful up to then and was a valuable tool in the prevention of gaining too much power.³⁶ In the end, the Party held on to the separation between party and government in December 2002, though it later accepted a “lasting compromise” that loosened, but did not rescind, the restrictions on the separation in May 2003.³⁷

In the same vein of reigning in the power of the individual, the Greens also sought to define policy through consensus. Not only would the high level leaders of the Party define goals and interests, but the grass roots—the local Green organizations, activists, and members—would play a significant role. Over the course of the debate on the use of force, the generally different approaches between the Party’s federal leadership and its grass roots would play a prominent role, especially in the mid to late 1990s. The federal leadership, with their linkage to the international realm, proved to be more open to change than the grass roots, who largely help firm to the traditional pacifism. This conflict, played out over a number of forums, would be a omnipresent part of the Party’s

³⁵ Stöss, 9-10.

³⁶ Alexander Weinlein, “Amt und Mandat: Es soll zusammenwachsen, was nicht zusammen gehören darf.” *Das Parlament*, no. 44, 4 November 2002, <<http://www.das-parlament.de/2002/44/Dokumentation/048.html>> accessed 12 May 2003.

³⁷ Alexander Weinlein, “Amt und Mandat—Nun soll die Basis den Dauerstreit beenden,” *Das Parlament*, no. 51/52, 23 December 2002, <http://www.das-parlament.de/2002/51_52/Dokumentation/065.html> accessed 12 May 2003; Stephan Haselberger, “Grüne lockern Trennung von Amt und Mandat,” *Die Welt*,

evolution.

The confusing nature of the Greens' decision making process warrants a short discussion. The federal Bundestag leadership met frequently to define the leadership's policies and provide declarations on specific issues. Similarly, the *Länderrat*, a high level meeting between approximately 30-50 federal and local party leaders, would provide senior level direction for the Greens. Neither the faction meetings nor the *Länderrat* defined overall Green Party policy. As this dissertation will illustrate in numerous instances, the leadership would often make decisions violently at odds with the base of the Party, only to be rescinded later. Unfortunately, both the press and scholars alike would often mistake these leadership decisions as general Party positions.

The primary arbiter of Green Party policy, and the inject for the grass roots, was the so-called *Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz* (BDK) or "Party Day." These large gatherings of 600-800 leading Party delegates were held at least annually to define the general way forward for the Greens, approve election platforms or discuss specific issues. There can also be special sessions, for example to debate the deployment of troops to Kosovo or for Enduring Freedom. The results of these conferences represent the will and decision of the entire Party, though their declarations would not always be followed by the federal leadership.

Though decentralized power and the provision of a voice to a disgruntled percentage of the population for a wide range of issues may have been the major underlying bond, it was not, however, enough to create unity. Unlike the other parties in Germany that focused around one issue that could give them a sense of identity, the Greens were a "compilation party" (*Sammlungspartei*) of groups championing different

issues.³⁸ A collection of feminists, pacifists, environmentalists, and other groups were held together by a “fundamental feeling of many of its members.”³⁹ A common, positive identity, either from their basic fundamentals, their political goals, social basis, or interests even today has not been achieved.

Though it would be hard to conceptualize all of the Green diversity into strict divisions, there were two diverse wings that had fundamental differences on the role and future of the party. Known as the *realos* and the *fundis*, or the realists and the fundamentalists, they argued for advancing toward the mainstream of political parties versus remaining true to their formative beliefs. In general, the *realos* operate pragmatically to attain definitive political goals, even at the expense of compromising with other political parties. Contrarily, the *fundis* adhere uncompromisingly to their principles, even at the expense of achieving any progress.⁴⁰

The division between the *realos* and *fundis* played out most decisively in the debate on whether the Greens should participate in government. Though they had some success in the 1980s and 1990s governing at the local level, Green participation at the federal level was another issue.⁴¹ Within the Party, the *realos* were much more focused on joining a coalition with the SPD than their *fundi* counterparts. As early as 1993, this *realo* obsession had ceased to become an issue of tactics and moved to a goal, all but

³⁸ Raschke, *Die Grünen*, 10.

³⁹ Raschke, *Die Grünen*, 33; Stöss, 6. The resistance of the establishment was even apparent in the vocabulary chosen by the Greens. Instead of using the common term “Party Day,” the Greens chose instead to use the term “Federal Delegate Conference” (BDK). They adopted the feminine plural form of the word speakers “SprecherInnen” to denote their party leaders. These subtle changes were endemic of their anti-establishment. In this dissertation, the English translation “Party Day” will be used. See Raschke, *Die Grünen*, 33-34.

⁴⁰ Geoffrey K. Roberts and Patricia Hogwood, *The Politics Today Companion to West European Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 58.

⁴¹ Lothar Probst, ed. *Kursbestimmung: Bündnis90/Grüne—Eckpunkte Künftiger Politik* (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1994); Winfried Thaa, Dieter Salomon, and Gerhard Gräber, eds., *Grüne an der Macht: Widerstände und Chancen Grün-alternativer Regierungsbeteiligung* (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1994).

“replac[ing] other issues in the Greens’ public identity.” From the *fundis* perspective, such a move decisively undermined the party’s “very essence” as an anti-establishment party.⁴² As this debate will clearly demonstrate, the divergence between the two factions on this issue would play a significant role on the use of force debate, especially during the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises.

Despite the massive divisions within the Party, empirical observations of the Greens during the 1990s and especially during the use of force clearly show the impact of the individual on the direction of the Party. Important members such as the Ludger Volmer, Hans-Christian Ströbele, and Jürgen Trittin guided debates at various times. In general, and especially amid the context of the use of force debate, perhaps the most influential leader, even if he only became the official Party Candidate for the 2002 election, was Joschka Fischer.

As a dominant leader and fixture within the Greens for over two decades, he helped to mold the Party’s evolution from a rebellious, counter-government group in the late 1970s that abhorred the establishment, to a party that engaged in changing the establishment and indeed became the establishment. In many ways he jettisoned his revolutionary past⁴³ and sought to engage in change for the betterment of Germany and from his perspective, the Green Party. According to his biographers Matthias Geis and Bernd Ulrich, Fischer was the very essence and representation of the evolution of not

⁴² Markovits and Gorski, 227.

⁴³ Fischer did, however, get swept-up in scandals that alluded to his past. Indeed, in early 2001, the German magazine *Die Stern* published some photos that allegedly showed the then foreign minister decisively involved in the violent anti-war protests in the late 1960s. The author Paul Berman, moreover referred to him as a militant with alleged ties to terrorists. Though these allegations did have some traction in the European press, they soon dwindled and all but disappeared in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. See Paul Berman, “The Passion of Joschka Fischer: From the Radicalism of the ‘60s to the Interventionism of the ‘90s,” *The New Republic*, 3 September 2001. See also Paul Berman, *Power and the Idealists: Or, The Passion of Joschka Fischer and its Aftermath* (New York: Soft Skull, 2001).

only the Greens, but also within the country as well. As one contemporary press account noted: "In Fischer, Germany has become reconciled with itself—the former rebels with the system, the system with the old rebels."⁴⁴

Even from his early days within in the Greens, Joschka Fischer had been important leader. Within two years of joining, and despite a rather colorful past that had seen numerous run-ins with the law as part of the protest movement, he quickly found success in Hessen as the Environmental Minister in the first instance of Green governance. His leadership was instrumental in regaining a part in the Hessen government in 1991 and that helped to enlarge his leadership portfolio. By the early 1990s, in large part due to the Greens' absence from the Bundestag and Hessen as the solitary Green participation in local government, Fischer was the most widely recognized and influential Green.⁴⁵ Within a decade, Fischer had grown from a new member to a prominent leader.

During the 1990s, there is little question that Fischer was the defining Green leader. According to Markus Klein and Jürgen Falter, after the 1994 election, Fischer was the single most important Green politician.⁴⁶ Winfried Herman, a Member of the Bundestag from the Green traditionalist faction, believed that the Green Party followed Fischer.⁴⁷ Kevin Cullen of *The Boston Globe* argued in 1999 that Fischer was the most powerful Green party leader.⁴⁸ His spirit and decisive nature could push a debate in one direction or another.

⁴⁴ "Germany's Fischer: The Man who Saved the Chancellor," *Agence France Presse*, 23 September 2002.

⁴⁵ Markus Klein and Jürgen W. Falter, *Der lange Weg der Grünen* (Munich: C.H. Beck oHG, 2003), 185-89.

⁴⁶ Klein and Falter, 189.

⁴⁷ Hermann, interview by author.

⁴⁸ Kevin Cullen, "Europe's Once-Radical 'Greens', Taking Power, Set Centrist Course," *The Boston Globe*, 24 August 1999, A1.

Within the context of the use of force debate under discussion here, some see Fischer as pivotal in the evolution of the Green's position on the use of force debate. Hoffman and Longhurst, based on an article from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* suggest that during the contentious debates of the 1990s Joschka Fischer consciously attempted to shift the Greens to accept a more "pragmatic policy stance" on the use force.⁴⁹ Indeed, Fischer had such sway within the party that he was able to push for the protection of minorities and their rights within failed states even against the dictums of a pacifist party and be largely successful.⁵⁰

Contemporary German political leaders also highlight Fischer's leadership role in this debate. Winfried Hermann, who opposed Fischer's argument, argues that Fischer was a central figure throughout the discussion that brought a new reality to the visions of "never again Auschwitz" and "never again war" amid the new challenges in Europe. The new use of the "never again Auschwitz" clause as a means to use military force was particularly critical.⁵¹ Gert Weiskirchen, a Member of Bundestag for the SPD saw Fischer as the "key politician" that helped in the evolution of the Green debate. From his perspective he helped to make the breakthrough against the ideological resistance to the "never again war" paradigm within the Party.⁵²

However, not all saw Fischer as a heroic figure of change. The Germanophone, Josef Joffe wrote in the *New York Times Magazine* that Fischer was a "sort of a Forest Gump" whose defining feature was "self-invention to fit the time."⁵³ Moreover, Ludger Volmer, in an interview conducted by this author, suggested that Fischer was important,

⁴⁹ Hoffman and Longhurst, 44.

⁵⁰ Christiane Schlötzer-Scotland, "Zwischen Gandhi und Caesar," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 28 August 1995, 4.

⁵¹ Hermann, interview by author.

⁵² Gerd Weiskirchen, Member of the Bundestag and Undersecretary of State, interview by author, 13

though not decisive in the Green Party's debate on foreign and security policy.⁵⁴

An analysis of the debate and its results suggests, however, that within the overall context of the Green Party's debate on the use of force, it was Fischer's letter and his distinct leadership that pushed this debate to new levels and in turn raised the perspective of the Party to a different threshold. He was not the first to argue for military force and he did maintain some distance from the rather hard-core *realos* by precluding the use of German forces in combat operations in Bosnia. Though understanding his role is a bit murkier in Kosovo and Afghanistan, his position as the German foreign minister and decisive roles in the Party Day amid the Kosovo and Afghanistan crises give clear indications of his strong leadership role.

Throughout this dissertation, it will be quite apparent that the unique nature of the Greens would have a profound effect on the use of force debate. The lack of a common identity amid a compilation of varied interests inflated internal divisions, a suspicion of government power, a desire to be an oppositional Party, and the decentralization of internal power were all obstacles to overcome. Still, leaders in all parts of the Party, most importantly Fischer, would be able to drive the debate and in turn the solutions.

PACIFISM IN A DIVERSE PARTY

From their earliest days to the present, foreign and security policy has always been a "difficult relationship" for the Greens. Throughout their existence, pacifism and anti-militarism have remained key elements of the Party's foreign and security policy. In

November 2002. The German SPD Party, Berlin, Germany.

⁵³ Cited in Berman, "The Passion of Joschka Fischer."

broad terms, the concept of non-violence for the Green Party has primarily focused on removing the use of force as a means to accomplish political goals.⁵⁵ However, the Green Party's stance on the use of force,⁵⁶ encapsulated in the phrase, "non-violence," has been left somewhat undefined. Amid the conflicts in southeastern Europe and as a result of the terrorist attacks in 2001, the concept of pacifism has transformed. To use Ludger Volmer's words from January 2002, the pacifism of one era does not give "categorical plausible answers" to the threats of a different era.⁵⁷ By 2002, the rhetoric of non-violence remained, though the absolutist nature of pacifism had withered, leaving a new concept of Green non-violence that differed significantly from its origins two decades earlier.

An Evolving Concept

In its infancy there was general consensus in the Greens on the pacifist approach as an articulation of the protest movement in the wake of the German Parliament's decision to permit stationing of American middle-range nuclear rockets in Germany. The 1980 election campaign platform rejected war as a means of solving conflicts between states and decried mutually assured destruction, which defined the US-Soviet Union nuclear struggle. During the final decade of the Cold War, the Party continued to call for

⁵⁴ Volmer, interview by author.

⁵⁵ Vogt, 155.

⁵⁶ An important distinction must be made here amid the plethora of meanings inherent in the concept of "force." From the UN Chapter VI style of force associated with permissive peacekeeping operations to aggressive, invasion based warfare, the use of the military has been viewed through different lenses by the Greens. After a decade of evolution, what had been seen as an illegitimate use of military forces, peacekeeping, has been accepted to the point that even pacifists will offer their support. Beyond peacekeeping, however, the acceptance of the military within the Greens as legitimate and justified becomes more nebulous and conflictive.

⁵⁷ Ludger Volmer, "Was bleibt vom Pazifismus," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7 January 2002, <<http://www.ludger-volmer.de/themen/aktuell/index.htm>> accessed 20 January 2002.

the outright dissolution of NATO and the Bundeswehr as well as the complete demilitarization of the world. The 1990s and 2000s, however, saw a confrontation between the ideological dogmatism of the *fundis* and the practicality of the *realos* that collided with the realities of southeastern Europe and the threat of terrorism. During this time the Party left the “alternative subculture” and consciously addressed the controversies of the day.⁵⁸

Though the majority of Greens during the 1980s remained wedded to a general form of nuclear pacifism reflective of the bloc confrontation of the Cold War, the very concept of nonviolence even at this stage was relative. In the declaration announcing the formation of the Greens, the idea of freedom from violence was not mentioned as one of the defining elements of the Party because the original Green peace manifest was a “minimal consensus” designed to gain the most support. Most in the Party rejected the use of force by states to achieve geopolitical goals and opposed arms races, but a reference to the rights of emergency defense and resistance put the absolutist nature of nonviolence into a more relative perspective. As such, the concept of being “against violence,” and as such military force, did not form a basis of collective identity within the Party because it led to discussion and conflict rather than consensus.⁵⁹

For the first election in the newly unified Germany in the 1990s, the Greens presented a campaign platform that was strongly reminiscent of its positions during the previous decade. Even after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Greens saw a role for their goals and policies, believing that disarmament in Europe and the creation of a “demilitarization dynamic” would lead to peace on a continental scale. They proposed

⁵⁸ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 17, 67, 75, 577.

⁵⁹ Vogt, 152; Stöss, 7.

Germany lead a unilateral disarmament of the West, a dissolution of NATO, an end to military training in Germany, and the cessation of weapons exports. For them, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), not NATO, offered the best chances to create peace in the region.⁶⁰ Continuity in the form of traditional pacifism remained the guidepost. It was a victory for the radical pacifists; the early *realo* reformers had failed even to set forth their position.⁶¹

As the conflict in the former Yugoslavia challenged the Green concept of pacifism and debates within the Party began in earnest, the 1994 election program remained largely consistent with Green traditional ideals. Common themes, such as demilitarization, disarmament beginning with Germany, and the dissolution of NATO remained. Yet there were some indications that the Party was beginning to respond to the new international environment. It called upon Germany to take on a new responsibility, one of peaceful conflict reduction, support for human rights, and the equalization of prosperity between North and South. It rejected the Kohl government's idea of responsibility, which focused on a greater involvement in UN peacekeeping actions, since it could lead to the militarization of German foreign policy.⁶²

Relative to the previous program, the 1998 election platform adopted in March 1998 showed some marked differences in foreign policy and the concept of pacifism, in large response to the events on the ground in Bosnia and the possibility of participation in the coalition government.⁶³ Old goals such as demilitarization, the dissolution of NATO, and unilateral disarmament of Germany remained, but now they were seen as a step in the

⁶⁰ Die Grünen, "Das Programm zur 1. Gesamtdeutschen Wahl 1990," AGG, 6-7, 18-21.

⁶¹ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 383.

⁶² Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Nur mit uns: Programm zur Bundestagswahl 94," February 1994, 51-59.

⁶³ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 559.

process of the creation of peace, rather than something to be done unilaterally. While the Greens had earlier called for an outright withdraw of Germany from NATO, they rejected that idea, believing such a unilateral action could create fear among Germany's neighbors, thus hindering the dialog needed to ensure peace.

Unlike earlier platforms, there was now a clear recognition of the necessity of becoming actively involved in conflict resolutions. Still, the Green approach was still tempered by its pacifist history. Military peace enforcement operations and combat operations in general and Bundeswehr participation in particular were still strictly rejected. The Greens instead argued for the creation of a civil based conflict prevention mechanism.⁶⁴ The 1998 election program continued to show the earmark of the left wing, pacifists, but the influence of the more realistic reformers was becoming more apparent. Instead of more idealistic trends as before, the Greens of 1998 wanted to become an active part of the international dialog.

After four years as part of the coalition government, in which the Greens had to react to several different security crisis that involved the use of the military (Kosovo, Macedonia, and 9/11), the election platform of 2002 showed significant evolutions in the ideas for non-violence. The goal of dissolving NATO has been dropped for the first time; in fact the Greens complimented NATO for its role in preventing the conflict in Macedonia. The concept of non-military means of conflict prevention, first conceptualized in the 1998 campaign, had become a stronger and clearer aspect.

Most significantly, the Greens evolved their stance on involvement in international security affairs. For the first time, they recognized that there were "threats," including international terrorism, ethnic conflict, and the spread of weapons of mass

destruction. Countering those threats could require the deployment of the Bundeswehr, which they had supported several times from 1998-2002. As such, the Party dropped its desire to dissolve the German military and instead focused on the values of a smaller military capable of deploying in a UN sponsored peace action.⁶⁵

Though the Greens claimed that these evolutions remained in the spirit of their original party values, it is clear that the decade since unification had brought forth some significant changes in the Party's policies. They have conceptualized a new view of security policy, moving from the idealist principles of strict pacifism to a pragmatic green-based policy of limited violence. The goal of dissolving NATO was eventually dropped; the realization of the utility, albeit limited, of the Bundeswehr had developed; and most importantly, a policy of active involvement in international security had been conceptualized. Though the goals of the Party remained the same, the means to achieve them had evolved. Though this brief overview of the election platforms provides a general evolution of the pacifism principle in the Greens, the reality of the debate was much more acrimonious.

Internal Green Differences

The evolution of the Party's perspective on non-violence and pacifism was more broadly reflective of a general division of the Party on the issue of the use of force. While not strongly apparent during the 1980s, it became much more noticeable when confronted with the foreign and domestic challenges after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

⁶⁴ "Grün ist der Wechsel: Programm zur Bundestagswahl 98," March 1998, AGG, 133-54.

⁶⁵ Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen, "Grün wirkt!: Unser Wahlprogramm 2002-2006," May 2002, <<http://archiv.gruene-partei.de/bdk/wiesbaden2002/beschluss/wp/wahlprogramm2002-web.pdf>> (13 May 2003), 76-88.

There were different cultural backgrounds between East and West German Greens, variations between federal and local level officials, as well as divisions among various groups in the Party. All of which help to explain the evolution of the Party's view on the use of force during the 1990s and early 2000s.

The Greens are in reality a tolerated combination of West German Greens and East German Greens, known as the Alliance 90. Their union after German unification was not a marriage of love, but rather one of "convenience."⁶⁶ The Eastern counterparts emerged out of the democratic resistance to dictatorship, and thus virulently supported democratic values. Their foundational initiative of protecting human rights carried significant weight during the early years of the new Green Party. Like their Western partners, the East German Greens presented themselves as an oppositional party, a protector of the environment, and a supporter of peace.⁶⁷ Unlike their western counterparts, however, the Alliance 90 members did not distrust parliamentarians. Indeed, in the early years of the union, considerable strife reigned as varying approaches between East and West Green sparred against each other.⁶⁸ It was the different political experiences, rather than diverse political goals that led to the discord.⁶⁹

In general, the Alliance 90 was less pacifist than the West German Greens in part because they saw NATO and the military pressure it exuded as a principle reason for the defeat of the Warsaw Pact. They still were decisively on the left, rejecting the use of force as a means of solving conflicts, opposing aggressive warfare, and forbidding the

⁶⁶ Christoph Hohfeld, "Bündnis 90/Grüne—Eine Neue Partei?" in Raschke, *Die Grünen*, 839.

⁶⁷ Reinhard Weisshuhn, "Menschenrechte in der Außenpolitik," in *Grüne Außenpolitik: Aspekte einer Debatte*, Hans Peter Hubert and BAG Frieden und Internationalismus, eds. (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt, 1993), 191; Bauer, 58; Markovits and Gorski, 395-98.

⁶⁸ E. Gene Frankland and Donald Schoonmaker, *Between Power and Protest: The Green Party in Germany* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 167; Markovits and Gorski, 257, 260.

⁶⁹ Hohfeld, 842.

use of German troops.⁷⁰ But as the conflicts of the 1990s expanded, members of the Alliance 90 were more open to the use of force in response to acts of aggression or to protect endangered groups. For example, some in the Alliance 90 supported the American led coalition to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. When confronted with genocide, as in the case of Bosnia, Alliance 90 members were much quicker to question the strict rejection of military force based on their adherence to the principle of protecting human rights.⁷¹

The extent of the influence the Alliance 90 had on the use of force debate within the Green Party as a whole was limited given their small numbers and the lack of a voter constituency in East Germany. Instead, the majority of leaders who had significant impact came from West Germany. Within a few years of their union, as Ludger Volmer argues, the axis of intraparty conflict had ceased to be between East and West, and had shifted to a left-right debate.⁷²

The various levels of the Green Party also bring forth considerable differences on pacifism and the use of force. Between the federal level leaders and local members there was a significant gap when it came to adhering to pacifism and sanctioning the use of force. In general, the lower levels of the Party have remained much more focused on the founding values of the Green Party. As the pacifist Green MP Winfried Hermann argued, pacifism has a much larger support base in the grass roots of the party rather than at the

⁷⁰ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 432-33.

⁷¹ Bauer, 41; 48; Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 128-29. At the time of the 1990 elections, the West German Greens and the Alliance 90 had not yet unified. Under the laws of a unifying Germany, the Alliance 90 received enough votes to send a small delegation to the Parliament; the West German Greens, however, fell short of the required 5% and were not represented in the Parliament.

⁷² Bauer, 74, 108; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 433. Bauer's conclusion is in part based on interviews with Helmut Lippelt and Winfried Nachtwei, both Members of the Green faction in Parliament. She also provides a comparison of Green membership numbers for 1999: East Germany – 3,096, West

federal level. Indeed, he believes that at the November 2001 delegate conference in Rostock that debated the prospect of German action in Afghanistan, the majority saw the prospects of war differently than federal leaders, believing that military force was not the answer.⁷³ In the context of the debate surrounding the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, local level leaders tended to propose motions at Party Days that were much more in tune with strict pacifism. While some federal leaders were more likely to propose pacifist leaning motions early in the 1990s, that tendency faded by the time Greens became part of the governing coalition.

In addition to the vertical differences, the Party was also split along horizontal lines. In general terms, the Greens were thought to have had two opposing groups debating the use of force—the *realos* and the *fundis*. The *fundis* most rigidly adhered to the basic constitutive concepts of pacifism in the party, deploring the use of violence. On the right side, *realos* approached the possibility surrounding the use of force from a more realistic perspective, accepting its use in certain cases. This general approach, however, does not provide an accurate view of the evolution during the 1990s; a more nuanced perspective on the debate is required.

The Greens were not simply *realos* and *fundis*, as many have believed; there was a third, swing group that proved to be the primary purveyor of change for the Greens in this debate. Generally, they stood between the radical pacifists and the *realos*. During the Cold War, the swing group, like the *realos* rejected every nuclear option, but accepted conventional defensive requirements and to an extent alliance responsibilities in

Germany- 47,801.

⁷³ Hermann, interview by author.

defense.⁷⁴ In the 1990s, this swing group would be more willing to accept the use of force for a variety of reasons, though they remained less supportive than the *realos*.

It is important to note here that few Green members openly admitted what group they adhered to; in fact it was the press that typically assigned that label and that was either *fundi* or *realo*, as there was no mention of the swing group. Though identifying *fundis* and some *realos* was easy, swing group adherents could only be identified through a *ex post facto* analysis of an individual members' evolution over the course of the debate. Making this even more challenging was the continuing evolution of baseline perspectives over time. What defined the *realos* in 1993, was in many ways accepted by some *fundis* in 2002. In general, a swing group member can be defined as one who stood in the political middle within the use of force debate, irrespective of when it occurred. While it is not a perfect science, its generalities are still effective for the purpose of identifying the adherent to the swing group.

The swing group, also referred to as "political pacifists" or "governing leftists," attempted to remove military force as a normal means of international politics and civilize it, but increasingly over the course of the 1990s adjusted to see military force as a means to achieve that goal in some cases. They based their decisions on strategic as well as convictional reasons.⁷⁵ Reaching that goal required disarmament, but also necessitated the continued existence of certain military institutions and capabilities. Indeed, Nina Philippi prophetically notes that as a compromise between the *realos* and *fundis* was

⁷⁴ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 494-95; Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force," 62. Volmer's term is not one accepted by others later, who then used nuclear pacifism to define the pacifism that existed during the Cold War. Nina Philippi largely glossed over the division of the Party into distinct camps, focusing instead on the role of specific personnel. Though Bauer did incorporate the *realos* and *fundis*, she did not make any mention of the third swing group. See Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 127-38; Bauer .

⁷⁵ Volmer, interview by author.

impossible, the swing group, what she refers to as those surrounding the Volmer compromise for the 1995 Bremen party Day, would in fact define the future.⁷⁶

Throughout the 1990s, the *realos* were the catalytic element within the use of force debate in Party, often questioning the dogmatic adherence to strict pacifism and openly asking whether force should be used. With each new security challenge, they were generally more willing to consider using the military. *Fundis* never wavered in their acceptance of pacifism as the mean toward world peace.⁷⁷ Indeed, that eight Green Party delegates wanted to vote against German participation in support of the Operation Enduring Freedom in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks demonstrates that radical pacifism has not been eliminated in the Party.

Yet amid the security challenges in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, it was the political pacifists from the swing group who were the primary purveyors of the evolution on the use of force; their decisions determined the compromise the Party would adopt. Federal level leaders such as Angelika Beer, Winfried Nachtwei, and Ludger Volmer became critical in the debate. Though the *realos* and the swing group were close ethically,⁷⁸ the latter were typically harder to convince of the need for military force. As this dissertation will demonstrate, the evolution of the Green Party's position on the use of force was largely endemic of the position the swing group adopted, particularly its

⁷⁶ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 138.

⁷⁷ The pacifists brought their objections to print in the 1990s and 2000s with books such as the German book with the English title *Make Love and War* and the edited volume **Error! Main Document Only.** *Wie Dr. Fischer lernte, die Bombe zu lieben* ("How Dr. Fischer Learned to Love the Bomb"), both with questionable sources, politically motivated arguments, and large information gaps pacifists. The latter even used chapter titles such as "Osama bin Fischer" and "The Day of Pearl Harbor: The Lies of the Green Bellicists after September 11th." See Jürgen Elsässer, *Make Love and War: Wie Grüne und 68er die Republik verändern* (Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 2002); Klaus Bittermann and Thomas Deichmann, eds., *Wie Dr. Fischer lernte, die Bombe zu lieben: Die Grünen, die SPD, die NATO und der Krieg auf dem Balkan* (Berlin: TIAMAT, 2000).

⁷⁸ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 494-95.

federal level officials.

CONCLUSION

Over the course of the first decade after German unification, the Green Party underwent considerable evolutions in their stance on security issues, on joining the government, and within the makeup of the Party. The Party's unique history of an oppositional political party made of an amalgamation of different interests groups exploded into crisis when confronted with the war in the Balkans that set the internalized dictums of "never again Auschwitz" and "never again war" against each other. The very soul of the Party began to evolve, as Greens confronted their outlook on foreign and security policy as well as participation in the government. The nuclear pacifism of the 1980s could not stand up to the pressures of the 1990s and began to wither

This chapter has set the background and the context for the following dissertation. First, it provided the context for the Green debate by highlighting the general German evolution and the various positions of the other political parties in Germany. Second, it outlined several factors outlining the debate, such as the strong history of anti-establishment, a hesitancy for power, and the importance of Joschka Fischer as a leader. Third, it examined the history of pacifism in the Party, to include the various divisions within the Party at the leadership level and between its leaders and grass root members and the three groups that would define the debate.

CHAPTER IV

CLINGING TO THE PAST

The end of the Cold War that changed so many of the dynamics of world politics left the Green Party's defining security policies mostly unchanged. The euphoria amid the collapse of the Soviet Empire that so quickly faded at the international level, remained strong within the Greens for several years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as most continued to maintain that the end of the US-Soviet confrontation would usher in a new era of peace and prosperity. Specifically, they dreamed that the world would demilitarize its politics, concentrate on North-South economic disparities, and usher in a wave of democratization. Such ideas were quite apparent with the 1990 election platform.¹

The end of the Cold War, moreover, further invigorated the Greens' belief that NATO should be dissolved (*aufgelöst*). For a strong majority of the Party, the western military alliance did not contribute to peace, but rather exacerbated the chances of war, which was a theme that would be heard often over the next decade. Yet even at this early stage, a small number of Greens, especially Joschka Fischer, were already pushing for a change to accept a pro-NATO position and accept western integration. However, the majority of the Party, especially the traditional *fundi* pacifists, remained steadfastly adhered to the pacifist ideals.²

The Gulf War in 1990-91 provided the first clear external challenge to Green Party pacifism, opening the gates ever so slightly to the withering of the pacifist ideal.

¹ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 386-87; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Tendenzbefschluss des Kommisarisichen Länderrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993," Bestand A—Helmut Lippelt, Akte Nr. 75, AGG.

Indeed, a very small minority were openly asking whether the use of military force could be justified in cases like this. However, the Gulf War would do little in the long run for the evolution of the Party's stance on the use of force. It would be the wars in the former Yugoslavia beginning in Bosnia, however, that would be the starkest catalyst for the questioning of the absolutist nature of pacifism. The atrocities that filled television screens provoked many Greens to call for some form of action to stop the violence. Amid such brutality, the prominent Green Member of Parliament (MP) and later speaker on security policy, Winfried Nachtwei, suggested that simply remaining aloof, "count me out!," as he described it,³ was no longer an option.

As the Bosnian conflict raged and the horrors of genocide and human suffering become more apparent, the Party was faced with a difficult, yet significant question: How could the Party develop an effective human rights oriented policy that could address regional conflicts defined by nationalism, without giving up the values of pacifism that it held so dearly? Amid the new dynamics of conflict, the Cold War based pacifism proved inadequate, as Green methods proved incapable of quelling the violence. For Joschka Fischer, the essential leader of change in the Party at this early stage, the pacifism that defined the Cold War times, the so-called "nuclear pacifism," had to be redefined. It needed a new "value base" that functioned in the Post Cold War world.⁴

Though the Party officially continued to cling to its past pacifist guiding principles, the beginning of the transformation process began during these early years after unification. Differing opinions began to develop and voices of dissent and

² Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 387-88.

³ Winfried Nachtwei, "In a Changing World, A Changing Peace Party: Greens and War, Military Force, and Non-Violence," <<http://www.nachtwei.de/zkb/weltumbruch.htm>> (15 October 2002), 2.

⁴ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 493; "Bitte nicht schon wieder ein Glaubenskrieg bei den

reconsideration toward the values of absolute pacifism in the Greens found larger audiences. Amid the Balkan wars in particular, the Greens began a significant “reorientation process”⁵ that would have long-reaching effects.

This chapter will outline the early portion of the Green Party’s debate on the use of force. It will be divided into three major section. First, it will discuss the strong rejection of the UN mandated eviction of Iraq from Kuwait by the US led military coalition in 1991. Second, it will discuss the Green Party’s initial reaction to the wars in the Balkans and how the emergence of this new security challenge opened the gates for a new, dynamic debate within the Party, leading to the emergence of various factions within the Party and divergences between the leadership and the base. Finally, it will look at the Green response to the worsening of violence in the region in 1994 and examine their reactions to the appearance of the political debate on the possible deployment of German forces.

THE GREENS AND THE GULF WAR

As Helmut Kohl’s CDU led German government expressed its support for the US led and UN sanctioned war to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait with financial support, the Green Party remained firmly wedded to its past. Resolutely rejecting any support for the governing coalition’s efforts, the Party clearly expressed its pacifist values. In the first challenge of the so-called Post Cold War world, the Greens showed few signs of jettisoning their views and evolving for the future.

Grünen!,” interview with Joschka Fischer, *taz*, 21 August 1992, 10.

⁵ Nachtwei, “In a Changing World,” 1.

Despite the apparent uniformity of the Green Party to the crisis in the Gulf, there were for the first time some small noises about the limits of pacifism and possible justifications for the use of force. Still, even among those few voices that quietly talked about the occasional need for the use of force, the prospect of using German forces remained effectively taboo. The debate on the use of force, though it remained quiet, nonetheless began with the war to evict Iraq from Kuwait.

Voices Against the War

The Green Party strongly opposed the invasion of Iraq against Kuwait, claiming that such naked aggression could not be accepted by the international community. It clearly violated international law, for which the Iraqi regime bore primary responsibility, and Iraq's gains needed to be reversed.⁶ Adhering solely to its pacifist values, the Party simply called on Iraq to leave Kuwait as quickly as possible and without condition.⁷ Saddam's taking of hostages was similarly criticized by the Greens. Still, though there was a distaste for the invasion of Kuwait, the mechanisms to counter it remained firmly embedded in the Green pacifism ideal.

The only mechanism to solve the crisis from a Green perspective was negotiation.⁸ The Greens forcefully rejected any considerations of the use of military force to eject Iraq from Kuwait, even if it were sanctioned by the UN. Instead, the Greens offered non-military methods, in particular the "good possibilities of promising

⁶ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 453; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Pressemitteilung Nr. 803/90 from Angelika Beer, 11 October 1990, Bestand B.II.3, Akte Nr. 6024, AGG; Die Grünen, "Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Grünen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90," Pressemitteilung Nr. 194/90, 26 November 1990, Bestand B.II.3, Akte Nr. 6024, AGG.

⁷ Die Grünen, Pressemitteilung Nr. 729/90, from Dr. Helmut Lippelt and Angelika Beer, "Erklärung zur Golfkrise," 7 September 1990, Bestand B.II.3, Akte Nr. 6024, AGG.

⁸ "Erklärung zur Golfkrise."

economic sanctions” against Iraq. Such means created both the chance for success while avoiding the dangers inherent in using military force. A strict embargo was from the beginning of the crisis the preferred method of pressure.⁹ To supplement this idea, the Greens called for an international conference under the auspices of the UN, the Arab League, and the European Community to deal with *all* of the military conflicts in the region in an effort to reduce the overall tensions in the region. Not only was Iraq-Kuwait included, but also the Palestinian-Israeli and the Lebanon conflicts.¹⁰ Even now, the important tendency to include the entire regional context, rather than a focus on just one specific conflict, is apparent in Green foreign and security policy.¹¹

The Greens’ characterization of the conflict also focused criticism on those they saw as bearing considerable responsibility for the increasing militarization of the world’s conflicts—in particular the weapons export industry. Indeed, they argued that the German government, as well as those of the French and American, bore some responsibility for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Even more explosive, the Party publicized its belief that the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988 was only possible through the export of German poison gasses. German firms, according to the Greens, had contributed approximately fifty percent of the materials necessary for Iraq’s WMD program. Stopping those exports would be a definitive measure to ensure that

⁹ Die Grünen, Pressemitteilung Nr. 681/90, from Angelika Beer, Tay Eich, Alfred Mechtersheimer, Almut Kottwitz, and Petra Kelly, “Stopp der Militarisierung des Golf-Konflikts- Entmilitarisierung statt weltweiter Bundeswehr Einsätze!,” 20 August 1990, Bestand B.II.3, Akte Nr. 6024, AGG; “Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Grünen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90.” The Greens were quick to point out, however, that any boycott must be sure to avoid humanitarian casualties by ensuring the food and medicine were still able to reach the people of Iraq, suggesting a strong adherence to the protection of human rights that would play such a large role later.

¹⁰ “Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Grünen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90.”

¹¹ The Party also expanded their definition of the conflict zone by including the dangers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Not only did they push for the removal of Iraq’s WMDs, but they also called for the creation of a WMD free zone for the entire Middle East, to include Israel. The spiral of escalation was only steepened by Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons according to this Green logic. See

conflicts in the world would not escalate further.¹² Out of this tenet of demilitarization arose another ideal of the Greens—the “logic of war” must be countered by a “logic of stopping weapons exports.”¹³

Relative to Green actions in later conflicts, in particular after 9/11 and even to an extent the 2003 Iraq war, the Party’s very loud criticism of western export industries was a bit of an anomaly. Though there would always be a desire to restrict the spread of weapons, over the next decade, the Greens would begin to focus blame for conflicts more on those who started the conflict, rather than on those who supplied the weapons. That shift would be an important recognition for the overall evolution of the Party.

The rejection of military force as an option and the choice for the use of political pressure to end the conflict found its background both in the desire to avoid the consequences of war and in the historical suspicion of the military and great powers so endemic in pacifist ideals. In the case of the former, the Greens focused on the destructive aspects of any war to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, in particular the results of any potential American-led bombing. Such damages to the people, infrastructure, and even the environment in both Iraq and Kuwait dispelled and usefulness of military action according to this logic.¹⁴ Even more importantly, the potential for humanitarian suffering as a result of a war led many Greens to reject the use of force as a viable option.

Green Party rejections of any use of force were also grounded in the pacifist belief that the use of military force brought with it a “danger of escalation” that could lead to a

“Erklärung zur Golfkrise.”

¹² “Erklärung zur Golfkrise;” “Stopp der Militarisierung des Golf-Konflikts;” “Nur mit uns,” 52.

¹³ Reinhard Mohr, “Dem Pazifismus ‘Gewaltfrei die Luft abdrehen’,” *taz*, 30 August 1990, p. 7.

¹⁴ Bundeshauptausschuss der Grünen, “Die Waffen Nieder!,” 28 January 1991, Bestand B.I.3, Akte Nr. 57,

remilitarization or further militarization of world politics. This argument was justified from the Green perspective with the US led military buildup for the forceful removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.¹⁵ Taking it a step further even, many in the Greens felt that the international military buildup was actually an hindrance to solving the crisis. As such, many in the Party called on coalition forces to withdraw from the crisis area.¹⁶

These fears of escalation predominated the Greens' perspectives in spite of the existence of a UN mandate authorizing the use of force to evict Iraq from Kuwait by a US led coalition. Despite that authorization, the Greens still viewed it as a dangerous precedent. The Green MP Helmut Lippelt called the UN ultimatum "playing with the destruction of the world (*Weltbrand*)."¹⁷ Whereas later the Greens would insist on a UN mandate before any use of force, at this early stage, not even an internationally agreed upon mandate and strong world unity could sway the Green perspective on using force.

Closely linked to this general distrust of military solutions was the perspective that the great powers, under the leadership of the US, were using this opportunity to pursue national interests. In particular, many in the Green Party felt that the primary purpose for the coalition reaction to the Iraqi invasion was for the securing of "'their' oil" in the region. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, there were some that feared that the great powers, especially the US would try to define Saddam Hussein as the new enemy to fill the security vacuum and provide a future role for the military and the military-industrial complex.¹⁸

AGG.

¹⁵ Erklärung zur Golfkrise."

¹⁶ Pressemitteilung Nr. 803/90; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 452.

¹⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Pressemitteilung Nr. 939/90, Helmut Lippelt, 28 January 1991, Bestand B.II.3, Akte Nr. 6024, AGG.

¹⁸ "Stopp der Militarisierung des Golf-Konflikts; Martin Graebener, "No Germans to the Front!: Sachstand und Positionsbestimmung zur laufenden Debatte um die Änderung des GG für 'Out-of-Area'-Einätze der

From the Greens' perspective, the evolving policies of the Western nations toward the use of the military in crisis situation such as in the Gulf prevented disarmament and the creation of peaceful world order.¹⁹ The distrust, if not animosity, toward the goals of western states, especially the US, was clearly expressed in a declaration by the Green federal leadership of the Party after the start of the invasion to liberate Kuwait in January 1991. Referring to the casualties caused by the war, they sharply rebuked the "inhuman happiness of the war planners in the White House."²⁰ Clearly there was not only a sharp mistrust of the US motives in the Gulf War, but also a strong abhorrence of any casualties caused by war.

As coalition military actions against Iraq began on 17 January 1991, the Greens sharply criticized the US led attack, citing reports of the immense destruction and the grief of the civilian population. They called immediately for an end to the war, claiming that the original breach of international law could not justify the destruction of an entire land and its population. Expressing solidarity with American protesters, the Greens claimed they would continue with anti-war demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience until the fighting stopped to bring pressure to bear on the government.²¹ In every official capacity the Greens were definitively opposed to the war and expressed that sentiment in declarations and on the streets.

The Greens and German Participation in the Gulf War

Much like their general approach to the use of force, the majority of the Greens,

Bundeswehr," 19 March 1991, Bestand B.I.3, Akte Nr. 57, AGG, 1.

¹⁹ "Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Grünen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90."

²⁰ Bundesvorstand der Grünen, "Der Golfkrieg und seine Folgen," n.d., Bestand, B.I.3, Akte Nr. 57, AGG.

²¹ "Die Waffen Nieder!," "Der Golfkrieg und seine Folgen."

and indeed the Party as a whole, were resolutely opposed to the use of German troops in the Gulf War. Although the debate within Germany as a whole about the possible uses of German soldiers in a Post Cold War world was only in its infancy,²² the Party remained clearly distant from the perspectives of the other major German political parties. During the Gulf War, Party declarations and press releases denounced any direct or indirect German participation. Economic support, the deployment of the navy to the eastern Mediterranean, the maneuvers of the German Army in Turkey, as well as the support from German territory including transportation and over-flight rights were strongly opposed.²³

The strong anathema in the Green Party toward the use of German soldiers arose primarily out of the tragedy of German history, in particular the Second World War. This view, encapsulated in the idea of “never again war” was strongly integrated into the Green psyche and continually influenced Green Party decision makers. Indeed, the Resolution adopted by the Party in Neumünster in April 1991 specified that because of the background of German history, German soldiers should not be used in internationally supported out of area operations, not even as peacekeepers.²⁴ Whereas the absolutist nature of “never again war” would later be diluted, at the time it remained extremely pervasive and highly influential on the Green Party debate.

The goal of “never gain war” in turn had an impact on the already evolving debate

²² The Greens did recognize that the Gulf War was not the sole reason for the debate on the possible participation of German soldiers in international operations. Rather the Gulf War led to a sharpening of a broader debate that had already begun. See Graebener, “No Germans to the Front!,” 1.

²³ Pressemitteilung Nr. 803/90; “Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Grünen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90.”

²⁴ “Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Grünen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90.” Such a perspective was not far from the Kohl government’s perspective either. Indeed, what would later be known as the “Kohl Doctrine” specifically noted German history as to the reason for not sending German forces to the Balkans initially.

within Germany surrounding the possible change of the Basic Law to permit out of area operations for the German military. The Greens viewed the piecemeal support of the US-led effort in the Gulf War by the German government (CDU/CSU and FDP) as well as the SPD²⁵ as a deliberate attempt to change the German Basic Law. Indeed, prominent Green security expert Angelika Beer derisively called debate on sending German force to the Gulf War a “welcome occasion” for the German governing coalition to take a decisive step on the way to a “worldwide intervention capability.” For the Greens at this stage of evolution, any change to incorporate German military deployments was an indication of a new phase of German foreign policy, one of being a great power, which had to be prevented.²⁶ The decision to accept a greater military role was “the wrong signal and especially the wrong lesson from German history.”²⁷ As such, the Greens rejected any change in the Basic Law to address the possibility of out of area operations, no matter what form it took.

Much like the overall perspective on the use of force, the Green opposition to the use of German peacekeepers had a strong number of dissenters, though not as many as the overall debate on the use of military force. The official resolutions of the Party, such as that from Neumünster, rejected any participation in peacekeeping operations even

²⁵ For some in the Greens, the SPD was the sole remaining chance to prevent what they perceived as a militarization of German foreign and security policy. Indeed, a Green position paper in March 1991 argued that a solid attempt must be made to influence the SPD. The paper suggested “internal” discussions with leaders of the SPD and its federal level Parliamentarians to influence their decisions. Similarly, in the resolution from Bayreuth in September 1990, the Greens publicly called on the SPD “especially” to withhold their support for any change in the Basic Law. See Graebener, “No Germans to the Front!,” 1, 19, and “Resolution der Bundesversammlung Die Grünen im Bayreuth vom 22/23.09.90.” That the SPD was already viewing the Greens as an incapable coalition partner because of their stance in foreign and security affairs illustrates the large disconnect between the two future coalition partners and the gulf that had to be overcome.

²⁶ Pressemitteilung Nr. 803/90; Die Grünen, “Keine Deutschen Soldaten ins Ausland–Nein zur geplanten Grundgesetzänderung,” Resolution bei der 12. Ordentlichen Bundesversammlung, Neumünster, 26.-28. April 1991, Bestand B.I.3, Akte Nr. 57, AGG. The resolution in Neumünster was accepted with a large majority, according to a handwritten note on a copy of the resolution.

under the auspices of NATO, the WEU, or, surprisingly, especially the UN. Some in the Party believed that agreeing to peacekeeping operations with the UN would only serve as a “door opener” for further military participation in NATO or the WEU.²⁸ Moreover, there was the distinct fear that introducing German peacekeepers would actually escalate the situation, rather than reduce the tensions.²⁹

Yet at the federal level a small number, such as MP Alfred Mechttersheimer, accepted the principle of German involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. He conditioned that support by arguing at the same time that it must not become a “door opener,” for further expansion of German participation. Mechttersheimer argued that it would not be a contradiction for the Green peace policy to accept Germans as peacekeepers. However, since it could be perceived practically as an acceptance of further military operations outside of peacekeeping duties, which he disagreed with, even he rejected the use of German peacekeepers.³⁰ For the Greens there was practically unanimous rejection of using German combat forces anywhere and strong majorities against even the use of peacekeepers. Interestingly, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, Mechttersheimer’s argument would prove somewhat correct, as the eventual approval of peacekeepers opened the door for greater involvement.

A Baseline with Dissent

In defining their policies subsequent to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iraq, Green perspectives showed stark differences relative to later years, in particular to their time in

²⁷ Graebener, “No Germans to the Front!,” 1, 14.

²⁸ “Keine Deutschen Soldaten ins Ausland;” “Stopp der Militarisierung des Golf-Konflikt”

²⁹ Graebener, “No Germans to the Front!,” 16.

³⁰ “Bundeswehr nicht an den Golf,” interview with Dr. Alfred Mechttersheimer, in *Deutsche Post*, Bestand

government. In these early years, there was a congruence of the normative ideas of “never again Auschwitz” and “never again war,” as they acted synergistically. Disdaining war and preserving human rights, in this case more specifically abhorring the consequences of war, were one in the same. Similarly, there was no linkage to the international community for the Greens. Despite the legitimacy afforded by a UN mandate, there was zero pressure exerted upon the Greens for change. Not only was there no momentum for change, but there was also no catalyst to begin the process. Thus, opposing war was the only possibility for the Greens.

Yet amid the near absolute opposition to the war, one very significant development for the overall use of force debate in the Green occurred. There were a few voices that spoke for the possibility of change, though they were largely drowned out by those for continuity of pacifism. A few accepted that the use of force may be legitimate in some cases. An even smaller minority proposed the use of German peacekeepers suggesting that the Green Party’s version of pacifism even at this early stage was not absolute. And for the first time, the very nascent concept of direct German involvement at the international level began to appear within small minorities in the Party. With the end of the Cold War and the appearance of new security challenges, some in the Party questioned the dogmatic adherence to strict pacifism. Could it work in a more dynamic world free of nuclear bloc confrontation? What would later emerge as a serious debate during the Bosnian campaign and continue through Kosovo, Enduring Freedom, and Iraq was barely in its embryonic stage.

Seemingly contrary to Green pacifist values, some well known names were suggesting that the use of military force could be legitimate. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who

would be one of the original *realo* MPs noted that the American war against the Germans in the Second World War was legitimate, thereby diluting the absolutist rejection of the use of force. The MP Alfred Mechttersheimer echoed a similar sentiment, believing that “there are historical situations in which the international community could be forced to use military force.” Both, however, believed that war should only be the final means available, the *ultima ratio*. Joschka Fischer, who would become the champion of change for the Greens, also showed his first indications of change now, even if they were quite mild, asking what the borders of pacifism truly were. How pacifists deal with the use of chemical weapons, invasions, or the taking of hostages needed to be defined. For Fischer, avoiding the issues surrounding the sanctioned use of force could make the Green Party’s version of pacifism unbelievable, which could have dire consequences for the future of the Party.³¹ Those asking the questions now about the nature of pacifism amid difficult crises became prominent members of what would be termed the *realo* section of the Party.

Even as a large majority of the Party officially rejected the use of German troops in the Gulf War, the discussion of that possibility in public was not completely a taboo subject, though it often elicited a strong backlash. It is worth briefly discussing this case to show the emotional level involved even at this early stage by using a series of papers from the late summer and early fall of 1990 by Bernd Ulrich and Udo Knapp, who were staff members for prominent members Waltraud Schoppe and Ludger Volmer.

Udo Knapp, in an article published in the Left newspaper *taz* recognized the importance of military pressure to achieve a diplomatic solution. In searching for a solution to the Gulf crisis, he believed comparing Hitler with Saddam was correct.

³¹ Mohr, “Dem Pazifismus;” “Bundeswehr nicht an den Golf.”

Moreover, the failure of appeasement vis-à-vis Germany prior to the start of the Second World War should not be forgotten, as it offered important lessons for the Gulf war. As the UN “internationalized” the conflict, he called on Germany to undertake its “responsibility for world peace,” to include logistical support and practical helping measures. Most controversially, he appealed for the active involvement of Germany in the Gulf War, even to the extent of the use of German military forces. His perspectives were well ahead of the debate, putting him very squarely in the leading edge of the *realo* argument. According to Ludger Volmer, his appeal met up with almost absolute rejection.³² Indeed, Knapp was called a “warmonger” by some of his own party members at a discussion in Frankfurt.

Bernd Ulrich similarly suggested the necessity of German involvement in world crises, proposing that Germany should be a new civil world power and act to create a new order of peace. Unlike Knapp, however, Ulrich believed that the chances of success of a military intervention would be doubtful in the short term, and fatal in the midterm. Consistent with the fear so common within the Party that war brings further escalation, Ulrich believed that any military response from the West would only lead to a stronger counter-reflex from Arabs and Islamic people. Although he argued against military force, he believed that the Germans must undertake some measures to halt the war. Deciding for a militarization or demilitarization of international conflicts would be the “decisive question” for the future role of Germany. To influence such a discussion, Germany, and the Greens, had to become involved. In the case of the Gulf War, an economic embargo was the best mechanism for solving the conflict and at the same time

³² Udo Knapp, “Sich Heraushalten geht nicht,” *taz*, 11 August 1990, 10; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*; Mohr, “Dem Pazifismus.” Knapp also strongly criticized the weapon export system and the

beginning the process of demilitarization that the Green Party held so dear.³³

Though Ulrich and Knapp argued in the end for different approaches to solving the crisis with Iraq, both maintained that a newly unified Germany, and in turn the Green Party, must play a role in the conflict. Effecting the world and by proxy interjecting some Green values, in particular the demilitarization of world and local conflicts and the economic disparities between North and South, required involvement. Though these discussions were clearly not framed in this context, the beginning of the idea expressed quite often later, that of *Regierungsfähigkeit*, can be seen among the suggestions of Knapp and Ulrich. Though there is no clear documentation that participation in government was a defining feature of these arguments, the call for involvement and the need for a German responsibility clearly do indicate the infancy of the expansion in Green thinking that will eventually result in the conscious desire to become *regierungsfähig* later.

In this early stage of the debate, the divide between the *realos* and the *fundis* was slowly beginning to clarify itself. The new *realos* were very clearly a small minority and their ideas were not exactly concrete. The group that would eventually play such a large role in the evolution of the Party in the late 1990s, the swing group, did not exist at this point; they were no different from the traditional *fundis*. The initial evolution of some MPs at the federal level, based in large part on their greater interaction at the international level, also meant that the difference between the federal level and the grass roots, that would explode so drastically in 1999, were beginning to show, even if they were still very minute.

involvement of the German government, thus maintaining a strong Green perspective.

³³ Bernd Ulrich, "Für einen Wirtschaftsboykott Iraks," *taz*, 11 August 1990, 10.

Comparing the policies of the Green during the Gulf War to those during the Kosovo crisis and after 9/11 gives the sharpest exemplar of the evolution by the Greens. Absolutist pacifism, predominant rejection of international involvement and, an absolute rejection of any positive role of military force were predominant here. Over the ensuing decade, the importance and even working definitions of the ideals of “never again Auschwitz” and “never again war” would evolve, the dynamics of the international community began to filter to the Party’s leaders, and voices for change began to speak. With the eruption of war in Europe’s own backyard, these changes would be decisively set in motion. The Gulf War can thus be considered a baseline of Green philosophy on the use of force, even as some voices of dissent began to emerge.

A WITHERING OF PACIFISM?

As the war in the former Yugoslavia spread, becoming increasingly more brutal, and as television reports brought its horrors to the everyday European, many pacifists were forced to address the new challenges it created. The Green Party’s view of peace politics was challenged as the increasing frequency of ethnic conflicts since the end of the Cold War “deeply troubled” the Party.³⁴ The wars in the former Yugoslavia, in particular in Bosnia, became a “test case” for all of the security and peace policies of the Green Party. That general debate, moreover, was a direct reflection of the overall discussion in the Party about the necessity and legitimacy of German military out of area operations.³⁵

³⁴ “Tendenzenbeschluss des Kommisarischen Länderrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993.”

³⁵ Die Grünen, “Erklärung des Bundesvorstands zur aktuellen Diskussion über eine militärische Intervention im ehemaligen Jugoslawien,” 3 February 1993, Bestand B.II.2, Akte Nr. 229, AGG; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 469. Interestingly, in their declaration of 3 February 1993, the party

Ignoring the conflict was not an option for either the Europeans or the Greens. According to Joschka Fischer disregarding this ethnic cleansing could not be accepted by Europe, for it would throw it back to the time of “nationalist chaos.”³⁶ Volmer notes that the Greens did not argue for remaining aloof from the conflict. Rather the choice of methods was at stake.³⁷ Moreover, as a general Green Party declaration noted, standing idly by could mean that war and territorial aggression could become more common in the future, the direct antithesis of Green values.³⁸ Taking it a step further, by June 1993, some of the leadership of the Greens were appealing for an “active policy of international intervention for the protection of human rights.”³⁹ Such a statement, however, left considerable room for interpretation. The question was what form that intervention should be.

Amid the early years of the violence of Bosnia, the distinct groups began to distinguish themselves based on their varying approaches to addressing the conflict. It is important to note here that the adherents to these various groups fluctuated, as their views changed; to say that someone was a *realo* in 1995, does not necessarily mean that they accepted that perspective in 1993. *Realos* generally broached the idea of an active intervention that could include military force, though generally not German forces, to stop the genocide. The *fundis* outright rejected any form of military intervention, strictly

leadership noted that the call by some within the Party for Bundeswehr participation in UN military actions “discredited the serious debate” within the Party. Moreover, in an opening paragraph the Party leadership rejected the notion floating in the press that the expressions of some members for a military intervention in the former Yugoslavia or the participation of German soldiers on such actions represented the view of the Party as a whole. Such comments reflect the continued influence of the Party as a whole of its pacifist ideals as well as its intense distaste for a new concept of German responsibility.

³⁶ “Bitte nicht schon wieder ein Glaubenskrieg bei den Grünen!”

³⁷ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 500, 581. Whether that inability to influence events led some within the Party to reexamine their views with the desire of becoming a part of the government in order to influence events remains unclear.

³⁸ “Tendenzbeschluss des Kommisarischen Länderrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993.”

³⁹ “Tendenzbeschluss des Kommisarischen Länderrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993.”

adhering to the credos of the old pacifism. At this point, the swing group continued to adhere to the basic pillars of pacifism and was for the most part indistinguishable from the traditional pacifists. Yet its later adherents, who would not be identifiable for another five years or so, began to ever so slightly differ from their *fundi* brethren in their attempt to define a policy that addressed the crisis and still affirmed their values. In essence, they tended to address the conflict quicker than the *fundis* did. They called for the construction of a new “world internal policy” (*Weltinnenpolitik*) that envisioned military protection for humanitarian convoys and the proclamation of safe zones to be protected by the UN.⁴⁰

The official position of the Party, which reflected the strong majority at this point, generally continued to suggest that the concepts of non-violence and the protection of human rights as complementary. The credos “never again Auschwitz” and “never again war” for the most part remained two sides of the same coin in policy. Non-military mechanisms remained the preferred method to address the Balkan crisis. However, as will be noted later, the Bosnian conflict would eventually fundamentally challenge the complementarities of these two tenets.

Reactions to the Evolving Crisis

In the early stages of Yugoslavia’s collapse and explosion into war, the Greens were not shy about expressing their opinions on the looming crisis. Early in the war between the Croatian and Serbian Republics when Yugoslavia still existed, the Greens continued to argue for the creation of an “overall solution” that envisioned a redefined

⁴⁰ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 501; Ludger Volmer, “Bosnien und der Pazifismus,” *taz* 5 September 1992, 10.

federal or confederate structure, economic assistance, and democratic developments.⁴¹

Yet, as conditions worsened through the late summer of 1991 the Green leadership shifted its position and for the first time blamed the Serbian government for the war and appealed for an economic embargo to stop the conflict. All thoughts of a military intervention were still soundly rejected by the Party as a whole.⁴² Though still steeped in traditional pacifist values, that early proclamation in 1991 would provide a hint of a larger and deeper Green Party involvement in the crisis. There was now a thorough recognition of the dangers of the crisis.

As the conflict raged and the Slovenian and Croatian Republics vied for independence from the Yugoslav federation the German government became a strong proponent of their independent recognition, hoping it would halt the violence of the Serbs in sending a signal that their aggression would bring no benefits.⁴³ In December 1991 Germany recognized the two new states, which was followed in kind by the European Community in January 1992. The Green Party, based in large part based on the support for the right of self-determination, also supported this motion, though they would eventually come to regret that decision as it would be a primary factor in the spread of the war.⁴⁴

Even as the Greens supported the recognition of the two states, the fear of escalation interjected a traditional value of pacifism into the debate. In March 1991 after traveling in the region Reinhard Weissshun, a staff member of Gerd Poppe, warned of the

⁴¹ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 465.

⁴² Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 466-67.

⁴³ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 186-93.

⁴⁴ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 467. Interestingly, the Party would later sharply criticize the Kohl government, viewing its recognition of the two Balkan states as partially responsible for the wars in the Balkans. Such changes demonstrate the incredible fluidity, and at times naivety, of the debate within the Green Party.

dangers of a war spreading to Bosnia. He eloquently defined the dangers of the policy of recognition Germany was debating, noting the deleterious effects it could have on the Yugoslav Republic with the Serbs and Croats already fighting and the strong divisions between those two groups in the neighboring ethnically intermingled Bosnia. By January 1992, even as the Greens accepted the recognition based on humanistic values, Party leaders were publicly expressing the fear that the war could spread to other regions, in particular Bosnia, and in turn bring monumental challenges to Germany and by proxy the Greens.⁴⁵

Despite these reservations and the strong tendencies of traditional pacifism, the Green Party did accept the recognition of the two individual states. Though in tune with other Green fundamentals, it did represent a new aspect to the Green foreign and security policy debate—involvement. In essence, the Greens took the first small overt steps in their debate, shunning for the first time the old principles of aloofness and as an anti-establishment party. To be sure, not everyone accepted this involvement, especially the grass roots, but this was an important step by the leadership. As the international domain began to have an increasing influence, Party leaders began to not only recognize the need for involvement, but also some form of action. As the crisis worsened, that involvement would only deepen.

The outbreak of the war in Bosnia in April 1992 created the very escalation the Greens had sought to avoid, as the war between Serbia and Croatia ballooned into the atrocities committed by both ethnic Serbs and Croats. The appearance of concentration camps as well as the circulation of news of massacres, rape gangs, and expulsion confronted members of the Green Party by directly contradicting the Green centerpiece of

⁴⁵ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 465-66, 469.

protecting human rights and the embedded norm of “never again Auschwitz.” Indeed, in June 1992 the Party leadership publicly recognized that the wars in the former Yugoslavia created “new types of challenges” for Green peace politics that traditional valued may not necessarily be able to address.⁴⁶

The events in Bosnia in 1992 and 1993 were quickly reflected in the publications of Party members and organization as the Greens finally joined the public discourse. The future MP Claudia Roth referred to the “tragedy of Yugoslavia,” believing that such actions had definitive elements of fascist ideology.⁴⁷ Citing statistics to highlight the tragedies that had befallen Bosnia, Helmut Lippelt, a leading foreign policy expert in the Party, stated that without question, the conscious policy emanating from the Serbs was genocide.⁴⁸ Party resolutions at various levels referred to the “genocide in Bosnia,”⁴⁹ or noted that the concentration camps, expulsions, and mass murders were “signs of a fascist genocide,” that had been viewed as no longer possible after the end of National Socialism in Germany.⁵⁰ The reference to the belief that such actions had ended with the fall of Nazi Germany illustrates the degree to which the early events in Bosnia shocked the Greens, as their ideals of pacifism had been in many respects built on the idea that such events could no longer occur in the modern world.

At the most basic level and over the long term, the Bosnian conflict led to stress between the two values that had defined the Party for so long—pacifism and protecting

⁴⁶ “Tendenzbeschluss des Kommisarischen Länderrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993.”

⁴⁷ Claudia Roth, “Nie wieder Faschismus—Nie wieder Krieg,” *Rundbrief*, 10 August 1992, 19-20.

⁴⁸ Helmut Lippelt, “Intervenieren in Jugoslawien?,” Summer 1993, Bestand A—W. Schulz, Akte Nr. 168, AGG, 129.

⁴⁹ “Resolution für den Länderrat vom 12.6.93,” 12 June 1993, Bestand A-Helmut Lippelt, Akte Nr. 5, AGG.

⁵⁰ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Gewaltfreiheit und Menschenrechte—Friedenspolitische Grundlinien von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” Beschluss der außerordentlichen Bundesversammlung vom 9.10.1993, Bonn, Bestand B.I.3, Akte Nr. 75, AGG, 2.

human rights. Amid the brutal violence effecting the people of the region, the Green values of non-violence were having little effect. Despite this ineffectiveness, official Party declarations appeared to reflect their apparent congruity and continued harmony. The Declaration at the Party Day in Bonn in November 1993 reflected that even in its title—"Non-violence and Human Rights: Foundations of Peace Politics in the Alliance 90/The Greens." Its preamble highlighted these lessons: "The most important consequence from German history for us is never again war. But it is also never again Auschwitz."⁵¹ In fact, this apparent congruity would be at the heart of the Green quandary for the Balkans and would be a primary means of change within the Party. In effect, applying the former to the wars in Bosnia prohibited active intervention with military force, while employing the latter ideal called for effective action, which could possibly include military action. Bosnia thus left the Green basis of peace politics in a complete quandary.

In the debate on the possibility of military intervention in Bosnia, these two historical lessons were seen with varying levels of adherence, depending on the guiding philosophy of the individual. The synergy that applied during the Gulf War began to break down on the violence in Bosnia. As will be demonstrated below, *fundis* tended to hold firm to "never again war," while the *realos* would believe that "never again Auschwitz" should be the preeminent value of the Greens. The majority dogmatically remained wedded to the tenet of "never again war," while others, at first a small minority, began to question the absolutist nature of avoiding war when faced with genocide. The early shocks of genocide in Bosnia forced the beginning of a major debate, with these two ingrained ideals as the backdrop.

⁵¹ "Gewaltfreiheit und Menschenrechte—Friedenspolitische Grundlinien von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen," 1.

The Early Debate on Military Intervention in Bosnia

A quick overview of the primary Green Party declarations in the early phase of the Bosnia debate suggests that the official line remained steady, wavering little from its pacifist ideology. At a conference in Hanover in March 1993, Green Party leaders rejected by a large majority three resolutions calling for “humanitarian interventions,” implying the use of military force, and instead passed a resolution calling on non-military methods, such as embargoes, to solve the Bosnia crisis. Another resolution from Green Party leaders in Bonn in June 1993 believed that military intervention could not bring a solution to the Bosnian war, though it called for an “energetic [non-military] intervention from the UN.”⁵² At the important special Party Day in Bonn in October 1993, Party members passed a resolution that opposed military intervention, but argued for “fast, hard, effective, and consequent, but not military” action.⁵³ In the 1994 election platform, the Green strictly rejected UN peace interventions, such as in Bosnia or Somalia, that used military forces.⁵⁴

The official party line apparent in its declarations and resolutions, however, masked a deepening conflict in the party. Even early on in the Balkan wars, the voices of dissent, primarily those who would define the *realo* side of the spectrum, began to emerge, questioning at first whether pacifism should be so absolute. The voices adhering to the traditional pacifism, however, still remained the strong majority. Importantly, differences between the Party leadership and its members on security issues began to become evident for the first time, especially at the 1993 special federal delegate

⁵² “Tendenzbeschluss des Kommissarischen Länderrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993.”

⁵³ “Gewaltfreiheit und Menschenrechte—Friedenspolitische Grundlinien von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 3.

conference in Bonn.

At this stage in the debate, the different heritages of the Party members helped to define their positions. The East German Greens (Alliance 90), who as of 1990 were in the Bundestag, focused strongly on the violations of human rights in the Balkan wars. They were much more open to the use of military force to stop genocide, in large part because of their acceptance that the threat of military force had been a defining factor of the end of the Cold War, and became an early driving force in the debate. Indeed, as part of the Bundestag, the Alliance 90 presented a motion in 1992 that called for changing the Basic Law to allow peacekeeping missions “to protect people from one another” under the auspices of a reformed UN.⁵⁵

The West German Greens, however, remained more focused on how the tenets of pacifism could be used to find definitive solutions for the Balkan wars.⁵⁶ They were distinctly more hesitant in considering the possibility of using military force to stop the conflict, as the tenets of “nuclear pacifism” continued to dominate the perspectives of the majority. Over the course of the debate during the 1990s, however, the West German Greens became the defining players, while the East German Greens faded increasingly more into the background, especially at the federal leadership level. As such, the focus will be on their debate.

Within the West German Greens, the debate about the use of military force in the Balkans began in earnest in August 1992, after Helmut Lippelt and Claudia Roth, two leaders and future MPs, returned from a fact finding trip in Yugoslavia. Both called for

⁵⁴ “Nur mit uns,” 57.

⁵⁵ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 128-29.

⁵⁶ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 464.

the use of force to free the concentration camps in Bosnia, though Roth later diluted her remarks.⁵⁷ Ralf Fücks, a leading figure in the Party, echoed a similar sentiment in December 1992, arguing that the erection of demilitarized zones, the supplying of foodstuffs to civilians, and the prevention of delivery of war materiel to the warring factions should be achieved “when necessary also with military methods.”⁵⁸

In an April 1993 essay entitled “Intervention in Yugoslavia?,” Lippelt, one of the early *realos*, expanded on his earlier thoughts. He proffered that the need to intervene militarily was based on the necessity to respond to genocide. In what would become a defining feature of the pro-intervention argument, Lippelt publicly claimed that the Green pacifist axiom of the dangers of escalation with further military involvement was in this case questionable. Moreover, he openly asked whether intervention must always lead to an enlargement of the war. He specifically cited the example of the Allied intervention in the Second World War, claiming that the German concentration camps would not have been liberated were it not for the Allied intervention.⁵⁹ Unlike others in the Greens who took the lesson of “never again war” from the past, Lippelt stood this lesson on its head and argued that force should be used to free concentration camps to stop that which historically had only been halted with military force.

The majority of the Party, including most of the leadership, however, did not share that *realo* perspective. Indeed, a declaration from the Party leadership conference in February 1993 noted that the public statements by some in the Party supporting military intervention in Bosnia were isolated perspectives. The conference’s end

⁵⁷ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 499. Though both proposed the use of force to free the concentration camps, neither supported the use of German troops in Yugoslavia. For both historical reasons as well as a fear of the militarization of German policy, both firmly rejected even German peacekeepers. See below for a larger discussion of this issue.

declaration believed that such ideas actually “discredited the serious debate” within the Party on how to address the Bosnian crisis. Accordingly, the statement enunciated that the “overwhelming majority” of the Party rejected any intervention in the former Yugoslavia, choosing instead to support non-military methods such as embargoes.⁶⁰ Indeed, with strong majorities the leadership council rejected motions that leaned toward humanitarian interventions three times in attempting to define their final statement.⁶¹ As of early 1993, the leadership and the members remained largely together, with only a few *realo* voices making headlines.

The clear majority of those that did not support military intervention in late 1992 and early 1993 included some who would later support armed intervention, suggesting that the *realo* perspective was just in its infancy. Joschka Fischer, who would be the champion of active military interventions in Kosovo and in support of Enduring Freedom, would not be a member of the *realos* until the summer of 1995 after the Srebrenica massacre. He did, however, decisively recognize the need for debate within the party, but in August 1992 he followed a traditionalist argument, believing that a military intervention would only lead to an expansion of the war and not to a cessation of the ethnic cleansing. Significantly, he recognized that pacifism could not have stopped the murders in Auschwitz, which conformed to his rejection of absolute pacifism, and suggested the potential for change.⁶² Such a viewpoint differs significantly from that proffered by Fischer in an open letter to the Party in July 1995, after the Srebrenica massacre. As will be described later, the worsening of the events in Bosnia and the

⁵⁸ Cited in Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 501.

⁵⁹ Lippelt, 129-40; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 499.

⁶⁰ “Erklärung des Bundesvorstands zur aktuellen Diskussion.”

⁶¹ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 501.

recognition of the ineffectiveness of political measures to stop ethnic cleansing will be an important factor in the evolution of the views of many in the Green Party.

Ludger Volmer, one of the later leaders of the swing group as it emerged during the Bosnian conflict, noted in a September 1992 essay the defining aspect of the debate at the time. He bluntly stated that “pacifism was in crisis.” Specifically, political pacifism, which was defined by historical experiences, was being challenged by the brutality in Bosnia. He decisively rejected using military force to free concentration camps, instead arguing for a new Green foreign policy that would champion a new form of political pacifism. Under this new guise, multilateral institutions would supplant national interests and nationally controlled armies. For Bosnia, this meant a complete blockade and the recognition of Milosevic as a war criminal.⁶³ Interestingly, the differences between Fischer and Volmer, who would have rancorous debates in the coming years, were not that stark in early 1993. Though both showed a recognition of the challenged Bosnia posed for Green Party values, it would be there different reactions to the worsening violence that would provide the primary reason for their later divergence in opinion.

Even Claudia Roth, who had earlier proposed using military force to liberate concentration camps felt the need to clarify her statements amid the strong resistance within the Party. She diluted her earlier comments in an open letter to the party in August 1992 entitled “Never again Fascism—Never again War” and moved away from the *realo* perspective and into what would become the swing group. From her perspective, the “fascist” elements of the Bosnian war directly contradicted the ideal of “never again Auschwitz” and had to be opposed with “every means” short of the use of

⁶² “Bitte nicht schon wieder ein Glaubenskrieg bei den Grünen!”

⁶³ Volmer, “Bosnien und der Pazifismus.”

military forces. Claiming that war can never be a method for solving conflicts, she did, however, call for the Greens to discuss the issue and to think about all possible options that could stop the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. In backing off some of her earlier harsh rhetoric, she claimed that her call to free the camps was neither a betrayal of the values of pacifism nor an acceptance of the “military logic.” She was not distancing herself from her “left identity.”⁶⁴ Though Roth had been galvanized by the horrors of the war to consider other action, even the use of force to liberate concentration camps, the strength of the Party’s pacifist ideals, however, imposed considerable pressure to the extent that she felt the need to clarify her views.

The Party’s overall perspective on the possibilities of military intervention in the former Yugoslavia does become somewhat murkier in the summer of 1993. The declaration from a June 1993 special *Länderrat* meeting in Bonn designed to project a course for the Party for the Bosnian conflict argued for the expansion of political methods, especially under the UN, to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia. It also cited a need to “protect” humanitarian food convoys from “terrorist attacks.”⁶⁵ Nina Phillipi, citing an article from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, believes that this resolution suggested a distinct shift in the Green Policy toward support for out of area actions, in that the resolution passed appealed for the use of force to protect UN humanitarian convoys. However, Ludger Volmer suggests the resolution from this Bonn conference was primarily a compromise before the main Party Day Conference in Bonn in October.⁶⁶

The *Länderrat* meeting was in fact a very complicated and difficult process

⁶⁴ Roth, 19-20.

⁶⁵ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 502; “Tendenzbefschluss des Kommissarischen Länderrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993.”

⁶⁶ Phillipi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten*

designed to find a guiding principle for a leadership that was very divided. Indeed, after the conference, the Green Party leaders were in fact only able to say with clarity that the view of the Party's peace politics had become "unclear."⁶⁷ A number of motions were presented at this meeting that represented several different viewpoints, though none of them found strong majorities. Even the final concluding resolution was based on a compromise and in the end, the meeting failed to chart a clear course for the Party on the Bosnian crisis. This largely dispels Philippi's idea that this represented a fundamental shift in the Party, as there was no clear consensus at all.

At the onset, eight motions were proposed, of which four were later voted upon after further negotiations. The proposal from the March 1993 Hannover meeting that focused on a general "civilizing" of international affairs through demilitarization and institutionalization of international affairs was deemed too general for this Bosnia specific conference and set aside.⁶⁸ A revision of the Hannover resolution attempted to address the Bosnia conflict more specifically by including a paragraph that decisively rejected military interventions in Bosnia, believing such outside interventions could not remain neutral and could not achieve the goal of de-escalation. This motions received thirteen supporting votes, thirteen rejecting, and two members withheld their votes. As such, this resolution was withdrawn.⁶⁹

The two remaining motions, one proposed by Helmut Lippelt and the other by a

Deutschland, 133; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 503.

⁶⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Erklärung des Bundesvorstandes zu der Abstimmung im Länderrat am 12.6.93." 16 June 1993. Bestand A—W. Schultz, Akte Nr. 68, AGG.

⁶⁸ "Erklärung des Bundesvorstandes zu der Abstimmung im Länderrat;" Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Für eine Konsequente Zivilisierung der Internationalen Politik!," Antrag bei dem Länderrat, 12 June 1993, Bestand A—W. Schultz, Akte Nr.168, AGG.

⁶⁹ "Erklärung des Bundesvorstandes zu der Abstimmung im Länderrat;" Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Resolution des Grünen Länderrates vom 21.3.93 zur Situation im Ehemaligen Jugoslawien (incl. Änderungs- und Ergänzungsanträge für den 12.6.93)," Antrag bei dem Länderrat, 12 June 1993, Bestand

group led by Friedrich Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf, each received a majority vote during the first round. Lippelt's received a clear majority of fifteen for and seven against, though with eleven abstentions, while Baringdorf's received fourteen supporting votes, thirteen against, and five abstentions. Though Lippelt's received a larger majority, the high number of abstentions meant that it did not have as much support among the participants as was desired.

The motion from Lippelt was more along the lines of the *realo* perspective. Citing examples of genocide and the lack of international protection even in the so called protection zones, this proposal set out that international politics for the Bosnian crisis had "collapsed." Clarifying that the Greens were decisively opposed to the use of German soldiers in the Bosnian crisis, the proposal argued primarily for non-violent measures to stop the war and address the humanitarian crisis. Croatia should be pressured diplomatically to stop the ethnic cleansing, while Germany should open its doors to refugees.⁷⁰

Baringdorf's suggestion, which would eventually be adopted in revised form, likewise noted the devastating war in Bosnia and similarly expounded the dangers of a militarization of German foreign policy through the use of German troops in Bosnia or elsewhere. For the Bosnian conflict the only possibility of success was through UN. It sought to use non-military methods, such as embargoes and political pressure to force the warring parties to end hostilities. It stopped short of supporting some form of military intervention.⁷¹

A—W. Schultz, Akte Nr. 168, AGG.

⁷⁰ "Resolutionsentwurf für den Länderrat vom 12.6.93," Antrag von Helmut Lippelt bei dem Länderrat, 12 June 1993, Bestand A—W. Schultz, Akte Nr. 168, AGG.

⁷¹ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 504.

Between the two proposals, neither developed a clear majority of support. Thus, shortly before the final vote, a number of participants, including Ludger Volmer, Helmut Lippelt, and Baringdorf, developed an ad-hoc group to create a compromise that could be supported by a strong majority. After a vote between the two motions, Baringdorf's received a slim majority of 16-14, meaning that it would become the primary document that would be supplemented by elements of Lippelt's.⁷²

While both proposals had similar elements, at issue was a section of demands from Lippelt's motion. Given the "alarming" situation in Bosnia, he argued for four immediate measures to stave off catastrophe. First, the provisions of the populations should be secured. Second, humanitarian supply convoys should be protected from "terrorist attacks." Third, the boycott should be fully implemented, even through "coercive police methods" if necessary. Fourth, weapons exports to the region should be interrupted.⁷³ Many of the delegates wanted these four demands included and by integrating these aspects into the section of Baringdorf's proposal, it received a solid majority of 20 to 10. The top thirty Green Party leaders from the *Länderrat* had general agreement, though by no means unanimity, on the idea to protect humanitarian convoys, though there was some resistance to an enlarged view supporting active defense, meaning the possible use of combat power. In speeches after the vote several delegates distanced themselves from the preamble of Baringdorf's proposal because it supported the active protection of these UN safe areas and the convoys.⁷⁴

Thus, the *Länderrat* declaration seemed to suggest a much more robust

⁷² "Erklärung des Bundesvorstandes zu der Abstimmung im Länderrat."

⁷³ "Resolutionsentwurf für den Länderrat vom 12.6.93," Antrag von Helmut Lippelt.

⁷⁴ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 504; "Erklärung des Bundesvorstandes zu der Abstimmung im Länderrat."

perspective for international intervention in the Bosnian conflict, while still maintaining a strict rejection of any German participation. Even that was declaration was a compromise that garnered only two-thirds support among a small group of leaders. However, as the October 1993 Bonn Party Day will show, the views of this small portion of the leadership were out of touch with that of the rank and file membership. In large part due to their fact-finding missions the necessity of involvement, and with their perceived evolution of the axiom “never again Auschwitz,” became further internalized for some leaders, but not yet members. This would be the first indication, though to be sure not the last, of a growing rift between leadership and grass roots in the use of force debate.

The Bonn Party Day

In preparation for this October 1993 Party Day conference, the arguments for and against military intervention in the Balkans were clearly laid out in a series of essays in the August/September 1993 issue of *Punkte Vier*, the magazine of the Green Party. “The military intervention in the former Yugoslavia is unavoidable in order to force a cease fire, which would bring an end to the death and aggression and, free from new militarily created *faits accomplis*, could be used to search for a political solution.” With that sentence, members of the Greens in favor of military intervention, led by Helmut Lippelt, began to lay out their case. With the brutalities in the Balkans that filled Europe with “shame” in the background, these *realo* Greens felt that a limited political intervention could no longer succeed. Indeed, to do nothing meant the situation in the Balkans would only worsen. As such, the value inherent in the Green Party’s pacifism, that force leads

to more violence and victims, had to be called into question. They decisively rejected the traditional argument of escalation, which would become a common practice for many *realos*.

To stop the genocide in the region, they called for the UN to become an mediator with some power, to include military force. For the first time, and in stark difference to the policy during the Gulf War when the Greens rejected force even with a UN mandate, the Greens would begin to argue for the empowerment of the UN. As such, they supported a UN military intervention, with a strengthened peacekeeping mandate, to protect and supply the civilians in the Bosnian controlled area. The use of “coercive measures” could no longer be “categorically rejected.” Limiting intervention simply to humanitarian help meant more violation of human rights and possibly even the acceptance of further genocide.⁷⁵ By this point for the *realos*, not only had the two axioms of “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz” ceased to be the same side of a coin, but the latter began to trump the former.

Though this relatively small group of Greens was calling for the use of military force, its premises did not include a blanket support of military strategies. The use of force was designed to protect civilians, particularly those in the safe areas in Bosnian controlled territory. Importantly, it did not support a large intervention force designed to stop the war; rather it hoped to create the space for a political solution. Moreover, these Greens did not support the use of German troops, believing that it would be politically counterproductive. Relative to their cousins of a decade later, these original supporters of the use of military force were still quite distant from later Green *realo* views on out of area policies.

The ideas laid out in *Punkte Vier* in favor of military options were not appearing for the first time. Indeed, they were quite similar to those in early July 1993 from a group led by Gerd Poppe, foreign policy speaker of the eastern German Alliance 90 faction in the Bundestag. He along with other members of the Green Party had visited Washington DC and attempted to push the Clinton Administration for a stronger engagement of the US in Bosnia. They appealed for an expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate to ensure the protection of humanitarian supply convoys, an increase in the number of UN troops in Bosnia, as well as the creation of parity between the warring parties by destroying the heavy weapons of the Serbs and Croats by “suitable military methods based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”⁷⁶

Much like the earlier qualification Claudia Roth issued, Poppe’s aggressive comments were qualified two days later after a report in the left wing paper *taz*. He denied that his delegation had pushed for a US military intervention in Bosnia, clarifying that they had spoken of UN actions rather than US actions. Moreover, Poppe cited the need to protect the civilian population from “terror attacks” as a reason to extend the UN mandate and increase its troop presence. He tempered the call for the destruction of Serb and Croat artillery pieces, whom he primarily blamed for the “terror attacks” against the civilian population, by stating the belief that it could be done without leading to a further escalation.⁷⁷

With this press declaration, Poppe likely sought to assuage some of the pacifist elements of the Party. First, he sought to ease the fears of escalation, which remained

⁷⁵ “Thema: Bosnien; Vor der Sonder-BDK,” *Punkte Vier* 1, no. 4 (August/September 1993): 8-9.

⁷⁶ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Pressedienst Ausgabe Nr. 158/1993 from Gerd Poppe, 19 July 1993, Bestand A—W. Schulz, Akte Nr. 168, AGG.

⁷⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Pressedienst Ausgabe Nr. 162/1993 from Gerd Poppe, 21 July 1993, Bestand

omnipresent among the Greens. Moreover, the inclusion of the phrase “terror attacks,” a phrase not used in his original declaration, was likely included to highlight the dangers to the civilian population, which resonated well within the Party. The need to clarify such statements reflects the distinct divergences within the Party at this point when discussing the use of force in Bosnia.

The essay against military intervention in *Punkte Vier*, written by the prolific writer and future MP Ludger Volmer, focused on the fact that such interventions would be directly contrary to Green Party values. Volmer asked how the party could support military intervention while at the same time continue to speak out for disarmament.⁷⁸ Indeed, Volmer and other opponents were maintaining the strong Green belief that military intervention would only lead to further escalation. From this perspective, supporting military force damaged the believability of the Party.

Instead of military action, they argued that the ideas inherent in civil conflict intervention had not been or were only partially used to date in Bosnia. Noting the weak status of the embargo and blockade, Volmer believed that they should finally be strengthened to the point previously envisioned, which could lead to success. Though these non-military mechanisms had not been totally effective to date, this was not a reason to “resignedly” reach for the military option. Still, Volmer argued that the international community had to get involved with an active human rights policy.⁷⁹

A—W. Schulz, Akte Nr. 168, AGG.

⁷⁸ In an earlier essay, Volmer argued that any peace movement supporter that rejects the use of force out of practical reasons, rather than absolutist reasons, is not a true pacifist and indeed avails oneself to military categories. Those who support humanitarian help supported by force were definitely in that category. At this point, Volmer remains a strong principled pacifist, though he recognizes the need to intervene somehow. See Volmer, “Bosnien und der Pazifismus,” 10.

⁷⁹ “Thema: Bosnien,” 10-12. Volmer was also reacting to the resolution passed at the *Länderrat* in Bonn on 12 June 1993 that, according to Volmer, implied military actions. He believed that to accept that resolution gave the Greens a profile that would only gradually differentiate them from other parties in the

As the delegates assembled in Bonn in October 1993 amid the violence in Bosnia, the Party stood poised for an intense debate. Two decisive perspectives had been laid out in the Party's magazine. Moreover, there were rumblings amid both the grass roots and the leadership for a clarification of the June 1993 *Länderrat's* proclamation that had suggested a possible use of military forces. Local groups saw it as a severe distortion of the Party's essential roots and had called for this special conference to address the difficult issue.⁸⁰ Unlike the earlier June conference, the Bonn BDK debate involved the entire constituency of the Party. In the end, three distinct "currents"—radical pacifists, supporters of peacekeeping operations, and those who appealed for stronger military intervention—aimed to determine the future direction of the Party in military affairs.⁸¹ It is with this Party Day that the three distinct groups within the Party begin to become clear enough for decisive distinction.

Though there were numerous position papers offered by divergent groups within the Party, only eleven were officially put forward as proposals for adoption at the October conference. In the first round of voting, all four *realo* proposals in support of a military intervention along the lines of that proposed by the *Länderrat* were dismissed, by receiving more no than yes votes. From such leaders as Gerd Poppe, Hubert Kleinert, and even Joschka Fischer these ideas often rested along the premise of providing protection to endangered people in the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, the title of Gerd Poppe's proposal blatantly argued for a humanitarian intervention. In it, he suggested

government. See "Tendenzbeschluss des Kommisarischen Länderrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993."

⁸⁰ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 504-05; Matthias Geis, "Bewaffnet für die Menschenrechte," *taz*, 9 October 1993, 5.

⁸¹ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 505.

that supply convoys should be protected even with “armed force” if necessary.⁸²

While adhering to the traditional green values of rejecting war as a means of politics, demilitarization, and the apparent militarization of German politics, Hubert Kleinert, Joschka Fischer, and others offered a new twist to traditional Green lines. Entitled “For a Non-violence Policy in a Violent World” their proposal paid special attention to the German responsibility based on its history for preventing a recurrence of fascism. As the authors contended: “No one can with definitive certainty and for all of the future rule out that such a situation could repeat itself.” Though they did not believe that such a possibility should guide foreign and security policy, its potential necessitated that the international community should maintain means and ways to subdue future dangerous states, without resorting to military means.⁸³ In the case of Fischer, the mantra of prevention of genocide and fascism was clearly becoming dominant though his support for military operations was still limited.

Despite some of its commonality with the final adopted resolution, the paragraphs of the Fischer declaration that argued that there could be exceptions to the Green perspective for intervention, and that the Party should be prepared for them, proved decisively unpopular with other Green members. The proposition, though not openly supporting military actions, left the door open for future possibilities. Still, it was diametrically opposed to the grass root beliefs of the majority of the Party at the time, which largely held to strict pacifism and remained unwilling to jettison its pacifist views in favor of an active intervention policy, putting Fischer then on the fringes of the *realo*

⁸² Gerd Poppe, u.a., “Für den Erhalt des multiethnischen Bosnien und für eine humanitäre Intervention,” Antrag A-8, in Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Außerordentliche Bundesversammlung von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in Bonn, Beethovenhalle, am 09.10.1993,” Bestand B.I.3, Akte Nr. 75, AGG.

⁸³ Geis; Hubert Kleinart, u.a., “Für eine gewaltfreie Politik in einer gewalttätigen Zeit,” Antrag A-21, in

perspective at this point.

While the majority of the Party did not want military measures used, the Bonn Party Day did demonstrate that the strict adherence to the tenets of early Green pacifism could also be tempered. Reimer Hamann's proposal, for example, rejected any discussion of the use of military force. He questioned how Greens could speak for disarmament while simultaneously proposing military intervention. In his view, the Party should not disappoint its largely pacifist constituency. The three radical pacifist proposals brought before the Party Day were, like the intervention ideas, rejected by a majority of the Party, thus suggesting that absolutist ideas in the face of brutality in Bosnia was also a minority opinion.⁸⁴

Of the remaining four proposals that received a majority of support in the first vote, two were dismissed in the second round voting, leaving only those from Bärbel Höhn and Ludger Volmer. Höhn's was more similar to the radical pacifist ideals with some important differences, while Volmer's fell into the category of supporting peacekeeping operations, though still a far stretch from the *realo* perspective. In the third round of voting, Volmer's received a significant majority, though not enough for formal adoption. These two in effect were setting the boundaries of what was fast emerging as the swing group.

The proposal from Höhn and others leaned heavily on early Green principles. It fiercely decried the principle of international responsibility being floated by some German leaders as a means of securing interests through military action. Moreover, though the proposal supported the UN, it rejected the use of UN military force of any

"Ausserordentliche Bundesversammlung von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen."

⁸⁴ Reimer Hamann, u.a., "Militärische Intervention? – Nein!", Antrag-5, in "Ausserordentliche

kind to secure human rights, believing it would more likely endanger them. Though the authors recognized that wars were occurring, they did not believe any military actions were a means of solution. Rather conflict prevention, disarmament, and global development provided the method of stopping wars.⁸⁵

Despite these general radical pacifist ideas, Höhn's proposal did depart from some elements of traditional Green pacifism. As the war in Bosnia raged, the authors struggled to come to grips with it. They passionately argued that nations must balance between the suffering of the people in Bosnia and the dangers of a possible escalation in determining a policy for the region. For Höhn's supporters, preventing the war from spreading and escalating as well as directed sanctions were the means to stop the war; military action could only further the difficulties. At the same time, the authors insisted that Germans actively help the situation in Bosnia by opening its borders to refugees, as well as preparing a non-military help group that could deploy to the region.

This more pacifist based proposal did not have enough support to be adopted, but it did force the evolution of the favored proposal set forth by Ludger Volmer. In the end, traditional pacifist ideas were integrated into Volmer's proposition, thus developing a compromise between radical pacifists and those who sought a more active approach for the Balkans short of military intervention. In the final vote, the diluted Volmer proposal received a strong majority of the votes, with only a small handful of opponents and abstentions. That such a large number supported the measure also indicates that the

Bundesversammlung von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen."

⁸⁵ Bärbel Höhn, u.a., "Frieden, Entwicklung, und Ökologischer Umbau: Positionsbestimmung von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen zur Internationalen Politik," Antrag-4, in "Außerordentliche Bundesversammlung von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen."

realos supported the measure as well.⁸⁶ The swing group had thus solidified its hold not just on the leadership of the Greens, but also on the direction of the Party.

The Bonn Party Day Resolution (Volmer's Proposal) in a strong adherence to the traditional values of the Party, argued that the logic of foreign policy based on military tactics must be supplanted by the that of non-military conflict prevention methods. It recognized the problems inherent in Bosnia, but remained wedded to traditional Green values to solve them. Foreign policy had to be civilized, meaning national power politics must be eliminated. Moreover, in light of the continued goal of the demilitarization of international politics that was again enumerated here, it criticized the maintenance and use of military force against human rights violators. It decisively rejected any use of German soldiers in military operations under any auspices. The fear of a possible escalation of the conflict with outside military intervention remained potent. As such, the resolution steadfastly declared: "We therefore reject military preventive or punishment actions. There can be no exceptions."⁸⁷

Such elements were clearly based on fundamental Green ideals—fear of escalation, demilitarization, and the desire for a pacifist Germany. In an adaptation to the radical pacifist proposal at the conference, the new declaration clearly opposed any military intervention in Bosnia, since violations of human rights could not be stopped with military force, even as the events there were labeled genocide. Though opposed to military intervention, the resolution also opened the door for such a possibility over the long term in saying: "Where power and violence are the only language, force must be used against it. Against Fascism, appeals to humanitarian values do not help, and against

⁸⁶ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 505.

⁸⁷ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 506; "Gewaltfreiheit und Menschenrechte—Friedenspolitische

genocide (*Völkermord*), the calls to respect human lives do not help. In such a case, swift, hard, effective, and consequential, but not military action must come.”⁸⁸ Yet in the face of a violation of fundamental human rights, as the conflict in Bosnia clearly was, the resolution argued that states cannot remain aloof from the violence.

A PARTY IN TURMOIL AMID A WORSENING CRISIS

A quick glance between the June 1993 leaders conference and the Party Day of October 1993 clearly shows that the Green Party did not have a lucid, defined view of how to act in the Bosnian crisis. The difference between the two declarations suggests that the direction of the Party during this period was not at all unified. In what would become a consistent theme within the Party, the leaders were often on a different level from that of the grass roots members. With the introduction of a number of new factors in 1994, the Party would be thrown into increasing turmoil.

The Party’s leaders of the *Länderrat* passed a resolution that supported an expansion of the UN mandated peacekeepers, without including German soldiers, while avoiding any possible militarization of politics. Their declaration appealed for an “active international intervention to protect human rights.” For them, based in no small part on personal observation, the calamity of Bosnia required intervention, even to a small extent the use of military forces. The resulting declaration was thought to represent the majority and firmly rooted in Green philosophy.⁸⁹ Seen within the context of the intra Party

Grundlinien von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.”

⁸⁸ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 506; “Gewaltfreiheit und Menschenrechte–Friedenspolitische Grundlinien von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.”

⁸⁹ “Erklärung des Bundesvorstandes zu den Abstimmung im Länderrat;” “Tendenzbeschluss des

division, the *realo* philosophy was a significant aspect of this declaration.

The events of the Party Day only a few months later firmly belied that interpretation from the Party leaders. With the integration of local members, all four *realo* perspectives were decisively rejected, clearly discarding the resolution from the *Länderrat*. Yet at the same time, the antithesis of the *realo* perspective, traditional, radical pacifism, was no longer the only option on the table. Even the three proposals from the radical pacifists were soundly rejected at the Party Day. Instead, the swing group forcefully emerged under the auspices of Ludger Volmer's proposal, which called for political action to stop the genocide in Bosnia.

Though later tempered by traditional pacifist elements, the resolution emerging out of the Bonn Party clearly indicated splintering of the Party into three elements. The *realos* remained a minority, but the call for some form of action now resonated through all levels of the Party; the debate was on the method and type of intervention. Yet as the declaration clearly denoted, the majority of the Party opposed military intervention. In many respects, the declaration from the Party Day does clearly state the Party's desire to become involved in the crisis. Even the Höhn proposal declared the necessity of Germany's responsibility for conflict regulation.⁹⁰ By the end of 1993, the Party was divided, yet considerably evolved relative to its stance during the Gulf War.

The year 1994 brought three new events that would have clear impacts on the debate—the election platform, the Constitutional Court's decision recognizing the legality of deploying German forces, and the first real debate for the Greens surrounding

Kommisarischen Länderrates vom 11.-13. Juni 1993." Interestingly, an original draft of the final declaration included a sentence supporting active intervention for humanitarian operations under UN auspices. It was later withdrawn so that it might be further discussed.

⁹⁰ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 505.

the possible deployment of German combat and support forces to Bosnia. This year was one of both continuation and change, as the Party splintered itself even more. The election platform focused the Green ideals more, while the Court's decision fundamentally altered their context. The debate on the possible deployment of German forces to help protect UNPROFOR at the end of the year brought the discussion within the Party to new levels with the realistic possibility of deploying armed German forces for the first time.

The election platform of 1994 was agreed upon at the February Party Day in Mannheim and aimed to return the Party to the Bundestag. The section on foreign policy was in part predicated on the idea that the current Kohl government had failed in its handling of the "challenges of our time." It had done little to contribute to development help for needy nations; it had some responsibility for the current war due to its recognition of Croatia and Serbia; and had not done enough to stop the export of weapons.⁹¹

A primary pillar of the Green principles for foreign policy in this election platform rested on that of human rights. Described as an "urgent" goal of the Greens, they proposed that the instruments for improving these rights should be developed in the context of the CSCE and European Council. Yet, as the Greens pleaded for improving human rights, the election platform remained largely devoid of real solutions for the ongoing crisis in Bosnia. The war was only mentioned in the opening paragraphs, only recognizing the horrors of what was occurring. While offering little to slow the war in Bosnia, the Greens did speak out decisively against the belief that the Kohl government was attempting to militarize German foreign policy and reiterated that they opposed any

⁹¹ Die Grünen, "Nur mit uns," 51-52.

use of German forces.⁹² The traditional, though slightly less radical, pacifist elements of the Party remained dominant.

For the most part then, this election platform deviated little from its earlier cousin of four years ago. However, the program does illustrate that there was a growing consensus within the Party as a whole that remaining aloof from international problems was no longer possible, a point borne out of the October 1993 Party Day. Speaking of responsibility and the world community this Green platform took a substantive step forward into the international system; its events now radiated down to the Party. Even more important for later, the Greens began to think more of the possibilities of being involved in the government. As Ludger Volmer noted, not only were the Greens preparing for a return to the Bundestag, but they were also preparing for possible coalition negotiations with future partners.⁹³ With their successful election into the Bundestag that year, the international context began to filter down even more to the leadership elements of the Party.

In July 1994, however, the dynamic of the internal Green debate was altered with the Constitutional Court's decision allowing for the use of German forces in operations outside of the NATO area so long as they were under a UN mandate. The decision to deploy German forces was left to a simple majority within the Bundestag prior to the deployment. With this decision, a series of criteria were developed that would define any German participation. Accordingly, there had to be a clear international mandate; the military tasks must be accomplished within a specific timeframe; military actions must only come in the context of a political framework for solving the crisis; Germany must

⁹² Die Grünen, "Nur mit uns," 51-59.

⁹³ Die Grünen, "Nur mit uns," 51-59; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 510.

have a clear role in the decision making process; all participation must be joint in nature; and Germany must have a clear interest in the crisis.⁹⁴ The result of the decision and the subjective political constructs was to create the potential for tremendous debate within the polity.

This decision also engrossed the Greens into a new level of debate. Within the Party the decision was heavily criticized. Immediately following its announcement in July 1994, the Green Defense Speaker, Vera Wollenberger, described the decision as a “step backwards” that “strengthen[ed] the government” to pursue the increased role of the military in German foreign policy. It had given the government “carte blanche (*Persilschein*)” to send German soldiers all over the world. The Greens, according to the statement, rejected all forms of the use of the military as an instrument of power. Prominent member Ludger Volmer added that the decision was a “legal cover of a shift to the right.”⁹⁵ To them this Court decision ushered in a new perspective on the use of military power that envisioned its usefulness to foreign and security policy crises, which they viewed as both dangerous and diametrically opposed to Green values.

The statements issued by the Party after the Court’s decision were very consistent with the Greens’ overall stance. Unlike the debate over the use of military force in the Bosnian context, there was strong consensus within the Greens on this issue. Even many of the *realos* remained opposed to the use of German forces abroad. As the long simmering debate within the German polity on the use of German peacekeeping forces for the protection of a possible withdraw of UNPROFOR raged after this decision, the

⁹⁴ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 210-11.

⁹⁵ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 133; Die Grünen, “Germans to the Front—Urteile stellt die Weichen für eine Militarisierung der Deutschen Außenpolitik,” 12 July 1994, Bestand A—W. Schulz, Akte Nr. 168, AGG.

Green leadership, in an obvious rebuke of the Court's decision, declared that a government must not always do what is allowed by law.⁹⁶

Most importantly, the Constitutional Court decision in 1994, according to Volmer, led the swing group to begin to separate themselves even further from the radical pacifists in suggesting a role for the peacekeepers, though still not German forces. Indeed at the Potsdam party Day in December 1994, the resolution championed by the swing group clearly stated the positive role such peacekeepers could play. According to the declaration, given the "impasse" in Bosnia, "there was no alternative to the de-escalation role of the peacekeepers."⁹⁷ Ludger Volmer later described this moment as the time when the swing group began really to separate themselves from the traditional pacifists, though they lacked the coherence, or perhaps the desire, to move the position even further toward the *realo* position.⁹⁸ Now, unlike the traditional pacifists, the swing group was beginning to see more practical uses for military forces, rather than automatic rejections of any use of the military.

The Constitutional Court's decision moved the discussion on the use of German forces for out of area operations from the legal to that of the political arena. The political debate reached a crescendo in late 1994 amid the question of whether to send German Tornados to Bosnia. In November, NATO requested six to eight Tornado electronic warfare aircraft, which would require support from German forces, to protect NATO combat air patrols from Serbian Anti-aircraft facilities. While there were some supporters, even the CDU led coalition was beset with strife, leaving the German government to wiggle out of the request diplomatically. The request for German forces

⁹⁶ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 512.

⁹⁷ Cited in Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 512.

for support to combat aircraft in normal day to day operations proved too much.

With the request from NATO a month later for a quick reaction force to cover a possible withdraw of UNPROFOR from Bosnia, however, German leaders were more apt to acquiesce. Chancellor Kohl stated that these forces would be used in “very specific circumstances.” With the future of NATO at stake, which clearly reverberated with German interests, in the summer of 1995 Germany offered up to 1800 personnel to assist in the protection of the UN forces, including the combat aircraft that had previously been rejected, in what the *Economist* would call a “Rubicon” decision.⁹⁹ The ground personnel would act exclusively in non-combat capacities and if their participation was required, the Bundestag would vote as mandated by the Constitutional Court. Though this decision was a “leap,” it was indeed carried out with “due German caution.”¹⁰⁰ In this case there was broad support within the government, including a minority from the SPD. For example Hans-Ulrich Klose, a rather hawkish SPD member, believed that it could not be “humanitarian or moral” to hold back when people were dying.¹⁰¹

At the time, the governing coalition members—the CDU and the FDP—made quite clear that they supported this deployment, largely viewed in the context of the expanding concept of reality on the ground. For the Greens, however, the decision to deploy the Tornados and possible ground forces was rejected; however there remained a potent minority voice that called for supporting that decision, which led many in the press to consider whether the Greens even had a Bosnia policy. According to *The Economist*,

⁹⁸ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 512.

⁹⁹ “Time to Move on, if not In: Germany and Bosnia,” *The Economist*, 1 July 1995, 39-40.

¹⁰⁰ “Time to Move on, if not In.”

¹⁰¹ Duffield, *World Power Forsaken*, 214; “Doch noch deutscher Tornado-Einsatz,” *taz*, 12 December 1994, 2. That is not to say that there was no dissension within the SPD. For example Günther Verheugen, a leading foreign policy expert, rejected this idea with the phrase: “Help, yes; waging war, no.” This would be a common theme within the SPD. Indeed, even as late as Operation Enduring Freedom, there were

the Greens, in general, viewed this decision as “a blank check for the entry of Germany as a warring party.”¹⁰² The Party’s security policy speaker, Angelika Beer, in an official press release forcefully rejected any Germany participation in this rapid reaction force, claiming that thought in invoked the idea of a humanitarian reaction, it instead pushed Germany down the path of a “foreign policy supported by the military.”¹⁰³

As conditions in Bosnia worsened in the early months of 1995, the Green Party’s debate began to increase in earnestness. The Party had already deemed the events in Bosnia as genocide and though the most recent Party Day declaration remained opposed to using military force, it still left the issue unresolved when it recognized that at times force might have some usefulness. Unlike the later debate after Joschka Fischer’s rather famous letter in the wake of the massacre in Srebrenica, the debate in early summer 1995 was focused more on possible participation of German forces, especially in the wake of the decision to deploy the German forces as part of the quick reaction force, and with it the political decision on whether to support that deployment or not in the Bundestag. The possible use of German forces had far fewer adherents than the general use of the military.

On the other side like before, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a *realo* Green member of the European Union parliament, and as such more socialized by international dynamics, supported the use of these German forces. He believed that Germany had to remain capable of action in foreign policy. He believed the Greens should develop a strategy of a common foreign and security policy that incorporated both civil and military

some who rejected the use of force within the SPD.

¹⁰² “Time to Move on, if not In.”

¹⁰³ Die Grünen, “Keine deutsche Beteiligung an schneller Eingreiftruppe!,” Pressemitteilung Nr. 390/95, 5 June 1995, Bestand B.II.3, Akte Nr. 7, AGG.

intervention possibilities. Such a policy would then work in cooperation with the idea of demilitarization.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the foreign policy speaker of the Party, Gerd Poppe also decidedly pushed for the possible use of military force.¹⁰⁵

Similarly, the MP Marieluise Beck in a press declaration argued strongly for using force, invoking the memory that Auschwitz was freed by military force, rather than pacifist principles. That was the lesson he took from the Nazi defeat. Though war would never be born on German soil, intervention to save those being attacked is “required given the legacy of our fathers.” In the case of Bosnia, Germany should take the side of the victim. From his perspective, the use of the quick reaction force was to save the people in Bosnia.¹⁰⁶ This was a clear reflection of his giving the ideal of “never again Auschwitz” precedence over “never gain war.” Though this idea was still in the minority at the time, it would continue to gain supporters in the coming months.

The new German Party federal speaker Jürgen Trittin, a swing group adherent, believed that the Greens must recognize that interests, which are the defining feature of foreign policy, may not necessarily be contrary to human rights, suggesting there could be an interest in a form of military intervention.¹⁰⁷ Some of the *realos* and an occasional swing group adherent were thus far ahead of the later conception of the Greens, bringing in interests, a stronger concept of human rights and in seeing the large ideal of German responsibility, though they remained largely opposed to the use of German forces. Still, they were a clear minority in the Party. Indeed, Ludger Volmer argued that those such as Poppe were thoroughly isolated within the Party and that there was a clear majority

¹⁰⁴ “Dürfen deutsche Soldaten Frieden stiften,” *taz*, 30 December 1994.

¹⁰⁵ “Interview im DLF vom 16.06.95 mit Ludger Volmer zu Bosnien und außenpolitischen Fragen,” 16 June 1995, Bestand B.II.3, Akte Nr. 7, AGG.

¹⁰⁶ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Pressemitteilung Nr. 452/95 from Marieluise Beck, 30 June 1995, Bestand A—

against any participation by German forces.¹⁰⁸

The faction leader for the Greens in the Bundestag, Joschka Fischer was decidedly against this German participation. Based on the historical baggage associated with the Nazi intervention in that area, Fischer believed that a German intervention in Bosnia would give the Serbs a new propaganda front that could be exploited, which could possibly make the situation worse. At this point, Fischer was opposed to the use of German combat forces as part of peacekeepers. However, he did not believe that German military forces could not play a part. Indeed, he supported the possible use of the German air force to supply the Bosnian people.¹⁰⁹ Such positions clearly place Fischer within the swing group at this time, since he accepted limited uses for the military. Such a placement is critical for examining the role of the shock of Srebrenica and his personal evolution after that pivotal event.

Others were also decisively opposed to using German military forces. In a theme that many in the Green Party would use both at this early stage and throughout the course of the decade, Kerstin Müller and Trittin, both swing group members, argued that the German leadership's (CDU-FDP) call for Germans support was in fact a means to militarize Germany's foreign policy, possibly to the extent of using the military to national interests.¹¹⁰ The Green Party's pacifism was completely at odds with a militarization of German foreign policy.

While the federal level officials were debating this in the open press, the grass

Ludger Volmer, Akte Nr. 23, AGG.

¹⁰⁷ Martin Graebner, "Ich bin ja hier der Realpolitiker...", *taz*, 12 June 1995, 5.

¹⁰⁸ "Interview im DLF vom 16.06.95 mit Ludger Volmer."

¹⁰⁹ "Dürfen deutsche Soldaten Frieden stiften;" "Doch noch deutscher Tornado-Einsatz."

¹¹⁰ Kerstin Müller and Jürgen Trittin, "Gemeinsames Papier von Kerstin Müller and Jürgen Trittin: Sieben Gründe warum es in Deutschland weiterhin Parteien geben sollte—Germans to the Front?," 12 June 1995, Destand A—Werner Schulz, Akte Nr. 170, AGG.

roots elements of the Party, in the guise of the regional organizations, also weighed in heavily against any German participation and were especially vocal against those in the Party that supported the use of German troops. The Brandenburg Greens criticized that some members of the Party diverged from the decision made at the October 1993 Party Day that had opposed the military intervention in Bosnia and the so-called militarization of German policy. The tainted history of German troops in southeastern Europe and the belief that this conflict could not be solved with military force guided their position. Significantly they called on the Members of the Bundestag of the Green Party to remain wedded to the ideals put forth in the Party Day declaration, which represented the voice of the entire party, and vote against any bill that would send German troops to Bosnia.¹¹¹

Such arguments were echoed, in what could have been a coordinated letter writing campaign, by the Greens in Alzey-Worms. In their 12 June open letter, they invoked the memory of the Nazis, claiming that Helmut Kohl would be the first Chancellor to deploy German combat forces since Adolf Hitler, an obvious reference meant to compare, even if only tangentially, the current possible deployment to the horrid memories of the past.¹¹² In a similar approach, Winnfried Hermann in coordination with the local leader from Baden-Württemberg, Barbara Graf, argued to the members of the Bundestag faction that they were duty bound to follow the position on the Bosnian war adopted by the Party during the December 1994 special Party Day, which overwhelmingly at the time rejected the use of any military force. To change such a

¹¹¹ Kerstin Duhme, Letter to the Bundesvorstand der Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 13 June 1995, Bestand A—Werner Schulz, Akte Nr. 170, AGG.

¹¹² Bernhard Bögelein and Detlev Neumann, "Dann gibt es nur eins! Sagt nein!," Letter to the Bundestagfraktion von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 12 June 1995, Bestand A—Werner Schulz, Akte Nr. 170, AGG.

position, as Fischer was indeed arguing for, would require another meeting.¹¹³

CONCLUSION

The debate between 1990 and early 1995 amid the challenges posed by events in the Balkans set the stage for the impacts of the more ghastly shocks of the summer of 1995. From the near absolute unity during the Gulf War, the Party was now clearly fractured into three distinct groups, as conflict raged in Europe's backyard. Though the line between the *fundis* and the swing group remained blurry, their differences were nonetheless there. The swing group often saw a use for the non-German military, for example in supplying the Bosnian people or in peacekeeping forces. Still a minority, the *realos* were gaining a voice, particularly as the images of Bosnia appeared daily. Moreover, the strong differences between the leadership and the grass roots had become painfully apparent given the variances between the *Länderrat* and the BDK.

The crux of the Green Party debate was the collision of traditional perspectives and their clash with evolving principles in the wake of the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, and the crisis in the Balkans. In a nutshell, the traditions of Cold War style pacifism simply proved too shallow for the new challenges of ethnic conflict and, perhaps more importantly in the long run, evolving German interests. Coming to terms with this dilemma would be even more prominent after the Srebrenica massacre.

Still, some issues had been decided in these years. Whereas the Gulf War had

¹¹³ Winfried Hermann and Barbara Graf, "An die Abgeordneten der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen im Bundestag zur Vorlage der entschiedenen Fraktionssitzung am Dienstag 20.6.95 zur Frage der Intervention in Bosnien," Letter to the Bundestagfraktion von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 18 June 1995, Bestand A—Werner Schulz, Akte Nr. 170, AGG.

brought almost universal calls for abstention, the events of Bosnia awakened a desire for involvement within the Greens. As the majority based BDK resolution confirms, action was now a matter of degrees. The watchword of “responsibility” that had been shunned as means of militarization earlier, now became a prominent part of the Party platform. Indeed, the 1994 election platform spoke of the “responsibility for the world community” as the pillar of Green foreign and security policy.¹¹⁴ Though not the developed form of responsibility that would be a watchword a few years later, this new idea was a significant step forward.

The 1994 election platform illustrates two critical elements of later Green Party change. First, the platform and the Party’s later inclusion into the Bundestag, both illustrated and facilitated the greater inclusion of the international dynamic on members of the party. Members now not only speculated about international events, but were forced to debate them with the possible necessity of voting on future German military deployments. Second, the Greens were now thinking of more grandiose policy impacts and with it the necessity of working with other parties. During the Gulf War, the Greens had shunned the international consensus for the use of force to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Yet, by 1994 as the election platform illustrates, the dynamics of international socialization and *Regierungsfähigkeit* were very becoming elements, if yet still unconscious, of the Green Party dynamic. While there is no evidence here of actual negotiations for changing the Green stance on the use of force, the seed had been lain.

By late 1994, some Greens deemed the radical pacifism of the days past to be a relic amid the turmoil of Post Cold War Europe. This suggests indeed some numbers within the Party were considering the necessity of change. Drastic alterations, however,

¹¹⁴ Die Grünen, “Nur mit uns,” 51.

were not possible given the differences within the Party and the strength of the grass roots base. Important issues such as the necessity of stopping the violence in Bosnia and great debates, particularly that on the future role of a unified Germany within Europe, essentially forced the Greens to adapt. The traditional pacifism of the Greens was beginning to wither slightly, evolving into a new reconstitution of Green Party pacifism in reaction to a new environment. Many green ideas remained, including a desire to avoid use of force and avoid militarization of German security policy. The shocks of Srebrenica, however, would inject a new vigor into the debate.

This chapter has defined the baseline and early phases of the Green Party's debate on the use of force by highlighting several key elements. First, with the first so-called post Cold War crisis, the traditional values of "nuclear pacifism" remained preeminent in the Party; not even a UN mandate could push the Greens from this idea. Second, the violence in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia, would be a minor shock to those that would compose the *realo* section of the Party and would lead to some change. This violence, moreover, would provide the seed for an ever increasingly sharpening debate within the Party that would help to begin the process that would highlight the intra Party division and usher in a role for the swing group. Third, the early phases of the war in Bosnia would also see the emergence of a common theme throughout the debate—the disconnect between the federal leadership and the grass roots. Finally, though there would be a slightly broader acceptance of the possibility of a positive use for military force in general, there was a near unanimity of opposition to deploying German forces.

CHAPTER V

THE SHOCK OF SREBRENICA

As the situation in Bosnia worsened, the Green Party leaders continued to be confronted with the daily bombardment of images from the battlefield, spurring constant discussion. Yet, it was the massacre in the Muslim dominated towns of Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 that in a way forced the Greens from their relatively relaxed debate into one of its fiercest ever. In addition to the impact of that direct shock, the violence in Bosnia led to direct actions from an evolving international system that added an element of international pressure to the Party's domestic decision.

As the situation deteriorated in Bosnia, the UN designated the town of Srebrenica, in the eastern portion of the Serb side of Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with five other locations (Žepa, Goražde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Bihać), a so called safe-haven. Designed to create some international cover for refugees fleeing the fighting, the minimal international forces deployed and the restrictive rules of engagement, however, did little to stop Serb forces from acting with impunity. Indeed, dismissing the protection of Danish peacekeeping forces surrounding the town, Serb forces took over the town of Srebrenica in July 1995. The ensuing massacre, which left over 8,000 Muslims dead, filled television screens in Europe and has widely been seen as the most single devastating event of genocide in Europe since the events of the Second World War.

The German government led by the CDU, in tune with Germany's evolving level of responsibility outlined earlier in this dissertation, began to push for a German involvement in the international response to the conflict in Bosnia. Even several months

before the massacre in Srebrenica, the CDU led government was pushing for the use of German troops, saying their involvement was a “question of European solidarity” that was necessary amid the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.¹ The CDU in particular firmly believed that Germany could no longer hide in the background, but rather must do more in the international realm, though at the time these international actions were restricted to interests in and for Europe. From this perspective, the evolving idea of responsibility incorporated protecting others in need, developing collective security structures in Europe that maintained a capability to act, which did include NATO, and the development of German capabilities to support NATO operations.²

With the worsening of events in Bosnia and a CDU led government proposing a more active German military participation, the Greens were in essence forced to address the challenge domestically within the political mechanism and internally within their own consciousness’, a process made all the more pressing by the massacre in Srebrenica. The Green Party had long been discussing the events in Bosnia, as the previous chapter clearly demonstrated, but there lacked a clear resounding personification of the conflict. There remained a perception that events were to an extent still far away.

That aloofness would change with the massacre in Srebrenica, as certain elements within the Party now became aggressive agents for change. Scholars widely recognize that Srebrenica was the turning point for the Greens. Fischer’s open letter of August 1995 suggesting the use of force to prevent genocide was viewed by many as a critical

¹ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 99.

² Eric Fritz, Member of the Bundestag, interview by author, 12 November 2002. The German CDU Party, Berlin, Germany.

turning point in the debate on the use of force.³ It was both the “learning ground” and a “test case” for all of the security and peace policy concepts anchored in the Green Party.⁴ Many, such as Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich as well as Nina Philippi, point to the importance of Srebrenica as a turning point, especially for Joschka Fischer, one of the leaders of the realistic wing of the Party. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen argues that Srebrenica left the German pacifists, including the Green party “speechless,” as the disparity between anti-militarism and support for human rights was “exposed in the most gruesome manner.”⁵

This shock caused “soul searching and re-thinking” for many on the *realo* side of the so-called swing group.⁶ For many of them and some of the *realos* in the Party, Srebrenica was a new zero hour for their views on war in the modern era. Indeed, the *realo* Hubert Kleinert called the events of Srebrenica a “point of change (*Wendepunkt*).”⁷ For many in Germany, and especially the Green Party, the Serb massacres in the UN Safe zones brought with them “another quality” that separated them from other events in the region.⁸ At the most basic level, Bosnia would clearly display that those who saw the preeminence of human rights over that of never using military force viewed the developments in Bosnia through an entirely different prism, in turn assigning each a different level of priority.⁹

Each of the three groups within the Party, the *realos*, *fundis*, and the swing group, all had varying perspectives on how best to approach the challenges posed by the

³ Markovits and Reich, 145-47; Philippi, “Civilian Power and War,” 112.

⁴ Hyde-Price, “Germany and the Kosovo War,” 21; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 469.

⁵ Dalgaard-Nielsen, 71.

⁶ Dalgaard-Nielsen, 71.

⁷ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 513.

⁸ “Den Menschen helfen: Die Grünen Hubert Kleinert und Ludger Volmer über militärische Intervention,” *Der Spiegel* 48 (November 1995), 41.

violence in the wake of the Srebrenica massacre. Issues such as the extent, if any, of military force that could be used, whether it should be under a NATO or UN flag, and the participation of German forces in any possible actions were hotly debated. At times the debate became very heated and indeed quite personal. Though several in the Party had already been advocating military force to stop the violence well before Srebrenica, it was this massacre and the impact it had on the primary de facto leader of the Green Party, Joschka Fischer, that provoked a new level to this debate. He would be an enabler and champion of change.

The intense shock of the massacre also combined with a more evolved and direct German government position to send German troops to Bosnia that forced the Greens to bring focus to a debate that had been devoid of such articulations. The requirement for significant and earnest policy decisions necessitating the Party to take a clear stand and translate their developing approach into a policy to guide MP votes at the Bundestag level were for the most part only in its infancy. After the Srebrenica massacre, issues such as German participation in the NATO stabilization and later implementation force (SFOR and IFOR respectively) now played a forcing function.

Within this debate, the schism between the federal level leaders and the grass root masses emerged and began to have an impact. Federal level delegates, as those most affected by the international realm, were forced to react in particular to the debate spurred by the international calls for action. The grass roots level, however, had the luxury of remaining more steadfastly adherent to their principles, as the political ramifications remained largely outside of their zone of interest. The increasing socialization of federal levels leaders helped to push them quicker in their personal

⁹ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 464, 498.

reflections as actually votes in the Bundestag were required to address clear policy ramifications.

Though there would be no finality to the Green debate over the use of force and in even over what to do in Bosnia during 1995, the Party's sharp debate on Bosnia and international or even German participation was a critical element of the overall evolution of their stance on the use of force. For the first time, active German participation was being considered by some in the Green Party. Moreover, even some of the more traditional elements of the Party began to realize that there were some positive gains that the military brought with it and using it as a tool could bring successes on the ground where it mattered most. Over the course of this section of the debate, though the Party was still divided, as a whole it began to move its overall perspective on the use of military force closer towards acceptance. The shock of the massacre in Srebrenica is a clear departure point for the Greens in general and for this phase of the debate in particular.

This chapter will introduce and discuss in depth the first of the two intervening variables—external shock—by examining the Party's rancorous debate during the summer of 1996. Through a detailed narrative of the positions held by the major players, especially Joschka Fischer, it will also begin to show the growing differences between the *realo* section of the Party and the remainder of the Party, in large part based on their different reactions to the massacre in Srebrenica. Finally, it will also begin to demonstrate some of the challenges for the leadership and its actions at the federal level relative to the desires of the Party's grass roots.

A PARTY TORN ASUNDER

The event that changed the tone and the intensiveness of the debate within the German Green party was the massacre in Srebrenica. These tragic events were a definitive shock to the people of Europe and Germany; indeed, polls about the possible deployment of German Tornado aircraft to Bosnia taken before and after Srebrenica, showed a jump of 19 points, from 39% to 58%, for support of the deployment with the German population.¹⁰ In many respects, the debate within the Green Party mirrored that occurring within the population as a whole. The clear shock, made particularly personal by the television pictures and the refugees in Germany,¹¹ created a new level to the debate that unequivocally had a clear impact on the overall evolution of the Green Party's stance on the use of force.

On the heels of the events in Srebrenica, the German Green Party exploded into a debate it had never seen in its history, moving beyond the identity crisis debate of its early history. This debate, which the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* at the time called the "disorientation of the Greens,"¹² would rage for months with no resolution. Matthias Geis postulated that this would be the Party's last "identity conflict," a reference to the long festering and as yet unresolved debate between the *realo* and *fundi* factions, who had been arguing over the principles of the Green Party for years.¹³ As will be discussed later that

¹⁰ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 171. The polls were taken in January and again in September 1995 and also showed a stronger support from the states of the former East Germany. The support for SFOR dropped to 49% in October 1995, but jumped again to 59.6% a month later.

¹¹ Hermann, interview by author.

¹² Christiane Schlötzer-Scotland, "Desorientierung der Grünen: Ludger Volmer kritisiert Joschka Fischers außenpolitische Vorstellungen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 10 August 1995.

¹³ Matthias Geis, "Basteln am außenpolitischen Konsens: Joschka Fischer bricht mit dem Pazifismusprinzip seiner Partei," *Die Zeit*, 11 August 1995; "Flügelkampf befürchtet: Grüner Bundestagsabgeordneter warnt

argument, however, would not reflect reality.

Some saw this debate as an advancement into the future for the Greens. Norbert Bicher of *Das Sonntagsblatt* believed that the debate about a new course of the Greens meant a “departure from the Puppet House” of peace politics.¹⁴ And Christiane Schlötzer-Scotland of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* argued that Joschka Fischer’s combative argumentative paper in the wake of the Srebrenica massacre would never be put away again; the questions it posed were here to stay.¹⁵ These and numerous other contemporary sources clearly demonstrate the decisive impact of this particular debate.

One of the principle underlying themes of the Green Party debate after Srebrenica focused on two of the defining principles of the psyche that defined the Greens—“never again war” and “never again Auschwitz.” Though already coming under fire within the past two years, these values of the past, for so long seen as unassailable, now collided with anew with the challenges associated with the new world order amid the collapse of the East Bloc. Erich Fritz, a CDU MP involved in foreign policy issues at the time, suggested that history presented a dual edged sword to German policymakers considering how to respond to the events in Bosnia and in particular Srebrenica. Many in Germany saw the ideal “never again war” as meaning no aggressive warfare emanating out of Germany, though many Greens and some in the SPD, as we shall see below, took this perspective one step further and believed Germany should never use military force for any reason.¹⁶ For the Greens then, there was an evolving debate on what exactly this normative perspective, “never again war,” actually meant when it came to the use of

von parteiinternem Grabenkampf,” *taz*, 26 August 1995.

¹⁴ Norbert Bicher, “Abschied vom Puppenhaus: Die Grünen suchen einen neuen außenpolitischen Kurs und bringen die Sozialdemokraten in Schwierigkeiten,” *Das Sonntagsblatt*, 11 August 1995.

¹⁵ Schlötzer-Scotland, “Zwischen Gandhi und Caesar,” 4.

force in general and German forces in particular amid the violence in Bosnia. That variance in perspective would have profound resonance within the Green Party.

The concept of “never again Auschwitz,” similarly, brought forth challenges for the Greens. It also posed two conflicting questions that would be especially hard on the Green Party’s debate—Does Germany’s history of genocide require it to become involved to ensure it is not repeated; or does its history in the Balkans mean that “prohibits” German actions in the region? For the majority of Germans writ large accepted the conviction that Germany has a “special responsibility,” given its murderous history to prevent genocide, even through the use of military force if required.¹⁷ The majority of Greens, though by no means all, in the mid-1990s, however, strongly resistant to this idea of a “special responsibility” and thus rejected the first question.

However, with the *realos* accepting both the new concept of “never again war,” and this special responsibility that created a new, proactive version of “never again Auschwitz,” especially after the Srebrenica massacre, that put them decisively at odds with the majority of the Party. The latter of these two ideas was a strongly ingrained norm accepted by practically all Party members and, as will be discussed in greater detail below, would eventually function as a facilitating norm providing a commonly held principle that in essence helped to ease the transformation for absolute rejection to a gradual acceptance of the use of the military in response to genocide or humanitarian catastrophes over time. While the available literature clearly notes the role of the shock of the genocide on Fischer’s personal belief, his invocation of a direct linkage to the memories of the Holocaust was the equivalent of a trumpet call for support within the

¹⁶ Fritz, interview by author.

¹⁷ Fritz, interview by author.

Party.

As will be discussed below, the Greens debate amid the Srebrenica crisis was punctuated by intense discussion on the role of history, encapsulated in these two internalized ideals, and how they conflicted, or in some cases, supported Green ideals. Jürgen Trittin accurately described the Green dilemma in an 11 August 1995 letter to the Party: “Both positions appeal to the ideals of a non-violent and anti-fascist party.”¹⁸ The challenge would be applying them to the current security challenges of a very violent world. Joschka Fischer’s letter to the Party after the Srebrenica massacre would be the first major shot of this new phase.

The debate within the German Green Party practically tore the party asunder. However, it was not the end. Nina Philippi, in one of the main secondary research works on this subject, has argued that Srebrenica was the “decisive turning point for the Green’s stance” on out of area operations.¹⁹ As will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter and in the following chapters, this perspective of a decisive turning point is shortsighted, even from the perspective of when she wrote her book in 1996-1997. The Party was far from any type of a clear decision; in fact this was just the beginning of a long, acidic intra-party debate. Indeed, the resurgence of the debate amid the ramp-up to the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the debate after the 9/11 attacks clearly demonstrates that the Greens still had not come to any consensus of the use of force as a viable policy option.

¹⁸ Jürgen Trittin, “Von der Verteidigung der Schutzzonen zur Neupositionierung Grüner Friedenspolitik,” 11 August 1995, Bestand A—Winfried Nachtwei, Akte Nr. 3724, AGG.

¹⁹ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 133. The other significant work on this issue, the MA thesis by Stephanie Bauer, suggests that Kosovo and in particular the Bielefeld BDK marked the end of the Green Party’s transformation to a more conciliatory view toward military operations. As the next chapter will show, this conclusion is also premature. Indeed, the German Green Party will continue to evolve and challenge its views on this issue,

The Realo Argument and Joschka Fischer's Letter

The debate on the use of force in Bosnia exploded to a new level with Joschka Fischer's open letter to the Party in the wake of the massacre. His letter and the reaction to it were the apex of the crescendo that surrounded the entire Bosnia debate for the Greens. Written on 30 July 1995, mere weeks after Srebrenica, Fischer began to present a much more bellicose argument in favor of protecting these safe areas with military force. Though he was not the first to make this argument, his clear leadership position injected a spark into an already festering debate. Indeed, the traditionally conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* argued that there was nothing new in Fischer's letter, as this argument had already been circulating within the Party for some time.²⁰ However, what the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* omitted was the fact that it was Fischer himself that was the real story not the argument.

As Fischer was clearly not the first to argue in favor of a military intervention, it is useful to briefly outline what others had said prior to Fischer's letter. In a joint letter from July 1995, nineteen Parliamentarians, of whom eleven were from the Greens, argued that military protection was the only means to save the people of Bosnia. The signatories also pointedly said that they "as Germans" were ready to "take a risk" to save the people of Bosnia.²¹ Members of the Green Party also spoke without the top-cover of other Parties. Gerd Poppe, Hulmut Lippelt, Marieluise Beck and Waltrud Schoppe, all Members of the Bundestag, had argued well before Fischer's letter for German military

in much the same way that other political parties continually adapt to new challenges. See Bauer, 100.

²⁰ "Grundsatzpapier gibt anstoß zur innerparteilichen Debatte," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 1 August 1995, p. 1.

²¹ "Erklärung zum Fall von Srebrenica," 14 July 1995, Bestand A—Ludger Volmer, Akte Nr. 23, AGG. The signatories were: 2 CDU/CSU; 5 SPD; 1 FDP; and 11 Greens. Of the eleven Greens, only one, Gerd

participation in the quick reaction force and, in a radical position, even pressed for NATO bombings of Serb positions. Indeed, Gerd Poppe argued that NATO action would be the main element that could create the chance for peace.²²

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a leading figure among the Greens at the European Parliament level, had long called for this intervention.²³ Waltraud Schoppe, an early member of the *realos*, argued that a new position of the Greens in favor of military protection was in essence the end of the Petra-Kelley position, which had been the dominant argument for the first fifteen years of the Party.²⁴ Rezzo Schlauch decried that “finally” the debate had begun.²⁵ Ralf Fücks argued passionately that it was the politic of non-intervention that in fact “legitimized injustice and encouraged the fanatic nationalism.”²⁶ In a similar vein, Krista Sager believed that Germany’s participation as part of the Western alliance was in fact in concert with Green values of conflict-prevention.²⁷

In one case, in an argument that was well ahead of its time within the Green Party, Waltrud Schoppe appealed to the new developing German responsibility, claiming that German soldiers had a responsibility to act as a part of Europe. In effect, he jettisoned the argument that some in Germany and the majority of the Green Party still clung to—

Poppe, could be considered among the leadership of the party. All eleven, however, were attached to the *realo* portion of the Party.

²² Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 135-36.

²³ Matthias Geis, “Basteln am außenpolitischen Konsens.”

²⁴ Andreas Borchers, “Grünes Licht für den Krieg,” *Die Woche*, 11 August 1995, 6. Petra Kelley was one of the original founders of the Party and had long pushed the idea of an anti-establishment Party as well as pacifism. Signaling its end meant a clear break with the past.

²⁵ Peter Ziller, “Fast Täglich meldet sich der Urlauber aus der Toskana: Ein ‘Markstein,’ an dem viele Anstoß nehmen—Joschka Fischers Bosnien-Brief und die Bündnisgrünen,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 August 1995.

²⁶ Ralf Fücks, “Adieu Bosnien? (Bosnische Lektionen),” 20 August 1995, Bestand A—Christa Nickels, Akte Nr. 243, AGG.

²⁷ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten*

that Germany's murderous past precluded any participation. In fact, he stood this argument completely on its head, claiming that in the fight to stop genocide, German soldiers would no longer operate independently, but instead would be in the service of the international community. As such, there was no difference between a German soldier and that of another nation.²⁸

One of the more aggressive members of the Green leadership that spoke in favor of an intervention was Reinhard Bütikofer. Immediately after the fall of Srebrenica, he argued not only for a military intervention to protect the security zones, but, following the path blazed by few others in the Party, publically believed that such an intervention could eventually see the participation of German soldiers in certain circumstances. In an eleven page public letter, Bütikofer claimed that this was not a complete rejection of the fundamental Green principles of pacifism. Though he pushed for economic and political solutions, he also believed that such efforts would not succeed without military force given the chaos of 1995. He likewise dismissed the dangers of escalation, claiming that even without any intervention, the crisis would escalate;²⁹ in essence there was nothing to lose.

Fischer's twelve page detailed letter to the members of the Green Party, in which he enunciated his position on the issue of the use of force in Bosnia for the first time publically,³⁰ showed a distinct evolution in personal perspective for the Green leader. Entitled "The Catastrophe in Bosnia and the Consequences for our Party, the Bündnis

Deutschland, 136.

²⁸ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 136.

²⁹ Reinhard Bütikofer, "Meine Position zur Frage einer militärischen Intervention in Bosnien-Herzegowina," 4 September 1995, Bestand A—W. Schoppe, Akte Nr. 157, AGG.

³⁰ "Fischer: Bosnien sollte Grüne zum umdenken zwingen—'Partei muss Prinzip der Gewaltlosigkeit überprüfen'," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 1 August 1995.

90/The Greens: A Letter to the Bundestag Faction and the Party,” the letter fundamentally questioned the Greens’ concept of pacifism amid the brutality of the war in Bosnia. From Fischer’s perspective, the Greens had to solve this final conflict of values in order to avoid completely collapsing at the heart of their ideals.³¹

Fischer’s primary purpose in writing the letter was to stir a strong debate within his party on the situation in Bosnia.³² However, he was not alone in the desire to stir a discussion on the carnage in Bosnia and the Green Party’s reaction to it, particularly in the context of defining an overall security policy. The need for such a debate was a position also held by Ludger Volmer who was an important member of the swing group, and others such as the Party speaker Antje Vollmer.³³ Winni Nachtwei, one of the Party’s leading authorities on national security, however, feared that Fischer’s letter would bring the Greens back to the “conflict culture of the 1980s.”³⁴

It is worth noting that Volmer, though he accepted the necessity of debate, would later suggest in his book written several years after the debate that Fischer’s letter, in fact, essentially “rolled over and choked” the already developing and “constructive” ideas that had started with the swing group earlier during the Bosnian conflict.³⁵ In actuality, however, Fischer’s letter proved to be the catalyst for a wider party debate that involved all possibilities for actions and was not just limited to more traditional Green values of the type the more traditional arms of the Party were suggesting. In this case, Volmer’s comments must be viewed through the prism of his position as one of the leaders of the

³¹ “Fischer: Bosnien sollte Grüne zum umdenken zwingen.”

³² “Grundsatzpapier gibt Anstoß zur innerparteilichen Debatte;” ““Das wäre blutiger Zynismus;” “Interview Joschka Fischer,” 1, 6.

³³ “Streit um die Außenpolitik der Grünen wird Schärfer,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 10 August 1995, 1; Norbert Bicher, “Abschied vom Puppenhaus,” *Das Sonntagsblatt*, 11 August 1995.

³⁴ Peter Ziller, “Grünen Fürchten Zerreißprobe: Abgeordneter—Bosnien-Debatte Rückfall in ‘Streitkultur’,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 10 August 1995.

swing group, who viewed Fischer's ideas as a direct challenge toward their leadership and perspective being laid out at the time.

The importance of Fischer's letter for a massive Green Party debate was echoed in the press and even some senior Green leaders. The political scientist Mohssen Massarrat in the left leaning newspaper, the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, argued that with this letter, Fischer "opened the flood gates" within the Party for a massive debate.³⁶ At the same, time there was considerable speculation within the press and within the Party that Fischer argument had a secondary purpose at attempting to make the Greens *regierungsfähig*. Significantly, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* similarly argued that inherent within Fischer's letter was in fact the vein of domestic politics and the push for *Regierungsfähigkeit*.³⁷ As we will discuss in the following chapter, that theme will indeed be an important part of the overall grand scheme of the argument presented by Fischer over the course of several years. For our purposes here, it is more important to focus on the letter and its immediate effects.

In an interview given shortly after the letter's publication, Fischer argued that it was vital for the Greens to address the challenges posed by the new Fascism in the Balkans, yet stay true to the Party's values.³⁸ In a different interview with *Der Spiegel* shortly after the publication of his letter, Fischer noted: "After the conquest of Srebrenica, I wanted a discussion."³⁹ That the war was "factually before our front door," meant that it required immediate attention.⁴⁰ As Fischer very poignantly noted in a

³⁵ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 513.

³⁶ Mohssen Massarrat, "Die bosnische Sackgasse und der Sieg herkömmlicher Politikmuster," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 10 August 1995.

³⁷ Volker Zastrow, "Fischers neue Auge," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 August 1995.

³⁸ "Interview Joschka Fischer," *BAB*, 11 August 1995, AGG, 1.

³⁹ "'Das wäre blutiger Zynismus'." *Der Spiegel*, 21 August 1995.

⁴⁰ "Interview Joschka Fischer," 10.

discussion several years later: “I was a non-interventionist until Srebrenica, until the mass murder following the seizure of the UN enclave, where people had put their trust in the security guarantees. This was where my position as a non-interventionist was shattered. Not only out of humanitarian considerations, but also out of very real political considerations, non-intervention can be far more dangerous than intervention.”⁴¹ From his memoirs in 2007, it is quite clear that Fischer’s personal journey of inner conflict, began in earnest with this escalation of the war in Bosnia.⁴²

Secondary sources at the time echoed Fischer’s later admissions. *The Guardian (London)* noted that Srebrenica was *the* reason for Fischer’s “overcome[ing]” of his green and pacifist principles.⁴³ Ludger Volmer, reflecting on the situation later, suggested rather provocatively that Fischer saw Srebrenica as a “signal” to re-think the pacifist position.⁴⁴ As we will see later, the Party’s interpretation of his ideas as being “Green” varied significantly based on each member’s personal perspectives.

As the leader of the Green Bundestag Party faction, Fischer’s arguments carried significant weight. Until this letter, the Green political leader had remained largely, though not completely, mute on the challenges in Bosnia; with it, however, he now enunciated a clear position.⁴⁵ A common theme that emerged in this examination is that Fischer’s shift in policies toward Bosnia was in many respects not as extreme a departure from Green principles as some presented. His shift did not suddenly make him a member of the CDU/CSU, a hawk member of the SPD or even the most hawkish member of his

⁴¹ Josef Hrycyk, “Fischer Reflects on Germany’s Role in the World,” *Die Zeit*, translation supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Original Title: “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,” 24 January 2002, p. 4.

⁴² Joschka Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre: Deutsche Aussenpolitik—vom Kosovo bis zum 11. September* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 2007), 212-216.

⁴³ “A Continent Stands Transformed—A Potent Generation of Leaders Have Lost their Military Virginity.” *The Guardian (London)*, 7 June 1999.

⁴⁴ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 513.

own party. In essence, Fischer reordered his policy and personal priorities in concert with Green principles and to an extent he used Green arguments to push for these changes. Such usage of principles that would resonate within the Green Party reflects first that Fischer was indeed a true member of the Greens and second, most importantly for the analysis here, that grounding of his evolutionary strategy in Green ideals meant many aspects of the Green platform acted as facilitating norms in the evolution of the Green position on the use of force.

The letter begins with a quote from Michael Thumann of the influential German periodical *Die Zeit*. In this citation, “The Bosnia war is above all else a conflict of armed criminals against unarmed civil populations. The Serb occupation of Srebrenica has again displayed the methods: selection, expulsion, herding men of warfighting age together like cattle and—when the evidence agrees—murder. Location—a UN safe haven,” Thumann directly references the atrocities of the Nazis, and relates them to current events in Bosnia. He claimed that the Serbian occupation of Srebrenica had again brought forth the echoes of the past—selection, expulsion, and murder. And all of this occurred amid the so-called UN protection zone.⁴⁶ Fischer’s choice of this quotation and its explosiveness set the tone for his own perspective as laid out in the letter.

For Fischer, the events in Bosnia caused a direct conflict with the internal values of the Greens. The long history of pacifism and support for human rights, as embodied in the concepts “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz,” had always been complimentary. But the events of Bosnia, and in particular those in Srebrenica, had

⁴⁵ Borchers; “Grundsatzpapier gibt Anstoß zur innerparteilichen Debatte.”

⁴⁶ Cited in Joschka Fischer, “Die Katastrophe in Bosnien und die Kosequenzen für unser Partei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: Ein Brief an die Bundestagfraktion und an die Partei,” 30 July 1995, Bestand A—Winne Hermann, Akte Nr. 99, AGG, 1-12. Unless otherwise noted, information from the following section comes

brought those values now into an apparent contradiction for Fischer and as he noted, in the conflict in Bosnia “life and freedom stand against the principle of non-violence.” Indeed, in his 2007 memoirs, Fischer noted that the conflict in Bosnia in many ways forced the need for a decision between the two ideas of “never again Auschwitz” and “never again war.”⁴⁷ In his letter, Fischer passionately argued that there could be no absolute pacifism; when faced with the atrocities of the Nazis or those in the Balkans in the 1990s, there must be action.⁴⁸ Indeed, the events of Srebrenica were the *casus belli* of the evolution of Fischer’s position from the idea that the Greens could be capable of governing without using military force, in essence the purer pacifist position, to the position that no longer rejected the use of force, which in turn changed the calculus on governance.⁴⁹

Fischer begins his essay by claiming the West’s Bosnia policy, particularly its political-military aspect, had failed. More directly, the Green Party’s policy of non-violence has been “helpless” to affect change. Unlike any other event, it was the fall of Žepa and in particular that of Srebrenica that demonstrated this failure. From Fischer’s perspective, three main reasons prohibited the possibility of using a political solution to stop the killing: there was no ground for compromise; there was no political will from the West to affect a solution; and the UN deployment was a tool being used by both sides for their own benefit. In particular, the lack of interest from the West made Bosnia a “ticking time bomb.” Using drastic words, Fischer claimed that Bosnia was the “bloody price for the dramatic failure of the Western powers.” Twelve years later, Fischer was more

from this citation.

⁴⁷ Joschka Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre: Deutsche Außenpolitik—vom Kosovo bis zum 11. September* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 2007), 212.

⁴⁸ Fischer, “Die Katastrophe in Bosnien und die Konsequenzen für unsere Partei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 3;

direct, noting that the catastrophes of Rwanda and Bosnia were “the current example of an historical failure of the United Nations, international law, and the West.”⁵⁰

Fischer distinctively blamed the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic for the conflict, believing that he had incited the Serbian nationalism, whose hostility infected and ignited the Balkan powder keg. Moreover, the national borders that for so long had been muted under the federated Yugoslavian rule, now no longer matched those of the current, fragmented states in the wake of the numerous declarations of independence and ongoing wars. In essence, from his perspective, border and minority questions were at the center of the post-Yugoslavian problem. With those complexities, an independent Bosnia could never succeed given its ethnic composition.

Yet Fischer also attacked the German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 as an important catalyst for the conflict, for it spurned the dissolution of the federation. He likened the Western diplomatic recognition to a military “written guarantee” for the two republics to fight within their borders. The German recognition of these republics went “ghastly” wrong, as the violence it generated clearly demonstrated. Such an argument was quite consistent with fundamental Green values.

According to the Green leader, the dissolution that emerged out of Western recognition of the new independent states emerging out of the Yugoslav federation combined with the aggressive Serbian nationalism, brought forth four distinct results: ethnic cleansing through murder and expulsion, barely “viable” Croat and Muslim states bordering the Serbs, minority conflicts within Serbia, and a total political order of “extreme instability” in the region that could lead to another war.

“Interview Joschka Fischer,” 2.

⁴⁹ Dieter Rulff, “Joschka Fischers Spielräume,” *taz*, 11 May 1999, 5.

The reference to the last result fits neatly within the grounding ideals of the German Green Party. In this case, Fischer references the possibilities of another war amid the concept of Serbian nationalism. To him, the Serbs were an “unstable construct” in an unstable region, whose presence would lead to a “loss of peace.” Moreover, Fischer debunked the idea proffered by some that if the Greens accepted the use of force in Bosnia that it would re-legitimize military force. He countered that doing nothing would not only fail to bring about a political solution, but also bring forth a “joint responsibility” with the Serbian persecutors. Building off of these perspective, Fischer believed that Serbian nationalism would soon mean that war would encompass Kosovo and Macedonia as well as Bosnia, given the minority populations there and as such required some form of action, to include military force.

In the past, the Greens had always rejected the use of military force as a means of preventing further escalation. In this case, however, when confronted with the possibility of further escalation and a worsening of the human right situation, the principle of escalation within the Green lexicon was stood upon its head. As Fischer noted in an interview with *Der Spiegel*, violence always breeds more violence, but at times survival is sometimes dependent on violence; that was the “contradiction.”⁵¹ Utilizing such logic, Fischer saw the events of Srebrenica as a catalyst to call for an intervention. Military force no longer led to escalation; instead it prevented escalation.

Here is a the most effective and significant example of the concept of a facilitator in the evolution from one norm to another. With both ideals so ingrained within the Party, it would be impossible to simply jettison one. Rather, changing normative

⁵⁰ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 216.

⁵¹ “‘Das wäre blutiger Zynismus’.”

perspectives required an appeal to something that a group, in this case the Green Party, already believed to be of particular value to them. In particular, the developing ranks of the *realos* and to an extent the swing group were affected by these facilitating norms during the Bosnian debate and its follow-on amid the ramp up to the bombing of Serbia in 1999.

As Peter Ziller of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* argued, preventing genocide is a concept that had “wide room” in the Green party.⁵² By appealing to those in the party who believed so firmly in the concept of the prevention of genocide, Fischer and other *realos* facilitated change. It is highly doubtful that the Greens would have seen such a significant evolution through the incorporation of these shocks, such as Srebrenica, into their identity, without a firm belief in preventing genocide. Had they been a strictly pacifist party for whom genocide was not an issue of concern, the Greens would not have changed as they did.

Moreover, to return to the ideas presented in the letter, the impacts of the violence and extreme instability in the region, Fischer suggested, would not be restricted to the immediate area. It would also have a dire impact on Europe itself in that it would threaten the future goals of a unified Europe. In particular, if the Serbs were allowed to succeed, that could lead to the perception that the use of military force to obtain strategic objectives was again an accepted means of politics. Such a shift would mean an end to a peaceful Europe. Bosnia, Fischer argued, was also about “fifty years of integration advances and peace in Europe.” As such, the European continent stood “stunned” before the fact that in Bosnia “the common European future is threatened by a victory of the nationalistic past.”

Much like the earlier reference to escalation, there are clear German Green Party values to be seen in Fischer's statements above. His reference to maintaining the future of Europe speaks directly to the goal laid out in the 1994 election platform that expressed support for the political integration of Europe. That vision incorporated an enlarged and deepened Europe, which would include the troubled region of southeastern Europe currently beset with ethnic conflict. Indeed, the platform, much like Fischer's letter, referenced the "new nationalism" as a large and significant challenge for modern Europe.⁵³ Similarly to the facilitative properties of the "never again Auschwitz" norm, Fischer's ideals on a greater integration within Europe appealed to already ingrained normative perspectives within the Party that could find some clear resonance.

Like the commonality in Green values expressed with European integration, the fear that the new wars of the Balkans could lead to a new militarization of politics was also a common Green ideal. But whereas earlier, such as during the Gulf War and during the onset of hostilities in Bosnia, when European involvement of military forces was seen by many in the Green Party as a possible catalyst for increased militarization of politics, Fischer now saw the wars of the Balkans themselves as a possible new wave of militarization of politics, especially among non-western nations.

Such a differentiation, while in basic form consistent with Green values, lowered the bar for the realization of what constituted the militarization of international politics for many in the Greens. Whereas the traditional Green perspective on escalation rested within the construct developed during the Cold War of great power, often nuclear, violence capabilities. Fischer saw the violence of smaller nations and its prevention as an

⁵² Ziller, "Grünen fürchten Zerreißprobe."

⁵³ "Nur mit uns," 56-57.

important means for preventing such large scale escalation. He now recognized the dangers of smaller regions, in particular those rife with ethnic conflict, in leading to a greater militarization of politics in the global context.⁵⁴

With the reasons for the conflict clarified and the enunciation of the potential to have a negative impact on Europe itself and international politics in general, Fischer directly attacked the usefulness of the UN military mission in Bosnia. While he did characterize it as a humanitarian success in its ability to deliver food to displaced persons, he decried its usefulness as a political-military operation, opining that it threatened to become a “debacle.” It had no political viability and even worse, its military actions were anemic at best, as the failure to protect Srebrenica clearly demonstrated. Importantly, for Joschka Fischer and many other *realos* in the Green Party, the failure to protect these safe areas provided the most clearly demonstrable representation of the failure of the UN and its policies in Bosnia, and with it the failure of the best chance for success.⁵⁵

In what would become his mantra of sorts, Fischer argued that though the UN had created these six protection zones, it did not have the will or the capability to actually protect them. The UN military forces were attempting, and failing miserably, to create peace in a hot war. Even worse, though they were supposed to remain neutral, they were actually becoming pawns in the war. They were used as hostages by the Serbs to protect against UN air strikes, thus permitting the Serbs to act with impunity. The UN mission

⁵⁴ Interestingly, in hindsight, Fischer may have been quite correct. Indeed, Western powers that immediately after the Cold War had begun to reduce the size of their armed forces and enjoy the so-called peace-dividend, have actually re-militarized many aspects of their foreign and security policy to counter threats emanating from small states in war-torn regions. Moreover, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, there has also been an increased militarization of many of the larger powers, in particular the US, to fight international terrorism. Though he may not have intended it, Fischer recognized quite prophetically the challenges to large states from smaller states that have strong militaristic tendencies.

then was from its onset “contradictory and very dangerous.”

The “bloody reality” of Bosnia and the deficient policies of the UN mission there meant that the UN was facing a “strategic” and “historic” defeat. From Fischer’s perspective the UN, and by proxy the West, faced two alternatives—to give in or to resist the events—and either choice would bring with it a high price. From his perspective, “nothing would be worse” than having to share responsibility for further catastrophes and more victims through inaction. Joschka Fischer, a pacifist for most of his life, now believed that something militarily had to be done to stop these atrocities.

With this personal reorientation, Fischer challenged the Party to engage in debate and question the absolute nature of pacifism. Simply being upset about the situation would not bring a solution; action was required. He directly asked the Party whether a pacifist, embodying the position of non-violence, could simply accept the “victory of the brutal, naked violence in Bosnia.” Further, he asked “What can be done when all previous efforts—embargoes, protection zones, control of heavy weapons, trade solutions—simply screwed up or at best did not adequately function relative to the military violence?” Such direct questions framed the very questions facing the Party—which of the two ingrained normative perspectives, “never again war” or “never again Auschwitz” would maintain prevalence? As will be discussed below, for Fischer and his colleagues, though they stood torn between the “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz,” the latter “had to prevail, even at the cost of NATO’s first hot war.”⁵⁶

Despite his rancor for a new approach, Fischer rejected calls that he was abandoning the traditional aspects of pacifism. Belying the idea that pacifism had

⁵⁵ “‘Das wäre blutiger Zynismus’.”

⁵⁶ Elizabeth Pond, “Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe,” *The Washington Quarterly* 22, No. 4 (Autumn 1999):

become old fashioned “complete nonsense,” Fischer rejected any change of the foundation of Green pacifism; instead he looked for an evolution of policy.⁵⁷ As we will see later, his opponents would not buy such an argument.

In his letter, Fischer, seeing all other options as exhausted, proposed two general options to address the situation in Bosnia—UN withdraw or support military action. He thoroughly rejected the first of these, a UN withdraw, as it would “probably intensify” the war, if not lead to its expansion. Moreover, it would mean the end of the humanitarian mission of the UN, which Fischer had always seen as a success in Bosnia. A withdraw of the UN could lead to a complete failure of the UN concept as a broker in conflict resolution, meaning states could simply ignore the UN when it came to international conflicts. As Fischer noted: “The end result of a UN retreat would be [the prevalence of] national power politics and not international conflict resolution through the UN.” Further debunking the withdraw option, Fischer believed that such a step would not protect Europe from other consequences, as the politics of national violence would not end with Bosnia. Indeed, in his opinion Europe would not be able to accept a UN withdraw without “enduring a heavy moral injury with wide-reaching results.”

Here, as in cases before, Fischer’s logic resonates with Green principles. An end to the humanitarian successes would further impinge on the human rights situation in the region, thus again resonating with the principle of “never again Auschwitz.” Furthermore, preventing a failure of the concept of the UN, which would lead to a return to national power politics, also linked to Green principles. Indeed, as the 1994 election platform noted, the Greens believed that the UN was the most important platform for

79.

⁵⁷ “‘Das wäre blutiger Zynismus’.”

solving international problems.⁵⁸

Fischer further utilized the concept of “never again Auschwitz,” sometimes referred to as “never again Fascism,” by directly highlighting the events in Bosnia as a form of fascism that would not stop. Rhetorically, he asked whether the German left would lose its “moral soul” if it “cowered away from this new fascism and its policy of violence.” Going even further, Fischer directly related the situation to the Nazis, claiming that today’s generation faced the same dilemma as those of the 1930s: What must be done in the face of such violence? Fischer, according to *The Economist* felt “passionately that the misery caused by Hitler’s war has landed the Germans with a special responsibility to help unite the continent.”⁵⁹

This argument however was denounced by some. In an opinion piece for *Die Zeit*, Franco Zotta argued that the comparison between the Nazi atrocities during the Second World War and the genocide in Bosnia was “too simplistic,” in particular given the smaller scope of the events.⁶⁰ However, there was significant resonance, as will be outlined below, within the population with these events to the Nazi past that suggests there the relationship was in fact quite involved.

Fischer also challenged the Greens using their own principles. “How should a non-violent party, who clearly and unequivocally recognized the right of self defense in its foundation program, behave?” he asked rhetorically. With the Muslims fighting for their very existence, can the German Left deny them their right of self defense, a policy that had been ordained even in the Green Party’s origins? Such logic rejected any form

⁵⁸“Nur mit uns,” 57.

⁵⁹ “Joschka Fischer, Germany’s Reluctant Statesman.” *The Economist*, 24 October 1998.

⁶⁰ Franco Zotta, “Es geht um die moralische Seele: Warum wirft Joschka Fischer wegen des Krieges in Bosnien seinen Pazifismus über Bord?” *Die Zeit*, 11 August 1995.

of non-action on the part of the West. As Fischer articulated in a speech before the Bundestag on 12 June 1995: “Between the solidarity for survival and the requirement for non-violence—that is our [the Green Party’s] contradiction.”⁶¹

The conflict in Bosnia especially after the Srebrenica massacre then brought the Green Party to a definite conundrum. The idea of non-violence stood diametrically opposed to that of the protection of life. In other words, the norms of “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz” again found resonance in the Green Party debate.⁶² Only this time, they were no longer mutually supportive of one another; instead they were mutually excluding. As Karsten Voigt, a prominent leader in the SPD noted, the reality of the violence in Bosnia collided with the Party’s vision for a peaceful world.⁶³ According to Fischer, the guiding principle of pacifism that had guided the Party in the 1980s, opposing nuclear war was not valid amid the current ethnic conflicts.

How then would a traditional pacifist address this new form of violence? For the most part, many pacifists profoundly rejected any use of military force, choosing instead to focus on non-military means to counter the rising violence. However, Bosnia still had an impact on the most ardent pacifists. One of the more prominent traditionalist pacifists in the Party, Winfried Hermann, importantly noted that even his perspective on the use of force was altered by the events in Bosnia. The primary paradigm shift within the traditional pacifists rested more along the axis of the recognition that war was no longer restricted to state on state violence, but instead could directly impact citizens and in turn

⁶¹ Cited in Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 134.

⁶² Volmer, interview by author.

⁶³ Voigt, interview by author.

lead to similar results as that in Auschwitz.⁶⁴ Though he and the other traditionalists did not change their perspective and accept the use of force, it is very clear that their perspectives and the context of their decisions were altered by the shocks of Bosnia.

After thoroughly debunking the option of withdrawing throughout the essay, Fischer argued for support to the increased military protection of the protection zone and acceptance of all the inherent risks. From Fischer's perspective, despite the fact that this action would not create a political solution, it would help to protect the civil population. Indeed, as he enumerated: "I am convinced that given the situation of the civil population trapped there, we [the Greens] must support the military protection of the UN protection zones." This key statement, which encapsulated Fischer's argument, immediately let the "alarm bells ring" for many in the Party according to *Die Woche*.⁶⁵

It is important to note two distinct reservations about Fischer's position. First, unlike others of his *realo* colleagues, he did not support the use of German troops in any response. He remained convinced that the historical arguments against any German military participation in the region were quite sound. Interestingly in an interview given around this time, though he rejected the use of the Bundeswehr as an international intervention force, Fischer did hesitate and resist answering the question of whether German troops could act in areas outside of where there was a history of Nazi action.⁶⁶ He did, however, implore for German humanitarian help in Bosnia, but not German peacekeepers.⁶⁷ This distinction, of not pushing for German involvement, would be a key point of criticism from others in the Party. Second, he was not arguing for the creation of

⁶⁴ Hermann, interview by author.

⁶⁵ Borchers.

⁶⁶ "Interview Joschka Fischer," 9-10.

⁶⁷ "'Das wäre blutiger Zynismus'."

peace through aggressive peacekeeping initiatives. Such would have been a much broader expansion of the use of military forces and would remain taboo for the majority of the Party for three more years until shattered amidst the Kosovo crisis.

The argument that Fischer put forth in this twelve page letter is clearly a new dynamic on the use of military forces for a Green Party member. As the commentator Matthias Geis of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* argued, Fischer was in essence trying to create consensus within all German political parties on foreign policy, in particular the use of the military, by bringing the Greens toward the mainstream.⁶⁸ In effect, he chose to protect the sanctity of life over the Party's prohibition on using military force.

However these ideas were not new, nor were they a complete departure from Green values, as such ideals are clearly reflected within his argument. Indeed, at the end of his essay, Fischer claimed that the Green values of non-violent cohabitation and the protection of human rights still remained. What was different however was his interpretation of these values and the importance that he attached to them. He rejected an absolutist perspective of pacifism in favor of a more nuanced approach. As a champion of change, Fischer had clearly taken some dramatic first steps.⁶⁹ But even he had further to go on his journey, as the evolution to his later positions clearly demonstrates.

The Response

Reactions to Fischer's letter from the non-*realo* sections of the Party were strong and quick. Denounced as a traitor to Green Party values, as a militarist, and even

⁶⁸ Geis, "Basteln am Außenpolitischen Konsens."

⁶⁹ More research is required to develop a clearer understanding of the personal and political reasons for Fischer's evolution. Was it caused solely by the Srebrenica massacre or were there other events that tipped his views? Similarly, what if any political calculations were involved in this process? Though some

implored to grab a weapon and go to Sarajevo, Fischer was attacked first in the press by his party and later with more official letters from Party members. The traditional pacifists responded with outright vehemence, while the swing group reacted “extremely acrimoniously.”⁷⁰ Indeed, Fischer found only a few supporters from the Greens. For several months this debate raged, with no clear resolution. Instead it was overtaken by the cessation of hostilities, only to reemerge in a new form several years later. Examining this portion of the debate, the reaction to Fischer’s letter, highlights in particular the three groups emerging with clearer distinction and is especially relevant to an overall understanding of the use of force debate within the Greens.

Within days there was a flurry of activity within the press, as political operatives and commentators on all sides of the Green spectrum took to the airwaves. The political writer Mohssen Massarrat believed that any attempt by the Greens to distance themselves from their non-violent principles through the acceptance of Fischer’s argument would prevent them from other fundamental reforms they wanted to accomplish.⁷¹ From his perspective, accepting the use of the military would weaken the Green soul and prevent it from achieving its higher goals.

Ludger Volmer of the swing group was one of the more prolific voices in this debate, publishing numerous pieces in several media from the swing group perspective. Generally, he argued that Fischer’s and the other *realos*’ current arguments were fundamentally turning the Greens away from their anti-military roots.⁷² He called

conclusions can be inferred, only a detailed examination of his personal files, which at this point remain sealed, will provide the definitive data required.

⁷⁰ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 514.

⁷¹ Massarrat.

⁷² “Den Menschen helfen,” 44.

Fischer “irresponsible” (*Verantwortungslos*).⁷³ In a rather sarcastic article, he implored Fischer to pick up his own weapon and head to Sarajevo. Focusing on Fischer’s choice to have others, especially the UN, conduct a robust defense of the safe areas, he mockingly rebutted Fischer claiming that he had made it clear to the entire world that the German Greens were ready to protect these safe areas “to the last Frenchman.” He believed that Fischer’s choice of defending the safe areas was a best “symbolic.”

Others in the so-called swing group also demurred on Fischer’s argument. Jürgen Trittin, one of the co-authors of the long response to Fischer to be discussed below, argued that there was no way for Fischer’s idea to gain a majority within the Party. Angelika Beer, a security policy specialist and Member of the Bundestag who would play a prominent role during the Kosovo and 9/11 debates, argued that Fischer’s ideas “helped neither the people in Bosnia, nor our Party.” Kerstin Müller argued that Fischer’s rush to use military forces had “little to do with real options” and was “cynical and absurd.” In the longer term, his proposed policies would be “devastating” for the Party.⁷⁴

Some in the swing group were somewhat closer to Fischer’s arguments in this particular instance. Winfried Nachtwei recognized the challenge at the crux of the debate—between the anti-fascist ideals of “never again Auschwitz” and the pacifist foundation of the Party endemic in “never again war.” Rhetorically he asked how the Party could rectify the ideals of action to protect human rights, solidarity with victims and non-violence in the context of Bosnia, without ignoring the concept of “never again war” through either collaborating with the aggressors or using military force.

⁷³ “Streit um die Außenpolitik der Grünen wird schärfer: Ludger Volmer nennt Fraktionschef Fischer ‘verantwortungslos’,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 10 August 1995.

He called for the implementation of typical Green non-military mechanisms such as embargoes to stop the war, but at the same time recognized the need for long-term solutions that may or may not incorporate Green Party principles. He rejected the proposed withdraw of the UN peacekeepers from Bosnia and the direct attack on Serbia aggression, yet was only lukewarmly supportive of the idea of using the military to protect the protection zones, as it brought forth the chance of escalation.⁷⁵

Antje Vollmer, in a very revealing statement for the swing group that represented both the desire to hold to traditional values, yet adjust for the future said: "We are and will remain a pacifist party. We will always push for non-military solutions. However, our foreign policy program must become contemporary."⁷⁶ Though many in the swing group recognized the need for a debate, there were few that recognized at this early stage that foreign and security policy in general needed to adapt more directly to the current crises.

The swing group, especially Volmer and Müller, rejected Fischer's argument citing the belief that the dangers of escalation were in fact quite genuine, which was a typical Green tenet. Volmer worried that this "crisis intervention" could in fact lead to a "punishment expedition,"⁷⁷ which would lean then toward the use of the military to achieve state goals. Using the military would then become a "next best solution," instead of a last solution. Indeed, he argued that Fischer's position was a legitimization of

⁷⁴ "Wenn Fischer sich durchsetzt, dann wäre das für die Grünen verherrend'," *taz*, 17 August 1995.

⁷⁵ Winni Nachtwei, "Nach dem Entsendebeschluss vom 30. Juni, nach der Eroberung von Srebrenica und Zepa—wie weiter?," 27 July 1995, Bestand A—Christa Nickels, Akte Nr. 243, AGG.

⁷⁶ Borchers; Daniel Alexander Schacht, "Joschka Fischers Kurs wird keine Mehrheit finden'," *Hannoversche Allgemeine*, 12 August 1995.

⁷⁷ Ludger Volmer, "Greif zur Waffe, fahr nach Sarajevo," *Die Tageszeitung*, 12 August 1995; Ludger Volmer, "Wenn Grüne kämpfe, den Griff zur Waffe fordern: Von der Politischen Kunst, die neue Barbarei ohne Militarismus zu überwinden," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 28 August 1995; "Wenn Fischers sich durchsetzt, dann wäre das für die Grünen verherrend'."

military force and actually pushed the Green Party in the direction of the conservative-based CDU. If the Party were to follow Fischer's arguments, it would lead eventually to the "disorientation" of the Party.⁷⁸ Intervening with military forces to stop genocide would be a "blanket clause for military interventions of the Bundeswehr."⁷⁹

The pacifist wing of the Party also engaged in the debate. Some members of the Party from this wing even threatened to leave the Party.⁸⁰ One of the more pacifist members, Winfried Hermann,⁸¹ recognized some of the analysis from Fischer, but demurred when it came to even the mere mention of the use of military forces. From his perspective, the use of military force could not bring any form of peace. In a voice that would be echoed among others on the Left, Hermann, in a direct contradiction to the suggestion put forth by Fischer that previous efforts had already failed, argued that Green ideas had never been truly tried. He suggested an option in concert with Green foreign and security policy ideas that would utilize a "consequent, enacted, and sanctioned embargo," the hindrance of weapons exports to the warring parties and a strengthening of the peaceful opposition. He believed that none of these efforts had ever been forcefully implemented from the UN or the EU. As Hermann clearly noted, the Green Party's ideas of "civil intervention remained [unutilized] as before and awaited enacting."⁸²

Hans Christian Ströbele, a Member of the Bundestag who was one of the more vocal, argumentative, and indeed colorful of the *fundis*, also weighed in on the debate.

⁷⁸ "Streit um die Außenpolitik der Grünen wird schärfer."

⁷⁹ "Den Menschen helfen," 41-44; Volmer, "Wenn Grüne kämpfen."

⁸⁰ Ziller, "Grünen fürchten Zerreißprobe." This threat to leave would be a common tactic that would again be seen during both the Kosovo crisis and in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In both cases, the Greens would lose some members, though the departures would be minimal.

⁸¹ Mr. Hermann would still be in the Bundestag in 2001 and would be one of eight Greens who resisted sending German forces to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

⁸² Winfried Hermann, "Zu Joschka Fischers Bosnienbrief, Militärintervention und Grünem Pazifismus," August 1995, Bestand A—Winne Hermann, Akte Nr. 99, AGG.

Calling Fischer's letter a "document of helplessness," Ströbele argued that Fischer's call for military action to protect the safe zones was not compatible with Green values. He did, unlike other strict pacifists, recognize that the voices within the Greens in support of military action had grown within the past decade. Adhering to traditional Green values, Ströbele believed that if the UN intervened militarily, they would no longer be seen as neutral, but instead be viewed as an enemy by all sides.⁸³

The primary differences between the three sections of the Party rested along the axis of how they defined a military action and in turn what level of support they would give to it. The traditional pacifists rejected any and all forms of the use of the military at this point, to include the use of peacekeepers. The *realos* proffered the use of military force to stop the violence, though generally not German forces, while the swing group accepted the possible use of peacekeepers in a permissive environment, as outlined in the 1994 Potsdam Party declaration. An interesting and key indicator of the debate at the time was reflected in the agreement between both the *realos* and the *fundis* that even peacekeeping was considered a military function. Each used their own slightly different perspective on peacekeeping and used it to support their own goals—the *realos* to push for using military forces and the *fundis* to decisively reject it.⁸⁴ In doing so, however, that made it much harder for the swing group to hold this current position of a foot in both camps and in essence forced them to evolve their position over the course of the following years if the Green Party was to reach any sort of consensus.

By far, the most compelling and organized response to Fischer's letter to the Party came from Members of the Bundestag and swing group authors Kerstin Müller, Claudia

⁸³ "Das pazifistische Prinzip aufgeben?" *Langewelt*, 10 Augusts 1995.

⁸⁴ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 516.

Roth, Jürgen Tritten and Ludger Volmer, who penned an eight page letter on 31 October 1995. An official reaction to his letter, which they viewed as problematic enough, it also incorporated their opposition to Fischer's proposal at the Bonn Party Congress that they believe took the proposals of his letter one step further—a *requirement* to intervene in the case of genocide. Combined, Fischer's proposals in both mediums invoked this strongly worded response.

From the onset of this letter, Müller and her group of fellow authors (hereafter referred to as Müller, et al.), were heavily steeped with the influence of traditional Green values. The authors criticized Fischer's call for military intervention in Bosnia and more so what they perceived as his call for an intervention requirement in the case of genocide, claiming that he did not consider the dangers of escalation or even the possibility that such a military intervention could be unsuccessful. The letter largely echoed a sentiment Volmer vocalized—that even in such dire cases, any mechanism of action must remain civil.⁸⁵ Moreover, there was considerable consternation that the call for intervention would be a clear “first step” (*Einfallstor*) for a “practically comprehensive support for combat operations.”⁸⁶

For Müller, et al., there was strong opposition to the call for action in the case of genocide, for they believed that genocide could be neither adequately defined, nor would there be any element of oversight or authorizing agency to determine when to intervene. Citing the over forty currently ongoing regional wars, which this faction of the Greens believed were not being fought with any sense of justice, Müller, et al. asked rhetorically

⁸⁵ “Den Menschen helfen,” 44.

⁸⁶ Kerstin Müller, Claudia Roth, Jürgen Tritten, Ludger Volmer, “Wohin führt die Forderung nach einer militärischen Interventionspflicht gegen Völkermord? Ein offener Brief an die Mitglieder von Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen,” 31 October 1995, Bestand B.I.10, BuVo/BGST, 1994-1998, AGG. Hereafter Müller, et. al.

when should there be intervention if all wars are unjust. In the face of such numerous conflicts, Müller, et al. argued that the definition of genocide must be clarified. From their perspective, they feared that genocide would become the *raison d'être* for big power intervention and by proxy, the further militarization of world politics.⁸⁷ Unlike Fischer, who saw the violence of small states as leading to future militarization, these authors remained wedded to the Cold War perception of trying to avoid the re-militarization of the great powers of the world.

Müller and her fellow authors went even further in questioning Fischer, asking him whether the UN should actually do these types of intervention, especially given the UN's limited capabilities. There was clear concern among Müller and others in the Greens that this call for intervention requirements would give NATO a further reason for existence. Indeed, the authors believed that Fischer's call was in fact a "subtle support (*Befürwortung*) of NATO." Moreover, Müller, et al. believed that giving NATO a new mission would negatively impact the process of demilitarization.⁸⁸

It is important to recall here that in the mid-1990s a significant part of the Party, as suggested by the Party's 1994 election platform, firmly believed that NATO should be dissolved and that demilitarization and disarmament were the means of achieving peace.⁸⁹ With NATO as the only credible intervention capable organization, from Müller, et al.'s perspective, Fischer was in essence calling for the resurgence of NATO and with it fundamentally opposing Green values. Though Fischer never made direct reference to using NATO and in fact denied that NATO would be the only institution capable of acting in situations of genocide, events would dictate that in fact the genocides

⁸⁷ Müller, et. al., 1-2.

⁸⁸ Müller, et. al., 3.

in southeastern Europe did provide a primary justification for NATO's continued existence. The fears and concerns of Müller and her fellow authors were thus clearly justified.

The strongest arguments against Fischer's proposals rested in their rejection of the claim that it was a moral imperative to intervene in the case of genocide. From their perspective, those who called for intervention in the case of genocide must intervene to succeed "rigorous[ly] and consequent[ly]" or risk sharing in the culpability of the genocide.⁹⁰ In essence, Müller, et al. stood Fischer's argument on its head—arguing that there could be no chance of success without full engagement, which was largely impossible. In an earlier article, Volmer had echoed a similar vein, asking who would define fascism, if the Greens and others were morally compelled to act against fascist regimes.⁹¹ Such rejections of the moral aspects of intervention largely debunked parts of Fischer's appeal to traditional Green values and the empowerment of "never again Auschwitz" for the swing group at this point.

Quite damningly, Müller, et al. compared Fischer's policy then to that of American interventionism, which was largely construed at that point as acting only when there was even a chance of success and in tune with the nation's interest. Indeed, invoking Woodrow Wilson's liberal ideas of spreading democracy and linking them to the later Kissinger intervention policy (noting this justified the Vietnam War, Desert Storm, and the Cuban Blockade among others), the authors argued that American intervention policy had always been about freedom and the people—much as Fischer's

⁸⁹ "Nur mit uns."

⁹⁰ Müller, et. al., 5.

⁹¹ Volmer, "Wenn Grüne Kämpfen."

idea proposed to do.⁹² In keeping with traditional Green ideas, the authors rejected any such policies that were remotely linked to action based on the interests of the country.

The authors then spent over a page of the eight page letter laying out specific examples and asking whether and how a military intervention would function from the Green perspective. Responding to Fischer's call that the UN should have intervened in Rwanda, they asked whether an operation in Rwanda in 1994 could have had any more success than the bloody failure in Somalia in 1993. How could a mission in Somalia to save the starving in 1993 have been successful, assuming it was genocide? What about the possibility of intervention in the south of Sudan, in Kurdistan, and in East Timor? Or were such issues, respectively, a domestic issue not worthy of international intervention, too much of a challenge given NATO member Turkey's involvement, or simply too far away? How should a practical intervention occur in Afghanistan, given the complicated history of interventions there? And, finally, what should happen in the case of Tibet? Would engaging the great power of China simply rule out any possibility of responding to the challenges in Tibet?⁹³

In the final analysis, according to this logic, there was no need to intervene against small criminal style elements, while at the same time interventions against larger, perhaps more heavily armed groups of perpetrators could have no effectiveness whatsoever. In cases of so-called "middle" conflict areas, the authors argued that there was no guarantee for success, thus reducing any high claim of moral imperatives. Again, the authors had spun Fischer's original argument one hundred eighty degrees by questioning the purity of the morality card. In other words, if you choose to intervene in

⁹² Müller, et. al.,4-5.

⁹³ Müller, et. al.,4-5.

one place, why not in another, when the need is just the same? If the chances for success are limited in most areas and success thus likely defines your decision to intervene (at least from their perspective), how does this definition differ at all from a great power political decision to intervene for power and interest reasons?

This argument was one that Fischer, and indeed the entire community of proponents for humanitarian interventions, were unable to come to grips with. In many ways, the purity of the moral card was diluted within the preeminence of a nation's or party's interest, even if the traditional, anti-establishment elements of the Greens still chose to believe that acting based on a nation's interest was still anathema. In essence, the so-called "moral card" can thus only be seen as a means of facilitating a particular involvement and could not be seen as the sole reason for supporting a change in policy or an active engagement.

However, that said, the "moral card" vastly helped to emotionalize the debate within the Greens on two levels. First, it caused individuals of the Green Party to rethink their perspective on the rejection of the use of military forces. Fischer's and others' letters during the public discourse attest to that. Second, it provided an element of "visual ammunition" through the pictures and video displayed in the press that gave a much clearer elucidation of shock and, indeed, emotion to sway members of the public and within the Party. While it was not the sole reasons to evoke change, it cannot be removed from the calculus of change. Though the moral card did not change the perspectives of the traditional and swing groups members overnight, it did indeed facilitate change over the course of the debate.

The authors also challenged this so-called moral argument by questioning some of

the Western policies occurring in Bosnia, in particular the gradual creation of “ethnically pure zones” as a result of the Dayton Peace accords. If this was indeed a moral argument, how could the western powers in the wake of an intervention accept the end results of the original genocide that precipitated the intervention?⁹⁴ Moreover, Winfried Hermann argued that it was neither realistic nor moral to suggest intervention by others, an eerie echo of Volmer’s call for Fischer to deploy to Bosnia himself.⁹⁵ From their perspective, the entire moral argument utilized by Fischer to gain traction in the push for change to become more *regierungsfähig* (as some viewed it) was illegitimate in its basis and could not even be fulfilled in the current geopolitical context.

The strong criticism of the moral basis of Fischer’s argument, its comparison to general great power intervention decisions, especially that of the US, and its perceived revitalization of NATO were strong arguments that had significant resonance within the Green Party. All of these were in effect cornerstones of the liberal Green base. By appealing to them, Müller, et. al. hoped to remove the emotional pull of the events in Srebrenica and keep the Party’s base focused on the primary tenets of Green foreign policy. As events will later show, there was some element of success in this action, though it was to be short lived, as the emotional events of Kosovo rekindled the emotional moral card and in the end demonstrated the facilitating nature of the moral argument in changing the Greens’ perspective.

In effect, this debate clearly demonstrates that the shock of Srebrenica as a means of change was never internalized by the swing group or the liberal wing of the Party. In effect then, the facilitating norms had only limited immediate effect. The effect of these

⁹⁴ Müller, et. al., 7.

⁹⁵ Hermann, “Zu Joschka Fischers Bosnienbrief.”

facilitating norms, however, must be seen in the context of the entire debate. For the swing group, the events in Bosnia combined with the later humanitarian crisis in Kosovo to create an internal re-examination that would then empower these facilitating norms. The traditional pacifist element of the Party, however, will likely never accept as part of its identity the need to react with military force to shocks of the kind described here, as the challenges associated with the violence in Kosovo and the later 9/11 terrorist attacks effectively demonstrate. For them, these facilitating norms paled in comparison to their firmly held pacifist values.

Significantly, however, neither the extreme pacifist wing of the Party, nor the swing group ever offered their own coherent version of how a Green Party should define its foreign and security policy amid such crises. They did offer snippets of ideas, but nothing coherent. In one case, Volmer did call for the creation of a blue-helmet peacekeeping force that German soldiers could participate in under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), though it was never really followed with any gusto. However, Volmer did eventually show significant evolution by suggesting that the Greens must now distance themselves from the desire to dissolve NATO, as it could play a significant role in the eventual integration of Europe.⁹⁶

Müller also left open the door a bit for some changes, but did not follow through. In an interview shortly after the release of Fischer's paper, she pointedly noted that she was no longer "per se" opposed to the deployment of strictly peacekeeping forces.⁹⁷ In both of these cases, Volmer and Müller showed their distance from the strict pacifists, who at the time were unwilling to support even peacekeeping missions. These statements

⁹⁶ "Streit um die Außenpolitik der Grünen wird schärfer."

⁹⁷ "Nur Nationale Interessen verfolgt: Kerstin Müller, Grüne Fraktionssprecherin, kritisiert Joschka

demonstrate the differences between the strictly pacifist *fundis* and the more open-to-change swing group. Their sharp divergence will become even clear in the context of the reemergence of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and amid the context of the Greens joining the governing coalition in 1998

Instead, for the most part only the tired rhetoric of calling for demilitarization and a clear international structure, avenues which had failed in the Balkans, remained prominent in the Green opposition to the *realo* ideas.⁹⁸ Hermann echoed such rhetoric, calling on the Green's "historical mission" for an "anti-militaristic, civil and non-violent" political mentality to be pushed into German foreign policy, while at the same time resisting any calls for the use of military force.⁹⁹ There was no mention of finding new mechanisms to cope with the new challenges within Müller, et al.'s letter, nor in other press pieces. Indeed, Volmer said publically that Fischer's overall letter should in no way be about the provocation of an internal debate on foreign and security policy as a whole.¹⁰⁰

Fischer's Missive in Response to the Müller Letter

Within a month of the open response to his earlier letter, Fischer wrote a scathing, sixteen page missive attacking the authors. Filled with exclamation points and at times condescending, argumentative and even competitive language, Fischer's letter rebutted their arguments, clarified what he believed were inaccurate assessments and near the end even laid out his perspective on the way ahead for Green foreign and security policy.

Fischers Bosnien-Kurs," *Berliner Zeitung*, 26 August 1995.

⁹⁸ Volmer, "Wenn Grüne kämpfen."

⁹⁹ Hermann, "Zu Joschka Fischers Bosnienbrief."

¹⁰⁰ Volmer, "Greif zur Waffe."

Though it was largely overcome by the cessation of hostilities, his second letter only served to heighten the debate for a time and even spilled into several Green Party membership meetings.

The primary guidepost of his rebuttal was his belief that the UN, if not the international community as a whole, had a necessity to intervene in the case of genocide, to include militarily as a last resort. Indeed, to emphasize his point he even signed the letter “with international greetings.” Importantly, he decried the view of the Müller, et. al. letter and statements from others that he was reacting with emotion to the events in Bosnia,¹⁰¹ instead focusing on clear reasoning for the evolution.

For Fischer, the wars in Bosnia and more so in Rwanda made an “active international politic against genocide irrefutable.” Using the context of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Fischer noted, with emphasis in the original text, that genocide had to be stopped. “Here it is in black and white: The United Nations and its member states are *required* by treaty to the prevention of genocide.” With stark clarity, Fischer argued that with the “danger” of genocide, the UN had the responsibility to intervene. Most importantly, he again reiterated his direct challenge to the Party, stating that the Greens, and their ideals of non-violence, must change when confronted with genocide.¹⁰²

Fischer spent considerable time expounding upon the case for reacting to genocide. Yet, while his critics had immediately assumed that his call for intervention meant military force, Fischer directly and sternly contradicted that, laying out the a more multi-discipline approach. Rather mockingly, he cited that even the German dictionary

¹⁰¹ Fischer, “Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit,” 1, 5, 16.

¹⁰² Fischer, “Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit,” 2-3, 6.

Duden defined intervention as engagement in another state's activities as including diplomatic, economic and military actions.

In a direct answer to his critics, Fischer believed it was the direct American involvement in Bosnia that led to the successes of the Dayton peace deliberations; the economic boycott and sanctions, which had long been the *modus operandi* for Green security policy leverage, had not been the deciding factor in the eventual agreement between the warring parties. Fischer took particular effort to highlight the effectiveness of the military in the intervention process, even at this early date. For Fischer, the call for using military force was not a call for the militarization of German security policy; it was genocide that drove him to change his perspective. Indeed, even at this point he still soundly rejected interventions in Somalia and the Gulf War.¹⁰³

Fischer, moreover, defiantly noted the clear definition of genocide within the 1948 convention, a direct challenge to Müller's argument that linking intervention to genocide would lead to an expansion of its definition to facilitate the further militarization of international, if not German, policy. Indeed, he noted that the October 1993 majority resolution from the Bonn special party day, authored primarily by Ludger Volmer and approved by the strong majority of the Party, had clearly stated that the actions against the Muslims in Bosnia had expanded to genocide with fascist tendencies.¹⁰⁴ That there was a clear definition of genocide would also forcefully play out in the public debate, as *realos* such as Hubert Kleinert made stark reference to it.¹⁰⁵ By clarifying that the Greens themselves had in fact recognized the increasing likelihood

¹⁰³ Fischer, "Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit," 4, 6.

¹⁰⁴ Fischer, "Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit," 3-5, 7. Müller's supposition on the militarization of German security policy is based on the fear of an escalating spiral of further involvement leading to increased militarization of German foreign policy in particular. See the above section on Müller's letter for

of genocide in Bosnia and that there were clear requirement to act in the case of such genocides, Fischer was reminding members of his Party, to say nothing of those in direct opposition to him now, that the concept of genocide was well established and carried clear legal ramifications for action.

For Fischer, the role of Germany's past was a "substantial political argument in the present," which remained an omnipresent factor in all of Germany's actions. As noted in earlier sections, the decisive events of the Nazis and the calamity of the Second World War contributed starkly to German Green ideals, especially "never again Auschwitz" and "never again war." In this letter, Fischer invoked the Nazi past and linked it to modern international law. Fischer argued that it was the Holocaust, especially Auschwitz, that led directly to the above mentioned 1948 convention on the prevention of genocide. Rhetorically, Fischer asked where the difference in the foundational ideals between the proceedings in Nuremberg and the current reaction to genocide after the end of the Cold War arose. For Fischer, they were one and the same, with each requiring punishment of those who committed those acts.¹⁰⁶

In addition, in the context of the role of Germany's history, he addressed the perception he garnered from Müller's letter of a deep suspicion of US policy. Whereas Müller's letter presupposed advancement of UN based military intervention as a precursor to a more active, great power style US hegemony, Fischer decisively rejected that argument, claiming that the swing group and traditional pacifist wings of the Party had a "negative obsession with the US." Here, Fischer again used this as an opportunity

more information.

¹⁰⁵ "Den Menschen Helfen," 41.

¹⁰⁶ Fischer, "Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit," 3, 7.

to further define the linkage to Germany's Nazi history as a primary reason for action.¹⁰⁷

Fischer also made some considerable efforts to define his new vision of what Green security policy should be. After the waning of the Cold War, the Greens were defined by freedom, justice, peace and equal chances for life; in essence the Left as a whole was defined by the rule of law in this new post Cold War era. The responsibility of the Left and by proxy the Greens was to fight all of its opposites.¹⁰⁸ This is perhaps one of the best examples of the impact of the change of the system on the Greens, as the Party's leader flatly laid out a change that evolved as a result of the collapse of the Cold War.

For that new view of foreign and security policy, Fischer recognized that the Left necessarily included non-violence as a core principle. Yet at the same time, he noted another requirement to help those in need, particularly in the case of genocide. His argument here is reflected by others in the *realo* section of the party. Hubert Kleinert, a self-identified *realo* argued that to be "Left" brought with it the requirement to "help the weakest" and protect "elementary human rights."¹⁰⁹ Such help and protection, according to the *realo* argument, must also include military assistance in the most extreme cases. As such, and here Fischer was quite adamant, the Left has an element of solidarity with those in need and thus must get involved.¹¹⁰ According to one author from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, a perspective such as this could very well fall under the mantra of Green philosophy.¹¹¹

In speaking of the events of Srebrenica, for which he did accept some of the

¹⁰⁷ Fischer, "Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit," 9-10.

¹⁰⁸ Fischer, "Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit," 10.

¹⁰⁹ "Den Menschen helfen," 41.

¹¹⁰ Fischer, "Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit," 10-12.

blame, Fischer again reiterated that the massacres were a clear reflection of the failure of UN conflict prevention. Earlier intervention could have prevented the loss of life. Indeed, Fischer made what to some Greens could only have been seen as a preposterous argument. Viewed through the lens of solidarity with those in need and the desire to prevent conflicts, the “only” criticism, according to Fischer, could be that the UN acted after instead of before the massacre.¹¹²

Fischer’s words were an echo of the argument made earlier by a leading Green *realo*, Ralf Fücks. In a position paper from late August 1995, Fücks asked rather sarcastically since when the idea of “without us” had become entrenched in the Green lexicon when emergency help against genocide was codified in the UN and, significantly from his perspective, when the defeat of National Socialism in the Second World War was directly the result of active interventionism.¹¹³ Even in this argument, Fischer was well behind the curve of many of his new *realo* brethren. The invocation of this solidarity with those in need was a direct manifestation of the transformative norm. No other concept provides a direct linkage to the actions of the Nazi past that have had such a clear resonance for every Green Party member and the current calamities affecting numerous regions throughout the world.

In addition to the linkage to Germany’s past and the solidarity with those in need, Fischer also outlined some more practical, if not realist, reasons for supporting active UN intervention. First, he believed that the wars in southeastern Europe could hinder the development and further integration of Europe. At the most essential level, he was

¹¹¹ Schlötzer-Scotland, “Desorientierung der Grünen.”

¹¹² Fischer, “Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit,” 11-12.

¹¹³ Fücks.

arguing for empowering the UN and furthering integration.¹¹⁴ Interestingly, such arguments were often heard by members of the SPD or the CDU, who had considerable more experience in, and thus more socialization from, the international realm.¹¹⁵ As events would later dictate, Fischer was in many respects part of the leading edge of the Greens who eventually began to realize the importance of the “completion” of Europe.

To end his letter, Fischer laid out ten tenets of a future Green security and foreign policy. Some, such as strong conflict prevention, the creation of an international commission on the prevention of genocide, reducing the power of the individual states, the rejection of German global intervention capabilities, the shrinking of the Bundeswehr, the further reduction of arms production and distribution, and the rejection of any nuclear German nuclear ambition were well within the bounds of normal Green values. Indeed, none of these, with the exception of the genocide commission, were new.

However, Fischer did make three suggestions that were beyond normalcy for the Greens and really set him apart as a trendsetter for the Party. First, he argued for an increased transnational integration, instead of “traditional military alliances.” While not exactly new, this was a clear attempt to empower the UN and reduce the fear among many in the Party that NATO would achieve primacy in intervention. Evidence at this time does not offer any clear indication whether this was a genuine appeal on the part of Fischer or whether it was merely a tactical suggestion to appease many in the Party. Given the significant weaknesses of the UN, which Fischer pointedly noted in his letter, it is likely that this was more of an appeasement tactic aimed at his fellow Green Party members.

¹¹⁴ Fischer, “Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit,” 13.

¹¹⁵ These comments do provide a foreshadowing of the later Joschka Fischer and indeed other German

Second, and directly related to the first one listed above, he proposed the strengthening of the civil and, importantly, the military capabilities of the UN. Third, he proposed limiting German participation to so-called blue-helmet activities, i.e. peacekeeping. He went even further and proposed that certain elements of the Bundeswehr should be trained in such practices and offered to the UN. He was quick to note though that such forces would not be offered for Chapter VII, peacemaking operations.¹¹⁶ Both of these ideas were clearly new and were a direct affront to the traditional Green values that generally abhorred all forms of military involvement, especially German forces. These suggestions were by far the most provocative and represented the most direct distancing from traditional Green values. As events will show, this debate on the wake of the Srebrenica massacre was a critical step of Fischer's, and to an extent, the Green party's journey of change.

Of course, Fischer's missive did spark some responses from his opponents, though the debate was largely overtaken by events as the war finally came to a close when the Dayton Accord was signed in November 1995. For example, Ludger Volmer in late November 1995 retorted that Fischer had "talked right by our argument in wild rhetoric," failing to answer any of the questions posed by Müller, et al. From his perspective Fischer's answer was proof that his underlying purpose was to elicit a principal voice of support for military action, for which the primary enactors would be NATO and the Bundeswehr. Indeed, he was quite concerned that even though Fischer had only proposed support for UN action, he feared that the Bundeswehr could soon be deployed worldwide, and that the Greens would have to support such actions. In a

Green leaders. See the next chapter on Kosovo for more detailed information.

¹¹⁶ Fischer, "Auf der Flucht vor der Wirklichkeit," 14-15.

somewhat sarcastic conciliatory tone, Volmer bemoaned that the Greens would someday say “yes” to military deployments.¹¹⁷

Fischer’s response to the members of the Greens was by no means the end of the debate, as it would continue in the press and in the public discourse. Nor would this missive convince too many Party members of the need for change. It did, however, lay out a vision of Green party security policy that would largely forecast the direction that Party would move. It would take, however, some clear successes in Bosnia with military forces and a second disastrous resurgence of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Balkans—this time in the Serbian province of Kosovo—for change to advance further. This short, but intense, debate in the fall of 1995 was thus a step in the process, spurned by the events of Srebrenica, but only a precursor to the even more rancorous debate amid the debate prior to the NATO attack on Serbia in March 1999.

CHALLENGES AMID PARLIAMENTARY DECISIONS

The debate that had for so long encapsulated the Party soon crept into the realm that actually required the Greens to make a decision at the Bundestag level, as the German government led by the CDU began to push for German participation in the war in Bosnia. The Party position reflected a party in the throes of a debate. There was consensus on some issues, but strong disagreement on others. The end result was that making any decisions as a group at the federal level was riddled with challenges.

As the fall 1995 decision on German deployment to Bosnia approached, Nina

¹¹⁷ Ludger Volmer, “Replik auf Joschkas Antwort zu unserem offenen Brief,” 27 November 1995, Bestand A—W. Schulz, Akte Nr.170, AGG.

Philippi has suggested that the *realos* had gained increasing support from the Party, due directly to the situation in Bosnia. Moreover, she argues, this *realo* perspective, based on local surveys, represented the “the desire of the majority of Green voters.”¹¹⁸ To an extent this is true, for the more realistic elements did gain some support. However, the element that would decisively shift the overall opinion of the Greens, the swing group, remained uncommitted to the *realo* approach in the summer of 1995. Philippi, however, is quite incorrect to argue that this position represented the majority of Green voters. As the events surrounding the Kosovo crisis will clearly demonstrate, many Green voters, in particular those that would call themselves members of the grass roots, would remain firmly entrenched in traditional pacifism, shunning the use of military force. As the following chapter will highlight, the Green debate was far from over. Thus, to say that a majority supported the policy is an oversimplification.

Contrarily Ludger Volmer quite correctly has suggested that as the debates that fall came to fruition, the Greens remained fractured, citing the fact that no common decision could be arrived at on whether the Greens should support or reject the August and September 1995 NATO attacks on Serb positions. The *realos* saw it as a necessary step to bring the Serbs to the negotiating table.¹¹⁹ Indeed, Waltrud Schoppe and Gerd Poppe argued in an open letter on 31 August 1995 that the air attacks over the previous few days had proven quite effective and had been “necessary.”¹²⁰ The pacifists and the swing group rejected these arguments based on their principles of abhorrence to the use of military force, some even suggesting that the attacks had long been planned as

¹¹⁸ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 138.

¹¹⁹ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 517.

¹²⁰ Waltraud Schoppe and Gerd Poppe, “Druck auf Bosnische Serben muss Aufrechterhalten Werden,” 31

retaliation for the massacre of Srebrenica.¹²¹

While there was tremendous discord on support to military operations in general in Bosnia, there was considerably more symmetry within the Green Party, especially between the federal leadership and the grass roots, on the choice to be made when it came to the German government's proposal to deploy German Tornado aircraft to participate in the rapid reaction force in Bosnia. Only four of the almost fifty Green Members of the Bundestag supported the government's position to use German forces in the Bosnia. Even Fischer, who spurned this hefty debate chose to reject the use of German forces.¹²²

That unity within the Green federal level leadership, however, fractured when the government proposal for the use of German participation in the initiation peacekeeping force IFOR (NATO Implementation Force) came before the Bundestag. It is important to note here that this was a NATO implementation force and not a UN instigated effort, which would provide a different twist to the debate, as many in the Greens still held reservations about the future relevance of NATO. Moreover, there was a stark difference between the earlier decision on the deployment of German tornado aircraft that could take part in actual combat operations and this decision on a proposal that would support the deployment of strictly peacekeeping forces. The latter perspective had considerably more supporters within the Party, to include many in the swing group, thus allowing it to gain more supporters.

In this case, with the inclusion of a future role for peacekeeping for NATO which still had many detractors within the Party, the planned agreement to the government's

August 1995, Bestand A—Winfried Nachtwei, Akte Nr. 3724, AGG.

¹²¹ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 517.

¹²² Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 517-18. It is interesting to note that not only were the Greens opposed to this proposal, but only one-third of the SPD supported the government proposal.

proposal by the federal leadership was seen as a “massive provocation” for many in the Party. Though this desire to support the proposal was rooted in the reality in Bosnia, which required an international peacekeeping force for which no other organization except NATO could fulfill, many were concerned that this would create a new role for the North Atlantic alliance, which the 1994 election platform still firmly rejected.¹²³ As Green votes were not needed for the successful passage of this proposal, the conflict was put off until later in the year when a strategy session again raised the issue of NATO’s role.¹²⁴

This portion of the policy debate—focusing on who should intervene and what level of intervention should be used—continued into October and November at a strategy conference in Bonn and at the leadership group meeting. In both cases, the *realos* pushed to accept the role of NATO, while the swing group and to an extent some traditional pacifists chose to look at a wider collective security system to send peacekeeping forces into Bosnia that would utilize the UN or OSCE as the overall umbrella for the operation.

This debate reached a crescendo during early December 1995 at the Party Day in Bremen. The Party voted on two *fundi* proposals, one *realo* and one swing group proposal. The more extreme version of the traditional pacifist and the *realo* proposals failed to receive enough votes to advance past the first round of voting, thus showing that the two ends of the spectrum in the Green Party had little chance of being enacted. The two remaining proposals, that of Ludger Volmer and the other traditional pacifist group, were eventually combined into one proposal that many of the swing group and the

Indeed, an SPD proposal to support the deployment was firmly rejected by the SPD overall.

¹²³ It would not be until 1998 that the Greens finally accepted a different view of NATO and foresaw it as a possible mechanism off a collective security system. See below for more details.

¹²⁴ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 518.

traditional pacifists could approve. The primary dissonance between these two proposals focused on whether deployed forces should be allowed to use force. While the swing group pushed for the use of weapons for self defense, the *fundis* wanted the German soldiers to be unarmed.¹²⁵

In the end, in a vote of 278-223, the Green Party in their Bremen Party Day approved a compromise resolution that brought forth elements of both major remaining proposals. It was instigated by the swing group, in particular by Ludger Volmer, as they were forced to compromise to ensure support from the traditional pacifists. Following traditional Green values, it suggested that non-military methods were the method of choice; however it moved away from those traditions by accepting a role for German soldiers in a peacekeeping environment. While it strictly rejected the use of German forces in combat deployments (Chapter VII), which many of the more radical elements of the *realo* camp had supported, it did allow the deployment of “lightly-armed” German troops to international trouble spots in a *peacekeeping capacity* (i.e. chapter VI), so long as all those deployed were volunteers and could only defend themselves in “extreme cases.” It moreover, focused on the UN and OSCE as the primary purveyors of collective security operations. Significantly, those who supported this motion made it clear that this agreement was not to be seen as step toward militarization.

While Volmer’s proposal was eventually adopted, the *realos* and Joschka Fischer had proposed a motion of their own in the early stages of the debate—one that saw the use of military force as a realistic approach to stop genocide. Though Fischer’s proposal was eventually rejected, he did perceive a reason to be optimistic that more elements of his Party were accepting the need for force in some instance, one that the national press

¹²⁵ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 520-21.

would pick up on. Fischer had proposed a motion that would have allowed for the use of force in cases when war would be the only means of preventing genocide. In the first round of voting, his proposal got approximately 38% of the vote from the Party, which was far more than he had expected and claimed that it was a “excellent” result. Ludger Volmer in his book recounting these events, however, points out that the 38% was in fact a false measure of success. That percentage came from the first vote, in which every delegate has four ballots to cast, thus precluding any delegate from having to make a clear choice. Moreover, in a sharply critical rebuke, Volmer suggests that Fischer and the other *realos* “allowed” this news to be distributed to the Press.¹²⁶

As the vote on the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) neared, the party leadership again broached the issue of NATO versus UN or OSCE leadership of the force. Both the *realos* and the remainder of the party proposed various alternatives, with the latter suggesting that although they were not against the use of peacekeepers, they were opposed to its incorporation into NATO’s operations. The party leadership’s 27-16 decision to support the *realo* idea of using NATO, led to what Volmer called the leadership’s “break with the Party” being complete.¹²⁷ Whereas the Party at the Party Day had just voted in support of a motion that used the UN and OSCE, the federal leadership had rejected that notion and accepted the concept of an operation under a NATO umbrella. Again there was a dissonance between the leadership and the grass roots.

Yet, when it came time to vote in the Bundestag on 6 December 1995 for the

¹²⁶ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 137; “Greens Drop Pure Pacifism, Voting for ‘Lightly-Armed’ Troops,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur (International Edition), 3 December 1995; “German Greens Drop Pacifism but put Brakes on Leader,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur (International Edition), 2 December 1995; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die*

deployment of German forces to support the IFOR for peacekeeping duties in Bosnia, which would be a Chapter VII mandate, the federal level of the Party chose not to worsen the debate and bring on the wrath of the party. In a tactical maneuver, the vote amidst the Green members of the Bundestag was 22-22, with four members, in a subtle political move, abstaining from the voting to ensure an equal vote. Doing this meant that the federal level Green federal leadership choose to avoid coming down on one particular side of the rather pernicious debate. But in so doing, the leadership largely ignoring the position developed in Bremen, in net effect still causing some of that consternation they had hoped to avoid.¹²⁸ That the Greens had offered such support and the overall strong support for the IFOR mission in the Bundestag (543-107) suggests that that the debate over the use of force had migrated from a division between Left and Right to one within the Left, in particular primarily within the Greens.¹²⁹

Though this delaying tactic was effective for a short while, events in Bosnia continued to have an impact on the debate. A year after the initial vote on IFOR, the mandate for the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) came to the Bundestag and again instigated debate in the Greens. Building on what Fischer perceived as the success of IFOR, though not all in the Party would agree to this, Fischer argued that the Party would support the NATO SFOR only so long until the UN force was ready to take its place. However, many in the Greens believed that supporting the ruling coalition's proposal for support to SFOR was in essence an effort to transform the mandate of NATO in Bosnia,

Außenpolitik, 520-21.

¹²⁷ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 522.

¹²⁸ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 137. Comparing this result with that after the 9/11 attacks and the vote for German participation in NATO combat forces deploying to Afghanistan, when only eight Green members of the Bundestag, opposed the motion gives a very stark representation of the evolution of the Party's perspective on the use of force.

which returned to the argument inherent in many in the Party of a fear of militarization of NATO's overall presence. As such, the federal leadership of the Greens rejected the government's proposal, with only two voting in favor and sixteen abstaining.¹³⁰

CONCLUSION

The events in Bosnia in the summer of 1995 pushed the Green Party to a new plateau in the way they thought about the use of force. The earlier internalized values of traditional pacifism that had guided the party for so long had begun to show some signs of weakness in the early days of the Bosnian war, as outlined in the last chapter, now began to show some serious cracks after the events in Srebrenica and the collapse of the UN actions. More members of the Party began to move toward the *realo* group, in particular the prominent leader Joschka Fischer. However, the swing group as a whole, in large part to preserve their hold on the power within the Party, appears to have shifted very little overall.¹³¹ Despite some defections, they remain largely intact and clearly linked to the traditionalist tradition. Indeed, as the following chapter will show, it would not be until a number of other factors exhibit their influence that the swing group will change their perspectives.

Some of the central ideals of the Green party were shattered against the violence of Bosnia. No longer were the tenets of "never again Auschwitz" and "never again war" compatible; rather they became mutually exclusive for many who moved toward the

¹²⁹ Dalgaard-Nielsen, 71.

¹³⁰ "Grosse Mehrheit für neuen Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Bosnien," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 December 1996, 1; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 522-23. Interestingly, the two that voted for the resolution eventually moved to the CDU.

realo perspective—to stop the genocide, which for many was the most important concern, meant military action. In effect, as Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen noted, for some, the very concepts of “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz” underwent a an “inversion,” literally changing what mattered most to each individual and to the pacifist movement.¹³² For many, the strict adherence to non-military measures lost its appeals to the brutality of the present, as the memories of Auschwitz cast a long shadow. For the *realo* section of the Greens now, as well as the SPD, the eventual support by some members of the Party was rooted in two primary factors—the view that something had to be done and a moral responsibility to act in the case of genocide.¹³³

Still, despite this divisiveness between the new *realos* and the remainder of the Party, there remained some commonality. Though the immediate aftermath of Srebrenica saw a growing chorus of voices that supported the use of the military in Bosnia to stop the violence, there remained almost zero support for the use of German combat power to enforce or create the peace under a Chapter VII mandate. Only as the Greens edged ever closer to a possible coalition government with the SPD, and by proxy an incorporation of the German responsibility, did the Green leadership, though not the majority of the Party, start to suggest more often, the possible use of German forces.

Moreover, with the evens in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace accords and in particular NATO successes in keeping stability in Bosnia,¹³⁴ the Party significantly shifted its position to recognize the greater role of NATO and the possible use of even

¹³¹ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 218.

¹³² Dalgaard-Nielsen, 47.

¹³³ Wolfgang Biermann, Foreign Policy Staffer, interview by author, 7 November 2002. The German SPD Party, Berlin, Germany.

¹³⁴ One interesting example of German involvement that did represent some success for German forces and indeed a step forward in operations within the region was a dramatic evacuation of German citizens with German helicopters from Albania as the political situation worsened there. See Volmer, *Die Grünen und*

German Chapter VI peacekeepers, such that there was now a general level of acceptance within a significant majority of the Party that supported the use of peacekeeping forces.¹³⁵ These sentiments followed the trends that were occurring in the population, as the support for peacekeeping operations in the NATO context steadily rose, indicating, as Nina Philippi suggests, a “learning process.”¹³⁶ By the time the Party agreed on the 1998 election platform, there had been a clear evolution in particular for the entire party with the role of NATO. No longer were the Greens seeking to dissolve NATO, but instead they saw it as a possible mechanism for a new collective security system in Europe. Indeed, there was now no longer a reason to pull Germany out of NATO.¹³⁷ More importantly, these successes tended to weaken, though not destroy, the traditional pacifist argument. For example, the decision to seek parity in the federal leadership vote before the Bundestag in the IFOR vote and the decision not to support the transition to SFOR in 1996, soon evolved in late 1997 and early 1998 into outright calls by Joschka Fischer to support the extension of the SFOR mandate, suggesting an empowerment of the *realo* wing.¹³⁸

All of that said, there are some who saw the Green debate amid Srebrenica and the challenges posed by Bosnia as of little importance. Dr. Wolfgang Biermann of the SPD believed that the debate in the mid 1990s was “more symbolic than real.” It lacked a specific strategic context, instead focusing on only one portion—that of the use of force—of the overall debate. As such, from his perspective, it was a simplified debate

die Außenpolitik, 524-25.

¹³⁵ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 525.

¹³⁶ Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 174.

¹³⁷ “Ablösen statt Auflösen: Geändertes Wahlprogramm verabschiedet Bündnis 90/Grüne gegen einseitigen Austritt aus der NATO,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 January 1998; “Nur mit uns.”

¹³⁸ “Ablösen statt Auflösen.”

with only minimal importance.¹³⁹ However, Dr. Biermann overlooks the role the dispute played in the overall context of the evolutionary debate. It may indeed have been somewhat simplified, but it focused on the issue that was front and center. Debating this issue first was critical, as it was one of the more challenging aspects of the Green foreign and security policy. Moreover, Dr. Biermann also omits the impact that even this focus had on later iterations of the debate, for example how the Greens' perspective on NATO changed with the evolving use of force debate. To fully understand the overall debate, this scuffle over using force in Bosnia was a necessary, even if a bit simplified, step along the entire evolutionary process.

Still, despite some military successes and a rising tide of support and inertia for the *realos*, the debate was far from over. The massacres in Srebrenica had pushed the debate to a new level and had highlighted the schism not only between the three groups within the Party, but had also clarified what would become a growing rift between the federal level delegates and the grass roots of the Party. The worsening situation in the region, defined in large part by Srebrenica, and the later successes on the ground in Bosnia in keeping a tentative peace forced many in the Party to rethink their perspective on the possible use of the military¹⁴⁰ and thus continued the evolutionary process even as the heat of the debate had resided.

Though the Party could in no way be seen as speaking with a common voice on this issue, neither where they completely fractured. The majority still remained opposed

¹³⁹ Biermann, interview by author.

¹⁴⁰ Nina Philippi, very prophetically, argued that military successes in Bosnia during peacekeeping operations would diminish the argument of the traditional pacifists. See Philippi, *Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*, 138. Incorporating this idea into the matrix of three distinct groups in the Greens, this effectively means that the swing group would be more willing to accept the positive benefits the military could bring, while moving, albeit slowly and at times grudgingly, away from the traditions that for so long had guided their policies.

to the use of military force to stop violence. Both the swing group and the traditional pacifists within the Party's leadership still remained opposed to using military force in a peace enforcement or peacemaking mission, though the former was beginning to accept the possibility of the use of the military for peacekeeping or logistic missions. As swing group member and Party Speaker Jürgen Trittin said, the Green Party foreign policy was "neither pacifist, nor militaristic (*Tschingdarassabum*)."

The *realos* remained a loud minority, but had only minimal support in the grass roots and could not effect major change in the Party's overall stance. They did, however, have the capability to influence the federal level debate well beyond their numbers, given their prominence at that level. Their involvement with the international community helped to engage them more and in essence created a forcing function that pushed for a re-evaluation of personal beliefs for those at the federal level. For those at the grass roots level, however, the principles of their ideology continued to trump the international events that only permeated their lives through the television. Such vast differences of experience contributed starkly to the ever growing rift between the federal and grass root levels.

As the conflict in Kosovo arose, the lack of a coherent plan on foreign and security policy in general and a clear policy on how to address such crises in particular would hamper the power of the swing group, as events in the region and the possibility of a Red-Green coalition would force the Greens to take a stance. The pacifist and swing group portions of the Party had been very slow to react to events on the ground in the Balkans and within the capitals of Europe during the mid 1990s, choosing instead to remain wedded to the values that guided them in the past. The swing group was a few

steps behind the *realo* wing of the Party and Europe, and with the resurgence of violence in the Balkans would eventually evolve and adapt to meet the challenges of the post Cold War era. It is their evolution that would help to define the overall position of the Party in the use of force. For the strict pacifists, however, who incorporated a much deeper philosophical internalization of the values of pacifism, they would remain loathe to give up, even as their reaction to the events after 9/11 will demonstrate.

This chapter has directly integrated the first intervening variable—external shocks—into the analysis. The Srebrenica massacre, a clear and decisive shock, would have its most important impact on Joschka Fischer, who, as clear leader in the Party, would push the debate to a new level. Moreover, this chapter has also highlighted the differences of the minority *realos* and the swing group and traditionalist thorough an analysis of the discourse of the acrimonious debate in the summer of 1995. In particular, the *realos* were the only ones to internalize the effects of the shocks; the swing group importantly remained on the side of the traditionalists. Finally, this chapter also noted that the post conflict decision requirements in the Bundestag demonstrated that the leadership was similarly fractured and that the *realo* part of it, somewhat paradoxically, still had power that exceeded its numbers, resulting in some level of support for peacekeeping operations.

The year 1998 would add two particular elements to this debate that would bring it to a new level—the worsening crisis in the Serbian province of Kosovo and the distinct possibility of the Green Party's participation in a governing coalition with the SPD. Though the Party was no longer purely pacifist, it still had no defining identity or clear policy on the use of force. Both of these two new elements would build on the evolutions

of the 1995-1997 and lead to a situation in late 1998 that few would have fathomed only a few years before—that the Green Party would support the deployment of German combat troops to an active peacemaking mission. It was a long, arduous journey that would push the Greens further from their pacifist roots and closer to identifying a clear policy. Though its final evolution was still years away, the debate on the use of force would continue to escalate during the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999.

CHAPTER VI

THE STRATEGIC CALCULATION TO GOVERN

Whereas the crisis in Bosnia would see the evolution and development of the *realo* perspective within the Greens, the crisis in Kosovo would focus on the changing views of the swing group. The challenges in Bosnia had brought the Party a long way from their traditionalist roots. The shock of Srebrenica, which galvanized Joschka Fischer to change his position, led to a firestorm debate and shifts in some positions. By the end of 1995, the Party was split between the minority *realos* and the rest of the group that largely remained wedded to the traditional Green, pacifist values. The evolution of the crisis into active combat with Green support meant that a generation of Green leaders who had been reared in the late 1960s “lost their military virginity” with the Kosovo crisis.¹

The years since the Dayton Peace Accords had seen the continuation of the foreign policy debate, but on a rather low simmer given there was little calling for any direct policy contrary to Green values. To be sure, the Greens, as the source documents suggest, maintained an interest in the events in the region. But it would not be until 1998, in particular as the violence surged to shocking levels in Kosovo, that the Greens would again begin to debate the merits of the two ingrained ideals of “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz” in the context of their adherence to pacifism.

Relative to the earlier debate, however, there was a distinctly different variable that would have a profound effect this time on the Greens, in particular the swing group. The chance that the Greens could soon join the SPD to form a majority in the executive

portion of the government, a so-called Red-Green coalition, raised direct requirements and positions the Party as a whole had to support. Encapsulated in the German term *Regierungsfähigkeit*, this new variable introduces a new strategic, calculating aspect to understanding the Greens' evolution. In order to be a part of the governing coalition, as clearly enunciated by the SPD, the Greens had to change their overall perspective on many issues, especially the use of force, and support Germany's international responsibilities. For many in the swing group, the ideals inherent in *Regierungsfähigkeit*, especially the conscious will to govern and the effect of being in the government, both of which required some element of change, were major reasons for their evolution.

It must be noted that the majority of the information on this section comes from newspaper accounts, speeches, and personal interviews. With the exception of some documents from early in this critical process, there are few primary sources and even fewer secondary sources that can provide direct evidence, since many of the documents were still sealed at the time of research. It is clear there was indeed a definitive process to this evolution though the ideas presented here are but snippets of the entire process that likely occurred. The complete story will remain a mystery for now, requiring more detailed interviews and examinations of primary source documents. However, it is quite clear that the pull of the desire to govern played a clear role on the evolution in the Green Party and, as we shall see later, will have a decisive impact on the staying power of the Red-Green coalition.

Unlike the situation during Bosnia where converts to the *realo* perspective made it quite clear why they changed their views, it is very difficult to separate the varying level of impact of the two intervening variables amid the shock of the resurgence of violence

¹ "A Continent Stands Transformed."

and the strategic calculation demanding change to be a part of the governing coalition. At the federal level, comparing speeches and articles of several major federal level swing group members will clearly demonstrate their evolution, though that may not provide a definitive answer as to their personal reason for change.

The evolution of the Party is a bit easier to judge. In creating the election platform at the Magdeburg Party Day, there were no pressures from *Regierungsfähigkeit*, thus leaving the Party to remain wedded to pacifist principles. Yet, eighteen months later during the Bielefeld Party Day, as the Greens were six months into their new government and two months into the shooting war in Kosovo, the change relative to the earlier Party Day can be easily measured. Examining in detail the Bielefeld conference provides an important understanding of how the Party as a whole moved closer to the swing group perspective and in turn the demands of *Regierungsfähigkeit*.

By the end of the war in Kosovo, the Green Party had weathered the storm, supporting both the Green leadership and the Red-Green coalition. The swing group, as the purveyor of change, had evolved their guiding ideas to choose the strategy of influence in the government over the principles of pacifism and opposition. Two years later, these values would again be put to the test in Macedonia, only this time the military mission would be a preventive deployment without it being a response to a particular shock. That difference provides an opportunity to measure the effects of being in government. For the Greens, but also the SPD, there would be enough dissonance to lead to the necessity of relying on the Opposition for passage of the deployment proposal, setting up the circumstances of the difficult debate after the 9/11 attacks.

Whereas the last chapter focused on the role of shocks to change the Greens, this

one will look primarily at the role of the second intervening variable—*Regierungsfähigkeit*—and to a lesser extent the role of shocks and Fischer to understand the changes during the Kosovo crisis. The chapter will be divided into three distinct sections. The first section will define the primary parameters of *Regierungsfähigkeit* in depth and discuss the debate within the Greens on the necessity and importance of this idea. The second section will focus on the changes in the Party during the Kosovo crisis. It will examine specific Green postures from various players in all groups to different aspects of the crisis. Most importantly, it will highlight the changes within the swing group that arose particularly out of the tenets of *Regierungsfähigkeit* by examining the evolutions of two important leaders (Volmer and Beer) as well as the Bielefeld Party Day. The final section will examine the challenges presented by the deployment of German forces to Macedonia, in particular the new parameters it outlined for German, and by proxy Green, security policy and the impact of *Regierungsfähigkeit* on the decision process.

A REGIERUNGSFÄHIG GREEN PARTY?

Throughout the mid 1990s, the newly unified Germany developed a growing sentiment of a responsibility within international relations. The SPD, like the CDU, accepted the need to continue this new responsibility and contribute to the “Western powers,” such as NATO, with troops or money as part of the multilateral process.² Deploying German military forces was a necessary component of this responsibility. The SPD’s desire to maintain continuity in German foreign policy meant that the acceptance

of this policy, among others, would become a measure of the ability to govern, or *Regierungsfähigkeit*, for any potential coalition partner with the SPD. As the SPD looked at options to replace the CDU in the governing coalition, many in the SPD leadership, especially Karsten Voigt, were extremely interested in setting up a coalition with the Greens, to the point that they even refrained from talk of a grand coalition with the CDU, which was a change relative to the past.³

The Green foreign and security policy at the time, however, remained steeped in the traditionalist pacifist perspective, with only small minorities accepting the idea of German international responsibility, to include the deployment of German military forces. The intellectual sparks after Fischer's letter in the wake of the Srebrenica massacre had only started the much needed debate; by the Bremen Party Day in 1995, the Greens still remained officially opposed to deploying German forces. Such a stance was not compatible with an SPD policy of continuity of German security policy.

This led to a collision at the nexus of the conscious desire by the SPD for continuity with German international responsibilities and Green policies that still argued for ideas such as the dissolution of NATO. As will be outlined below, the concept of *Regierungsfähigkeit* was the second, and perhaps most important, major variable contributing to a change in the Green policy and eventually to a successful Red-Green coalition.

As outlined in the early stages of this dissertation, *Regierungsfähigkeit*, loosely translated, refers to a political party's capability to govern and its ability to act responsibly within the German government. Joachim Raschke defines the term

² Weisskirchen, interview by author.

³ Weisskirchen, interview by author; Voigt, interview by author.

specifically as the “strategic capability to act as a governing party;” in other words, from his perspective, the idea is to bring a conceptual strategy into the coalition. By the latter definition, as Raschke argues, it would be hard to imagine the Greens as *regierungsfähig*, as torn as they were on foreign policy issues.⁴ That definition is for the purposes here too narrow. As elegantly argued by Ludger Volmer, *Regierungsfähigkeit* was not simply an objective category, but was rather more of a “political” issue for many Greens.⁵ Thus a more nebulous approach is required to understand its impact on the Greens.

In defining *Regierungsfähigkeit* this dissertation moves beyond just having a strategy to bring to the government. First, it integrates a conscious decision aspect into its definition—a will to govern and have an influence on policy by the Greens. That desire was clear for some in the party in the mid 1990s, especially in the *realo* section. As Fischer would later explain approvingly in May 1999: “The more we pursue our interests multilaterally, through Europe, the more we’ll get for ourselves.”⁶ Yet governing as part of a coalition for the Greens meant adhering to the desires of the SPD. As will be discussed below, the two parties’ views on foreign policy, perhaps the most contentious issue between them, differed enough that bridging those differences made this a very political issue for members of the swing group.

Overcoming these differences, however, was not simple in execution. As Christoph Egle argues, the goals of participating in the governing coalition and ideals inherent during the development and execution of the Party’s politics are often conflicting. In other words, a party’s guiding principles may be at odds with the demands

⁴ Joachim Raschke, “Sind die Grünen regierungsfähig?” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B10 (2001), <<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/BRW3B3.html>> accessed 16 October 2007.

⁵ Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 580.

⁶ Josef Joffe, “A Peacenik Goes to War,” *New York Times*, 30 May 1999.

of government. For the Greens in the foreign policy realm that will to govern conflicted with the traditional pacifist principles. Yet, pressure exerted by the coalition partner, the necessities of adhering to the state's politics, and other factors can challenge a party's defined principles prior to joining and while in a governing coalition. This is especially true when a state's responsibilities are so strongly defined. Indeed, as the consummate Green MP and writer Winfried Nachtwei would later describe, the dependability of the Greens political decisions within the NATO alliance were a "cornerstone" of *Regierungsfähigkeit*.⁷ As this cases here will clearly demonstrate, there were a number of specific interactions, events and leadership elements that helped to counter the political friction between the parties and in turn the discord within the Greens between the desire for government participation and party identity.⁸

The second aspect of *Regierungsfähigkeit* that will be examined is its impact on the Greens once they are in power. The necessity of continuity, as outlined by the SPD and enshrined in the coalition contract, had a powerful influence on many Greens, in particular on their voting patterns and political speeches. An essential element of pressure inherent in the idea of *Regierungsfähigkeit*, what could loosely be described as discipline, hovered over all Green decisions on the use of force. In the cases of Kosovo, Macedonia and to an extent 9/11, this pressure would have a profound effect on the swing group in particular.

Reduced to its most basic element, this disciplining pressure of *Regierungsfähigkeit* gained its strength from the precarious Green electoral situation after

⁷ Winfried Nachtwei, "Pazifismus zwischen Ideal und politischer Realität," 2006, <http://www.nachtwei.de/downloads/beitraege/Winfried_Nachtwei_Pazifismus.pdf> accessed 26 October 2007.

⁸ Christoph Egle, "Die rot-grüne Außenpolitik," in *Das Rot-Grüne Projekt: Eine Bilanz der Regierung*

1998. After receiving only 6.7% of the votes in that election the Greens had only a minimal majority to form a government with the SPD. As a result, their grip on power was tenuous at best. As Joschka Fischer noted, the SPD could have very easily worked with the CDU in a grand coalition if the Greens failed to live up to their expectations. That fact, along with a dismal performance at the Hessen local election in late 1998, led Fischer to suggest that the Greens' precarious electoral position actually had a "disciplining" effect on them within the government.⁹

Taken a step further, this uncertainty translated to a clear choice for many in the Green party. As Ludger Volmer would note in March 1999, the ability of the Greens to garner only 5-7% of the vote with any regularity did not make them a "great power." It was enough to help build a governing majority, but clearly not enough to define government policy. Moreover, it would be an "illusion" to believe the Greens could find a "new strength" in the opposition. The dictum was "influence," not "assertion" of policy.¹⁰ Thus, in order to achieve domestic goals and have a decisive "green" effect on Germany's foreign policy, the Green leadership and the Party as a whole had to accept some very difficult decisions, especially in the realm of foreign policy. Achieving environmental changes or developing a preventative foreign policy became linked with an acceptance of the continued presence and efficacy of NATO. In at least two very clear situations, with the Green Party day in Bielefeld amid the Kosovo war and later during the Bundestag vote on the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan, the decision was even clearer. Either accept combat deployments of the German military or return to the

Schröder, 1998-2002, 93.

⁹ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 136.

¹⁰ Ludger Volmer, "Auto-Biopsie—Thesen zum Durchhängen der Grünen," 26 February 1999, Y096, AGG.

opposition and lose the opportunity to achieve political goals, which would be crucial to the continued success of any political party. In the final analysis, it would be this element of *Regierungsfähigkeit* that would have the most profound impact on this part of the Green evolution.

To get into the government, however, meant first dealing with the political issues that separated the two parties—in effect dealing with the challenge of the first aspect of *Regierungsfähigkeit*. For the SPD and the Greens in the mid 1990s, there were a number of issues that needed to be gulfed—immigration, environmental policy, and international trade. Relative to other parties, the Greens still lay outside the norms of German political ideology in many areas.¹¹ But by far, the most challenging and the one the public most focused upon was foreign and security policy, in particular the varied positions on the use of force.¹² Those differences covered specific issues such as the future of NATO, the future of the Bundeswehr, and of course out of area operations. On some, such as the future of the draft and the Bundeswehr, the Greens were not politically strong enough to push through their position; they thus decided not to make it a major issue.¹³ For the out of area operations problem, however, there was a necessity for Green change. As that change struck at the most basic of Green core principles, any effort to change it would require considerable effort and thought.

To understand the early aspects of this process, it is useful to look at the varying perspectives of how the SPD and the Greens perceived the potential of the Green party's *Regierungsfähigkeit*. According to two of the leading SPD MPs in the foreign and

¹¹ Egle, "Die rot-grüne Außenpolitik," 93.

¹² Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 582.

¹³ Oliver Thränert, "Die Reform der Bundeswehr: Die Debatte bei den Regierungsparteien SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B43 (2000): 28.

security policy section, Gerd Weisskirchen and Karsten Voigt, the Greens quite simply were not *regierungsfähig* in the mid 1990s because they did not support deploying German military forces in out of area operations like Bosnia. According to Voigt, it was the single toughest issue between the SPD and the Greens.¹⁴

This realization did not suddenly arise, but had been under careful study by the SPD since at least the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Karsten Voigt of the SPD, a leading proponent of a possible coalition with the Greens, argued even in a 1989 paper entitled “The Peace Politics of the Greens: Between Fundamentalism and Half-Realism” that the Greens were not capable yet of being in a governing coalition with the SPD. Five years later in a joint article with Wolfgang Bruckmann, Voigt went even further, declaring again quite empathically that the foreign and security policy was not acceptable; only this time, in an indication of his interest in working with the Greens, he offered means to address that problem. Though these documents are clearly only the tip of the proverbial iceberg of the SPD’s perception of the Greens as a potential coalition partner and their efforts to address those shortfalls, there is indeed much that can be gleaned from them.

At the early juncture of 1989, though both parties at the time shared similar goals for the international sphere, the SPD’s issues with the Green Party’s security stances were largely driven by the challenges from being on the front line of the Cold War. Chief among them was the latter’s failure to recognize the importance of *Westbindung*, Germany’s integration with the West, in particular through NATO. Moreover, their rejection of weapons procurement, the nuclear weapons strategy of NATO, and military maneuvers in Germany provided further friction points. Voigt lamented the fact that the

¹⁴ Weisskirchen, interview by author; Voigt, interview by author.

Greens strove only for disarmament and not for solutions to other, pressing security challenges, a necessary skill for any governing coalition party.

The Green ideas such as unilateral disarmament that would be taken outside of Western and NATO counsel, what Voigt called “national unilateral actions,” did not fit with the concepts of a responsible Germany. As such, the multilateral tenets of German foreign and security policy as well as the “contractual requirements” were “neither understood nor a consequence of [German] history” for the majority of the Greens. The concept of “nuclear pacifism” that still defined the Greens at this point was from the perspective of the SPD incapable of being a part of the governing coalition. Simply put, what the Greens would actually do as part of a governing coalition could not be calculated.¹⁵

Five years later, the situation had changed considerably. A unified Germany had to react to significant challenges in the Balkans and its responsibilities, especially in the area of using German military forces, were becoming increasingly expanded and concrete. Moreover, unlike five years earlier, this time there was a distinct chance for an SPD led coalition without the FDP or the CDU. There was renewed attention placed on the Greens as a possible partner, even though Fischer later would note that this constellation came with a “high risk” and was not guaranteed to maintain a stable majority or dependability.¹⁶

Even with these changes, foreign and security policy remained the most likely trouble spot for any potential Red-Green coalition. Still concerned about possible Green obviation of German responsibilities if it became part of the governing coalition, Voigt

¹⁵ Karsten D. Voigt, “Die Friedenspolitik der Grünen: Zwischen Fundamentalismus und halbem Realismus,” September 1989, Y34, AGG, 3-4, 27-30.

and Bruckmann, in an article entitled “Responsible and *Regierungsfähig*? A Critical Analysis of the Foreign and Security Policy Positions of the Greens,” remained convinced that the Greens were not capable of governing with the SPD. Voigt and Bruckmann named six specific areas where Green policy would not support maintaining continuity with the current German foreign and security policy; the Greens’ position on out of area operations was one of the major sticking points. At this juncture the authors admitted that the Greens at heart still held firm to a “traditional anti-western and pacifist world view” and continued to lack a vision of security policy.

The authors did recognize, however, that the Greens were in the middle of a major foreign policy debate, in particular over the steadily worsening war in Bosnia, that created particular openings that could be exploited. In fact, they believed that the result of that debate, and importantly whether the Greens were flexible and programmatically “ready to change,” would determine the *Regierungsfähigkeit* potential of the Greens. The SPD authors believed that the end of the Cold War had brought a “loss of meaning” of foreign and security policy for the pacifist base of the party that now opened some “room to maneuver” for intra-party debates and in turn SPD influence. The potential success, however, hinged upon how strong particular interests and dogma in the Greens remained.

From their perspective then the goal should be to engage the Greens and lead them to revise their foreign and security policy positions. Voigt and Bruckmann believed that without a “push” from outside, perhaps utilizing the strong acceptance of the protection of human rights, inherent in the “never again Auschwitz” ideal in the Greens, there would be no chance of change, even with supporters of change already in the Party and several opportunities to address reform in the Greens.

¹⁶ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 24.

They gave five specific recommendations for this engagement. First, the SPD and the Greens should hold a personal and open debate on the basis of German foreign and security policy to clarify the specific guiding principles of a potential Red-Green government. Second, both sides must have clarity on the expectations of the German government in the international affairs. Third, these agreements on foreign and security policy must be codified in the coalition treaty. Fourth, and importantly for this dissertation, the Greens should be pushed between 1995 and 1998 to support Germany's multinational political and military roles as an international partner. Finally, the SPD should work with the Greens to achieve some Green political goals, such as the reform of NATO and the strengthening of OSCE among others.¹⁷ As will be described in more detail below, it does appear that several of these recommendations were acted upon.

Where the SPD saw an opening was not with the traditionalists, but rather the swing group, those who saw the chance of joining government as potentially more important than holding firm to the traditionalist vales.¹⁸ The *realos*, even as early as the 1980s, never ruled it out, while the *fundis* would only “tolerate” it if allowed for a greater airing of their criticisms and for changing the SPD,¹⁹ a position they would not really change until much later. Behind the successes of governance at the state level, the Green *realo* leadership between 1994 and 1998 made a conscious decision to strive to become a part of a governing Red-Green coalition.²⁰

The purveyor of change in the Greens then, as the SPD correctly identified, would

¹⁷ Wolfgang Bruckmann and Karsten D. Voigt, “Verantwortbar und Regierungsfähig? Eine kritische Betrachtung der außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Vorstellungen von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” December 1994, Y81, AGG.

¹⁸ In his 2007 memoirs, Joschka Fischer called this group, identified here as the swing group, as the “*Regierungslinke*”—or governing leftists. See Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 25.

¹⁹ Klein and Falter, 63, 77.

²⁰ Voigt, interview by author.

be the swing group. As a contemporary article and a later interview with Volmer suggest, the swing group was quite interested in joining the governing coalition;²¹ what remained was simply the execution of how to adapt them to the requirements of *Regierungsfähigkeit*. Given the SPD's clear delineation that the Green's were not yet *regierungsfähig* under foreign and security policies defined by the swing group in 1995, achieve governing power meant both jettisoning their strict adherence to pacifism and their typical oppositional approach. For the swing group then, who would now define the direction the Party would take, their politics would have to trump their principles.

Choosing politics over principles, especially one so dear as pacifism, was clearly not easy. Adding to the conundrum, however, was the challenge such a shift posed within internal Green party politics. The swing group's power came when they supported the traditionalist base. As Joschka Fischer noted in his 2007 memoirs, any compromise with the *realos* or with reality meant an end to the swing group's leadership.²² For the swing group then it boiled down to a simple equation: Choose to join the governing coalition that brought influence on Germany's domestic and foreign policies and allow the *realos* to gain the primary leadership role within the Party, or maintain leadership in the Party and remain in the opposition, thus limiting their chances of affecting Green political goals. That was the fundamental challenge as the wars in the Balkans raged and the 1998 election loomed.

Though the war in Bosnia, as highlighted in the previous two chapters, did change the views of many in the Greens, there remained a wide chasm with the SPD perspective outlined above. Most in the swing group during the Bosnian crisis strongly opposed

²¹ Ralf Beste, "Volmers neue Friedfertigkeit," *Berliner Zeitung*, 16 October 1998; Volmer, interview by author.

relinquishing pacifism to be able to become capable of governing. At this point in the debate, the traditionalists and the swing group continued to walk together in lock step. In fact, strong leaders from each group, traditionalist Winfried Hermann and swing group member Ludger Volmer, believed the Greens were *regierungsfähig* already in 1995, despite their rejection of the deployment of German military forces, suggesting they did not see their principles at this point as inhibitive. Indeed, in a 1995 editorial in *taz*, Volmer argued that foreign policy would not be the issues that would destroy a potential Red-Green coalition, meaning that no Green Party ideal must be jettisoned.²³

Moreover, both the traditionalists and the swing group publically criticized Fischer, suggesting he used the Bosnian crisis and his July 1995 paper arguing for a military engagement solely as a method of making the Greens *regierungsfähig*. In a joint paper Kerstin Müller and Jürgen Trittin, both adherents to the swing group, argued the following right in the middle of the Bosnian crisis: “A yes to a [German] combat deployment [to Bosnia in June 1995] is no pass (*Ausweis*) for *Regierungsfähigkeit*, but rather a political declaration of bankruptcy for a party of peace.”²⁴ At the very precocious Party Day debate in Bremen in 1995 referenced last chapter, others, such as the MP Ursula Schönberger strongly criticized Fischer’s acceptance of the military as in fact simply an opening for joining the governing coalition at the expense of Green values. Going even further, Müller in fact argued that the Greens should remain a part of the opposition while Germany should practice a self-limiting foreign policy, in effect

²² Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 29.

²³ Hermann, interview by author; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 580-596; Volmer, “Greif zur Waffe.”

²⁴ Christiane Schlötzer-Scotland, “Zwischen Gandhi und Caesar.” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 28 August 1995, 4; Ziller, “Grünen fürchten Zerreißprobe;” Müller and Trittin.

shunning the very argument of power over principle.²⁵ During the Bosnian crisis, the majority of the Green Party remained opposed to relinquishing the principle of pacifism in favor of a gaining the SPD as a coalition partner.

Though the swing group and traditionalists remain wedded to the traditional principles, the *realos*, out of the horrors of the war in Bosnia had already changed their defining principles. Moreover, they had largely aligned with the SPD position on the use of force and, taking the next step that had long been a goal of leaders like Fischer, began to argue quietly that the rest of the Greens must evolve their position to become capable of governing. Daniel Cohn Bendit, the early leader in the *realo* wing, argued in 1995 that “a party that wants to be *regierungsfähig* at the federal level must find a principle in foreign policy that can be accepted by the federal partners in the German government.”²⁶ That idea of evolving the foreign policy politics, though not necessarily the core principles, of the swing group in particular was an important mantra among many who pushed change.

By far the most important player in this evolution, though by no means the only one, was Joschka Fischer. From the mid 1990s, Fischer had the goal of joining the governing coalition; indeed, according to Klein and Falter, Fischer had the goal of being Germany’s foreign minister since 1992. Karsten Voigt believed that this goal was “always” on Fischer’s mind. Volmer believed that Fischer had the goal of joining the government as early as 1983 and he brought that idea to many others in the Party.²⁷

The exact nature of Fischer’s specific role in pushing the idea of *Regierungsfähigkeit* remains open to some conjecture, given the lack of primary

²⁵ Rene Heilig and Wolfgang Rex, “Bündnis 90/Die Grünen—Die Sorge um Srebrenica oder die Furcht der Linken,” *Neues Deutschland*, 4 December 1995; “Die Zerreißprobe fand nicht statt,” *Neues Deutschland*, 4 December 1995.

²⁶ Borchers, 6-7.

resources. Frank Pfetsch argues, without a plethora of details, that Fischer indeed had been making direct attempts to make his party *regierungsfähig* with the SPD.²⁸

Contemporary newspaper accounts, moreover, often made reference to Fischer's effort to make the Greens a *regierungsfähig* party.²⁹ The Green MP Winfried Hermann believed that Fischer was always one step ahead of the party on this issue and the party followed him.³⁰ Ludger Volmer, on the other hand, believed that the Greens as a whole undertook a "learning process," in which Fischer played a central, though not decisive role. Klein and Falter make particular emphasis of Fischer's overall leadership in the Party, for which there is no doubt that he played a large role here as well. Karsten Voigt made numerous references to the strong role of Fischer during this process in a personal interview.³¹

What is clear is that Fischer's decisions and actions had profound effects on the course of the process. He believed that the Party would only change its guiding values if a discussion were held before the Greens became a part of the government.³² Amid the debates during the Balkan conflicts, Fischer looked at reality and pragmatically, out of principle, made a new decision and many followed him. His letter after the Srebrenica massacre clearly opened the floodgates for a debate the Greens needed both for internal purposes, in coming to terms with the challenges posed by Bosnia to its own version of pacifism, but also, in hindsight, for external purposes, as a first step toward a foreign policy position that was more acceptable to the SPD. His leadership position during the

²⁷ Klein and Falter, 190; Volmer, interview by author.

²⁸ Pfetsch, 382.

²⁹ See for example Borchers; Schlötzer-Scotland, "Desorientierung der Grünen;" "Fischers neue Augen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 August 1995.

³⁰ Hermann, interview by author.

³¹ Volmer, interview by author; Klein and Falter, 177-203; Voigt, interview by author.

³² Voigt, interview by author.

1998 election and later as the foreign minister also provided substantial opportunity to lead and push members of the swing group on both the political and principle front.

In public, however, Fischer kept the idea of change to become *regierungsfähig* on a low key. In an interview at the height of the internal party crisis over his letter in 1995, he clearly stated in an interview that the issue of out of area operations would not lead to an end to a possible Red-Green coalition. Instead, he criticized those who argued his new argument was about internal political change. He decried those suggesting that he was “instrumentalizing” the tragedy of Srebrenica and spoke more of the need for an internal Green Party debate. He even sought to change the political subject, suggesting only that Germany needed a Red-Green coalition to replace the Kohl government, not how to actually accomplish the goal.³³

However, it is also clear that Fischer was keenly aware of the need to shift the Green position on the use of force. According to both Hermann and Voigt, Fischer knew that without a change in the Green perspective on the use of German military forces, the primary sticking point, there would be no chance of a coalition with the SPD.³⁴ Moreover, at the height of the Green Party’s debate on Bosnia, the SPD’s leading politician, Rudolf Scharping, opined to Fischer that he should bring in a military dimension to the discussion on foreign policy,³⁵ suggesting that Fischer was also talking with the SPD about this potential and was aware of the SPD requirements. By early 1998 when the chances of a Red-Green coalition were on the doorstep, Fischer clearly saw the challenges for attaining *Regierungsfähigkeit*. As he outlined in his memoirs, foreign policy, in particular that of out of area operations, was the primary “question of

³³ “Interview Joschka Fischer;” “‘Das wäre blutiger Zynismus’.”

³⁴ Voigt, interview by author; Hermann, interview by author.

confidence” for the Greens.³⁶ In many ways then, Fischer was a key enabler of the acceptance of the *Regierungsfähigkeit* ideal within the Greens.

Though Fischer’s leadership was likely the most decisive important part of the acceptance of the idea of *Regierungsfähigkeit* by the Green Party, there were also other parts to this equation. Despite all of his attempts to change the Party, they only succeeded, according to Ludger Volmer, when the swing group changed their mind on the use of force.³⁷ That the swing group did indeed consciously make this decision is suggested by Volmer’s comments in June 1999: “When one says that we will not join the government because we cannot solve the [foreign policy] problems, than one is historically finished.”³⁸

For some swing group Greens, it was a tactical decision that trumped their convictions; for others their convictions, which had already been tested in the Balkans, led them to embrace deploying German military forces as the crisis in Kosovo deepened. For some, conviction and political strategy were inseparable, as the two intermingled and had compounding effects.³⁹ Though there were some evolutions amid the swing group between the end of the Bosnian war and the ascendancy to the governing coalition, as will be demonstrated below, it is important here to understand all of the factors at work that influenced this change both before and after joining the government.

One important element, that exhibited its power primarily after the Greens joined the governing coalition, was the purposeful integration of Green Party members, especially of the swing group, into senior government positions. Fischer suggests that

³⁵ Schlötzer-Scotland, “Desorientierung der Grünen.”

³⁶ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 28.

³⁷ Volmer, interview by author.

³⁸ Ralf Beste, “Eine fundamentale Überraschung,” 7 June 1999, *Berliner Zeitung*, 3.

integrating Green swing group members in particular into the actual mechanisms of government, as opposed to being just a part of the opposition, brought with it a chance to evolve perspectives. This exposed them to the international environment more and most importantly put them in a position of serving the state, as opposed to the party, which provided a stronger impact for *Regierungsfähigkeit*.

Moreover, keeping the Greens integrated, especially as the Kosovo crisis heated up, would both prevent resistance and instability within the Greens and prevent an immediate disconnect between the coalition partners. Indeed, Fischer cites the appointment of one of his arch rivals, Ludger Volmer, to a leading position in the foreign ministry as an important opportunity to “strengthen his integration.” Though it was not an easy decision for Fischer, he believed that leaving Volmer in the faction would make him a “not to be underestimated disrupting factor” who could cause considerable angst at the first international crisis.⁴⁰

In a personal interview, Karsten Voigt highlighted a second element at play here—a conscious attempt by the SPD to change the Green perspective through personal and enduring discussions between both parties prior to the formation of the Red-Green coalition. Held daily in restaurants, in the Bundestag, and other forums, SPD members, including some former Green members such as Otto Schily, exposed Greens at all levels to the specific arguments in the debate, in particular the idea that without a change in the Green stance in some aspects of foreign policy there could be no chance of a coalition. Such interpersonal debates can demonstrate considerable effectiveness in political settings, especially when future potential is seen relative to present hurdles. By late 1997

³⁹ Voigt, interview by author.

⁴⁰ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 66, 71, 103.

and early 1998, according to Ludger Volmer, the regular discussion group between the SPD and the Greens prior to the election had determined that the divergence on foreign and security policy would no longer pose a problem; however, though the current evidence available does not discount that possibility, his perspective must be seen with some suspect given his earlier perspectives on the capability of the Greens to govern.⁴¹

A third reason for this evolution rests with trips to the region by the Green Party, in particular an October 1996 visit to Bosnia by fifteen members of the Green Party faction. Fischer, one of the leaders of the trip, wanted to show the “concrete reality” and leave the theoretical debates behind. Though he cited no names, Fischer argued that as the delegation stood over the hills of Sarajevo and met the survivors of Srebrenica, some from the Party’s left wing recognized the brutality of the war and, importantly, that it was the West’s and Germany’s military that had ended the violence.

The delegation’s trip report pointed to the successes occurring in Bosnia, in particular the return of refugees and the Dayton Peace Treaty. Without exception, everyone (Serb, Muslim, NGO, or foreign government official) that spoke with the Green members on the trip offered their strong support for the current operation and the continuation of IFOR in Bosnia, even as those same people decried the UN operation. They even wished for a continuation of the German presence there. Without IFOR, the successes seen to that point in Bosnia would not have been possible. These trips, according to Karsten Voigt, had psychological effects that moved individual politicians to change their perspective on the use of military force.⁴²

⁴¹ Voigt, interview by author; Volmer, interview by author. Interestingly, Volmer claimed that the SPD had no role in the change of the Greens, even though there was “regular” contact between the two parties on this issue.

⁴² Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 220; Joschka Fischer, “Schlussfolgerungen aus der Bosnienreise der

This idea is also supported to an extent by a similar idea proposed by Ludger Volmer in his 1998 book. Though he offered no “tipping point” or specific names, his “learning process” idea suggested that some in the swing group learned from the tragedy of Bosnia and adjusted their strategy accordingly through an evolution in their principles. Bosnia created a new security reality for the Greens that went well beyond any theory. Their inability to have any real impact on the situation in Bosnia due to their status in the opposition in turn contributed to the acceptance by parts of the swing group that participation in the government would give the chance for the Greens to drive the security agenda.⁴³ Indeed, as the short case study of Macedonia will later demonstrate, there would indeed be numerous opportunities when the Greens’ philosophy would have considerable impact in international affairs once they were in the government, especially given their prominence in the foreign ministry.

All of these methodologies were at play here, but in the end it was the Green’s entrance into the government and the resulting discipline that would play the most significant role in the change. Even Joschka Fischer suggests this was one of the main ways of instilling change. In a harshly worded section in his memoirs, Fischer strongly suggests that members of the swing group were willing to change only after the Greens made it to the governing coalition. Until then, there would be no “programmatic or power politics compromises in the Party.” As Fischer decries: In the Greens, “the principles were more important than the power.”⁴⁴ Christoph Egle cites a similar argument, suggesting most Greens would rather “be right than govern.” From his

Bundestagsfraktion von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” Bestand A—Christa Nickels, Akte Nr. 243, AGG; Voigt, interview by author.

⁴³ Volmer, interview by author; Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik*, 584.

⁴⁴ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 29, 33.

perspective, the Greens, and by proxy the swing group, “learned under stress” during their time in government, which led to a change in their principles. Indeed, he argues overall that this participation in government led to a general movement away from a strict pacifism and toward the acceptance in the program of international responsibility.⁴⁵ As will be demonstrated in the Kosovo and 9/11 case studies, the necessities of politics would have the potential to trump the luxury of principles.

The effect of joining the government on the swing group can be clarified by looking at the changes it had on the some group members, in particular those who held to the traditionalist principles just before joining the government. Though the positions during the Kosovo crisis as the Greens were in government will be described below, it is useful here to look back at where the Party stood just prior to the election to offer some points of comparison. The election platform and the Party Day in Magdeburg in March 1998, mere months from the election, clearly suggested that the swing group remained wedded for the most part to the traditionalist values and still needed to change to meet the demands outlined by the SPD. The results of the Party Day would provide a serious challenge for the *realo* wing in particular and demonstrated to many that the Greens as a whole still remain well outside the norms of politics. Indeed, public polls at the time showed the clear damage, with only 8% of the public seeing the Greens as “unlimited *regierungsfähig*” and almost half seeing them as incapable of governing out of principle.⁴⁶ To get elected, the Greens would have to overcome that perception and the election platform would not help.

The Party Day and the election platform contained several positions that were

⁴⁵ Egle, “Die rot-grüne Außenpolitik,” 94, 99, 110-11.

⁴⁶ Egle, “Die rot-grüne Außenpolitik,” 97.

decisively opposite what the SPD required of them. Most importantly, through a very slim majority, and despite the attempts by the *realos*, the traditional pacifists prevailed in a vote on SFOR, arguing against the continued deployment of German forces as a part of the protection force. Both sides blamed each other, though it was clear that the grass roots of the Party, and with it enough of the swing group, would not accept the deployment.⁴⁷ The *realos* viewed this perspective as “suicidal,” believing it would weaken the overall Green position in a potential Red-Green coalition. At the Party Day, the *realos* tried to find a formula for foreign policy for the Party Day declaration that did not “completely rule out” a possible military mission to the Balkans, but the all important swing group would not accept such a change. Even a decade later, Fischer could never rationalize the swing group policy, asking rhetorically in his memoirs why the Party would so jubilantly damage its own interests.⁴⁸

The election platform also held firm to other traditionalist perspectives—the demilitarization of international affairs, the idea that lasting peace could not be achieved with military force, the eventual dissolution of NATO, a clear declaration of a rejection of military peacekeeping and combat operations, and an opposition to restructuring the Bundeswehr to become capable of international operations.⁴⁹ Even at this point, prominent swing group member Ludger Volmer noted that he believed the Greens could clearly succeed on this foreign policy perspective, a belief that Fischer publically rejected.⁵⁰ Christoph Egle suggests that the Greens on the eve of the election had not yet come to any sense of clarity on their defining principles; they were still struggling with

⁴⁷ Ralf Beste, “Der Bosnien-Beschluss sorgt weiter für Zwist im grünen Lager,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 10 March 1998, 2.

⁴⁸ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 22, 25-31.

⁴⁹ “Grün ist der Wechsel,” 133-48.

an internal conflict on foreign policy. Indeed, he notes that it took until 2002 for the Greens to replace the Base Program from 1980 that updated their defining principles.⁵¹ That the swing group won out in the election platform and the Party Day made it clear that on the eve of the election, the Greens as a party were still in turmoil and had a long way to go to meet the SPD guidelines outlined by Karsten Voigt.

In an attempt to alleviate what Fischer called the “fatal public impression” of the Magdeburg Party Day, the party leadership convened a small Party Day consisting of a primarily federal leadership. The final resolution, proposed by both Jürgen Trittin, a member of the swing group, and Fritz Kuhn, a *realo*, supported the continued presence of the SFOR in Bosnia. Though it was not a binding resolution of the entire party, when the federal leadership did vote for the extension of the SFOR mandate on 19 June 1998, the majority of the faction supported the extension, suggesting that the federal leadership was much more willing to accept peacekeeping operations than the rest of the Party and, as such, more open to some change as part of a governing coalition.⁵²

Despite the calamity that was the Magdeburg Party Day, the Greens nonetheless prevailed in the 1998 elections, gaining 6.7% of the vote, which was enough to form a clear majority with the SPD. With that victory came the challenges of forming a government—agreeing on disposition of ministers, political positions and goals. The guiding document of this agreement was the so-called Coalition Contract. Encompassing twelve separate sections, it defined the way the Red-Green coalition would move forward. Despite the recent reversal in direction with the Greens, the foreign and security

⁵⁰ “Den Grünen droht kein Absurz,” *taz*, 14 October 1997, 6; “Joschka Fischer: Rot-Grün gibt’s nur bei NATO-treu,” *taz*, 30 October 1997, 1.

⁵¹ Egle, “Die rot-grüne Außenpolitik,” 94, 110-11.

⁵² Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 38-39.

policy section, worked out by the later undersecretaries in the foreign ministry, Volmer and SPD MP Günter Verheugen, made clear that it would be a coalition guided primarily by the SPD's goals, though with some clear Green influence. While an examination of the extensive section on foreign and security policy is not necessary here, it is worthwhile to examine how the two parties saw the baselines of the future and rectified their differences over the use of force.

Both accepted that there would be continuity with the previous German foreign and security policy, though there was now to be a renewed emphasis on conflict prevention and an expansion of the concept of human rights. In the first paragraph of this section, the contract noted that Germany had a "special responsibility" for stability in southeast Europe, a clear reference to continued support for military operations in the Balkans. Moreover, under the human rights section, the two parties would work to prevent violations in human rights. The Bundeswehr would be recognized as a force for stability in Europe that was available to defend the western alliance.

Despite this declared responsibility, the means of achieving it was spread through a variety of organizations with no outright declared acceptance of any German out of area deployments. Instead of arguing for an end to NATO, as had often been pushed by the Greens, the contract did see NATO as a necessary aspect of achieving peace and stability in parts of Europe, but deploying German forces under its auspices was not mentioned. Instead, the Red-Green coalition would work to strengthen the role of the UN in conflict prevention, recognizing that German forces could be available to the UN so long as their deployment was approved by the Bundestag.⁵³

⁵³ "Aufbruch und Erneuerung—Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert: Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen," 20 October 1998,

The contract was at best a compromise that set the basis for a Red-Green coalition. It largely avoided the most contentious issues, such as direct support for the use of German forces in out of area operations, yet it provided mechanisms for their eventual deployment. Instead of codifying the specifics positions of the coalition, it left them unresolved, providing the setting for tremendous political discord and debate whenever such major issues arose. Kosovo, Macedonia and 9/11 would all bring calls amid the press that the coalition was in danger of collapsing.

Yet as events will show, there was enough common unity and, importantly, a common desire to continue to govern together that the coalition was able to weather the challenges that it could not clarify in its coalition contract. The Green Party swing group at this point held the future of not only the Party, but to a large extent the coalition, in its hands. It was their desire to continue to govern once they joined the government, resident in the ideas of integration and *Regierungsfähigkeit*, that would provide the real staying power of the Greens in the coalition. Hanging over all of this was the omnipresent fear that any rejection of the inherent principles of *Regierungsfähigkeit* would mean an end to the coalition and possibly even a failure of the Greens to make it back into the Bundestag.⁵⁴

The question thus becomes how to measure the impact of the will to govern on a change in policies. Aside from interviewing all of the major players in the Green Party, it can be quite useful to look at how the perspectives of some of the key players in the swing group changed once they became a part of the government. While this is not a foolproof method, as personal records that may indicate changing personal convictions in

<<http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/de/koalo/index.htm#11>> accessed 16 October 2007.

⁵⁴ Egle, "Die rot-grüne Außenpolitik," 100.

the intervening years between the end of the Bosnian crisis and the start of the Kosovo crisis may not always be available, examining statements in the later crisis can provide clues as to the reasons for their evolution and even demonstrate a clear change. In addition, speeches and declarations from those who already accepted the role of German forces out of conviction can show the new influence of the pull of the will to govern. An examination of the Kosovo crisis and the Macedonia deployment in this chapter and the 9/11 debate in the following chapter provide tremendous opportunity to measure this influence.

THE GREEN KOSOVO CRISIS

Over the course of 1998 the two intervening variables in this dissertation, reaction to shocks and the will to govern, collided for the Greens amid the crisis in Kosovo. There is a general recognition in the secondary literature of the strong impact this crisis had on change within Germany and the Greens. It was an “important step” in the evolution of attitudes toward the use of force, particularly for the SPD and the Greens, according to Hans Maull. Rainer Baumann agrees, though to a lesser extent, suggesting that Kosovo was just “another step” in the evolutionary process that had begun in the early 1990s. Nina Philippi argues, in a similar vein, that Kosovo made it clear that the idea of rejection of military force had been replaced by the priorities of “solidarity” with NATO and the protection of human rights.⁵⁵ There are also a considerable number of theories as to why Germany took part ranging from the pressure exerted by the US to

⁵⁵ Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force,” 56, 61; Rainer Baumann, “German Security Policy within NATO,” in *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, 174; Philippi, “Civilian

participate as a responsible ally to the moral based need to prevent another genocide.⁵⁶

Most recognize external stimuli, such as pressure or external shocks, as the cause of the Green Party's change. However, as this section will demonstrate, though those aspects were present, there was also a conscious internal, strategic calculation influencing the Greens.

This section will dig deeper into those ideas and outline the specific reactions and evolutions of the Green Party to the events in Kosovo. After first proving a detailed overview of the process of events, highlighting general Green changes, this section will examine two specific instances of change. First, it will trace the specific evolutions and reasons for change of two major players in the swing group—Ludger Volmer and Angelika Beer. Doing so will show the direct mechanisms of change and in particular highlight the influence of the ideals inherent in *Regierungsfähigkeit* as outlined in the last section. Second, it will look at how the Party changed as a whole with an examination of the Party Day in Bielefeld. Such an analysis will clearly demonstrate how the priorities of the Party shifted from adhering to convictions to adjusting to govern.

The Greens React to Kosovo

The crisis in Kosovo was nothing new to the Greens. For years, they had been arguing for international, non-military involvement to prevent the region from becoming a major humanitarian problem. In late 1996, the *realos* Gerd Poppe and Joschka Fischer argued that the stability of the entire region depended on an equitable solution of the Kosovar Albanian situation. Even Winfried Hermann, a pure traditionalist, argued after a

Power and War," 65.

⁵⁶ Baumann and Hellmann, 75; Hyde-Price, "Germany and the Kosovo War," 21-22; Joetze, 36-39, 59.

weeklong trip to Kosovo that the situation was so dangerous that something had to be done. However, he did note that this should be done non-violently, urging economic cooperation efforts and direct support instead of military force as the best way to attain this goal.⁵⁷ Prior to the major spike in violence, there was only interest, as the crisis had not devolved enough to spark a major interparty debate as had been the case in Bosnia.

Yet by early 1998, the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating amid the renewed Serbian actions leading many Green leaders to rethink their perspectives, though there was still no real push for active combat operations. In March, the faction leadership, including such signatories as Joschka Fischer and Kerstin Müller, called for greater international criticism of Serbian actions, suggesting the possibility of sanctions, and even asking for an extension of the peacekeeping mission currently stationed in Macedonia. By May and June, however, the position of some *realos* was becoming more focused on the possible use of military forces. Gerd Poppe began arguing that stopping the conflict in Kosovo, which he was now calling “ethnic cleansing,” with non-violent means was no longer capable of being successful; the means of intervention should rest with the UN and not NATO, though preparations by the Atlantic Alliance were necessary. However, even at this early stage, there remained a fear among some, such as Angelika Beer of the swing group, that any potential NATO involvement that began to be discussed in 1998 lacked a clear political plan from the start.⁵⁸ Still, around the time of

⁵⁷ “Antrag der Abgeordneten Gerd Poppe, Amke Dieter-Scheuer, Dr. Angelika Köster-Lossack und der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen—Lage der Albaner in Kosovo,” Drucksache 13/5752, 9 October 1996, in Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion, “Der Kosovo Krieg,” *lang & schlüssig* 14, 22 April 1999, 31; Winfried Hermann and Dietrich Willier, “Kosova—‘Pulverfass’ oder einer zivilen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung,” Bestand A—W. Hermmann, Akte Nr. 88, AGG, 4.

⁵⁸ “Entschliessungsantrag der Abgeordneten Gerd Poppe, Dr. Angelika Kösgter-Lossack, Dr. Helmut Lippelt und der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen—Für eine Verhandlungslösung in Kosovo,” Drucksache 13/10543, 4 March 1998, in Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion, “Der Kosovo Krieg,” 32; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/235, 235. Sitzung, 7 May 1998; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

the Magdeburg Party Day, large swaths of the Party remained opposed to any direct military involvement even as the crisis worsened.

As the Greens prepared to enter into the government, the worsening crisis in Kosovo and a drive by NATO and the US to act to stop the bloodshed led to the need to make a decision on the so-called NATO ActOrd (Activation Order). The Bundestag approval of this order, which would allow German forces to be placed on alert with other NATO forces for a possible attack on Serbian forces, was for the most part seen as a means of raising the diplomatic pressure on Milosevic by showing NATO's unity and capability to act. By this point, Germany was the one nation that had yet to support this order, leading to enormous pressure from other NATO nations upon Germany, and by proxy its political parties.⁵⁹ That pressure would have varied impacts on individual members of the Greens, as will be demonstrated below.

As the possibility of a vote on the ActOrd was discussed on the eve of a Red-Green takeover of the government, Fischer was hoping to delay a vote on it to gain time and thus not force the Greens to make a decision, as the Party remained divided on the eve of taking power. He believed that without the pressure of the integration into the government, which still stood a few weeks away, there was no way to predict what the Party would do. Fischer's wish, however, would be short-lived. Though the US had agreed to postpone the decision when Fischer and Schröder visited Washington, President Bill Clinton soon reversed that decision at the behest of his chief negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, who feared Milosevic could use Germany's potential abstention from

Bundestagsfraktion, "Kosovo: Auf Handlungsfähige Alternativen wie UNO und OSZE setzen," Pressemitteilung Nr. 0381, 12 June 1998, in "Der Kosovo Krieg," 34; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion, "Kosovo: Einen neuen Völkermord verhindern," Pressemitteilung Nr. 0386, 15 June 1998, in "Der Kosovo Krieg," 34.

operations in Kosovo to withstand the diplomatic pressure. Fischer and the Greens were thus forced to decide even before entering the government whether to preserve the unity of the NATO alliance and offer one more chance for a diplomatic success or risk collapsing diplomatic efforts and the Red-Green coalition before it even began.⁶⁰

At the Bundestag special session on 16 October, right in the middle of the coalition contract negotiations between the SPD and the Greens, the old Bundestag came together one last time to debate a proposal from the Kohl government, though also accepted by the incoming Schröder government, for support of a German deployment of combat forces to Kosovo as part of the ActOrd. The Greens, who had only months before rejected an extension of the SFOR in Bosnia, were now faced with the necessity of approving the deployment of German combat forces for the first time since the Second World War amid the context of demonstrating their *Regierungsfähigkeit* to their incoming SPD partners and the Atlantic Alliance. They were so divided in fact that two speakers, instead of the normal one, would speak as representatives of the Party.

Joschka Fischer, who *The Economist* referred to at the time as the “reluctant statesman,” spoke for the *realo* wing of the Greens and argued that the threat of force was necessary, as it was the only possibility, outside of actual military force, that could persuade Milosevic to stop his operations in Kosovo and prevent a further outbreak of war in the volatile region. Moreover, Germany could no longer remain aloof from its responsibilities and risk degrading the capabilities of NATO. It was a clear argument for the Greens to accept the requirements of *Regierungsfähigkeit*.

Ludger Volmer, who was the designated speaker for the opponents to this

⁵⁹ Philippi, “Civilian Power and War,” 63.

⁶⁰ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 103-04; Bettina Gaus, “Mehr Selbstbewusstsein!,” *taz*, 16 October 1998,

authorization, followed the arguments of many in both the swing group and to an extent, though not as strong, the traditionalists, criticizing it because it lacked a UN mandate and it could be seen as a precedence for future operations.⁶¹ Indeed, even Helmut Lippelt, who had actively argued for a military operation to help the situation in Bosnia, argued against a NATO led attack failing a UN mandate, seeing it as a transition to the “rule of force.”⁶²

When it came to the vote in the Bundestag there was general acceptance, though also some resistance, from the Green Bundestag MPs. The results were twenty-nine supporting, nine opposing, and eight abstaining from the vote. In general, the *realos* supported it, the *fundis* opposed it and the swing group abstained. The majority support for the proposal came with the perspective that the situation was an exception, rather than a rule, and with Holbrooke’s success in coming to an agreement with Milosevic that made the possibility of a German participation a little less likely while showing the effectiveness of the military threat strategy.⁶³

With the support of the new CDU led opposition, the overall results of the votes were never in doubt; what was at stake, however, especially for the Greens at this critical stage, was their *Regierungsfähigkeit*. Even before they actually joined the governing majority, their very ability to govern would be judged by how they viewed and voted on this crucial policy decision. Though Chancellor Schröder publically suggested that the

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⁶¹ Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/248, 248. Sitzung, 16 October 1998.; “Joschka Fischer, Germany’s Reluctant Statesman.” 53.

⁶² “Geschlossen auf unterschiedlichen Positionen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 9 October 1998. Interestingly, Fischer and other *realos* countered with the argument that although one was greatly desired, it was not a requirement. It was more important to prevent the violence in Kosovo from getting worse. See “Fischer: zur Not ohne UN-Mandat—Grüne streiten über Nato-Angriffe im Kosovo,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3 February 1999.

⁶³ Berthold Meyer and Peter Schlotter, “Die Kosovo-Kriege 1998/99—Die internationalen Interventionen

Greens and the SPD were consistent in their foreign policy and he would not preclude governing with the Greens based on how many supported and how many opposed the vote, Fischer knew that an outright rejection of this proposal would mean the end of the Green participation in the government even before it started. Failing to meet one of the SPD's deciding factors for participation on the eve of a crisis in Kosovo would not show the party's dependability. An end to the coalition would in turn have far reaching repercussions, as it would have a direct impact on the Greens' electability since it would disappoint Green voters who had expected results.⁶⁴

The swing group's decision to abstain from the vote reflects a clear decision to maintain the Greens' *Regierungsfähigkeit*, even though many, such as Volmer, publicly opposed the proposal. Their abstention instead of an outright rejection was the first clear indication of the triumph of strategy over principles, even if it was only a small change in vote. Indeed, Angelica Beer, one of those who abstained, later publicly noted that these abstentions in fact represented declarations of complete loyalty to Fischer and by proxy the Red-Green coalition. Even though Fischer believed that the swing group at this point still remained uncommitted to the responsibilities of governance, he did see their abstention as opposed to rejection as a "hopeful partial step forward" for the swing group.⁶⁵ As will be noted below, it would take the direct integration into government positions before many would accept the new course. This idea is quite measureable, especially in the case of Ludger Volmer.

As the Greens joined the government, there was some hope of a possible

und ihre Folgen," Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Report 1/2000, 2000, 31.

⁶⁴ "Kabinett billigt Nato-Einsatz im Kosovo," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 October 1998, 1; Beste, "Grüne mehrheitlich für Kosovo-Einsatz," *Berliner Zeitung*, 14 October 1998, 2; Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 106-07.

settlement with the success of Holbrooke's mission. But even as political negotiations continued, the violence in Kosovo "dramatically increased" in December 1998, reminding many of the brutality so evident during the Bosnian war. Television pictures and the presence of war refugees in Germany personalized the event for many Greens and pushed them to take some form of action, including the traditional pacifist Winfried Hermann. Indeed, as an advisor to then-Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping noted, "When TV pictures of starving and freezing children appear, then we [the Germans] are on."⁶⁶ This spike in violence in early 1999 registered with many Greens, in particular the *realos* and some in the swing group, enough to be a clear shock that could lead to a change in position, again bringing the variable of external shocks into the calculus.

The January 1999 shootings of civilians in Racak, however, escalated the crisis in Kosovo to a higher level, "dramatically sharpening" it in the words of Fischer. The tragedy, though significantly smaller than others executions even in Kosovo and far smaller than the clear shock of Srebrenica, in part gained such resonance within Germany and to an extent with the Greens because of the use of the word "massacre" and the ubiquitous pictures and commentary on television. Indeed, as Günter Joetze argues, and Joschka Fischer agrees, the massacre in many ways ushered in a new quality of the media that helped to influence policy development. Coming on the heels of the agreement between Holbrooke and Milosevic to stop the attacks, it was a clear indication of the Serbian duplicity.⁶⁷

The West reacted to the massacre quite decisively, ratcheting up the public and

⁶⁵ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 107-08, 111; Beste, "Grüne mehrheitlich für Kosovo-Einsatz."

⁶⁶ Hermann, interview by author; Ludger Volmer, "Krieg in Jugoslawien—Hintergründe einer grüner Entscheidung," 26 March 1999, <www.ludger-volmer.de/themen.neue-regionalpolitik/index.htm> accessed 2 December 2002; Alexander Szandar, "Kriegsschauplatz Irak?," *Der Spiegel* 49, 3 December 2001, 28.

diplomatic pressure on Milosevic. Ludger Volmer, now in his position in the foreign ministry, argued that the massacre required a decisive reaction in order to prevent giving the perception to Milosevic that he would have the ability to act with impunity in Kosovo, a clear position of a government official as opposed to a Green member. At the government level the events at Racak had equal political effects, though far smaller, than the massacre in Srebrenica. For the West, it exemplified the point that little room for delay remained. As Fischer later noted, it invoked memories and lessons from Bosnia and cemented the idea of drawing a line in the sand. Kosovo was to be “the red line;” nothing like Bosnia should ever happen again. New ideas, including the possible intervention of ground troops, now had to be considered and the time to act was fast approaching.⁶⁸

The strong resurgence of violence in turn again enabled the facilitating norm of “never again Auschwitz,” which had a strong impact during the Bosnian war and likewise could now affect Green positions on the use of force in Kosovo.⁶⁹ Gerd Poppe’s notation of the violence as ethnic cleansing was a direct reference to the brutal events of the Bosnian conflict. As early as his speech before the Bundestag on 16 October, Fischer made references to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo that compared it to the Bosnian conflict. He noted both Milosevic’s “aggressive nationalism” and being a “danger for peace and security in the region,” while clearly noting that Germany’s need to act was

⁶⁷ Joetze, 46-47; Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 119, 122.

⁶⁸ Joetze, 50; “Grüne Balkandiplomatie,” *taz*, 4 February 1999, 6; Volmer, “Krieg in Jugoslawien—Hintergründe einer grüner Entscheidung,” Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 118-19, 121.

⁶⁹ Some in the Greens and the German public criticized the use of the term “never again Auschwitz,” as they argued there could be no comparison between Serb actions and those of the Nazis. In turn, Fischer and others began to use “never again genocide” or “never again fascism,” as he did at the Bielefeld Party Day. Though the terminology changed, the principles of the facilitating norm did not. As such, the original term will be maintained here.

dictated by its history, in particular the lessons of “never again Auschwitz.”⁷⁰

For the Party as a whole, as the Bielefeld Party Day would later show, the return of genocide in the Balkans and the clear desire to prevent it, thus adhering to the “never again Auschwitz” dictum, would also be an important reason for the acceptance of the military option, which would in turn allow the Greens to stay in government. Though the tragedy at Racak amplified the shock of the violence in Kosovo for the grass roots Greens, the ideas inherent in *Regierungsfähigkeit* remained the primary driver of the evolution of Green policy at the leadership level vis-à-vis Kosovo. Indeed, as a collection of essays two years after the campaign noted, though often seen in the press as a primary justification for the bombing campaign two months later, the massacre was in fact not the primary reason for the Greens’ leadership support for the NATO bombing in March.⁷¹

What the massacre very clearly did, however, was to impart a new energy into finding a solution for the crisis. As Fischer noted several months later during a speech at the Bundestag, the renewed violence that culminated with Racak would “compel” NATO to find a solution first against Serbia and then in cooperation with it, as he so politely phrased it. NATO members, especially the US pushed again aggressively, threatening air, and possible ground, attacks if Milosevic did not stop his assault. For Germany, and in particular the Green foreign ministry, there was now a renewed effort to prevent NATO military actions through a final diplomatic round. Indeed, the Green faction would note two years later that the massacre at Racak would actually be the primary

⁷⁰ Plenarprotokoll 13/248.

⁷¹ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion, “Materialsammlung zum zweiten Jahrestag der militärischen Intervention der NATO im ehemaligen Jugoslawien,” *lang & schlüssig* 14, March 2001, 14.

reason for the Rambouillet peace conference, to be discussed in more detail below.⁷²

Less than two months after the massacres in Racak and amid the final diplomatic push in Rambouillet prior to the war, the Greens held a smaller Party Day in Erfurt in the first week of March that clarified their overall position. Much like the October 1998 vote in the Bundestag, where the Green MPs were in some cases forced to choose strategy over principle, the Erfurt Party Day forced more elements of the Party's leadership to make a similar decision for the first time. The looming crisis led to considerable dissonance within the Greens, threatening to limit the foreign policy effectiveness of Fischer and by proxy Germany. In Erfurt, however, unlike the earlier larger Party Day in Magdeburg, the Party chose to support Fischer and his Kosovo policy, which included supporting a possible deployment of German forces to Kosovo. The declaration, written by Angelika Beer and even supported by the strong pacifist Hans-Christian Ströbele, gained wide support at Erfurt.

At issue here was not just the Party backing Fischer, but rather the Party demonstrating to the SPD and the international community, that it could govern and act responsibly. The foreign minister made it quite clear to the opponents within the Greens, addressing the forum with "you" instead of the more traditional "we," that the Greens could no longer remain in the government if its principles could not adjust to the requirements of government; the Party had to adapt its ideals.⁷³ That the Party chose to adjust to these requirements strongly suggests even at this early stage that most of the Green party-wide leaderships' principles were malleable in the face of governance

⁷² Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/022, 22. Sitzung, 25 February 1999; "Materialsammlung zum zweiten Jahrestag der militärischen Intervention der NATO im ehemaligen Jugoslawien," 11.

⁷³ "Grünen vertagen Strukturdebatte," *Handelsblatt*, 8 March 1999; Rainer Stephan, "Das Fiasko der Grünen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8 March 1999.

requirements. The support of the grass roots would only come with the much more volatile, if not violent, Bielefeld Party Day two months later.

Less than three weeks after Erfurt, NATO began its attack with the support of Green leadership. As the bombs began to fall in Kosovo and Serbia, the two leading foreign and defense speakers, Lippelt and Beer respectively, argued that there were two primary reasons for the NATO attack—the desire to prevent further expulsions and massacres in Kosovo and the desire to prevent an expansion of the war to the surrounding area. The Green party leadership in their declaration immediately after the beginning of the attack argued it was the execution of a “long threatened consequence” that, though hopefully short, could prove useful in bringing Milosevic back to the table. The responsibility for the escalation of the conflict to this new level rested with Milosevic and it required action. Indeed, Fischer later argued that the war did not begin with the NATO attack, but instead had started when Milosevic’s forces renewed their aggression in Kosovo the week earlier. In fact, he strongly criticized the traditionalist Left in his Party for failing to denounce the Serbs’ assault and instead only criticizing the NATO attack.⁷⁴

The leadership used both the argument of preventing genocide and fulfilling German responsibility in support of the NATO campaign. In the days after the attack, Helmut Lippelt, in a shift away from his earlier objection to an attack without a UN mandate, recounted both the “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz” ideals ingrained in the Greens, noting that the genocide in the Balkans was actually a threat to world peace that required action. Moreover, Green values argued for action to stop it and

⁷⁴ “Erklärung zu den NATO-Luftangriffen in der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien,” n.d., <<http://www.muenster.org/frieden/beer.html>> accessed 28 October 2007; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Zu den Lufteinsätzen der NATO in Jugoslawien,” Pressedienst Nr. 39/99, 25 March 1999, in “Der Kosovo Krieg,” 53; Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 155-56.

from his perspective military action was the only possibility. A Party leadership declaration mere days after the NATO attack suggested that the events in Kosovo were a “tremendous humanitarian catastrophe” requiring a greater international and multilateral involvement.⁷⁵ Ludger Volmer, as will be discussed in greater detail below, made considerable reference to the role of Germany being in the government and the importance of adhering to alliance goals as an important factor of the Green decision.

Though there was by no means complete support of the NATO bombing, there was at least a reluctant acceptance in the early phases amid the expectation that it would be a short campaign. However, within a few days of the start of the bombing campaign, as it became clear that the NATO attacks were actually making the situation worse on the ground, there would be considerable internal criticism within the Greens about the course of the war. The initial justification—preventing a genocide—was now collapsing under the weight of the turn of events on the ground. As the bombing campaign continued, support for it within the Greens fell from 57% in April to 38% by May.⁷⁶ From the leadership perspective, however, there was a general recognition that Milosevic remained responsible for the continued need for NATO’s operations.

In the case of whether to halt the bombing or not, especially as civilians were increasingly suffering, there would be increasing public unity between the *realos* and the swing group, especially now that the latter was thoroughly integrated in the government. The Party leader and *realo* Rezzo Schlauch, though he understood the traditionalists who wanted to stop the attacks unconditionally, argued that doing so would only embolden

⁷⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/031, 31. Sitzung, 26 March 1999; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Alle Ansätze zu einer Lösung des Kosovo-Konflikts ernsthaft prüfen,” Pressedienst Nr. 42/99, 29 March 1999, in “Der Kosovo Krieg,” 63.

⁷⁶ Peter Rudolf, “Germany in the Kosovo Conflict,” in *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War—Allied*

Milosevic and allow him to complete his already planned attack on the Kosovar Albanians. Fischer followed a similar argument in his public pronouncements.

Though swing group adherents were quick to suggest new political strategies to complement and perhaps supersede the military actions, they were hesitant to directly challenge government policy. Their views effected a declaration from the leadership less than a week after the beginning of operations that noted the growing uneasiness in the Party and suggested the vigorous pursuit of possible diplomatic initiatives to bring the ethnic cleansing to an end. Still, there was no direct criticism of the NATO attacks. With the worsening conditions on the ground Kerstin Müller, Angelika Beer, and Ludger Volmer, and others, rejected the traditionalist idea of an end of the NATO attacks, and instead followed the *realo* idea of rejecting any halt to the bombing, though the latter two did recognize the possible use of a cease fire as part of a negotiation strategy. A week after the original leadership declaration, a new one published by Angelika Beer again renewed the call for political initiatives as a part of the NATO operation; unlike the earlier leadership declaration, however, there was by this point an overt attempt to push the military action to the background, even if it was not overt criticism.⁷⁷

This unity can easily be seen as a part of integration in the government, one of the ideals of *Regierungsfähigkeit*. Speaking out directly against NATO actions and by proxy the government's policy would have caused a crisis of confidence within the governing coalition amid their first major foreign policy challenge. By this point, the impact of

Force or Forced Allies?, eds. Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 136-37.

⁷⁷ "Erste Flüchtlinge in Deutschland eingetroffen; Kritik bei Grünen und der SPD an den Nato-Angriffen," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 8 April 1999, 1; "Breite parlamentarische Unterstützung für die Bundesregierung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 April 1999; "Wenn es schon mit Gottes Hilfe nicht geht . . .," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 May 1999; "Milosevic handelt nich anders als Hitler," Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Alle Ansätze zu einer Lösung des Kosovo-Konflikts ernsthaft prüfen;" in "Der Kosovo Krieg;" Bundesvorstand Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Grüne fordern Bundesregierung zur diplomatischen Initiative im

being involved in the government, most particularly the successes of forestalling the war with the Rambouillet conference, had demonstrated considerable value even at this early state. The chance to further that impact with new diplomatic initiatives and the overall desire for continued influence on German foreign policy would be a critical aspect of the swing group's evolution.

There was considerable unity at all levels within the Party, however, when it came to the possible introduction of ground forces as the campaign ground along. First suggested by the US and Great Britain, the idea fell on deaf ears in all of Germany, not just in the Green Party, and there was no chance of any German support.⁷⁸ Within the Greens there was practically universal condemnation, though both Fischer and Volmer as part of the foreign ministry, tried to allay such fears, denying that there was a real American drive for ground troops. Angelika Beer rejected such a possibility, calling it the "painful border" past which the Greens would not go. The Party leadership, which by organization did not include Fischer or Volmer at this point, as early as three weeks into the campaign argued against any use of ground forces in Kosovo, saying it would bring considerable danger of escalation while not helping to create any chance for a political solution. That rejection would not wane for the duration of the conflict.⁷⁹

This firm stance demonstrated the limits that the Greens, as well as the Germans, were willing to accept. Prevention of genocide and even Germany's responsibility to NATO and the western alliance would only go so far. Indeed, from Fischer's perspective, it was quite fortunate that it did not come to a ground war, as it was doubtful

Kosovo-Konflikt auf," 2 April 1999, in "Der Kosovo Krieg," 64.

⁷⁸ Rudlof, 138; Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 206-07.

⁷⁹ Jan Bielicki, "Ohne die Deutschen," *Die Woche*, 4 June 1999, 6; Bundesvorstand Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Keine Bodentruppe im Kosovo," 19 April 1999, in "Der Kosovo Krieg," 85.

that Germany would have participated for any reason. That would likely then have had serious consequences for the NATO alliance and Germany's international position.⁸⁰ Indeed, it would take the successes in Macedonia and the absolute shock of the 9/11 attacks before the Greens would entertain the idea of supporting the deployment of German ground combat force elements.

Though the Greens would only go so far in the military sphere, with their control of the foreign ministry and a focus on preventive politics, they were quite active in the diplomatic sphere, as both the Rambouillet conference and the so-called Fischer plan both illustrated. These initiatives were a balancing act for the Green leadership, especially Fischer, between the traditionalist ideas and the Greens' new international responsibilities. Both diplomatic initiatives would be exemplifications of the new Green foreign policy in action—a desire to prevent the war, while also working within the confines of the international community to achieve the final goal of stopping the ethnic cleansing. They would illustrate the consummate influence of the swing group in addition to the drive of the *realos*.

The Rambouillet conference, amid the escalating violence and shortly after the Racak massacre, was a final attempt to create a political solution that both sides would accept by using the threat of military force in a diplomatic setting. While the US and other NATO partners pushed for an ultimatum methodology to compel Milosevic to acquiesce, Fischer and Germany pushed for the idea of a conference along the lines of the Dayton Peace Conference. Fischer, who held numerous internal meetings in the foreign ministry, was convinced of the necessity of convening such a conference to prevent the situation from reaching a state of “escalation automaticity,” while at the same time

⁸⁰ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 207.

avoiding the idea of “negotiation at any price” that, from Fischer’s perspective, had worsened the Bosnia crisis.⁸¹

The entire Rambouillet process demonstrates several aspects of a Green approach. As many Greens had argued since joining the government, one of Germany’s primary goals was to integrate Russia into the path to peace to ensure the UN was involved in the final peace process. With Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council any UN participation could be rejected if their demands were not met. Though the conference would be extended only to fail in the end, amid the departure of the Serbs and their massive attack in Kosovo two days later, the Rambouillet Conference represented a sustained effort to push Green ideas in German foreign policy.

In the middle of the conference, NATO took steps to prepare for possible events in Kosovo, in particular by deploying an extraction force to Macedonia that would act as a protection force if the conference succeeded. During the February debate in the Bundestag on whether Germany should support the NATO extraction force, Fischer argued that looking away from the events in Kosovo was not possible, as it would mean the “acceptance of the murderous logic” being used by the Serbs. Supporting the proposal, even though it was for a NATO force instead of UN force, which had been opposed by many in the Greens including the swing group, was seen as part and parcel of the solution, as it was the only form that the Kosovars would accept.⁸²

The so-called Fischer plan was proffered by Germany and without the consultation of other NATO allies in mid April during the escalating air attacks absent concrete results. Amid fears that the military effort would escalate out of control, the

⁸¹ Joetze, 64; Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 123-25.

⁸² Plenarprotokoll 14/022.

plan was a way of creating a diplomatic settlement by enlisting Milosevic in a broader peace effort for the area. While the NATO Council settled on a five point requirement focused on military requirements, the German foreign ministry began to develop the Fischer plan that aimed to retake the diplomatic initiative by offering fewer conditions than the five being offered by NATO and in particular offering a short cease fire to allow the Serbs to begin withdrawing their forces. It focused on achieving a Serb withdrawal followed by the entrance of a heavily armed UN peace force, at least as originally proposed, and then the return of the refugees before determining the final status of Kosovo.⁸³ The ideas inherent in the Fischer plan, especially the cease fire option, were quite similar to ideas proposed by many in the Greens in particular the swing group, as will be demonstrated in more detail below. It would receive considerable support from the Green Party; indeed, at the Bielefeld Party Day, the final declaration would include a firm declaration of support for this plan.

All of these examples—the Rambouillet conference, the vote on the extraction force, and the Fischer plan—demonstrated a new focus of influence on international affairs for the Greens and in turn a greater willingness to accept the ideals inherent in *Regierungsfähigkeit*. The Rambouillet conference was seen as a success of German foreign policy and by extension Green foreign policy. Ludger Volmer would later cite the fact that the conference even occurred as a “big success” of Green foreign policy. The Green Party’s declaration at the Bielefeld conference in May would recognize that the new Red-Green government’s actions had definitively led to Rambouillet and the

⁸³ Rudolf, 139; Joseph Fitchett, “Diplomatic Efforts by Allies Over Kosovo Begin to Surface: EU Leaders Back UN Cease-Fire Plan For Serb Pullback,” *International Herald Tribune*, 15 April 1999; Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 187.

chance to avoid a military conflict.⁸⁴

The debate on the extraction force showed some evolution in the Green perspective and a new acceptance of *Regierungsfähigkeit*. Though traditionalists continued to oppose this deployment believing that it would strengthen NATO and the military mechanisms, there was widespread support within the Greens to include the swing group, as only five opposed the motion. Even Volmer and Beer, as will be discussed below, supported the resolution.⁸⁵ NATO had now become even more acceptable to the swing group.

The Fischer plan though was more about an adaptation of Green values to the international level for both domestic and foreign needs. As Fischer would later note in his memoirs, he “absolutely” needed this plan, especially for the domestic audience. With the pressure from his party growing every day as the bombing continued, Fischer “desperately” needed “domestic relief” through the “development of a convincing political initiative.” Its eventual planned release by the foreign ministry through the Associate Press was both “helpful and important” for his domestic politics. Indeed, Alister Miskimmon of the University of London agrees, arguing that this plan was an example of domestic pressures being translated to the international level, especially given Fischer’s desire to reduce the domestic pressure on him.⁸⁶ Without the now developed acceptance of the desire for influence on the foreign policy stage, it is doubtful that the Party would have accepted the Fischer plan as such a success.

⁸⁴ Rudolf, 135; Plenarprotokoll 14/022; Volmer, “Krieg in Jugoslawien—Hintergründe einer grünen Entscheidung.”

⁸⁵ Plenarprotokoll 14/022.

⁸⁶ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 187, 189-90; Alister Miskimmon, “Europeanisation and German Foreign and Security Policy—The Case of Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe,” n.d. <<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/pdfs/EFPUEuropeanisationandGermanPolicy.pdf>> accessed 28 October 2007.

The Swing Group Evolves

For the swing group, there was no real argument between “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz.” There was an acceptance of the desire to protect the values of human rights. Instead, it was between “never again war” and the will to govern and the ideas of *Regierungsfähigkeit*. By the time the Party convened for the Party Day in Bielefeld, which will be discussed in more detail below, many swing group leaders, such as Ludger Volmer and Jürgen Trittin, no longer spoke “from the soul” of their defining principles. Their evolution was primarily a manifestation of the integration into the government.⁸⁷ This section will examine the specific changes of two of the most important swing group members—Ludger Volmer and Angelika Beer.

As one of the key leaders of the swing group and one with significant power to enact Green foreign policy once in the government, Volmer’s perspectives and evolutions on this crucial portion of the debate carry significant weight. Fischer saw him as the “Crème de la Crème” of the swing group.⁸⁸ Moreover, Green leader and MP Fritz Kuhn noted, it was Volmer and his evolutions that brought the Greens, and by proxy the swing group, to the point where they could be a part of the governing coalition.⁸⁹ During the Bosnia debate, as outlined in the previous chapter, Volmer was very much opposed to any deployment of military forces, let alone German forces. Yet, between 1995 and 1998, Volmer changed this perspective primarily out of a mixture of strategic reasons, in hopes of the Greens becoming and remaining *regierungsfähig*, and to an extent out of conviction.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Paul Lersch and Hajo Schumacher, “Weltpolitik in Bielefeld,” *Der Spiegel*, 10 May 1999, 25.

⁸⁸ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 217.

⁸⁹ Ralf Beste, “Die Macht wird neu verteilt,” 15 May 1999, *Berliner Zeitung*, 3.

⁹⁰ Voigt, interview by author.

From the onset of the crisis in 1998, the impact of events, in this case the shock of the resurgence of violence in Kosovo, did help to evolve some of his viewpoints, though it would not be enough to change his perspective. In his speech before the Bundestag during the initial debate in 1998, Volmer argued that action to stop Milosevic's campaign of violence was long overdue. After the massacre at Racak, the continuous flow of television picture depicting the tragedy in Kosovo allowed his personal objections to the lack of a UN mandate to recede into the background. By April 1999, Volmer was calling Milosevic's preplanned actions in Kosovo "genocide" perpetrated under his direct planning. Indeed, as he himself later noted in an interview 2002, the challenges inherent with the violence in Bosnia and the resurgence of the war in Kosovo in 1998 created a new security reality that was "stranger than theory" for the Greens. A new idea of Green security policy that could come to terms with these new challenges and be more consequential had to be developed.⁹¹

Despite his desire to end the violence in Kosovo, by October 1998 Volmer still did not support using NATO. Though he was one of eight Greens, mostly swing group members, to abstain from voting in a purely political move to avoid demonstrating any disloyalty to Fischer on the eve of him becoming foreign minister or weakening the political pressure the military threat could bring, Volmer clearly noted in his speech that he opposed the proposed deployment of NATO and German forces as it lacked a UN mandate, thus making it illegal in international law. Like others in the Greens, he feared using NATO here would be a "precedent" that would lead to future cases when regional

⁹¹ Plenarprotokoll 13/248; Markus Krath, "Warum die Grünen den Angriff mittragen," 25 March 1999, <www.ludger-volmer.de/themen.neue-regionalpolitik/index.htm> accessed 2 December 2002; "Milosevic handelt nich anders als Hitler;" Volmer, "Krieg in Jugoslawien—Hintergründe einer grünen Entscheidung;" Volmer, interview by author.

powers would use the same methodology to use military force. He charged those arguing that it was an “exception” instead, were “window washing” the real issue.

Instead, he fell back on traditional Green arguments here, arguing for an empowerment of the UN and OSCE to push conflict prevention mechanisms.⁹² Thus, despite his belief that the violence had to be stopped, that shock of the resurgence of violence was not enough to overturn his conviction on the use of military force. Only with the addition of strategic desires for the Party that came with the inclusion into the government, would Volmer’s rhetoric drastically change.

Over the course of the first six to eight months of being in the government, Volmer demonstrated a clear change in his views on the use of military force. Eckart Lohse, the prolific writer on the Greens for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, argued that Volmer’s “decisive” change in foreign policy came during this time,⁹³ as the potential means to reach the Green ends that had been long articulated had evolved with joining the government. Achieving the “civilization of foreign policy,” one of the pillars of Green foreign policy, could now “when necessary” include air attacks.⁹⁴ By the late 1999 debate about the base program for the Greens, through a dexterous intellectual dance, Volmer had flipped the argument of non-violence for the Greens. The issue was not a complete acceptance of non-violence, but that was rather a goal to be achieved. In the interim amid such calamities as in the Balkans, however, it was “completely unreal” to argue that no weapons could actually be used. Violence could not solve a crisis, but it

⁹² Beste, “Grüne mehrheitlich für Kosovo-Einsatz;” Plenarprotokoll 13/248; Volmer, “Krieg in Jugoslawien—Hintergründe einer grünen Entscheidung.” Other major members of the swing group who abstained in this vote were Winfried Nachtwei, Kerstin Müller, and Angelika Beer.

⁹³ Eckart Lohse, “Ludger der Wendige,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 February 2005, 6.

⁹⁴ Krath.

was at times necessary.⁹⁵

During this same time, Volmer also showed some clear changes in at least two other areas. Whereas in October 1998 he had based his opposition to the deployment of German forces on convictions and the lack of a UN mandate, a few months later, that position had drastically changed. Just prior to the actual beginning of air operations in March 1999, Volmer recognized the legitimacy of using the NATO military threat to achieve change on the ground in Kosovo. Shortly thereafter, he publically claimed that his requirement for a UN mandate had receded to the background, replaced instead by the “hyper-legal (*Übergesetzlichen*) emergency” on the ground. The September 1998 UN Security Council Resolution 1199 now provided legal cover for the attack, a complete reversal from Volmer’s October 1998 argument. Interestingly, in a March 1999 essay to the Party, Volmer argued that the October 1998 vote was in fact only about developing a military threat for political leverage, rather than an opposition to military force.⁹⁶

A second example rested with Volmer’s perspective on the continuation of the bombing campaign. A week into the attacks, Volmer argued that a unilateral end to the NATO attacks, as some in the traditional pacifist elements of the Party were calling for, would not lead to any success, as the war would continue according to Milosevic’s plan with a NATO pause. Even as it dragged into its third month, Volmer did not make a direct call for stopping the attacks. Instead, he recognized that NATO should only look at the possibility of a cease fire when it was integrated into a negotiation process

⁹⁵ Eckart Lohse, “Soll Außenpolitik gewaltlos, gewaltfrei oder gewaltmindernd sein?,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 November, 1999, 3.

⁹⁶ “Grüne Balkandiplomatie;” “Milosevic handelt nicht anders als Hitler;” Krath; Volmer, “Krieg in Jugoslawien—Hintergründe einer grüner Entscheidung.”

requiring specific Serbian actions.⁹⁷

These evolutions emerged primarily out of his desire for a *regierungsfähig* Green party. This influence of the will to govern was clear even as Volmer held to his traditionalist principles during the October 1998 debate. Despite its division into three distinct elements on this vote, he argued that the Party was acting “fully together.” Even with his abstention on the crucial vote, he was trying to denounce the influence of the internal strife on the eve of joining the governing coalition.⁹⁸ As the attacks began amid the collapse of the Green sponsored peace talks, Volmer also highlighted the second aspect of *Regierungsfähigkeit*—in this case the potential for the Greens to have an impact on international affairs. This is a stark change for Volmer, especially given his early misgivings in 1998 that the Greens should even take over the foreign ministry. Within six months, however, Volmer was arguing the contrary. With Fischer as the foreign minister, the Party was now inexorably bound into the “solidarity of common action of the international community.” That integration gave a tremendous chance to have an impact, even as the Greens were no “great power,” as the successes with the calling of the Rambouillet conference demonstrated.⁹⁹

Volmer himself in a 26 March 1999 article for the Party laid out the reasons for the change. Following much of what he had highlighted publically, the essay argued that the Greens were now acting in a new environment that not only did not conform to Green wishes, but also brought forth new influences to guide Party actions. Unlike when the Greens were in the opposition, they now had to act within the confines of the interests of

⁹⁷ “Interview im Deutschlandfunk zum Kosovokonflikt.” 2 June 1999, <www.ludger-volmer.de/themen.neue-regionalpolitik/index.htm> accessed 2 December 2002; “Milosevic handelt nicht anders als Hitler.”

⁹⁸ Beste, “Volmers neue Friedfertigkeit.”

national states (including Germany), alliances and international organizations. It would be these new international elements of multilateralism and Germany's responsibility to those ideals that would be crucial: "The decision making process that led to the combat operation [in Kosovo] cannot be understood without the principal of multilateralism, for which there is no alternative for German foreign policy." Indeed, at an April 1999 interview, Volmer further enunciated the impact of the *Regierungsfähigkeit*. In leaving the opposition and joining the government, he had to act "at another level and in another context," which in turn required using other methods. No longer was simply stating an opinion an option; instead, as a member of the governing coalition, he had to attempt to rectify his principles with the complexities of the international environment.

Unlike their days in the opposition, according to Volmer, the crisis in Kosovo would confront the Greens "stronger" now that they were in the government. Not only would convictions define politics, but the necessities of German policy as a whole had to be taken into account. The past ideals declared in Green programmatics must fall to a "governance politic" that "acts responsibly." Though Green values can guide actions, the new environment in which the Greens now had to act restricted what they could achieve. For the swing party then, this new situation can lead to a situation where their pacifist tendencies would be "depleted" against the realities of the situation.¹⁰⁰

Though many scholars have pointed to the pressure exerted by other allied partners on Germany's government, Volmer himself did not see this pressure as having a major impact. For him the events on the ground and, more importantly, the effects of the

⁹⁹ Krath; Lohse, "Ludger der Wendige;" Volmer, "Krieg in Jugoslawien—Hintergründe einer grünen Entscheidung."

¹⁰⁰ Volmer, "Krieg in Jugoslawien—Hintergründe einer grünen Entscheidung;" "Milosevic handelt nicht anders als Hitler."

ideals inherent in *Regierungsfähigkeit*, helped to change his perspectives on the Kosovo crisis. Being a part of the government in the foreign office gave him first-hand access to and understanding of the challenges of operating in this new environment, as his essays and public declarations make quite apparent. The choice of abstention instead of rejection of the proposal in October to send German troops to participate in the NATO attack as well as the choice to defend the bombing campaign even amid direct challenges from his own party are clear indications of his evolved perspective. Indeed, at the Green Party Day at Bielefeld, Volmer remained true to the governing coalition's perspective, even attacking some of the traditional leftists in the Party.¹⁰¹

By late 1999 after the end of the Kosovo crisis, Volmer was strongly embedded in the new government and was seeing that as a chance to affect Green values on the international stage. In an internally distributed article in October 1999, Volmer spoke of the necessity of operating in and pushing Green objectives as a part of the international community. Protecting human rights, a pillar of Green policy, required direct international involvement, though with the primary mechanism being the UN. Later, in an article in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in September 2000, Volmer argued that it was “unarguable” that the international community had a “moral responsibility” to prevent suffering and limit damages.¹⁰²

While Volmer's evolution was quite clear, it also useful to look at the viewpoints of another swing group member at the federal level to trace the factors affecting her evolution. Angelika Beer, one of the renowned defense experts in the Party, was, like

¹⁰¹ Volmer, interview by author; Lohse, “Ludger der Wendige.”

¹⁰² Ludger Volmer, “Erste Jahresbilanz—Grüne Akzente in der deutschen Außenpolitik,” 12 October 1999, <www.ludger-volmer.de/themen.neue-regionalpolitik/index.htm> accessed 2 December 2002; Ludger Volmer, “Die neue humanitären Herausforderungen meistern,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22 July 2000.

Volmer, viewed during the Bosnian debate and its immediate aftermath as a one of the primary voices against the *realo* ideals of Fischer.¹⁰³ Yet by the March 1999 Party Day in Erfurt, she supported Fischer in his position, even as she did not completely agree with him.

Even as the situation in Kosovo was at a low simmer, Beer was quite aware of the dangers inherent in the region. In a paper to members of the foreign policy circle in the Greens in 1996, she argued that with the region likely to see violence again, the Greens would have to find a solution without a repeat of the controversy immediately after the Srebrenica massacre. It must be a policy that was responsible for the people in the region; there was scant mention of any need for responsibility within a German government. She was still opposed to the use of NATO forces in the Balkans, preferring to see UN or OSCE forces being used, a position she would still hold even as late as October 1998. At this point, she continued to adhere to the traditionalist perspective, arguing that any solution must move away from military perspectives.

However, she did also offer some indications of a potential for evolution. In particular, she now offered her support of a UN mandated and run peacekeeping operation for the Balkans, which the ardent *fundis* continued to oppose at this point in the debate. Even as it was not the best mechanism, such a solution would present the chance for success in the region, especially since the tools the Greens preferred to use were not available in the region. She even suggested the possibility of the deployment of German soldiers for a UN peacekeeping mission, so long as they were not under NATO command.¹⁰⁴ By 1996, Beer was a step ahead of the traditionalists, but still remained

¹⁰³ Ralf Beste, "Die Frau zwischen den Fronten," *Berliner Zeitung*, 26 March 1999, 5.

¹⁰⁴ Angelika Beer, "Wie weiter nach dem 12.06.96 im ehemaligen Jugoslawien?," 3 July 1996, Bestand

primarily wedded to traditionalist ideas, even as the potential for her evolution out of consciences reasons was apparent.

Overall, Beer's evolution in 1998-1999 rested on both the conscience and strategic desire, though as Karsten Voigt argues, it was more out of consciences reasons. In her own words, there was no "logical" nature to her development.¹⁰⁵ Her statements during the crisis routinely mention the plight of the people in Kosovo. In the Bundestag debate just after the bombing campaign began, she noted the goal of stopping the "continuing (*anbahnende*) humanitarian tragedy" in Kosovo as a primary reason for her support to the campaign. Even as the NATO attacks did not create an immediate solution, she foremost maintained her rhetoric to end the massacres.¹⁰⁶

Intellectually, as part of the explanation for her change, she recognized the gulf between strict pacifism and the protection of human rights: "Guarding the peace and protecting human rights are two Green objectives that cannot be realized simultaneously at this point."¹⁰⁷ Her general acceptance of NATO, which she had strongly opposed even a year earlier, evolved out of a conscience desire to end the suffering of the refugees in Kosovo. From her perspective, by early 1999 only NATO's military pressure could create the circumstances to achieve that goal. Indeed, even when she was criticized as a "warmonger," she often asked rhetorically what other options were even available to stop the crisis. Moreover, she also reversed her position on using NATO forces to secure the peace when she supported the use of German forces for the quick reaction force

B.I.10, Akte Nr. 372, AGG.

¹⁰⁵ Voigt, interview by author; Armin Fuhrer, "Meine Entwicklung ist nicht logisch," *Die Welt*, 12 May 1999.

¹⁰⁶ Angelika Beer, "Grüne fordern Bundesregierung zu diplomatischer Initiative im Kosovo-Konflikt auf," 2 April 1999, in "Der Kosovo Krieg," 64; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/030, 30. Sitzung, 25 March 1999.

¹⁰⁷ Joffe.

deployment in February.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, likely as a compromise with her own principles of non-violence, she publicly noted that the situation for Kosovo would be a solitary instance and not be a precedence case for the further militarization of NATO.¹⁰⁹ The dilution of her pacifist principles thus came largely because of a conscious choice to view military operations as the best means to fulfill her desire to end the suffering in Kosovo.

Even as the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo played a large role in the evolution of her pacifist principles, she also incorporated a more strategic vision that supported becoming and later remaining a part of the governing coalition. Though she remained critical of NATO leadership and the ActOrd, suggesting it lacked a political concept as part of the solution and that its goals were focused more on the prevention of refugees in the rest of Europe rather than preventing the conflict, by October she began arguing in public that it should now be a goal to distance the Party from the general rejection of out of area operations.¹¹⁰ Moreover, during that crucial vote she publically noted that there would be no efforts to prevent this deployment after the new coalition took power.¹¹¹ These positions were now clear reflections of her change to accept the responsibilities of being part of the governing coalition.

When it came to the October 1998 ArctOrd vote she, like Volmer, chose the strategic route of abstention. Even later as she constantly criticized the lack of a UN mandate, she never actually officially opposed the Red-Green coalition's position. In statements shortly after the start of hostilities, she recognized the Green Party's

¹⁰⁸ Fuhrer; Beste, "Die Frau zwischen den Fronten."

¹⁰⁹ "Ein Ende des Krieges hängt nicht von grünen Beschlüssen ab," *Die Welt*, 15 May 1999.

¹¹⁰ Beer, "Kosovo—Auf handlungsfähige Alternativen wie UNO und OSZE setzen."

¹¹¹ "Kabinett billigt Nato-Einsatz im Kosovo."

acceptance of its responsibilities, suggesting that a new responsibility that was previously “unknown” in Germany’s recent history had developed with this decision made by the Red-Green coalition. By making the decision, she recognized that the Greens had placed themselves in “full responsibility in the governing coalition.”¹¹² Indeed, one of her rivals and arch pacifist Hans-Christian Ströbele believed that Beer would never have approved the Kosovo operation had the Greens not been in the government.¹¹³ Her decision making process was beginning to reflect a strategic choice to accept the ideas inherent in *Regierungsfähigkeit*.

Even as her position on the war in Kosovo evolved, she remained critical of some elements of its execution and the government’s perspective. When Fischer originally hinted at the possibility of using NATO ground forces in mid April, an idea which he later backed away from, Beer strongly criticized him. Moreover, she rejected Fischer’s equating of the Waffen SS of the Second World War with Milosevic’s forces in Kosovo. Both criticisms aimed to reel in what she perceived as a potential extension of the goals of the NATO attacks to include the possible occupation of Serbia, while at the same time arguing for the increase of diplomatic pressure and options to end the fighting.¹¹⁴

Even more illuminating is her 11 April letter to the leadership of the Green Party. She strongly argues the only alternative with the failure of NATO to have achieved its objectives with military force and the situation on the ground worsening, was a return to diplomacy. Importantly however, she still did not suggest a unilateral halt to the NATO campaign as many in the traditionalist wing did; instead she argued for essentially a reduction in the NATO demands for a conditional cease fire. Her conditions, which

¹¹² “Erklärung zu den NATO-Luftangriffen in der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien;” Plenarprotokoll 14/030.

¹¹³ Beste, “Die Frau zwischen den Fronten.”

would be similar to the Fischer plan, were only that Milosevic withdraw from Kosovo, the ethnic cleansing be ended, and all refugees be allowed to return. As she clearly stated, an unconditional end to NATO's air campaign was "not responsible," as it would only lead to the fulfillment of Milosevic's goal of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.¹¹⁵ Such a perspective demonstrates a clear adaptation to the new position supporting the governing coalition.

For both Volmer and Beer, their evolutions from the traditionalist perspective toward a more *realo* point of view emerged during both the shock of the increasingly worsening situation in Kosovo and the transition from opposition to governing party. It is also clear that their changes came about as a mixture of both an evolving conscience and the strategic calculations of *Regierungsfähigkeit*. For Volmer, strategic decisions were likely at the heart of his evolution; in fact it also appears that he internalized the responsibilities of government more than others. Beer's change appeared based more out of a conscious desire to prevent another humanitarian disaster, even if that meant using military force.

That the Greens were able to remain in government for five years through several other major out of area deployments strongly suggests that the swing group at the leadership level accepted, if not internalized, the responsibilities of being a part of the German government. As the later sections will clearly demonstrate, the swing group would no longer be resistant to using military force. The rest of the Party, however, would be a different story.

¹¹⁴ Christoph Schwennicke, "Fischers Sprache befördert Bodenkrieg," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 April 1999.

¹¹⁵ Angelika Beer, "Krieg im Kosovo—und kein Ende," 2 April 1999, in "Der Kosovo Krieg," 66-67.

Interparty Violence in Bielefeld

Whereas many at the federal level of the Greens had long been encumbered with the burdens of strategy over conscience, the Party as a whole was essentially confronted with this dilemma in May 1999 in Bielefeld for the first time. Bielefeld, the first Green major Party Day held with police protection, would be the “nightmare of all Green nightmares”—a Party Day held in the middle of a war during a Red-Green government. Unlike the earlier major Party Day in Magdeburg, when the Greens were able to hold onto their defining traditionalist principles in front of the looming election, Bielefeld, building somewhat on the smaller Erfurt Party Day in March, would see the additional pressure down to the grass roots of the newly minted *Regierungsfähigkeit*. It would demonstrate how split the Party actually was and without question represent their deepest existential crisis. But by the end, it would also be a clear delineation of a “deep break” in the Party’s foreign policy stance.¹¹⁶

The atmosphere was “full of hate,” according to Fischer, who bore much of the physical brunt of it when he was hit in the ear by a large sack of paint hurled by a protester. The proceedings were the “ground war in Bielefeld.”¹¹⁷ At issue was the core of the future for the Greens—traditional principles or the strategy of an evolved responsible political party as part of a German government. Going into the conference, it was quite unclear how the Party would vote.¹¹⁸ However, according to Fischer, and borne out in contemporary accounts, the Party was well aware of what was at stake. The debate was not about the deployment of German forces to Kosovo, for that could not be stopped. Instead, it was about the future of the Red-Green coalition. The Party would

¹¹⁶ Beste, “Die Macht wird neu verteilt.”

¹¹⁷ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 222-23.

have to leave the “sun deck of theory” where it traditionally resided, and accept reality by giving up the principles of absolute pacifism if it wanted to remain in government.¹¹⁹

Bielefeld would be a decisive zero hour for Fischer’s future leadership in the party;¹²⁰ he was fully aware that a failure would be disastrous. Fischer believed that the Greens wanted to govern and Bielefeld would show that or it would be the end: “Now [the Party] will be hardened or burned to ashes.”¹²¹ His speech, filled at times with at times testy exchanges with hecklers, was an impassioned plea to his party to give him the strength to carry out his duties as a Green foreign minister and continue the Red-Green coalition. It was a plea to accept *Regierungsfähigkeit*. Anything but absolute support of his position would leave him weakened both within the coalition and internationally. Fischer was so convinced of this that he threatened to resign both from the government and the Party if he were not given a mandate in Bielefeld.

He began his speech with a reference to the Greens joining the government amid a clear understanding that war was a possibility. The Greens could no longer be a protest party; it must confront the reality in the Balkans and act responsibly. The Party had a responsibility to the government, and thus the state of Germany, to have total clarity and support for this policy. He noted on several occasions his personal efforts to avoid the confrontation; indeed, he highlighted the Rambouillet conference as a final effort of the Greens to stop the war. He also reached for the ideas that would resonate most in the Party—“never again Auschwitz”—when he argued that his personal decision was based also on the barbaric and planned actions of Milosevic in Kosovo, a strong belief in the

¹¹⁸ Lersch and Schumacher, 22.

¹¹⁹ Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 221; “Kosovokrieg—Entschlossene Zweifler,” *Focus Magazin*, 12 April 1999, 20-25; Lersch and Schumacher, 22-23.

¹²⁰ Lersch and Schumacher, 22.

idea of “never again Auschwitz,” and a desire to prevent a resurgence of war in Europe. He firmly believed and clearly stated that traditional Green pacifism could not provide an answer to the challenges posed by Milosevic.¹²²

Fischer’s ideas were of course not shared by all, especially by the traditionalists. For example, Annelie Buntenbach, who would later be one of four MPs to vote against the deployment to Afghanistan, decisively rejected using military force even in the face of the catastrophe in Kosovo. Though not a feeling accepted by all, she also clarified her desire to remain in the government and change its policy. This suggests that even for the traditionalists, the idea of *Regierungsfähigkeit* had some impact, though not enough to trump their pacifist principles. The consummate pacifist Hans-Christian Ströbele passionately argued that NATO’s actions had only worsened the situation. Another traditionalist, Ulrich Cremer, called the results an “historic betrayal” of the Green values.¹²³

The *fundi* proposal for the Party’s Bielefeld declaration had both significant similarities and differences with the final declaration. It followed the final declaration with the belief that using NATO had damaged the strength of the UN, the perception that this was a precedent case, and the complete rejection of using NATO ground forces. It also accepted that the brutality in Kosovo was similar to Bosnia and caused by Milosevic. Unlike the *realos* and to a large extent the swing group though, the *fundis* now decisively rejected using this as a reason for reducing the influence of pacifism in the Party, calling

¹²¹ Jürgen Hogrefe, Paul Lersch, Rainer Pörtner, and Alexander Szandar, “Zweimal total verkalkuliert,” *Der Spiegel*, 12 April 1999, 29.

¹²² “Autorisierte Abschrift des Tonbandmitschnittes der Rede von Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer zum Tagesordnungspunkt Kosovo,” 13 May 1999, AGG.

¹²³ Rede von Annelie Buntenbach zur BDK von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen am 13. Mai 1999 in Bielefeld, 13 May 1999, Bestand A—Peter Bartelheimer, Akte Nr. 11, AGG; Roger Cohen, “Crisis in the Balkans: Germany’s Mood,” *The New York Times*, 14 May 1999; Ralf Beste, “Die Machtfrage ist beantwortet,”

it “selective information politics.” In other words, the traditionalists rejected the facilitating norm of “never again Auschwitz” that had influenced others earlier.

There was strong reference to the ideas inherent in traditional pacifism in this declaration. The authors believed the “dominance of military logic” was leading to the disastrous potential of escalation in Kosovo and throughout the region. Extricating the region from the “military spiral” was becoming increasingly difficult while combat targets were becoming increasingly fuzzier; from their perspective it was the Green Party’s responsibility to build the peace. Moreover, the *fundis* argued that the military actions were not only actually helping Milosevic to achieve his goals, but could not prevent the catastrophe, a direct rejection of the central argument of the Green leadership, the German government, and NATO. To escape this dangerous spiral and help the refugees, they called for an immediate end to the bombing and a return to more traditional methods of Green policy, such as sanctions and political negotiation. At the most basic level, the *fundis* continued to believe that military methods could have no success in Kosovo and only made the situation worse.¹²⁴ All of these perspectives were quite consistent with traditional pacifism, which was devoid of the necessities of being a *regierungsfähig* party in the Red-Green coalition. Had this proposal been approved by the delegates, it would have likely meant the end of the coalition, according to a contemporary interview with Angelika Beer.¹²⁵

Unlike the *fundis*, members of the swing group and the *realos* offered support to Fischer. Volmer was a decisive ally of Fischer in this debate, pleading to the delegates

Berliner Zeitung, 14 May 1999, 2.

¹²⁴ Claudia Roth, Christian Ströbele, u.a., “Die Luftangriffe sofort beenden und mit der Logik der Kriegsführung brechen,” Antrag 74, 2. Außerordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 13 May 1999, AGG; Rede von Annelie Buntenbach zur BDK von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen am 13. Mai 1999 in Bielefeld.

that they not undercut the foreign minister. In a personal exchange with one high level *fundi*, he retorted that the Greens “must speak about real possibilities, not the reality in one’s head.” He also drew considerable applause and public attention as he described the Milosevic policy in Kosovo as “fascism,” a close synonym to the ideals inherent in “never again Auschwitz.” Kerstin Müller implored her fellow party members to understand that unilaterally stopping the war would not mean an end to the violence; for her the memories of guilt on failing to prevent the tragedy in Bosnia remained fresh. The *realo* Daniel Cohn Bendit argued that it was “perverse” to save traditional Green values at the expense of the dying in Kosovo; action was required.¹²⁶

With a vote of 444-338, Fischer and the governing Greens succeeded in passing a Bielefeld declaration by a strong majority that first and foremost affirmed the governing policy, giving Fischer a “free hand” to act.¹²⁷ But it was also a document full of compromises that spoke to many sections of the Party, simply accepting rather than supporting NATO’s attack. It even incorporated some ideas from the *fundi* proposal. The clear winner was of course Fischer, but this declaration was also an indication of the growing shift of the swing group, especially as those in the general membership of the Party now supported those in the federal leadership, away from the traditionalist perspective and toward a governing responsibility. It is also a very clear representation of the Party’s acceptance of the ideas of *Regierungsfähigkeit* over one of the most deeply ingrained principles, even though it received only limited direct mention in the declaration.

¹²⁵ “Ein Ende des Krieges hängt nicht von grünen Beschlüssen ab.”

¹²⁶ Cohen; Beste, “Die Macht wird neu verteilt;” Beste, “Die Machtfrage ist beantwortet;” Brigitte Fehrle, “Ein bisschen Frieden,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 14 May 1999, 3.

¹²⁷ Beste, “Die Machtfrage ist beantwortet.”

The lengthy five page declaration¹²⁸ began with an affirmation of Fischer's request for absolute support. The rhetoric of the facilitating norm "never again Auschwitz" was very clear throughout the first few sections of the declaration, as the Party recognized the importance of acting with military force amid the violent and worsening "extermination and expulsion war" to prevent a repeat of the events in Bosnia. There was no doubt of the "moral legitimacy" to stop the Milosevic's actions. Though there was no clear statement that claimed support for the NATO military actions, the Party did agree that the real blame for the need to use military force rested with Milosevic, who had absolute control to prevent NATO from attacking by simply stopping his war in Kosovo. There was some strong criticism of the NATO attack strategy, given its lack of a decisive end after two months and the worsening conditions. Though by no means a *realo* declaration, it was indeed strong enough to give Fischer the backing he needed both to maintain the governing coalition and act internationally.

This support for Fischer, which was only a small portion of the declaration, was tempered with a clear recognition that this situation should be an exception, rather than the rule of Green foreign policy, a strong reference to the ideals of the swing group and to an extent the *fundis*. The lack of a UN mandate and the belief that NATO would now act without such a mandate in "exceptional situations" were both seen as particularly troubling. The declaration reaffirmed the Green desires to make the UN the ultimate purveyor of military power, while strengthening both the UN and the OSCE. Reinforcing this idea was the suggestion that any follow-on force to secure Kosovo should not consist

¹²⁸ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Beschluss der 2. Außerordentlichen Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz—Frieden und Menschenrechte vereinbaren! Für einen Frieden im Kosovo, der seinen Namen zu Recht trägt!," 13 May 1999, <<http://www.gruene.de/archiv/bdk/99/Bielefeld/beschlus/Kosovo.htm>> accessed 16 October 2007.

of NATO forces or any troops from those countries who participated in the attack, as their use could “torpedo” the potential for a political success. Given the already deployed and approved NATO forces stationed in Macedonia, it is unlikely that this proposal would have been seen as possible; instead it was more likely an internal political statement designed to assuage the traditionalists in the Party. This analysis is supported by the later strong support the Greens gave to the NATO led KFOR just after the war.

A significant portion of the declaration also focused on the potential of the Greens now that they were in government. Highlighting the failures of the Kohl government in leading to the crisis and the successes of the Greens with preventative policies since being in office received considerable mention. Further, there could now be no conflict between the principles of “never again war” and “never again Auschwitz,” but instead a merger to develop a Green foreign policy based on preventive policies. The declaration perceived a clear future for Green ideals in German foreign policy. Though not specifically mentioned, this is the closest affirmation of the desire to remain in government supported by the entire Party.

Perhaps the most interesting suggestion in the declaration came with the perspectives on whether to halt the NATO bombing campaign. With 62% of the Party’s regional organizations at the time wanting an immediate end to the campaign and only 26% supporting a diplomatic solution, the challenge was clear.¹²⁹ While the *realos* had not wanted to halt the campaign, the *fundis* wanted it stopped immediately. In between and the purveyor of policy in this declaration was the swing group’s idea to see a halt in the bombing as a tool in the negotiation process. The declaration clearly rejected the complete halt to the bombing proposed by the *fundis*; instead it argued for a unilateral

“interruption” of the attacks to give the Serbs the chance to acquiesce to the ideas of Rambouillet and increase the potential for a diplomatic end to the conflict. The goal was to end the spiral of escalation that had been defining the conflict up to that point. Contemporary accounts at the time suggested that this inclusion of a limited interruption was representative of a change in policy, if not a break with the SPD.¹³⁰ In fact, however, the inclusion of this nuanced perspective into the declaration was a clear victory of the swing group, showing just how differentiated from the traditionalists the group had become with their inclusion into the government.

The Bielefeld declaration was at its core a reflection of the evolving Green party. Whereas the governing members of the swing group, such as Volmer and Beer, had already grown to support this policy, the Bielefeld conference was a vote of confidence from the grass roots not just on Fischer’s leadership, but also on the overall direction the Party was moving. Despite considerable unhappiness among the *fundis*, leading some to feel betrayed and even leave the Party,¹³¹ there was strong support for the new course. In the end, the Bielefeld conference, held at perhaps the most challenging time for the Greens, was an affirmation of the entire Party’s desire to govern and influence events, even at the expense of a purist interpretation of their traditional pacifist values.

As the swing group was the purveyor of change, Bielefeld was also an affirmation of the policy of the swing group, in particular its new emphasis of *Regierungsfähigkeit* over traditional pacifist principles. Indeed, MP Antje Racke was “relieved” with the decision. As one of the leaders of the federal level, she had urged the Party not to play “Russian Roulette” with the coalition, arguing that there was a greater chance for

¹²⁹ Lersch and Schumacher, 25.

¹³⁰ Cohen.

influence as part of the government as opposed to being in the opposition. Andrea Fischer, another MP, agreed: "This is a big step for the Greens to accept responsibility in government, especially for what is probably the most difficult issue for us."¹³² Bielefeld demonstrated that a majority of the Party supported the idea of being in government, even as the distance in perspective between the federal leadership and core elements of the Party had appeared to be never greater.¹³³ According to Volmer, the *fundis* were now "fragmented." As Green MP Klaus Müller suggested, this conference confirmed the general support for the direction of the *realo* line. Only now, with the swing group's adherence to the course, there were "left and right *realos*."¹³⁴

Fischer's clear statement that a failure to adhere to the government policy meant an end to the Red-Green coalition no doubt influenced the decision of some in the Party to support the declaration. His leadership of the Party and their admiration for him was clearly an enabling factor in this process. Without his diplomatic successes and strong charisma, it is unlikely that support would have come so easily. But equally as important was the potential to have a strong impact on foreign affairs. The early successes of the Greens, with the Rambouillet conference and the strong potential of such diplomatic initiatives as the Fischer plan to bring a political end to the conflict, offered clear indications of their potential while in office, especially in contrast to the earlier Magdeburg declaration that had all but rejected involvement. Indeed, as events in Macedonia would later demonstrate, there would be considerable potential for these ideas.

¹³¹ Cohen; Beste, "Die Macht wird neu verteilt."

¹³² John Schmid, "Stormy Party Congress Backs Fischer in Holding off Pacifist Critics: German Greens Reject Bombing Halt," *International Herald Tribune*, 14 May 1999.

¹³³ Beste, "Eine fundamentale Überraschung."

PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT TO MACEDONIA

The cessation of hostilities in Kosovo did not mean an end to the challenges in the Balkan region, as Macedonia soon joined the ranks of troubled countries. This time, however, the West as well as many in Germany, and importantly many Greens, had learned from the previous failures first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo and looked to quell the potential for violence before it occurred. Over the course of several months beginning in August 2001, Germany approved and deployed forces to Macedonia for two separate military operations designed to prevent an outbreak of violence. Indeed, by 1 November Joschka Fischer argued that the successes seen in Macedonia would not have occurred without the use of military force.¹³⁵

The Green Party's debate surrounding the deployment of German forces to Macedonia, though not requiring an in-depth case study here, warrants attention for two reasons. First, it introduced the idea of prevention by military force, meaning the use of military force to halt the possibility of a surge in violence. Though excepted by many in the Party, this new concept still provoked enough debate and discord within the Party to cause a problem. That dissonance eventually led to the failure of the first mission—Essential Harvest—to receive a governing majority within the Red-Green coalition, which set the prelude for the November 2001 vote of confidence that directly challenged the traditional pacifists to choose between their values and continued participation in the

¹³⁴ Beste, "Die Macht wird neu verteilt."

¹³⁵ "Interview von Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer mit der Westdeutschen Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ) am 01.11.2001 (Auszug)," 1 November 2001, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=2267&type_id=4&bereich_id=1.htm> accessed 23 November 2001.

government. Second, it provides a brief examination of the effectiveness of *Regierungsfähigkeit* absent a direct shock, allowing an examination of the measure of internalization of this concept in the Green security identity.

The first mission deployed, Operation Essential Harvest, was designed to be a thirty day mission to disarm Albanian rebels in Macedonia such as the UCK, who were willing to relinquish their weapons to NATO forces. Though the proposed operation had the support from both sides in Macedonia, it lacked a UN mandate and would be executed by NATO, two conditions that irked the traditionalists in both the SPD and the Greens. As the crisis in Macedonia deepened and the vote on Essential Harvest neared, the Party's leadership supported the idea inherent in this operation. The faction's July 2001 discussion paper argued that any German Bundeswehr participation was designed to prevent a civil war. Unlike the Kosovo crisis, this NATO deployment force would help to create a political solution sanctioned by a democratically elected government. As the faction clearly noted: "The mission is to provide military security and organizational execution of an agreed upon demilitarization." The leadership's official declaration later that month noted that this deployment, again unlike Kosovo, was not a "combat deployment," but rather a "peace enhancing" mission. Just prior to the Bundestag debate in August, the Party's leadership element voted 10-1 to support the deployment and urged the other Green MPs to do the same.

As the faction leader Rezzo Schlauch noted in August, many Greens supported the idea of a preventive deployment as it was a means of security policy they had always wanted—preventive politics. In a joint letter with Schlauch, the swing group adherent Kerstin Müller also argued that this deployment was exactly the methodology proposed

by the new Green foreign and security policy. Joschka Fischer would also agree, arguing at a 22 December 2001 Bundestag session that the two Macedonia mandates were a “success” of “preventive politics,” an idea he had noted several times earlier. Winfried Nachtwei, the consummate intellectual moderate in the Party, argued that the deployment was “politically necessary” for the eventual stabilization of Macedonia.¹³⁶ In the end, there was a substantial majority within the Green Party federal level that supported the deployment, adhering to the new concept of preventative policy.

Even as many in the *realo* and swing group portions of the Party supported the deployment of German forces to Macedonia, the traditional pacifists among the leadership and in the population still had their lingering doubts, though even this showed a new evolution in their perspectives. Hans-Christian Ströbele, the loudest of the group, in an editorial in *taz* just days before the vote in the Bundestag argued that he would support the deployment of German troops to Macedonia as part of Essential Harvest only if there was a clear UN mandate. The declaration from the UN Security Council of 13 August did not have a UN mandate and instead left the duties to NATO, which traditionalists still saw as an impediment to peace. Ströbele believed that NATO could not act neutrally within Macedonia and would actually make the situation worse. The proposal also lacked political clarity and acted against the 24 June 2000 Green Party

¹³⁶ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Zur politischen Lage in Mazedonien,” 10 July 2001, in Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Materialsammlung zum Bundeswehreinsatz in Mazedonien*, 2002, AGG; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Beschluss des Bundesvorstandes,” 23 July 2001, in *Materialsammlung zum Bundeswehreinsatz in Mazedonien*; Nico Fried, “Der Rest ist Hoffnung,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 28 August 2001, 8; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Gruenen-Parteirat empfiehlt Zustimmung zum Mazedonienereinsatz,” 27 August 2001, in *Materialsammlung zum Bundeswehreinsatz in Mazedonien*; Rezzo Schlauch and Kerstin Müller, “Brief an die Abgeordneten der Fraktion,” 24 August 2001, in *Materialsammlung zum Bundeswehreinsatz in Mazedonien*; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/210, 210. Sitzung, 22 December 2001; Winfried Nachtwei, “Notwendige Entwaffnungshilfe oder militärisches Abenteuer? Anforderungen an einen möglichen Bundeswehreinsatzes in Mazedonien,” 21 August 2001, in *Materialsammlung zum Bundeswehreinsatz in Mazedonien*.

declaration from the Münster Party Day that held that the Greens would only support the use of the Bundeswehr for peacekeeping missions under a UN mandate.¹³⁷

At the debate in the Bundestag over the deployment of German forces to take part in Essential Harvest, seven Greens—Annelie Buntenbach, Winfried Hermann, Steffi Lemke, Irmingard Schewe-Gerigk, Christian Simmert, Hans-Christian Ströbele und Sylvia Voss—entered a statement into the record that explained their reasons for opposing the deployment. Primary among them were the inherent risk of traditional escalation through the introduction of additional military forces, their belief that NATO's policy was neither coherent nor believable, and because this would represent the third, lasting NATO deployment in the region. Though they recognized the necessity of disarming the UCK, neither the proposed deployment nor the planned political process could be effective in their view.¹³⁸

In the end, the vote on Essential Harvest was approved with 497 votes in favor, 130 opposed, and eight abstaining. For the Greens, six MPs voted against and two abstained from the vote, a far cry from the original ActOrd vote in October 1998. The vast majority of the opponents, and the primary reason for the necessity of relying on the opposition, came from the SPD with some minorities from both the CDU/CSU and the FPD. Having to accept this settlement reduced the political effectiveness of the governing coalition, a position the Schröder government would be loathe to repeat just a few months later.

Amid the successes of Essential Harvest, a follow on action, Operation Amber

¹³⁷ Hans-Christain Ströbele, "NATO Einsatz in Makedonien widerspricht der Vernunft und Grünen Beschlüssen," (sic) 25 August 2001, <<http://www.stroebele-online.de/themen/krieg/913.html>> accessed 2 October 2002. Those in the Greens who supported the deployment argued that the permission from both sides of the conflict gave this deployment its international law mandate.

Fox, began a month later to protect EU and OSCE international monitors overseeing the peace plan in Macedonia. The worldwide developments since the first mission, namely the 9/11 attacks and the awaited American response, had shifted NATO's internal priorities and led to a greater need for German participation as the British pulled out of their leadership role in Macedonia. With this operation, Germany would for the first time in its history act as the lead nation in a NATO led operation, contributing approximately 1000 troops. Unlike its earlier cousin, this proposal by the German government garnered the support of 528 of the 578 voting members in the Bundestag, including large sections of all the major parties. In this case, the Red-Green coalition was able to get a governing majority.

Interestingly, the transition from Essential Harvest to Amber Fox brought more support from the traditionalist Greens. Unlike the earlier vote, five of the Greens who had originally opposed the deployment of German forces as part of a weapon-collection force this time merely abstained from the vote that offered armed German combat forces for the protection of international observers invited by the Macedonian leadership. Though they saw the international resolutions as a positive step, the continued use of NATO, and the perceived baggage it brought with it, was problematic. Three others, including the arch traditionalist Steffi Lemke, supported the deployment, even though they likewise opposed the use of NATO forces. However, they believed that this force, with the strong international consensus from the new UN mandate, created the potential for political success.¹³⁹ The focus on protection as opposed to more combative collection of weapons and the increased potential for political success, and with it de-escalation of

¹³⁸ Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/184, 184. Sitzung, 29 August 2001.

¹³⁹ Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/190, 190. Sitzung, 27 September 2001.

tensions, this deployment was entirely more acceptable for even the traditionalists in the Green Party. In some cases, that was enough to even change their votes.

The large support behind these votes, especially the latter, suggests that many in the Green Party had accepted this new idea of deploying forces for preventative purposes amid the substantial demonstrated successes. Winfried Nachtwei noted a year later that “without this deployment” the partial disarmament would not have happened and the chances for political peace would have collapsed.¹⁴⁰ Even the small minority that opposed Essential Harvest did so out of old fears of the escalation potential of NATO or out of a disbelief that military forces could be a part of the solution as Schlauch and Müller had argued.¹⁴¹ With the Amber Fox deployment, even Ströbele, who abstained in the voting because NATO executed the operation, recognized the de-escalation impact the OSCE observers had and the necessity of protecting them.¹⁴²

The second reason to examine the Macedonia debate was to look at the Green party debate exclusively from the perspective of the impact of *Regierungsfähigkeit*. Unlike the case of Kosovo or even Bosnia for that matter, there was no shock for the Green Party to spurn its political decisions. The German deployments to Macedonia rested not only on the prevailing concept of conflict prevention, which for the first time had become an important component of Green security policy, but also on Germany’s international responsibility. Many of the Green leadership perspectives were steeped in the rhetoric of responsibility.

Joschka Fischer saw Germany’s engagement in Macedonia, including the

¹⁴⁰ Winfried Nachtwei, “Verhinderung eines neuen Balkankrieges,” n.d., <www.nachtwei.de/bilanz/mazedonia.pdf> accessed 15 October 2002.

¹⁴¹ Schlauch and Müller.

¹⁴² Plenarprotokoll 14/190.

deployment of military forces, not as an “abstract recognized concept of solidarity,” but rather as a part of the greater European Common Foreign and Security Policy. It would thus be “highly counterproductive” if Germany were to renege on its responsibility to participate, especially given Germany’s continuing role in the further integration of Europe, a remark that earned him an ovation not just from his own party, but also that of the SPD and the CDU. Put succinctly: “[The deployment] is about our responsibility for peace and stability in the Balkans and our solidarity with our most important partners in the EU and the transatlantic alliance.” That responsibility, from Fischer’s perspective, could not be ignored.¹⁴³

Another direct argument for support of the deployment of German forces as an aspect of its international responsibility came from Schlauch and Müller. In their opinion, for a party with a growing interest and impact on international affairs, simply leaving the hard issues for others was no longer possible. The Bundestag and its constituent elements had to decide whether it would act in concert with other NATO partners and share the risks. If Germany’s opinion in international security crises was to be seen as important, it, and by proxy the Greens, must act by supporting these military forces. “The loss of meaning of German foreign policy in the event of a German rejection [of the deployment] would be enormous.”¹⁴⁴ For them, this new international responsibility also had a clear linkage to the potential influence for Green policies. By now, it was thoroughly internalized in the swing group, as its use as an argument for supporting the deployment clearly illustrates.

The few major Green opponents to the deployment did not heed any call of

¹⁴³ Plenarprotokoll 14/184.

¹⁴⁴ Schlauch and Müller.

Regierungsfähigkeit, instead arguing that NATO would only make matters worse. From their perspective, the UN was the organization that should collect the weapons and the concept of responsibility still had no decisive pull for Germany when it came to the UN. By the time the second vote for Amber Fox appeared, there remained no pull from the pressure of government, especially as the coalition was able to secure a governing majority.

Though Macedonia was in just about every respect a small element in the Green learning process over the decade since German unification, it nonetheless does offer some significant insights. Though several Greens and a number of SPD MPs caused the chancellor some heartburn by denying him a governing majority with the Essential Harvest vote, the large majority of the Greens now accepted a new methodology for potential humanitarian crises that included a positive role for the German military under NATO command. With the follow-on operation that provided NATO protection of OSCE observers and a new German military leadership of that operation, there was even less resistance, as there was a tacit acceptance of this new role amid the demonstrated successes of Essential Harvest.

Whereas the Kosovo conflict required the new strength inherent in the pull of *Regierungsfähigkeit* and to an extent an external shock, the decision process for the Macedonia challenge was in many ways a product of a more mature Green party actively involved in international politics. The leadership had clearly learned that the shocks of the past—namely Bosnia and Kosovo—should be prevented, rather than left to be cleaned up after enormous devastation. The very idea of “preventive diplomacy” became cemented as a cornerstone of the new Green security policy and in many respects,

Macedonia was both its first major trial and its first success.

The majority of the Greens, particularly within the leadership, now embraced the concept of Germany's responsibility within the international sphere; it was significantly internalized enough that the arguments by the swing group in favor of it were steeped in its rhetoric. The Greens were now making sincere arguments in favor of accepting this responsibility and highlighted the disastrous consequences should Germany renege, as the vote on Amber Fox in particular shows. Compared to the Bremen Party day in 1995 and the Magdeburg Party Day in 1998 when the Greens rejected any German participation in a peacekeeping force approved by both sides with the Dayton Peace Accords,¹⁴⁵ the acceptance of this deployment represents a major shift. Moreover, the ability to affect Green policy goals in the international sphere through the Party's leadership in the foreign ministry in particular, made the pull of the *Regierungsfähigkeit* concept that much stronger.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated several key elements in the Green Party's evolution. First, as the purveyor of change in the Greens, the swing group's conscious, strategic decision to govern, a part of *Regierungsfähigkeit*, was a major factor in the Party's overall shift in the use of force debate. Second, when confronted with the option of remaining in government or holding true to their pacifist principles, both the federal level swing group adherents and the Party as a whole chose to remain with the government. Third, both the Kosovo and Macedonia challenges proved to be

evolutionary in the overall Green concept of “never again war,” as using military force, both in coercive and preventative means, to achieve ideas inherent in Green foreign policy became accepted.

The Greens’ reaction to Kosovo, and to an extent the later Macedonia crisis, was without question a further evolution of their stance in the use of force debate. This chapter’s examination of these crises clearly shows that the ideal of *Regierungsfähigkeit* had a clear and definitive impact on the Party’s perspective on the issue. Though the external shock of the violence in Kosovo and in particular the massacre at Racak was an important aspect of NATO’s, Germany’s and to an extent the Green’s selling of the military response to the events in Kosovo, its overall impact on the purveyor of change in the Greens, namely the swing group, was smaller than that of *Regierungsfähigkeit*.

As the Greens prepared to enter the governing coalition, it was quite clear that they needed to change. Many *realos* possessed and demonstrated the will to govern; yet the swing group, as aptly displayed during the Magdeburg Party Day, saw no need to change before actually being in the government. Ludger Volmer’s speech at the October 1998 debate on the deployment of German forces for the NATO ActOrd offers important evidence in support of that fact. Yet, within a few months after taking office and after being integrated directly into the government, many in the swing group began to change their rhetoric and their viewpoints, as the discussion of Volmer and Beer above demonstrate. Moreover, as the Bielefeld Party Day clearly established, when faced with the decision to support Fischer and the Red-Green coalition or remain fixated on traditional pacifist values, the Party as a whole chose to remain in government. In essence then, there was a strategic calculation among all levels of the swing group that

¹⁴⁵ Thomas Brackvogel, “Der geteilte Pazifismus,” *Der Tagesspiegel*, 4 December 1995.

helped push them toward a changed perspective on the use of force. With the swing group as the purveyor of change, when faced with the choice, the Party chose participation in government and the influence it brought over principles of pacifism.¹⁴⁶

At the same time, however, the acceptance of a larger role in the government and by proxy Germany's international responsibilities did not mean a pure denial of "never again war," but rather a re-codification of it within Green security identity to deal with current crises. Though few in the Party wanted to bomb Milosevic, large elements of the Party both accepted it and defended it at internal debates. There was both an acceptance of the events, especially since nothing could be done to stop it, as well as a clear evolution in the very concept of Green pacifism in the majority of the Party away from the absolute forbiddance of using military force. Indeed, the large support within the Party for the NATO KFOR peacekeeping force, despite earlier misgivings, similarly suggests a strong evolution in the guiding principles of pacifism.

With this shift in perspective, the Greens were no longer simply interested in limiting themselves to expressing their pacifist opinion as part of the opposition; rather they were striving now to develop anew their ideas of pacifism and non-violence to deal with the security challenges of the time and remain in the government. As Daniel Cohn-Bendit, said: "We have to be coherent. We cannot say we are still against war and remain in this government."¹⁴⁷ Indeed, the events during the Kosovo crisis and the later exhibition of preventative policies in Macedonia demonstrated a general shift within the Party closer to the mainstream of German politics.

¹⁴⁶ Egle, "Die rot-grüne Außenpolitik," 100; Fischer, *Die Rot-Grünen Jahre*, 136. The swing group's decision had ramifications beyond the survival of the Red-Green government. The US would also see the Green party's decision on the Kosovo question as a measure of their capability to govern, thus linking any chance for US support of Green initiatives to the Green decision on Kosovo. See "Schröder für Härte im

This shift and Germany's participation in the combat action in Kosovo came with particular influence in the diplomatic arena. As Peter Rudolf argues, Germany's "steadfast solidarity" during the crisis gave the German foreign policy makers, especially the Greens, the "credentials to make a comeback with innovative ideas." Less than a year after the crisis, Volmer would recognize this idea as well, noting that the "Kosovo engagement was the implementation of Green peace politics in a time of war."¹⁴⁸ Without the strategic, conscious desire to become a part of the government and have an impact on both international and domestic events, it is doubtful that this evolution of the guiding principles and with it international influence would have occurred.

Coming after two years of integration into the government and the already significant influence of successfully imparting Green ideals of German foreign policy, the situation vis-à-vis Macedonia demonstrated an adaptive capability in Green ideas. Both the swing group and the *realos* supported the deployment as a new aspect of Green foreign policy, even as enough traditionalist in the Greens and the SPD rejected it, forcing the coalition to depend on the opposition to pass the legislation. With this choice came an even greater acceptance of Germany's international responsibilities, even absent a clear shock such as the violence in Kosovo, suggesting additional internalization of the new concept on the use of force by many in the Party. It was the exemplification of a learning process that began with the integration of the Greens into the government with the Kosovo crisis.

This chapter has demonstrated the clear impact of the intervening variable of *Regierungsfähigkeit*, both as a conscious desire to join the government and thorough the

Kosovo-Konflikt, Treffen mit US-Präsident Bill Clinton," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 10 October 1998.

¹⁴⁷ Cohen.

integration of Greens into the government. It weathered the challenges of both Kosovo and Macedonia, suggesting an internalization of the concept by the swing group, but not to a full extent by the traditionalists, leading some to believe as late as October 2001 that the Party was at best only “partially” *regierungsfähig*.¹⁴⁹ Some believe that the Kosovo crisis marked the end of the Green Party’s transformation cycle on the use of force, since the pacifist elements were removed.¹⁵⁰ However, the challenges amid the possible deployment of German troops to Afghanistan after the shock of the 9/11 attacks would belie these arguments as the debate surrounding the war on international terrorism and Iraq demonstrated the continuing differences even within the Green Party.

¹⁴⁸ Rudolf, 138; Volmer, “Erste Jahresbilanz.”

¹⁴⁹ Raschke, “Sind die Grünen regierungsfähig?”

¹⁵⁰ Bauer, 100; Gregor Schöllgen, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1999), 217.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE

The tragic events of 11 September 2001, so often referred to in US literature as 9/11, were a clear shock that brought forth another wave of personal reconsiderations and definitive policy requirements for the Greens that would test the limits of their *Regierungsfähigkeit*. Reacting to this shock that played out on live television during the early afternoon in Germany, the Greens both as a Party and as the coalition partner of the SPD, were thrust again into the spotlight on the debate over the use of force that some had, perhaps a bit optimistically, thought largely complete several years earlier. In this new debate, the Greens would take another step forward that even the most radical of Green *realos* would never have thought remotely possible even a few years earlier.

The highly emotional debates amid the Bosnian and Kosovo crises had beset friend against friend and practically torn the Party asunder. Whereas Bosnia had led to an evolution on the *realo* perspective amid the shocks of Srebrenica and the Kosovo crisis led many in the swing group to change their views on the use of force out of deference primarily to the ideals of *Regierungsfähigkeit*, the crisis after the 9/11 attacks would challenge the *fundi* element of the Party. The debate over deploying German forces to Afghanistan would force the *fundis* into a direct conundrum between the strategy of governance and their traditional pacifist principles. Unlike Bosnia and to an extent Kosovo, both independent variables will be clearly and decisively present here; however, in the end it is clear that the latter, much like three years earlier, would provide the primary influence.

The evolution of the Green perspective after the 9/11 attacks flows through the early rhetoric recognizing the shock and debating possible options, amid speculation that Germany may deploy German combat forces in support of the US, to the clear political choice that came with the Bundestag vote on that deployment in November and the later Rostock Party Day. The debate evolved from an entirely changed perspective highlighted by German leaders. Echoing German chancellor Schröder's argument that 9/11 was a direct attack on the entire western world that required new actions, Ludger Volmer, still a senior leader in the foreign ministry, called the attacks a new "zero hour in foreign policy" that was comparable with the end of the Second World War or the fall of the Berlin Wall.¹

The debate of speculation ended though with chancellor Schröder's announcement in early November of the government's proposal to send 3900 German troops to participate in operations against terrorism. Supporting the deployment of German combat forces, to include some ground forces, to a theater outside of Europe made supporting this vote even more complicated, especially as the traditional pacifists remained sternly opposed to any use of the military in the Global War on Terror. The linkage of the vote on the military deployment with a vote of confidence in the Red-Green coalition in November directly challenged the *fundis* in particular to choose between voting their conscience of pacifism and continuing the Red-Green coalition. Much like the situation during the Kosovo crisis, when elements of the Greens were forced to choose principles versus strategy, this new crisis again brought the coalition on

¹ Ludger Volmer, "Grundlinien der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik," speech before the "Politischen Forum Ruhr," 12 November 2001, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/2001/r011112a.pdf>, accessed 18 March 2002; Schröder, "Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers zu den Terroranschlägen in den USA."

the brink of disaster.

Though the Green Party leadership did eventually form a compromise under direct pressure for the November Bundestag vote that saved the coalition, the differences between the federal leadership and the grass roots of the Party were substantial. The rancor of the base, in particular at the Party Day in Rostock just a week after the fateful vote of confidence, was considerable and rivaled that of the Party Day in Bielefeld in 1999. This Party Day also demonstrated that the Party's base, for a second time, choose the ideas of *Regierungsfähigkeit* over principle. Despite this acrimony between the two sides, there was still evidence that the majority of the Party had grown to accept military force as a legitimate tool in international security, as its codification first at Rostock and later in the 2002 base Program demonstrated. Moreover, the widespread support for the ISAF also showed a greater acceptance of international responsibility.

Still, the considerable advances in the Green Party's perspective on the use of force over the past decade were not an absolute acceptance of using the military in all cases. As a brief review of the debate surrounding the run-up to the war in Iraq a mere eight months later will clearly demonstrate, the Greens at all levels had very clear limits on what they would support. Though their opposition in this case would in many ways return to the basic principles of Green traditionalism, it would also not represent a retreat from their earlier gains.

Before delving into this case study, one caveat must be stated. Unlike the numerous source possibilities through access to archival documents for earlier portions of this study, the documentation of the Green Party's reaction to the 9/11 attacks is somewhat limited. The lack of internal communications and specific press releases that

tell volumes of the thought processes of individual members and are not usually reported in the mainstream press does hamper the overall analysis. That said, by utilizing speeches and press reports, a very reasonable perspective can be produced. With the release of more resources later, this analysis can be further enhanced.

This chapter will focus on the influence of both intervening variables—external shocks and *Regierungsfähigkeit*—to explain the Greens' choices in supporting Germany's deployment of the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan. It will be divided into four major sections. First, it will discuss the acceptance of 9/11 as a shock by the Party and describe the general parameters of the immediate reaction. Second, it will discuss the political debate surrounding the linkage of the deployment vote and a vote of confidence that forced the *fundis* to choose between political strategy and principles. Third, it will briefly discuss the Party's grass roots acceptance of the ideals of *Regierungsfähigkeit* with their vote in the Rostock Party Day. Finally, over two short sections it will examine two aspects of unanimity, the support for ISAF and the rejection of a war in Iraq, as a demonstration of the overall evolution of the Party's stance on the use of force debate.

PRELUDE TO A COALITION CRISIS

While the SPD-Green coalition managed to weather the storm surrounding the deployment of German forces in support of operations against Serbia in 1999, the significant challenges associated with supporting German forces in Afghanistan stretched the governing coalition nearly to its breaking point. The fears and premonitions of some Greens, especially of the *fundis*, immediately after the attacks soon burst into outright

disagreement. As the American attack against al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan evolved over October, those reservations again received attention in the public eye.

Unlike the earlier conflicts, where many in the Party could invoke already ingrained beliefs to offer a facilitating norm to support the use of the German military, most prominently the “never again Auschwitz” clause, the debate on the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan lacked such a direct ingrained moral norm. Instead this support for the deployment’s facilitators rested along two primary axes—the new moral imperative many felt to respond to the attacks and *Regierungsfähigkeit* at the November 2001 Bundestag vote, in this case the clear political desire to remain a part of the governing coalition and continue to affect domestic priorities. This section will outline the Green and to an extent the government debate from the attacks leading to the crucial Bundestag vote.

The Immediate Reaction

That 9/11 was an external shock need not be debated here, for there is likely no clearer example, perhaps even eclipsing modern history’s other major shock—Pearl Harbor. When al Qaida terrorists hijacked four commercial jetliners to use them as kamikaze style weapons, the threat posed by international terrorism received a personification that had been lacking in the past. As viewers across the world watched in horror as the two World Trade Centers in New York City fell, as smoke poured from the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia and as the reports of the fourth aircraft crashing in Shanksville, Pennsylvania arose, an already overwhelmed public was filled with a new sense of shock.

In Germany, the reaction was often filled with emotion. The German state and its people rose almost as one voice in condemnation of the attacks and in sorrow for the victims. German television stations interrupted scheduled programming, devoting the evening to the situation in the US and scrolled news along the bottom or told viewers which channels were carrying information on the events in the US. In a very telling display, Germany lowered flags on government buildings to half-mast for several days.

Those feelings of the German government and television stations were soon echoed among the population. Three days after the attacks, 200,000 people came together in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin to express sorrow for the victims.² Berlin and local communities held vigils for the victims of the attacks. Memories of the US support to Germany in the past were a common theme running throughout Germany. Invoking the memories of US President John Kennedy's famous "*Ich bin ein Berliner*" speech, chancellor Schröder publically suggested that in these dark hours, "we are all Americans."³

That emotion was coupled with a feeling, even in first days after the attack, that a political debate loomed. Leaders in the German government almost immediately recognized that Germany would again have to address the possibility of the use of its military. In a Bundestag session on 19 September, even the CDU faction leader Friedrich Merz noted that Germany must now be prepared to go to "new and possibly uncomfortable" places.⁴

The afternoon and evening of 11 September 2001 were busy for German

² This gathering was not completely comprised of those paying their respects. As will be noted later, there were some that were there to protest the possibility of American military responses.

³ The preceding observations were based on the author's personal experiences in Regensburg and Berlin, Germany during the early months of his Fulbright scholarship.

politicians. In a speech only a few hours after the attacks, chancellor Schröder laid out the guideposts through which Germany's security apparatus would view this conflict—the attacks had been a “declaration of war on the entire civilized world.” At the same time, Schröder gave a hint of things to come when he declared “unlimited solidarity” with the US, clearly noting this solidarity would require action.⁵ A “new world order” had emerged that would bring a new focus on Germany's international responsibilities. Indeed, as Bob Woodward has noted, Germany was one of the first nations to call the US and pledge its desire to become involved, even with military forces. Interestingly, in this case the US would actually withhold significant pressure, being very cognizant to avoid asking for forces that Germany could not provide out of both domestic and materiel reasons.⁶

The senior German leadership from the early days after the attack, however, remained rather cautious with its rhetoric on the possible use of German forces in support of the war against terrorism.⁷ Indeed, the first government declaration by the chancellor before the Bundestag two days after the attacks did not even mention the possible use of military force.⁸ However, in a more lengthy government declaration eight days after the attacks, the chancellor mentioned that very possibility, though he attempted to push that into the background by dwelling even more on the broader necessities of combating terrorism through non-military means. Predicating it through direct linkages to the

⁴ “Der Terror und die Folgen,” 13.

⁵ Schroder, “Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers zu den Terroranschlägen in den USA.”

⁶ Schröder, “Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers zu den Terroranschlägen in den USA,” Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 179; Biermann, interview by author.

⁷ “Härtetest für Rot-Grün,” *Der Spiegel* 39, 24 September 2001, 37. Contrary to the SPD, the CDU was quite vocal about its support for deploying the Bundeswehr in support of the war against terrorism. See Hans-Jürgen Leersch, “CDU Will Bundeswehr gegen Terror Einsetzen,” *Die Welt*, 29 September 2001, 2.

⁸ Gerhard Schröder, “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder vor dem deutschen Bundestag zum Terrorakt in den USA am 11.09.2001,” 13 September 2001.

terrorist attacks, the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 that called international terrorism a threat to world security, the invocation of NATO's Article V self-defense clause that Germany had supported, and the inherent right of self-defense, Schröder reiterated his claim of "unlimited solidarity" and for the first time argued publically that Germany's response could also include military means. Indeed, by late September and early October German flight crews on NATO AWACS aircraft were being deployed at the US' request to help protect its airspace.⁹ Schröder's speech very matter-of-factly outlined the direction Germany would follow—military operations were possible, though it would only be one part of the overall effort.

Within the population, there was support for Germany's military option. In a survey in *Der Spiegel* from late September 2001, 58% of the population believed that Germany should participate in military action in the war on terror, despite the fact that 72% believed such action would lead to a further escalation. That support, however, was only for limited military operations, as only 42% supported a "hard American retaliation attack." Those numbers left considerable room for opponents of the military option; indeed those pacifistic tendencies found public outlets within a few weeks, as the US Embassy turned from a shrine into a place of protest for the peace movement.¹⁰

It is important to note here that even as the German leadership began to suggest the possibility of using German military forces, it also began to suggest some limitations

<http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_55757.htm> accessed 12 December 2001.

⁹ Gerhard Schröder, "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder vor dem deutschen Bundestag zu den Anschlägen in den USA," 19 September 2001,

<http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_56381.htm> accessed 21 December 2001; "Der Terror und die Folgen," "Kujat: Einätze gegen Terror möglich," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 October 2001, 4; Hans-Jürgen Leersch, "Berlin bereitet sich auf Teilnahme an internationaler Militäraktion vor," *Die Welt*, 5 October 2001.

¹⁰ "Zwischen Krieg und Frieden," *Der Spiegel* 39, 24 September 2001; "Deutsche sind gegen Vergeltung, aber für mehr Terror-Abwehr," *Die Welt*, 29 September 2001, 2; "Peace Movement Gains Popularity in

on the extent of that support. Chancellor Schröder argued in that same 19 September speech at the Bundestag that Germany was ready to undertake risks to fight terrorism, but was not ready to go off on an “adventure.”¹¹ Though Schröder’s original statement was aimed at assuaging fears of a German deployment to Somalia, this mechanism demonstrated its full effectiveness during the Iraq debate the following year, which will be discussed below. As this situation brought the German debate on the use of force into uncharted territory, the impulse towards anti-militarism would remain an important part of the entire debate, despite the earlier advances, effectively acting as a hurdle.

Within a few weeks of the attacks, however, the prospect of paying, as Germany had done during the Gulf War, was decisively and publically ruled out.¹² The impending decision would be on the extent, rather than the possibility of action for military forces. As Germany’s original call offering military forces suggests, the interests and desire to participate were internally generated. Though no concrete numbers had been determined, this decision, according to Ludger Volmer, was motivated by solidarity as a result of the attack. Gerd Weisskirchen, an SPD Member of the Bundestag, agreed, suggesting that there was a “deep conviction” that Germany had to support the US.¹³ In practically every level, the debate on whether to use German military forces was internally driven, with little overt pressure from the outside.

That internal acceptance of a necessity to participate was broadly supported by all

Germany,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (English version), 23 September 2001.

¹¹ “Abmarsch in die Realität,” *Der Spiegel* 46, 12 November 2001, 25; “Der Terror und die Folgen,” “Konsequenzen aus den Anschlägen für Deutschland, 18 September 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Dokumente/Artikel/ix_56164.htm> accessed 12 December 2001;” Schröder, “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder vor dem deutschen Bundestag zu den Anschlägen in den USA.”

¹² “Der Terror und die Folgen,” 13; “Kujat: Einätze gegen Terror möglich,” 4; Leersch, “Berlin bereitet sich auf Teilnahme an internationaler Militäraktion vor;” “Kämpfen statt Zahlen ist diesmal die deutsche Devise,” *Die Welt*, 2 October 2001, 2.

parties except for the PDS.¹⁴ In fact, following Schröder's 19 September speech, the Bundestag approved with a strong majority a broad declaration of support by all parties, though with some consternation within the Greens. The declaration, signed by the Party's faction leaders expressed strong solidarity with the American people in the wake of the attacks. Moreover, it accepted and supported the American call for a worldwide struggle against terrorism and accepted Germany's responsibilities as a part of NATO. Bowing to the concerns among many to avoid usurping constitutional authority, it supported the call of "unlimited solidarity," but only in the context of planning. Finally, the approved document also included the importance of providing humanitarian help as well as political and economic measures to combat terrorism.¹⁵

A true display of compromise, the declaration nonetheless represented a broad element of support by Germany's political leadership to take an active role in the struggle against international terrorism. Though there was considerable consternation early on the issue of legality,¹⁶ it would be the thorny issue of the use of German military forces in general, however, that would be the primary obstacle for the governing coalition. The challenges posed by the intra-coalition politics, in particular within the Green Party itself,

¹³ Volmer, interview by author; Weisskirchen, interview by author; Biermann, interview by author.

¹⁴ "Der Terror und die Folgen."

¹⁵ "Entschließungsantrag der Fraktionen SPD, CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP zu der Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers zu den Terroranschlägen in den USA und zu den Beschlüssen des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen sowie der NATO," 19 September 2001, <http://www.spdfraktion.de/rs_datei/0,,1442,00.pdf> accessed 3 July 2007.

¹⁶ In spite of the fact that many recognized the responsibility to act in the context of Article V and in response to the attacks, there was considerable concern from some political factions that Germany would be forced to contribute military forces without the Bundestag's approval. Less than a week after the attacks Rudolf Scharping, the SPD Defense Minister, argued instead that it was Germany's "sovereign decision" to determine what actions it would take. Such sentiments were also echoed by the chancellor during his government declaration of 19 September, when he clarified that the requirements of the Basic Law would be "strictly" upheld if German forces were to be deployed. See "Interview von Verteidigungsminister Scharping zu möglichen Militäreinsätzen nach den Anschlägen in den USA, *Die Zeit*, 17 September 2001, <http://bmvg.de/ie/archiv/reden/minister/010920_terror_zeit.html> accessed 2 October 2002; Schröder, "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder vor dem deutschen Bundestag zu den Anschlägen in

would shake the German government to the point that some would even think of the possibility of a Grand Coalition (SPD-CDU) in the face of Green Party debate.¹⁷ Within the Green Party, rectifying the idea of *Regierungsfähigkeit* with the significant hesitancy of its base toward the use of the German military would be the significant challenge.

The Greens are Challenged Anew

From the days immediately following the attack until November, when the German Bundestag voted to support the deployment of German forces, a number of issues played into the evolving debate within the Green Party on the deployment of the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan. In particular the largely accepted idea of *Regierungsfähigkeit*, especially the political reality of a Germany that was a responsible member of NATO, placed enormous pressure on some sections of the Greens. The public speculation as to whether the Greens could remain a part of the governing coalition in the wake of their failure to provide the chancellor a governing majority in support of the deployment of German forces to Macedonia to collect weapons just a few months earlier, made this internal debate much more challenging.

The Green leadership recognized that there would be considerable intraparty consternation and did everything possible to prepare the Party for the eventual debate. In a speech before the Bundestag one day after the attacks, the Green Party chairman Rezzo Schlauch argued that the great change the world experienced as a result of the attacks would also bring a “great challenge” to the Greens.¹⁸ Fischer’s 26 September speech in

den USA.”

¹⁷ Regine Zylka, “Im Konzert der Großen mitspielen,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 18 September 2001, 2.

¹⁸ Rezzo Schlauch, “Erklärung des Vorsitzenden der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Rezzo Schlauch zu den Anschlägen in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika,” 12 September 2001,

the Bundestag was more direct. Suggesting that the Greens will soon be confronted with “difficult decisions,” Fischer directly asked whether there was any alternative that did not also include some form of military force, which could include German forces.¹⁹ Playing out in special Party Days, in the press, and no doubt in private this debate would rival the one amid the deployment against Serbia forces in 1999. Though Fischer this time would avoid the pain of a physical attack, the verbal assault by some would make this situation as challenging as the one a few short years before.

The majority of the Green Party accepted that the attacks were clear shocks. Joschka Fischer, in a very truncated statement on the afternoon of the attacks, said Germany was “stunned and horrified” and stood in solidarity with the victims and people of the US.²⁰ The leaders of the Green Party, Claudia Roth and Fritz Kuhn, noted a similar emotional response to that elicited by Fischer in a letter to the American Ambassador in Berlin saying that the Greens as a whole were “horrified” by the attacks.²¹

The reference to the shock value of the attacks continued in the weeks that followed. Speaking a week later from the Pentagon, Joschka Fischer noted that the events had “deeply” shocked the people of Europe. For him, it was an “emotional reaction” to a “criminal and mass murderous attack on open society.” He also followed the rhetoric of the chancellor, claiming that it was indeed an attack on “all of us.”²² At

<http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/2001/rede_schlauch_terror-usa.html> , accessed 2 July 2007.

¹⁹ Joschka Fischer, “Erklärung des Bundesaußenministers Joschka Fischer zu den Terroranschlägen in New York und Washington vom 11. September 2001,” 11 September 2001, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/Außenpolitik/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=2025&type_id=2&bereich_id=31> accessed 1 July 2007.

²⁰ Fischer, “Erklärung des Bundesaußenministers Joschka Fischer zu den Terroranschlägen.”

²¹ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Grüne entsetzt von abscheulichen Terroranschlägen in den USA,” Pressedienst, Nr. 074/01, 12 September 2001, <http://www.gruene-partei.de/rsvgn/rs_dok/0,,2862,00.htm> accessed 6 November 2002.

²² Press Conference at the Pentagon between Paul Wolfowitz and Joschka Fischer, 19 September 2001, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/state_dept_brief006.htm> accessed 19 June 2007.

the onset of his speech before the Bundestag on 26 September, Fischer noted that the events of that day represented a “deep break into our everyday life.”²³ Likewise, the Green local leadership felt the shock and used similar language as the federal leadership. For example, in a 6 October 2001 declaration the Berlin local council wrote that the attacks were in “contempt of humanity and were an attack on the values of an open civil society.”²⁴ Thus, from both the leadership level as well as the local, grass roots level of the Green Party, it was quite clear that the shock of the 9/11 attacks had clear resonance.

Moreover, most also quickly recognized 9/11 had thrust a new security perspective onto the world requiring a new policy from the Party. Ludger Volmer noted on 19 September that that world had “undergone a radical change” and as a result the Greens must develop a new security policy that recognized terrorism as the number one threat.²⁵ Two months after the attacks in a speech before the United Nations, Fischer argued that the attacks of 9/11 “thrust a dangerous future upon the world” in which no country would be truly safe from the dangers of international terrorism. This “eerie danger” had “dramatically altered the foundations of security policy” within international politics.²⁶ The Party leader and MP Claudia Roth similarly suggested that the Greens needed to undertake an “offensive debate” on the means of combating terrorism. Even

²³ Joschka Fischer, “Rede von Bundesaußenminister Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 26.09.2001 zu den international Konsequenzen der terroristischen Angriffen in den USA und ihren Auswirkungen auf die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” 26 September 2001, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/Außenpolitik/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=2120&bereich_id=17&type_id=3> accessed 23 November 2001.

²⁴ Länderrat in Berlin, “Politik gegen internationalen Terrorismus,” 6 October 2001, <http://archiv.gruene-partei.de/gremien/LR/01Berlin2/beschluss/beschluss_gegen_terror.htm> accessed 2 July 2007.

²⁵ Zylka; Ludger Volmer, “Rede des Staatsministers im Auswärtigen Amt Dr. Ludger Volmer zu den Terroranschlägen in den USA und den Beschlüssen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen sowie der Nato vor dem Deutschen Bundestag,” 19 September 2001, <http://www.documentArchiv.de/brd/2001/rede_volmer_0919.html> accessed 2 July 2007.

²⁶ Joschka Fischer, “Address by Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Fifty-sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” New York, 12 November 2001, <<http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Rede/Archiv/2001/011112->

the Party as a whole recognized this change with the declaration passed at the Rostock BDK in late November 2001.²⁷

One of the early issues that the Green's quickly addressed was Schröder's declaration of "unlimited solidarity" with the US. Many in the Party were harshly critical of this idea, believing that it would lead to a required use of German military forces. In fact, Fischer would avoid repeating this phrase, instead choosing to use the more limited phraseology of being in "strong solidarity" with the US.²⁸ Though it would soon recede into the background of rhetorical history, the early Green criticism of this idea would set the tone of their debate.

Two days after the attack the Green Party issued a declaration of the Special Party Council that reflected a general political compromise. Unfortunately this simple compromise belied the heated debate that was to come, as the resolution was a quick statement rather than a policy guidepost. An agreement by the Bundestag group and the party local leadership, the declaration condemned the attacks. Mirroring some of the chancellor's rhetoric from 11 September, the resolution argued that the "cynical strike" attacked the "values of an open society for which we stand." Moreover, the Council "share[d] in" the solidarity with the victims and the American people and recognized the UN's demand that those responsible be brought to justice.

Referencing the invocation of the NATO Article V self-defense clause from 12

Fiftysixsession.html> accessed 19 June 2007.

²⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Internationalen Terrorismus bekämpfen, in kritischer Solidarität handeln, die Rot-Grüne Koalition fortsetzen," 17. Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 24-25 November 2001, <<http://www.gruene.de/archiv/grem/bdk/01Rostock/beschluss/B-P-01.htm>> accessed 6 December 2001.

²⁸ Fischer, "Erklärung des Bundesaußenministers Joschka Fischer zu den Terroranschlägen," "Schröder und Rau einig über deutschen Beitrag," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 September 2001, 2; "Konsequenzen aus den Anschlägen für Deutschland." The idea of "unlimited solidarity" did have resonance within the population, despite the fear held by many that it could act as a forcing function. It garnered 71% support in an early October survey. See "Solide Solidarisch," *Der Spiegel* 41, 8 October 2001, 25.

September, the Greens recognized they “could not oppose the employment of the joint-defense situation” and thus recognized that military force to some measure would likely be used. Yet, in a clear return to the traditional escalation fears that had been resident in the Green ideology since the Party’s foundation, the declaration made it quite clear that the Greens opposed the perspective of all-out war on terrorism as the US was suggesting at the time. The Council feared that this could in turn incite the very violence that the terrorists had hoped to stimulate. This early Green compromise recognized the principle and the right of the US to respond based on the law of self-defense, but definitively rejected any violence based on revenge. Importantly, though they recognized this right of self-defense, the declaration did not suggest that the NATO Article V clause meant a decision in favor of German participation in US planning or in the actual projected attacks in response to 9/11, a rebuke of the “unlimited solidarity” argument. Germany itself, through the parliamentary decision making process, would have to decide whether it would want to partake in military actions.²⁹

As the narrative that follows will demonstrate, this declaration was in fact not a roadmap of the direction of the Party, especially that of the Party’s Bundestag leadership. It was both an acceptance of what many feared would eventually come and a voice for caution of what could come. In fact, this declaration was more likely a representation of general Green values, but was largely devoid of the political realities of government participation.

Over the first two months the battle lines that would largely define the debate were clarified. Traditional pacifists such as Winfried Hermann and Hans-Christian

²⁹ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Resolution of the Special Party Council and Bundestag Group,” 13 September 2001, <<http://www.providence.edu/polisci/affigne/responses.htm#Anchor-51315>> accessed 17 June 2007.

Ströbele argued from the very beginning that any military attack in response to the 9/11 attacks should be avoided. During the intervening decade since the Bosnian crisis, the traditional pacifist argument had changed little and thus does not require significant discussion until the next section. The *fundi* position would only become important when their numbers in the Bundestag faction were enough to cause a crisis within the coalition, as will be discussed in more detail later.

On both the *realo* and to a large extent the swing group side, the rhetoric focused on the larger picture, in particular the importance of Germany acting responsibly in this crisis to include the idea of utilizing the military component as part of the larger effort. The Party's leader and Germany's foreign minister Joschka Fischer clearly had a prominent role. He was in particular very conscious of the need to maintain German responsibility within NATO and maintain that continuity the Red-Green coalition had established after the Kohl government. As he noted four months after the attacks, not participating with military forces would have "deviated from the line which can be said to have run from Adenauer to Schröder, with dire consequences for our country."³⁰ In his 26 September speech before the Bundestag, which gave an accurate portrayal of his argument throughout this early debate, Fischer argued vehemently that Germany could not ignore these attacks, in particular as these international dimensions of the terrorist threat also posed a risk to Germany. Turning away would not bring an end to that threat, but rather would be an "invitation" to terrorism. From Fischer's perspective, any response to counter that threat would require the use of military forces.

Still, even throughout these first two months of the debate, Fischer often remained close to his Green heritage for both political and personal conviction reasons, by aiming

to address the challenges that led to the terrorist threat through non-military means.

Protecting human rights, the inequality created in the wake of globalization, and European integration were never far from his speeches that also argued for using military force.³¹

His belief in responsibility and using military force were often echoed by others in the Green Party leadership. The Green Party *realo* and leader Fritz Kuhn argued that Germany “may not avoid its responsibility.” Ludger Volmer, who had been the leader of the swing group, continued to speak clearly of Germany responsibility: “As an ally of the attacked partner, we have not only the moral authorization, but also the moral and political responsibility to contribute our capability to the defense” and bring those responsible to justice.³²

Both Volmer and Müller, stalwarts of the swing group, also talked of the possibilities of military actions in their 19 September speeches in the Bundestag. Volmer recognized that such military strikes by the US would be “justified and unavoidable,” though he also reiterated that these strikes would have to be targeted and limited such that Afghanistan would have a chance for the future. Moreover, remaining true to his swing group ideas, such military actions would not be as important as the political measure to be undertaken later. Müller noted that “limited military actions may be necessary,” but also proposed a greater focus on civil conflict prevention measures to destroy the

³⁰ Hrycyk, 4.

³¹ “Rede von Bundesaußenminister Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 26.09.2001.”

³² “Kritische Stimmen zu deutscher Beteiligung an Vergeltungsschlag,” *Netzeitung*, 14 September 2001, <<http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/160168.html>> accessed 8 July 2007; Regine Zylka, “Wir dürfen der Verantwortung nicht ausweichen,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 28 September 2001, 5; Ludger Volmer, “Rede des Staatsministers im Auswärtigen Amt Dr. Ludger Volmer zu den Terroranschlägen in den USA.”

structure of terrorism.³³

The focus on a mixture of military and non-military means as a response to 9/11 were critical elements stressed during a special small Party Day called by Green leaders in early October to address the consequences of the 9/11 attacks. The leadership group here recognized the need for force, to include the possible participation of German forces, “in view of the terrorist attacks” and the invocation of NATO Article V. Importantly, in a strong reflection of the evolution of the Party leadership, a proposal asking for the mere “acceptance” of this possibility as opposed to support, was rejected. During the conference Party chair Claudia Roth argued that no Green wanted to have war, but the terrorist threat required that military actions, stopping short of revenge, not be taken off the table.³⁴ The *realo* perspective along with that of some swing group adherents carried strong weight and from all accounts appears to have taken the plurality, though not a unanimous perspective. Much like the earlier events in Bosnia, this declaration reflected that the leadership was ahead of the rest of the Party.

Stuck in the middle, however, were a number of others from the traditionalist side of the swing group, who followed a tentative line focused on the futility of military involvement. They understood and supported the ideals of *Regierungsfähigkeit* and had even supported the deployment of German forces in Kosovo; however, this debate was well outside of their comfort zone. One of the leading members of this portion of the swing group, Winfried Nachtwei, believed in addressing this threat with critical eyes toward a solution. Decrying the possibility of “returning to the roots” of the Greens,

³³ Volmer, “Rede des Staatsministers im Auswärtigen Amt Dr. Ludger Volmer zu den Terroranschlägen in den USA.”; “Der Terror und die Folgen.”

³⁴ “Alle Parteien außer der PDS stellen sich hinter den Kanzler,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 October 2001, 1-2; “Grüne befürworten Einsatz der Bundeswehr,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8

Nachtwei argued that the continuing security problems required a new vision of Green security policy. He strongly believed that the use of the military would not lead to any success, but instead over time would be “less responsible and legitimate.” Later, in early November, amid the slow progress of the war in Afghanistan at the time, he would follow that ideal calling for a rejection of any German participation in the operation there, instead focusing on political dynamics as a means of reducing the tension.³⁵

Other Green Party staffs followed a similar argument in a position paper in which they stressed using military force would likely worsen the situation as it would lead to considerable escalation. Using military forces, moreover, could actually backfire, creating more martyrs and in fact solidifying opposition to the US if civilians were hit. These staffs advisors instead proposed a new strategy that focused on dialog, solving the conflict in the Middle East between the Israelis and Palestinians, stopping the “war economies” of weapons proliferation, and pushing for a “law based international order.”³⁶ These two examples show that the swing group as a whole still had some pacifist tendencies, though they remained in the minority. The majority of the swing group supported the *realo* position.

As the US began its military strikes against targets in Afghanistan in early October, the progress and methods of the campaign soon became fodder within the Green debate. US military actions had always been a *cases belli* for criticism from the Greens. As one party member noted, the greatest unease for many Greens was the fact that support for deploying German forces was also a decision in support of an American

October 2001, 1; “Fischer: Grüne müssen Verantwortung annehmen;” “Grüne befürworten Einsatz der Bundeswehr,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 October 2001, 2.

³⁵ Winfried Nachtwei, “Afghanistan-Krieg—Innere Lage,” 2 November 2001, <www.nachtwei.de/terror/offener%brief.htm> accessed 15 October 2002.

attack. Fischer called these attacks “legitimate,” and “targeted.” A declaration from the Party’s chairmen (Müller, Schlauch, Roth, and Kuhn) on the day after the attacks likewise recognized the targeted nature of the attacks and noted they were also “proportional”—a tremendous difference from the earlier commentaries in the wake of the start of the Gulf War.³⁷

After ten days of bombing attacks in Afghanistan, the German population as a whole was expressing hesitancy in the wake of the developing humanitarian catastrophe that was receiving considerable press attention. Importantly, over 90% of the self-ascribed Green members argued for a halt to the bombing, relative to 57% within the rest of the population.³⁸ That differed significantly relative to Kosovo. By early November, many Greens, including at the leadership level, were becoming more critical of the American campaign in Afghanistan, especially the use of cluster munitions, and became more vocal about a possible cease-fire. The leadership level was beginning to show some cracks. Several federal level delegates, such as Roth and Kuhn favored a pause in the attacks for humanitarian reasons. However, in a demonstration of the contention even at the federal leadership level, a few days later Kuhn moved away from that earlier perspective for undeclared reasons. Those on the left fringes of the swing group, to say nothing of the traditional pacifists, also expressed discontent with the worsening humanitarian situation amid the American campaign. Nachtwei went even further,

³⁶ Martin Fischer, Dieter Reinhardt, and Albert Statz, “Nichts wird bleiben wie es war,” 28 October 2001, <www.nachtwei.de/terror/terrorfolgen1.rtf> accessed 15 October 2002.

³⁷ Jonas Vierring “Zusammen raufen—und dann zusammenraufen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 10/11 November 2001, 9; “Fischer: Grüne müssen Verantwortung annehmen,” “Gemeinsame Erklärung der Vorsitzenden von Bundestagsfraktion und Bundesvorstand zu den Militärischen Aktion der USA in Afghanistan,” 8 October 2001, <http://www.angelika-beer.de/content/themen/01_10_08_BaVO.pdf> accessed 2 October 2002.

³⁸ “Für Bombenstopp,” *Der Spiegel* 43, 27 October 2001, 20. Majorities in all parties, with the reception of the FDP at 49%, supported a pause in the attack.

suggesting that a halt in the attacks was called for not only out of humanitarian reasons, but also to support a long-range solution to the terrorist threat.³⁹

However, in a clear indication of the split between the majority of the leadership and the base, an 18 October statement from the faction argued that a halt in the bombing would not substantially improve the situation in Afghanistan as it was not the “decisive hindrance” for the terrible humanitarian situation there. Joschka Fischer also rejected all such calls, arguing that the continued rule by the Taliban was the “central issue” preventing the distribution of humanitarian resources. As he clearly stated: “When one wants to help the humanitarian situation, one should rather try everything to defeat the Taliban regime quicker. I think in any case that the interruption of the bombing would not help the humanitarian situation. It would only strengthen the Taliban.”⁴⁰ Despite this outcry within the Greens, there would be not official Green or German argument for a pause in the attacks.

In addition to these varied perspectives on the use of or effectiveness of military forces before and during the US strikes in Afghanistan, early statements from the traditionalists and that small portion of the left side of the swing group suggested a considerable wavering on whether to follow their conscience or support the alliance and with it the coalition. As early as a week after the attacks, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* was rhetorically asking whether the Greens could indeed remain in the coalition. By late

³⁹ Tissy Bruns, “Dem Kanzler in den Rücken gefallen,” *Die Welt*, 16 October 2001, 3, “Grüne bekunden jetzt ihre ‘Kritische Solidarität,’” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 November 2001, 1; “Winfried Nachtwei, “Nachtwei: Blinde Loyalitäten sind gefährlich,” 26 October 2001, <www.nachtwei.de/presse/Nachtwei%2030%20Afghanistan.rtf> accessed 15 October 2002.”

⁴⁰ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Afghanistan: Humanitäre Lage und politische Perspektiven,” 18 October 2001, <http://www.angelika-beer.de/content/themen/01_10_18_BTfHumLageAfg.pdf> accessed 2 October 2002; “Wir müssen die Terroristen bekämpfen und besiegen,” interview with Joschka Fischer, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 18 October 2001, <<http://www.sueddeutsche-zeitung.de/aktuell/sz/artikel187789.php>> accessed 6 December 2001.

October, as the Greens intraparty fractures were becoming even more public and well before Schröder publically called for the deployment, *Der Spiegel* noted that the Greens were fighting for their very existence in the government as their capabilities of serving in such a dire situation continued to be questioned.⁴¹

In a preview of the more intensive debate in mid-November, the various factions had in essence been staking out their perspectives on the dichotomy of supporting a potential German deployment and adhering to their conscience. While *realos* supported maintaining German responsibility, traditionalists such as Hans-Christian Ströbele argued two weeks after 9/11 that opposing the use of the military was more important than remaining in the coalition. Green swing group leaders such as Müller, however, countered that the Greens as a whole should not “rob” themselves of the chance to influence the deliberations, both internally and externally.⁴² Volmer, in his speech before the Bundestag on 19 September, took a similar approach, arguing strongly for the continuation of Green influence and the Fischer foreign policy, noting that it was showing some effectiveness in the near East.⁴³ Angelica Beer, who had only slowly accepted the course to governance laid out by Fischer, believed that there was no alternative to using force against terrorists. Beer even paid homage to the traditional pacifist, asking rhetorically where the Party would be without them, but at the same time suggested that many of them, particularly as the base did not have the necessity of acting for a state to guide them.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Thorsten Denkler, “Die Grüne und der Kriegeinsatz,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 19 September 2001, <www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/politik.24844/index.php> accessed 12 December 2001; “Gefährliche Routine,” *Der Spiegel* 43, 22 October 2001, 22.

⁴² Brigitte Fehrle, “Grüne streiten über Militäreinsätze,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 28 September 2001, 22.

⁴³ Volmer, “Rede des Staatsministers im Auswärtigen Amt Dr. Ludger Volmer zu den Terroranschlägen in den USA.”

⁴⁴ Barbara Supp, “Die Olivegrüne,” *Der Spiegel*, 46, 12 December 2001, 179-186.

However, there were others on the traditional side of the swing group that questioned this logic. Nachtwei strongly disagreed with Fischer's argument that Germany's responsibility carried with it the chance of German participation. If it came to a vote on German participation, the individual's vote should be based "not on alliance loyalty or coalition discipline," but should be a function of conscience. The Bundestag's vice president, Antja Vollmer held a similar position.⁴⁵ In the end, however, as will be demonstrated below, the swing group as a whole followed the acceptance of the use of force based on a number of reasons, though largely due to *Regierungsfähigkeit*.

By early November, the stage was set within the Green Party for a tremendous debate. Fischer's adherents were strongly supportive of the use of limited military force in the context of a responsible Germany, while the traditional pacifists were as adamantly opposed to using military force based on their conscience. In the middle again was the swing group, though the majority accepted the ideas of *Regierungsfähigkeit* and some had even moved toward the *realo* perspective in large part due to their high level government positions. This time, however, it would be the *fundis* that would primarily have to make the choice between principles and strategic calculation.

THE COLLAPSE OF A DREAM?

The German government's decision to deploy combat forces to Afghanistan was pursued early on behind the scenes. From the days after the attack, Germany had expressed its willingness to offer military forces to the fight. In early October, Schröder

⁴⁵ "Nachtwei: Blinde Loyalitäten sind gefährlich;" Eckart Lohse, "Hegen, Pflegen und die Parteiselle bedienen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 November 2001, 3.

made it quite clear through direct discussion between his and the US National Security Advisors, that he understood military forces would be a part of Germany's contribution. In that same discussion, however, Germany noted that there were limits to that participation—no German ground combat formations could be used in Afghanistan.⁴⁶

On 6 November 2001, amid some of the hardest fighting in Afghanistan, chancellor Schröder made what he called the “necessary decision” and proposed the twelve month deployment of up to 3900 German troops in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Developed out of a request from the US,⁴⁷ the proposal the Cabinet put forward significantly noted that military action was “essential” to combat the terrorist threat and prevent a repeat of the deadly events of 9/11.

In his speech before the Bundestag that day arguing for the passage of the proposal, the chancellor spoke of Germany's responsibility as an international partner. Reminding his audience of the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 and NATO Article V, Germany would contribute its troops according to the idea of collective security and its responsibility within Europe. This decision, moreover, was in concert with Germany's decision to accept its “growing responsibility” in world affairs. Importantly, Schröder noted that accepting such responsibility was “in Germany's interest.” The proposal did contain the important caveat that the deployment would be

⁴⁶ “Abmarsch in die Realität,” 25.

⁴⁷ The issue of whether the US requested forces from Germany, or whether Germany offered forces, or whether Germany asked the US to ask Germany is an interesting twist on this debate. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* suggests the US asked for specific capabilities, which would seem to be consistent with the answer Defense Secretary Rumsfeld gave when asked about the issue. That same statement did not provide any concrete evidence that the US may have solicited Germany's request to assist. Only later documentation will provide clear answers, which in turn will provide greater insight into whether there was any form of systemic pressure or, indeed, systemic assistance. See “3900 Soldaten für den Kampf gegen den Terror,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 November 2001, 1; “Erklärung des US-Verteidigungsministers Donald Rumsfeld zur Bitte um militärischen Beistand Deutschlands im Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus,” 7 November 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_61995.htm> accessed 2 July 2007.

limited by what was “objectively possible” and “politically responsible.” Its area of operations, in reaction to the considerable fear, especially from the Greens, that German forces could be deployed around the world, moreover would be somewhat limited to prevent an expansion of its mandate.⁴⁸

Though the possible deployment of military force garnered the most attention in his speech, Schröder also incorporated the need to address the problem of terrorism through non-military means—humanitarian assistance and combating terrorist finances—partly in deference to the Leftist portions of his coalition, but also in concert with general Red-Green policies. Indeed, his speech laid out a vision for greater German involvement that incorporated military means, but focused more on non-military measures.⁴⁹ The evolution reflected in this proposed deployment and greater involvement in a global threat in essence expanded the very concept of German responsibility beyond the confines of Europe to the world stage and to a large extent broadened the tools Germany was capable of using.

The 3900 troops proposed for deployment consisted of 1800 Navy personnel that would patrol the Horn of Africa and Mediterranean Sea, 250 medical and transport personnel to move wounded from Afghanistan, nuclear-biological-chemical detection “Fox Panzers” for Kuwait, 500 personnel for air transportation and 100 KSK Special

⁴⁸ “Antrag der Bundesregierung auf Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte vom 7.11.01,” 7 November 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_62015_1499.htm> accessed 12 October 2001; “Bundeswehr vor dem Einsatz—Interview mit dem Bundeskanzler in der ARD,” 6 November 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/rede/ix_61999_1499.htm> accessed 12 October 2001; Schröder, “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zur Beteiligung Bewaffneter Deutscher Streitkräfte,” 6 November 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_62094_1499.htm> accessed 7 November 2001. Karsten Voigt, an influential SPD leader, offered a partial explanation as to why it was in Germany’s interest, arguing that only “military relevant” partners would have influence. See Gerold Büchner, “Nur militärisch relevante Partner haben Einfluss,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 9 November 2001, <<http://www.berlinonline.de>> accessed 10 November 2003.

⁴⁹ Schröder, “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zur

Forces. Though the Navy would take on the majority of the burden, the Army, especially the KSK and to an extent the Fox Panzers, would take on the greatest risk.⁵⁰ Yet, Schröder took great pains to show there was little overall risk involved and that German forces would not be partaking in combat operations. In a released statement, the chancellor made it clear that it was important to him that German troops would not take part in air attacks or be present as ground troops for operations against al Qaida and the Taliban.⁵¹ Though Germany was deploying its military further than it ever had before and in rather large numbers, its leadership took considerable care to avoid the message that they would take part in active combat operations, which represented a significant difference from the Kosovo operation.

The deployment of the KSK posed by far the greatest challenge for the coalition. The possibility of a KSK deployment at the request of the US had been mentioned in the press as early as October, but the government remained largely mute throughout the debate.⁵² Seen as one of the best in Europe and having trained with American and British special forces, the KSK were the one group outside of US special forces that could bring so much specialized capability. With 100 KSK troops slated to deploy, whose mission necessarily could bring them into active combat situations, their addition to the deployed German forces could potentially cause significant, if unspoken, problems for an already shaky coalition.

Within three months of their deployment, however, and despite Schröder's

Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte."

⁵⁰ "Zuschlagen und abhauen?," *Der Spiegel* 46, 12 November 2001, 42.

⁵¹ "Statement von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur Bereitstellung militärischer Kräfte," 6 November 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/mitschrift/ix_61991_1499.htm> accessed 12 October 2001.

⁵² Udo Ulfkotte, "German Special Forces in Washington's Focus," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (English version), 18 September 2001; "Zuschlagen und abhauen?"

promises to the contrary, it became public that the KSK were moving beyond their police-oriented operations and were actively taking part in the anti-terror combat operations against al Qaida in Afghanistan. Though it would be difficult to call the comments after this public admission an outrage there was significant criticism from members of every party. Within the Green Party there was no major uprising, suggesting that there was some measure of acceptance. The Green pacifist Winfried Hermann argued that the fact that the KSK was partaking in active combat operations should have been made public, while withholding the specifics. Contrarily, the Greens' defense expert, Angelica Beer, argued that any discussion on the KSK endangered their lives, instead suggesting that a committee should be informed. The foreign minister followed on this argument, arguing that the government was responsible for their security and there should be little discussion about their operations.⁵³

It would not be until late 2006, after allegations that KSK forces were involved in inappropriate actions toward a detainee, that more Greens began to call for the end of the KSK mission in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Party chairwoman Claudia Roth suggested then that she would have rescinded her original vote in favor of the use of the KSK. Asked about the KSK in March 2007, defense expert Winfried Nachtwei, however, argued that given the numerous successes the KSK has had in protecting German forces deployed in Afghanistan that they should remain, though with greater control from the Bundestag.⁵⁴ It thus took five years before significant criticism from the middle, swing group elements

"KSK-Einsatz: CDU und Grüne, rügen Scharpings Informationspolitik," *Netzeitung*, 25 February 2007, <<http://www.netzeitung.de/default/179996.html>> accessed 3 July 2007.

⁵³ "KSK-Einsatz: CDU und Grüne, Rügen Scharpings Informationspolitik."

⁵⁴ "SPD und Grüne fordern Ende des Anti-Terror-Kampfs in Afghanistan," *Bild*, 20 October 2006, <<http://www.bild.t-online.de/BTO/news/aktuell/2006/10/20/afghanistan-ksk-einsatz/afghanistan-ksk-einsatz.html>> accessed 3 July 2007; Winfried Nachtwei, "Nachtwei zum Einsatz des Kommandos Spezialkräfte in Afghanistan," 30 March 2007, <<http://www.nachtwei.de/index.php/articles/492>> accessed

of the Green Party began to exhibit itself on one of the more controversial aspects of the original deployment, suggesting that even if the original deployment had only grudging support, it was strong enough to last the negative publicity of alleged KSK actions a half decade later.

The announcement of the proposed deployment, to include the KSK, to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 was met with widespread support in general. Both parties of the opposition, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, supported it and majorities in both the SPD and the Greens also pledged their backing. Only the PDS, the successor to the East German Communist Party demurred. Within the Greens, however, the Party stood divided⁵⁵ and this division would be a critical area of interest for the chancellor.

Within a day of the announcement, there was already considerable talk that the SPD-Green coalition would not have enough votes to create a governing majority, leading some in the Green Party to think the coalition may be approaching its end. Indeed, *Der Spiegel* on its 12 November 2001 cover called it an “emergency” for the Red-Green Coalition.⁵⁶ Schröder, however, remained steadfast early on, believing that he would attain a majority with the use of his own coalition, though he also predicated those thoughts with the comment that such a result was his “expectation.” However, those expectations soon proved overly optimistic as within a few days, there were public admissions of at least five coalition members of the Bundestag (4 Green and 1 SPD) who

3 July 2007.

⁵⁵ “Union unterstützt deutschen Beitrag,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 November 2001, 2; “Gerhardt fordert regelmäßige Konsultationen,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 November 2001, 2; Günter Bannas, “Zwischen Anspannung und Optimismus,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 November 2001, 2; “PDS lehnt Einsatz der Bundeswehr ab,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 November 2001, 2; Eckhart Lohse, “Von Grüner Seite keinerlei Rechtfertigung und Unterstützung,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 November 2001, 2.

would definitely vote no on the proposal, and several others that might follow that part. Within a week, the number of Green opponents had grown to eight.⁵⁷

From insider reports, the total numbers of defectors throughout the process from the coalition numbered eight Green Members of Parliament and twenty to thirty members of Schröder's own Party, suggesting there was considerable pressure exerted within the chancellor's own party.⁵⁸ Those numbers, even only the eight of 47 Green Party members alone, were clearly enough that the chancellor would have had to rely on the opposition to pass the measure, which would put him in a precarious political position given his failure to achieve a governing majority with the vote for the deployment to Macedonia a few months earlier, when nineteen members of his own party and five Greens rejected the proposal. Failure to achieve a governing majority would mean that he could no longer trust his coalition partners, thus inhibiting his ability to govern.⁵⁹

Though the break of the eight Greens at the federal level was by far the most public division within the Party, much like the earlier Kosovo crisis, there was also a more refined, subtle debate occurring. Building off of the previous crisis, this division would be the Party's "hour of reality." Each of the major groups had their various opinions, though for the most part, at the federal level the division stood between the traditional pacifists as well as some left leaning swing group proponents and the

⁵⁶ *Der Spiegel* 46, 12 November 2001, cover.

⁵⁷ "Teil der Grünen nehmen Bruch der Koalition in Kauf," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 9 November 2001; Günter Bannas, "Zuversicht und Sorge," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 November 2001, 8.

⁵⁸ Hermann, interview by author. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* offers some confirmation for that number, suggesting on the day of the vote that twenty members of the SPD had originally been opposed to the deployment of German forces. In the end, however, only one of these, who had just left the SPD, voted against the chancellor. See "Die SPD-Fraktion verliert eine Abgeordnete," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 November 2001, 1 and "Schröder gewinnt die Vertrauensabstimmung," *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 17/18 November 2001, 1-2.

⁵⁹ "Schröder Considers Ending Coalition, Sources Say," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (English Edition), 12 November 2001; Steven Erlanger, "Schröder Calls a Vote of Confidence on the War," *The New York Times*, 14 September 2001, 1.

remainder of the MPs. The realist side of the Greens, for example the Green faction leader Rezzo Schlauch, spoke of maintaining allegiance to the alliance, of German responsibility, and of the dangers of terrorism. Others, such as defense expert and swing group adherent Angelica Beer, accepted a “limited” deployment of German forces.

Ludger Volmer, who had only six years previously attacked Fischer for even proposing that military force be used in Bosnia and had now moved more to the *realo* side, supported Fischer’s ideas of international responsibility, arguing for “continuity” with the German growing international responsibility. From his perspective, the new lessons of the past had now morphed into a necessity for international responsibility. The Kosovo and Macedonia operations had shown the necessity of acting within that new international responsibility and support for the operations in Afghanistan was no different.

Yet there was also some clear hesitation by some in the swing group. One of the leading defense experts, Winfried Nachtwei warned that “blind loyalty” was “dangerous.” The Bundestag’s vice president Antja Vollmer, who had long been a part of the swing group during the debate, and the Bundestag member Franziska Eichstädt-Bohlig remained critical of the direction the Red-Green coalition had taken with this decision. On the extreme end of the pendulum, the traditionalists, such as Hans-Christian Ströbele remained strongly opposed to any deployment of forces and would resist it, even if it meant the end of the coalition.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Eckart Lohse, “Was Fischer so in Rage brachte,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 November 2001, 3; “Abmarsch in die Realität,” 26-29; Holger Schmale, “Wenn der Außenminister droht,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 8 November 2001, < <http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2001/1108/politik/0103/> > accessed 3 July 2007; Ludger Volmer, “Grundlinien der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik;” Nachtwei, “Nachtwei: Blinde Loyalitäten sind gefährlich;” Fehrle; Gerold Büchner, “‘Ich halte den Krieg gegen Afghanistan für falsch und fatal’—Grüne haben Zweifel an Bundeswehr-Einsatz,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 7 November 2001,

Though the eight members of the Bundestag that opposed the deployment were vastly outnumbered within the parliamentary group, they had considerable support among the Green base. Approximately 70% of the regular Green members opposed the use of German forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, by November only 24% of the Greens supported the overall policy of “unlimited solidarity” that chancellor Schröder had offered the US, a drop of six points from a survey done the previous month.⁶¹

The majority of the Green county organizations were also opposed to the German participation in Afghanistan, even in the face of the later linkage of the vote to the confidence measure. A quick recount of a few traditionalist proposals for the Rostock Party Day will give a good flavor for the base’s disdain for the perspective deployment of German forces to Afghanistan. The local group from Thüringen, in a resolution passed on 8 November strongly decried any deployment of German forces. The group from Ronnenberg, following a similar line, invoked an idea suggested by Ströbele that this vote and the possible support of military operations was not about taking part in the governing coalition at any price; it was about the “believability” of the Party. In a very radical approach, the local group from Hersfeld-Rotenberg argued that the Greens in the Bundestag should leave the coalition if the 16 November vote supported deploying the Bundeswehr. Another radical position from the Brandenburg group believed that the Green Bundestag members should push the US and Great Britain to pay Afghani civilians for any damages incurred from the military action.⁶²

<<http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/2001/1107/politik/0013/>> accessed 3 July 2007.

⁶¹ “Abmarsch in die Realität;” “Solide Solidarisch.”

⁶² LaVo Brandenburg, “Ja zur kritischen Solidarität, Nein zum Marsch in die militärischen Interventionsmacht Deutschland bzw. EU,” 16 November 2001, Antrag P-39: 17. Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 24-25 November 2001, <www.gruene.de/Archiv/grem/bdk/01Rostock/antrag/p-39.htm> accessed 6 December 2001; KV Hersfeld-

That does not mean, however, that all county organizations were opposed to using force, though those in the base that supported using the military were clearly in the minority. In fact, in a 10-4 leadership vote, the Baden-Württemberg state leadership organization issued a clear “yes” to supporting the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan. The Gross-Gerau local group argued that not only were the US led actions in Afghanistan legitimate, but these actions could also be the precursor for bringing in much needed help to the Afghani people.⁶³

The leadership of the Party was thus put in a very precarious situation, pulled between the competing demands as part of Germany’s ruling coalition requiring it to act responsibly internationally and the necessity of maintaining its more traditionally oriented membership base. In a declaration from 12 November the leadership ostensibly tried to assuage some of those fears and laid out some guidelines for their decision to support the proposal. Recognizing that this would be the hardest decision the Party has ever had to make, that many in the Party and the population had rejected any possible deployment, and the contradictory paths laid out before them, the leadership while still pledging its solidarity to the US based on the 9/11 attacks, chose to practice “critical

Rotenburg, “Grüne Müssen Friedenspartei Bleiben,” 28 September 2001, Antrag P-03: 17. Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 24-25 November 2001,

<www.gruene.de/Archiv/grem/bdk/01Rostock/antrag/P-03.htm> accessed 6 December 2001; OV Ronnenberg, “Bundeswehr Einsatz im Afghanistan-Krieg,” 7 November 2001, Antrag P-20: 17.

Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 24-25 November 2001,

<www.gruene.de/Archiv/grem/bdk/01Rostock/antrag/P-20.htm> accessed 6 December 2001; LaVo Thüringen, “Gegen den Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte!,” 8 November 2001, Antrag P-23: 17.

Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 24-25 November 2001,

<www.gruene.de/Archiv/grem/bdk/01Rostock/antrag/P-23.htm> accessed 6 December 2001.

⁶³ “Dem Kanzler droht der Verlust der eigenen Mehrheit,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 November 2001, 1; “Abmarsch in die Realität,” 26; Tobias Blum, “Grünen-Landesverbände lehnen Einsatz weiter ab,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 15 November 2001, <<http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/bin/dump.fcgi/2001/1115/politik/0064/>> accessed 3 July 2007; “Auf der Sucht nach Orientierung,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 November 2001, 5; KV Gross-Gerau, “Verantwortung wahrnehmen,” 14 November 2001, Antrag P-33: 17. Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 24-25

November 2001, <www.gruene.de/Archiv/grem/bdk/01Rostock/antrag/P-33.htm> accessed 6 December

solidarity” instead of “yes and amen.”

In a foreshadowing of the later Green leadership argument, the declaration dwelled considerably on the value of the ideals of *Regierungsfähigkeit*. As members of the governing coalition, the Greens had to “vocalize and accept the doubts, insecurities and criticisms” that arise if they are to advance the causes of the Green Party. And that included the use of German military forces. The leadership appealed to the overall political desires of the Party for the international stage, arguing that above all else, the Greens should remain a part of the governing coalition. With a war underway, remaining in power would allow the Green to exhibit significant influence and ensure that the war against terrorism also included a “coalition for humanity.” Remaining in the coalition would also give the Greens, through Joschka Fischer, the opportunity to practice their ideals of conflict prevention, in particular in the Middle East and in protecting human rights in Afghanistan.

Much like during Kosovo, the leadership rejected the proposal for a cessation of all military actions in Operation Enduring Freedom, given the rights of the US to defend itself and the threat posed by terrorism. In a clear acceptance of their role as part of the governing coalition, the leadership argued that the Greens had a “responsibility” to “protect the population, international security, and the peace as well as the preservation of an open society.” At the most basic level, however, approving the German military participation was “responsible;” not only was it the correct action, but by remaining in the coalition, the Greens could also ensure that it was embedded in the “corresponding political realm.”

However, the declaration did lay out some conditions for their approval, in

essence leveraging the precarious position that Schröder was in, to restrict the mandate even further and at the same time make it more tenable to the Green's base elements. The military was to be restricted from fighting all but al Qaida; the area of operations would have to be limited; any changes in levels of participation or area of operations must be approved by the Bundestag; and the government must keep the Bundestag informed of all military operations.⁶⁴

Overall, the declaration attempted to rectify the challenges inherent in being a part of the governing coalition and the necessities of responding to the 9/11 attacks, while also maintaining some of the philosophy inherent to the *fundis* and some swing group adherents. The considerable attention paid to the benefits for advancing the ideals of the Green Party through remaining involved in the coalition was a way of achieving that goal. Moreover, by outlining demands for the SPD, some of which were later accepted, the leadership was able to demonstrate the "critical solidarity" while also exhibiting the clear influence that the Greens could have. As will be seen below, the declaration clearly had some resonance on the Party and in particular within its dissenting members of the Bundestag.

The Green leader himself, Joschka Fischer, also echoed many of the ideas outlined in this declaration. In a speech before the Bundestag on 8 November, Fischer, in championing the *realo* end of the spectrum, laid out his reasons for supporting the deployment of German forces. His speech was given from the perspective of the position of the foreign minister and vice chancellor of the republic, though it also invoked Green

⁶⁴ Schmale; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Kritische Solidarität statt Ja und Amen: Zur Bereitstellung deutscher bewaffneter Kräfte im Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus," 28. Ordentlicher Parteirat von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen am 12. November 2001 in Berlin, <<http://www.gruene.de/archiv/grem/PR/PR011...PR011112MilitaerischeUnterstützung.htm>> accessed 23

ideas as well. The decision at hand was a question of war versus peace. Though war was “abominable” and Germans had a responsibility to avoid it, the necessity of responding to the terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11, to include military force, was crucial—a logical conclusion from his belief that it was impossible to negotiate with Osama Bin Laden, as his continued use of violence meant that “dialog had no chance.” Following the logic that he had developed amid the Bosnian crisis and used later during Kosovo, Fischer flipped the concept of “never again war” on its head and argued that acting with military force to prevent violence, in this case the terrorist threat, was indeed justified. However, any use of the military would be an “instrument” in order to make a political solution possible.

Moreover, Fischer also exhibited the pull of multilateralism and German responsibility, arguing that the “primary question” facing the Bundestag now, would be whether Germany would leave its “most important partner,” the US to fight against terrorism alone, which would have significant negative consequences for German security and capabilities. Following on much of his rhetoric from the previous two months, Fischer was making a clear connection between this decision to deploy German forces and Germany’s evolved international responsibilities.

At the same time, Fischer also exhibited his Green traits. Germany, he said, must endeavor to bring the methods of conflict prevention though conflict mediation and addressing other “soft” issues to greater prominence in international affairs. The mantra of the overall politic for the Greens would be prevention, rather than militaristic attacks.⁶⁵

November 2001.

⁶⁵ Joschka Fischer, “Rede von Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 08.11.2001,” Plenarprotokoll 14/198, 198. Sitzung, 8 November 2001; “Wir Müssen die Terroristen Bekämpfen und Besiegen;” “Interview von Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer mit der Westdeutschen

His adherence to these values was a clear manifestation that he still retained his “Greenness,” though such admission surely were also aimed at the swing group and leftist elements of his own party.

Unlike the two earlier Bosnian and Kosovo crises, this time Fischer did not have the crutch of “never again Auschwitz” to use; instead he unapologetically did not try and “sweeten” the situation. Fischer relied solely on the reasons of international order, self-defense, and German responsibility within the alliance system.⁶⁶ Yet, Fischer did have a political weapon at his disposal, one that he had used with considerable effectiveness during the Kosovo crisis—he threatened to resign, not just from the government but also from the Greens if his Party did not support him. This threat, which many took quite seriously, was offered amid the important intraparty meetings in early November when the Party was debating its fate. Indeed, as Eckart Lohse of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* argues, his resignation threat was an important reason why the Left of the Party either moved toward the *realo* perspective or acquiesced.⁶⁷

While there was a majority of support among the Bundestag members, the eight *fundis* that did oppose the use of force were boisterous within the press. The soul of the leftists and a “stubborn man,” Ströbele, saw the war in Afghanistan itself as “false and fatal.” He asked rhetorically how many would have to die before the Greens would return to their roots and stop any support for this war. The rigidity of coalition duties did not appeal to the man borne of opposition as he remained true to the original ideals of the Party. Winfried Hermann, who had also been a loud opponent to any military action throughout the entire debate, believed the war in Afghanistan was illegitimate because of

Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ).”

⁶⁶ “Abmarsch in die Realität,” p. 29.

its brutality.⁶⁸

The eight parliamentary opponents⁶⁹ penned a position paper on 11 November outlining in detail their reasons for rejecting the use of force. Adhering completely to the pure tenets of Green pacifism, the treatise could very well have been written during the Bosnian or Kosovo crises as in the months after 9/11. From their perspective, the military methods of waging the war against terrorism were ineffective and, moreover, damaging to the civil population. Indeed, adhering to the traditional value of escalation in Green Party values, they believed that any use of force would only make matters worse, leading to a “continuation” rather than ending of the terrorist threat.

They then listed eight specific reasons why they opposed the deployment of German forces, of which the primary reasons were; the war in Afghanistan could not solve the terrorist problem; the goals of the military strike were unclear; there was no post-Taliban political solution in place; there was a distinct possibility of escalation of the conflict; and it could lead to greater support worldwide for the terrorists. Summed into a single sentence: “The war against Afghanistan is politically false, does not serve the targeted goal of combating terrorism, is humanitarially irresponsible, and creates new political problems.” In practically a direct quotation from the early 1990s, the group stressed that this deployment would lead to the militarization of German foreign policy.⁷⁰

This considerable and strong opposition within the Greens alone, to say nothing of the challenges within the chancellor’s own party, essentially challenged the leadership

⁶⁷ Lohse, “Kampfeinätze und die Ost-Erweiterung,” 3.

⁶⁸ Fehrle; Büchner; Hermann, interview by author.

⁶⁹ The Greens who authored this paper were: Hans-Christian Ströbele, Winfried Hermann, Annelie Butenbach, Christian Simmert, Steffi Lemke, Sylvia Voss, Monika Knoche, and Irmgard Schewe-Gerigk.

⁷⁰ “Positionspapier der Abgeordneten Annelie Butenbach, Steffi Lemke, Christian Simmert, Monika Knoche, Irmgard Schewe-Gerigk, Hans-Christian Ströbele, Sylvia Voss, und Winfried Herman,” 11 November 2001, <<http://www.gruene.de/aktuell/anschlag-usa/texte/GruenerAfghane121101.htm>> accessed

of the SPD and the Greens alike and threatened the very existence of the Coalition. In order to bring the members of his own coalition into line, chancellor Schröder upped the ante and on 13 November linked a vote of confidence on his leadership with the vote for German participation. The linkage of the two votes dramatically changed the context of the debate, particularly for the eight Green members who were planning to vote against the use of force. If they followed that course with this new connection, the coalition would collapse. No longer was a philosophical choice the only factor that needed to be considered; there was now a real strategic, political choice to be made.

In linking the two votes, Schröder presented the opponents within his own coalition with a choice—vote for the deployment of the German military or force new elections, which the Greens were not expected to fare well in, even possibly falling below the 5% hurdle required for entrance into the Bundestag. With the large majority including the opposition supporting the deployment, failure to vote for the proposal would mean not only an end to the coalition, but it would also not prevent the deployment of German forces. This hard choice was clearly part of what Christoph Egle called “learning under stress.”⁷¹ To have an impact and continue to govern thus required a political decision that was diametrically opposite to the decision of conscience. The choice was now about the *Regierungsfähigkeit* of the Party.

Schröder made it clear that if the Green Party wanted to remain a part of the governing coalition, it had to support him completely on security questions to give him the capability to act, both politically and internationally, when needed. Indeed, Schröder

23 November 2001.

⁷¹ Egle, “Lernen unter Stress,” 100-01; Volmer, interview by author. Though the CDU and the FDP supported the deployment of German soldiers, they would vote no on a vote of confidence. Thus, in order to keep governing, Schröder had to attain a majority within his own coalition between the SPD and the

also emphasized to the Greens during direct talks the necessity of Germany expressing solidarity with its NATO partners. He placed all of the burden for the future of the coalition on the Greens, aiming at “disciplining” the Greens and forcing them to “renew their commitment in the coalition and to the requirements of power.” There was considerable talk both within the press and behind closed doors that the idea was gaining traction within the SPD to end the coalition and push for new elections. In essence, Schröder “attacked the Greens,” bending their political will to his desires.⁷² Interestingly the week after the vote, Schröder backed away from this rhetoric, claiming that the intent was not to end the Red-Green coalition, but rather to create a “new dynamic [and] also a new closeness.”⁷³

Many in the Greens expressed dissatisfaction about the linkage of the two votes. Indeed, almost every member that spoke or entered material into the record for the 16 November debate were opposed to the coupling. In the words of Winfried Hermann, who opposed the deployment, the linkage was the “emergency brake” to save the coalition. Steffi Lemke, also one of the eight public opponents, believed that the coupling of these two votes was legally “acceptable” but was not done correctly. She sharply attacked this choice, claiming that their separation could have led to a passage of both votes. Several in the Green federal level argued against the coupling of the two votes saying that the vote for the use of German forces was a “conscience decision,” rather than a cold, political calculation. Christian Sterzing and Ulrike Höfken similarly strongly opposed the

Greens.

⁷² Günter Bannas, “Mit der Milde des Kanzlers ist es vorbei,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 November 2001, 3; “Eine letzte Chance für die Koalition—Schröder stellt die Vertrauensfrage,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 November 2001, 1; Hermann, interview by author; Günter Bannas, “Tags drauf war das Fenster zu,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 December 2001, 3.

⁷³ Weisskirchen, interview by author; Gerhard Schröder, “Bundeskanzler Schröder: Die Entscheidung zur Bereitstellung der Bundeswehr im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus ist unumstößlich,” 19 November 2001,

linkage of a “question of conscience and a question of political power.” Gerald Häffner believed their combination would have the “absurd consequence” of reducing the seriousness of the conscious decision on such a difficult topic. In her speech before the Bundestag, swing group adherent Kerstin Müller, who largely supported the use of force, argued that to force this debate into one between “power and morality” was both “polemic” and disregarded those who struggled with the lessons that had emerged out of the Second World War.⁷⁴ Moreover, at the base level, outside of the reach of the power of political decision requirements, some among the Green Party county organization saw the linkage as “power politics extortion.”

As the debate in the Bundestag with the linked votes approached, the vote on the deployment of German forces was likely made a bit easier as the fighting in Afghanistan waned. The very day that Schröder offered the vote of confidence, the headline just under that article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* noted that the Afghanistan capital of Kabul had just fallen to the Northern Alliance.⁷⁵ That the worst of the fighting appeared to be over likely had an impact on the perceptions of those voting, though likely only on easing the consciousness, as the hard political reality of preserving the coalition remained the primary driving force. Indeed, Winfried Nachtwei, one of the Green Party’s leading international security experts, argued during the 16 November debate that the proposal for the deployment only became acceptable to him with the improving situation in Afghanistan.⁷⁶

<http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_62937_6090.htm> accessed 23 November 2001.

⁷⁴ Hermann, interview by author; Erlanger, “Seltsames Spiel,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 November 2001, 1; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/202, 202. Sitzung, 16 November 2001.

⁷⁵ Erhard Haubold, “Kabul fällt an die Nordallianz,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 November 2001, 1.

⁷⁶ Plenarprotokoll 14/202. Erich Fritz, Bundestag Member from the CDU argues, however, that such a hypothesis is speculative, as the situation there was still dire and the images of 9/11 remained fresh. Fritz,

Despite the strong opposition in the base, the federal leadership of the Greens overwhelmingly supported the deployment of German forces. Even before the linkage of the two votes, 39 of 47 Greens supported this deployment. Just prior to the vote on the linked proposals, the leadership issued a statement outlining their reasons for the supporting the deployment that especially highlighted the Green influence on the government proposal. In particular, the increased restriction on the area of Bundeswehr operations to Afghanistan and an outline for the political goals of the war against terrorism, which had been the reasons for the conditional support as outlined in the leadership declaration of 12 November, had both been fulfilled. The leadership highlighted both these changes as a “Green victory,” which many members believed pivotal to their support. Though the leadership respected the difficulty of the issue, it asked that all members of the Bundestag support the decision.⁷⁷

The debate in the Bundestag on 16 November was rambunctious to say the least, as politics at all levels took to the stage—the argument between governing coalition and opposition over control of the Bundestag; the intra-Green Party struggle over its possible future; and the push by the coalition to save its own majority. The transcript of the debate is filled with interjections and demonstrations of emotion. There were 77 written declarations submitted for the record; of the 23 attached in the recorded record, 13 were from the Greens. Both the CDU/CSU and FDP leadership made it quite clear in their speeches that their parties supported the proposal to deploy the use of force, yet

interview by author.

⁷⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Beschluss des Bundesvorstandes von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen zur Abstimmung über den Antrag der Bundesregierung zur Bereitstellung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte im Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus am 16. November 2001,” 15 November 2001, <http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/2001/gruene_vorstand-abstimmungsempfehlung.html> accessed 3 July 2007; Werner Kolhoff, “Verwirrung um möglichen Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Somalia,” *Berliner Zeitung*, 23 November 2001, 7; Plenarprotokoll 14/202.

unanimously opposed the governing coalition.⁷⁸ The Red-Green coalition side, however, was a debate replete with crisis. Both the speeches and the statements entered for the written record provide considerable insight, illuminating the cantankerous debate within the coalition. Moreover, the latter of these suggest that support for the deployment within the Greens was not at the level suggested before the vote.

The chancellor's speech, echoed by the SPD party leader Peter Stuck, focused on international responsibility, but began by highlighting the successes in Afghanistan with the fall of Kabul, noting that the military successes had opened the possibility for humanitarian assistance. Indeed, the first half of the speech was devoted to ideals that were dear to many on the Left and were inherent in preventative politics and reducing tensions in other conflicts such as that in the Middle East. Schröder directly alluded to the politics of the time and explained the reason for calling the vote of confidence—the “dependability of our politics” vis-à-vis the German people, Germany's European partners and the international community. In that context, the deployment of military forces was “necessary.” Moreover, with this deployment, Germany would meet the “expectations” of its partners in a “politically responsible” form. In particular, “through this contribution, the unified and sovereign Germany meets its growing responsibility in the world.” Stuck followed that logic, arguing that avoiding these responsibilities would leave an isolated Germany, which would be very damaging.⁷⁹

The speeches of the Greens covered the entire spectrum of possibilities. All of them resonated to one respect or another with Green ideas. Many who supported the use

⁷⁸ Plenarprotokoll 14/202.

⁷⁹ Gerhard Schröder, “Rede des Bundeskanzlers vor dem Bundestag anlässlich der Abstimmung über den Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus,” 16 November 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_62926.htm> accessed 23 November 2001;

of force still pushed for strong humanitarian efforts and conflict prevention. No Green spoke of an outright support to the US strategy, instead opting for “critical solidarity.” Moreover, all who supported it spoke of a “limited” military involvement, rather than a blank check. Clearly, that demonstrates that although the Greens had undergone a significant evolution over the previous six years, there will still vastly differ from the CDU or the FDP.

Kerstin Müller, the Green Party leader slated to speak during the debate, invoking the danger of new attacks after the shock of 9/11 and using language that would become the mantra of many Greens, made it very clear: “Without limited and goal-oriented military measures against the terrorist network infrastructure, Bin Laden and his associates will plan and carry out new attacks.”⁸⁰ At the same time, she looked toward the future influence Greens could have in foreign policy and the chances for a Green based, peace movement that could have considerable effect in the international community. Müller also dwelled on the question of morality, believing that there was an element of morality in the decision to be made. But whereas the Bosnian and Kosovo deployments had been about protecting citizens suffering from genocide, that was not the case here. Instead she suggested that in this case, the moral argument focused on the struggle against “oppression, hate and violence,” all of which were squarely in line with traditional Green values.

Perhaps the most enlightening, and indeed most interesting speech, came from the Green foreign minister, Joschka Fischer. Fischer did touch on the military deployment, pointing out that it would help the situation in Afghanistan and spoke of the importance

Plenarprotokoll 14/202.

⁸⁰ Plenarprotokoll 14/202.

of continuing the efforts to prevent future wars through non-military means, a cornerstone of Green foreign policy philosophy. Yet, he chose largely to ignore the tenets of international responsibility and focused on the accomplishments of the SPD-Green coalition and the potential of the Green Party to have continued influence. His audience was not so much the Bundestag itself, as it was his Party. Indeed, Guido Westerwelle of the FDP who followed Fischer at the lectern, called it a masterful “party day speech.”

At one level Fischer’s speech focused on the challenge to Green governance posed by the vote of confidence. Instead of trying to persuade what he called the “pacifists by conviction,” he highlighted the merits of the Green Party’s domestic agenda within the current coalition and offered possibilities of where it could go in the future. Issues such as tax reform and the budget, normally outside of a debate on the use of the military, were perfectly within perspective here. The current coalition had “decisively renewed the Republic” and to ditch that on this vote would be disastrous. At the most basic level, the vote was a “decision about the future of this country” and Fischer asked for the trust of his fellow Party members. The foreign minister’s choice to focus on political and domestic politics clearly demonstrates that the Party leader wanted to make this vote about domestic politics, rather than foreign policy. Continuing *Regierungsfähigkeit* was the theme.

The written statements entered into the record provide further detail of those who supported the deployment. Dr. Uschi Eid and seven other Green Members, who were clearly attached to the *realo* camp, offered compelling reasons for supporting the use of German forces. They expanded on Müller’s argument of the possibility of an expanding

threat posed by terrorism, and evoked the potential of a weapons of mass destruction attack or even attacks in Europe. In an eerie reminder of the argument that Joschka Fischer made in his letter to the Party amid the Bosnian crisis in 1995, these authors suggested that those who did not act would share in the guilt of future attacks.

Others, such as *realos* Volker Beck and Gerald Häfner, weighed in on the values of a Red-Green coalition. In one of the longer written statements Angelika Beer, a very vocal member during the debate, argued that her support for the deployment of German forces was based on international requirements and an analysis of the current situation on the ground. As she noted, “targeted military measures in the current situation are essential.” That said, she also expressed significant criticism of the way the US was conducting the operation and believed that other methods should be used in concert with the military measure. Nachtwei, who had only a week before argued against supporting the deployment, noted that the de-escalation of violence and the clearer mandate the Germans would have for the support of the post-Taliban process made his vote for supporting the deployment more palpable.

These supporters also highlighted how remaining in the coalition had meant influence on the current policies. The draft proposal circulated before the vote contained many provisos that had many Greens concerned, among them the role of the KSK special forces, the possible expansion of the mandate to permit operations in Iraq or Somalia, that German forces may be placed under American command and maybe forced to conduct operations outside of that permitted by the Bundestag mandate, and the possibility that German forces would be used in air or attack functions. In a brilliant display of political prowess and in fact helped by Schröder’s use of the vote of confidence, the Greens were

able to exact political changes that would have wide ranging repercussions on the proposal. Indeed, largely because of the Greens, the mandate of the KSK was limited to only police-military missions (e.g. hostage rescue or arrests such as had occurred in Bosnia), the operating area for the Bundeswehr was limited and no German forces were slated to partake in ground operations. Dr. Eid's group and several other Greens referenced this specific success and the power that the Greens had as part of the coalition as a reason for their support.⁸¹

This was a very crucial argument that many in the Green federal level made—as part of the government, they had a much stronger influence in the development and execution of German security policy. The idea of preventative security policy and Joschka Fischer's strong initiatives in the first three years of the Red-Green coalition were consistently mentioned by many during the debate. Moreover, as Joschka Fischer's speech and the written declarations of Albert Schmidt made clear, the chances to further the Green domestic agenda were now inexorably linked to the vote.

Though public reports before the vote for the most part suggested that the Green Party was in fact largely unified with the exception of the eight *fundi* members, the written declarations suggest there was considerably more opposition to the use of force. There had been some speculation earlier that week that Fischer's threat to resign was in large part due to some significant opposition in the Greens beyond the eight primary

⁸¹ Plenarprotokoll 14/2002; Winfried Nachtwei, "Offener Brief an die KollegInnen der Bundestagsfraktion von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen vor der Entscheidung—Schwarzer Freitag für Rot-Grün?," 15 November 2001, <www.nachtwei.de/terror/freitag.htm> accessed 15 October 2002. It is a very interesting, yet speculative, question to ask whether a CDU led government would have contributed a larger number or a more combat-capable force than the SPD led government. That the Greens pushed as hard as they did for limiting the deployment parameters as part of an SPD-Green coalition and the CDU and FDP were so supportive of the idea to send German forces, it is quite likely that a CDU led government may have stretched the German military further.

opponents.⁸² In her speech, Gila Altman rejected the German deployment, yet voted yes to continue the coalition. Gritje Bettin also opposed the use of German forces, yet “against her conscience and against her convictions” voted yes on the linked measure. Moreover, in a joint declaration Christian Sterzing and Ulrike Höfken, who were also not part of the publically admitted eight opponents, sharply opposed the war and its execution by the US; they also firmly rejected the use of German soldiers in Afghanistan.

All of those in this position believed that preserving the Red-Green coalition was more important than the “conscious decision” of rejecting the use of force. Indeed, just two days before the vote, Eckart Lohse, the prolific writer on the Greens for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, suggested that a large number of Greens, including those who had their doubts about the use of military force, had come to the conclusion that the Greens could do more in the coalition than if they were to leave it. Even Steffi Lemke, one of the eight public opponents, recognized that this was the defining question of the 16 November vote.⁸³ This opposition suggests that dissent within the Green Party may have been more widespread than had originally been recognized and also that the desire to maintain influence was a major factor in the Party’s support.

The eight Greens who publicly opposed the deployment of the Bundeswehr maintained their strict opposition to the deployment of the military while decrying the linkage of the two votes. Steffi Lemke, the spokesperson for the group during the debate in the Bundestag, argued that not only were the military attacks damaging to civilians and were actually counterproductive, but the use of the Bundeswehr would be a “further

⁸² Lohse, “Was Fischer so in Rage brachte,” 3.

⁸³ Eckart Lohse, “Feste Ümarmt,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 November 2001, 3.

decisive step toward de-tabooing military means.”⁸⁴ Though no one, even at that level wanted to end the coalition, for these traditionalist members the idea that war was “politically irresponsible and humanitarian false” was the deciding factor, leading them to argue for opposing the resolution.⁸⁵ The eight *fundis* held the fate of the coalition in their hands. In essence, to maintain the coalition and thus salvage the domestic goals and foreign policy influence of the Greens four of the eight would have to vote yes and jettison their principles.

In the end, 336 MPs supported the resolution and the coalition survived. Of the eight Greens who had earlier expressed their desire to vote against the German troop participation, in a brilliant tactical political maneuver, four—Steffi Lemke, Annelie Butenbach, Monica Knoche and Irmgard Schewe-Gerigk—voted for the chancellor to save the coalition. To ensure that result, the eight Greens devised a compromise whereby they would split their vote to save the coalition while still expressing their disdain for the use of force. Thus the four others, Annelie Butenbach, Winfried Hermann, Christian Simmert, Hans-Christian Ströbele, along with one former member of the SPD and the entire opposition voted against the proposition.

Three of the eight publically announced opponents—Winfried Hermann, Silvia Voss, and Irmgard Schewe-Gerigk—made written statements. Voss and Schewe-Gerigk both made abundantly clear their disagreement to the deployment of German forces, but noted that their positive vote was to save the Red-Green coalition. Interestingly Voss took special pain to ask for understanding from her political base, which had written her asking her to withhold the confidence from Schröder. As she

⁸⁴ Plenarprotokoll 14/202.

⁸⁵ Blum.

noted, it was a decision she made with a “heavy heart,” but with a “responsible consideration” of the question. Hermann spent considerable time explaining the politically tactical maneuver that allowed the vote to pass and saving the coalition.⁸⁶

For these eight members, the only thing worse than the deployment of the military was the possibility of a conservative government, as illustrated by the written statements in the record. Even the arch-pacifist Winfried Hermann recognized that though many were opposed to the war, the desire to save the coalition was stronger. As such, the eight opponents, according to Winfried Hermann, made a group decision to ensure that it would be seen as a collective action. As Steffi Lemke noted, the group “answered a power question strategically, in that we say ‘yes’ to the continuation of the coalition and ‘no’ to legitimatizing of the Bundeswehr mandate.” It was a political answer that the Group believed was “very responsible.”⁸⁷ At the same time, in order to express their displeasure, the eight MPs published their rejection of the Bundeswehr deployment in an open letter.⁸⁸

The clear choice by the eight *fundis* of governance over principles represented the culmination of the internalization the ideals of *Regierungsfähigkeit* by the federal leadership. The question they faced could not have been clearer and their decision was equally as unambiguous. The earlier decision in the mid 1990s by first the *realos* and later the swing group to vie to become a part of the government had now come to a full resolution. Though the vote of confidence in the Bundestag was successful and the Greens ultimately remained in power for four more years, this does not mean to suggest that the Greens as a whole had supported the decision. The base had strong discontent

⁸⁶ Plenarprotokoll 14/202.

⁸⁷ Hermann, interview by author; Plenarprotokoll 14/202.

with the leadership's decision, ostracizing the traditional pacifist left wing of the party, even if there were few defections.⁸⁹ To codify that ideal more in the base of the Green psyche would require bringing the entire Party together to discuss the issue in a special Party Day; two years ago a similar event had practically brought the Party to its knees and Rostock would be almost as contentious.

PARTY INFIGHTING IN ROSTOCK

The Party Day at Rostock from 24-25 November 2001 had originally been planned to discuss the long outdated party base program, but instead it became a general debate on the foreign and security policy situation after the 9/11 attacks. With 776 delegates and over 40 distinct proposals for the way ahead, the conference saw hefty debate among all sides of the Party as the concepts of the use of military force in Afghanistan and the desire to continue to govern as part of the coalition demanded a clear position among the Party's base and its leadership. Indeed, as Joschka Fischer stated in his speech, there was a need for clarification on the military issue; the base must also accept its "responsibility" and make a decision or there would be no success in the election in 2002. At the same time there was a distinct move within the BDK to define a Green position for incorporation into its base ideals, rather than continually react to each crisis as it appeared.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ "Nein, aber Ja," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 November 2001.

⁸⁹ "Ja zu Rot-Grün Oliv," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25 November 2001; "Kölner Grüne wollen neue Partei gründen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 29 November 2001, 2.

⁹⁰ Katharina Körting, "Das Rostocker Dilemma," *Schrägstrich* 11-12/ 2001, <www.gruene-partei.de/rsvgn/rs_dok/0,,2504/00.htm> accessed 17 December 2002; "Joschka Fischer—"Ich möchte, dass Ihr mich nicht Allein lasst," BDK in Rostock, 24 November 2001,

The speeches and the proposals from the debate provide an excellent window into the various themes within the conference. Two of the Party's leading chairs—Claudia Roth and Kerstin Müller provided an excellent tandem that explained both the case for staying in the coalition and for using limited military force as part of Enduring Freedom. It was a direct one-two from the leadership to the base.

Roth spent considerable time speaking of the need for and responsibility of the Green Party in Germany—"Exactly now, we need the Greens." The very divisions and debate that so many in the press lamented, she saw as a strength; the Greens have evolved, but their basis principles remain. In particular, Roth focused on the influence of the Greens in government and the potential for future accomplishments. They had substantially limited the current deployment of German forces in the war against terror; Joschka Fischer was actively engaged in diplomacy in the Middle East; and, importantly, the Greens had significantly strengthened the German society domestically. The coalition must be continued "because it is good for the people of this country." The "critical solidarity" and using limited force in reaction to a threat belong to a new view of a "world oriented" Green party.⁹¹

Müller argued passionately for never ruling-out the use of military force as a last resort. The Green Party needed an answer to the threats posed by terrorism, in particular how they proposed to stop it. In her view, and one held by a majority of the federal leadership, terrorism could not be stopped without "limited and targeted" military force. Yet, in highlighting the concept of "critical solidarity," she clearly noted that simply

<www.gruene.de/aktuell/bdk/rostock/meldung/sa/jfischer-rede.htm> , accessed 6 December 2001; "Rostock und die Folgen," <www.gruene-partei.de/rsvgn/rs_dok/0,,2506//00.htm> accessed 17 December 2002.

⁹¹ Rede der Parteivorsitzenden Claudia Roth, 17. Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 24 November

accepting the use of military force here does not mean blanket support to US military operations, in particular if Iraq were to be attacked. Moreover, using the military was only a last resort, as civil conflict prevention remained the primary method of the Greens.

With her reasoning defined and a long history of having to deal with an internal crisis every time the use of force became an option, she forcefully asked for the party to make a clear decision on the use of military force. Though she offered respect for those who opposed its usage, she argued that to hold to that view meant a return to the opposition.⁹² Though not directly stated, Müller clearly argued that to be a part of the governing coalition, the use of limited force must be an accepted practice.

Joschka Fischer, who, in a sign of reverence and respect, received a long standing ovation from the delegates at the conference, asked his Party, much like he did during the Bielefeld Party Day, not to leave him alone. Instead, they should offer their trust and confidence in him and his leadership, which included accepting the use of force. Much like Müller, he pushed for a consensus within the Party, arguing that such a decision would determine whether there would even be a Green Party in the future. Invoking the concept of international responsibility and potential Green influence, Fischer argued that as a part of the governing coalition the Greens could push for political solutions and humanitarian help, but had “no other way” but to accept the use of force as a tool and send German forces. Antje Vollmer criticized this perspective of Fischer’s, suggesting that Germany had now accepted a new military role. In her speech she asked Fischer what the limits of this new role would be, a clear reference to the importance of defining

2001, AGG.

⁹² Rede der Fraktionvorsitzenden Kerstin Müller, 17. Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 24 November 2001, AGG.

the new basis of foreign and security policy.⁹³

For the traditionalists, Hans-Christian Ströbele also receiving a considerable amount of ovation from the assembled delegates, and Steffi Lemke renewed their arguments that military force and German participation were not acceptable. Winfried Hermann noted that he received considerable personal praise for his position during the BDK. The war in Afghanistan according to Ströbele had now evolved away from a targeted strike against terrorists and was now focused on a state, causing considerable damage to civilians, and was actually creating the grounds for an increase in terrorism rather than defeating it. Moreover, he believed that the American leadership of the military effort was “false.” Though he did receive personal applause, he would find that his argument would fall on largely deaf ears, overpowered by the desire to “accept” the German deployment and remain in the coalition.⁹⁴

The over forty proposals presented at the conference fell generally into two categories—the *realo* or *fundi* perspective. The swing group’s perspective, though they may have been more critical on the military aspect relative to the *realos*, generally fell in with that of their *realo* brethren. The *fundi* proposals followed the same traditional logic, rejecting any use of the military in the war against terrorism. Many of these came from the base, though they came with varying radical degrees. The *realo* proposals tended to vary more than their traditionalist cousins, especially in the level of possible effectiveness of military operations. There were no war-mongers within the Greens; the primary issue to be decided here was the extent to which military forces, which all recognized could

⁹³ “Joschka Fischer—“Ich möchte, dass Ihr mich nicht allein lasst;” “Antje Vollmer—“Grenzen benennen,” BDK in Rostock, 24 November 2001, <www.gruene.de/aktuell/bdk/rostock/meldung/sa/avollmer-rede.htm> , accessed 6 December 2001.

⁹⁴ “Hans-Christain Ströbele—Nein Sagen,” BDK in Rostock, 24 November 2001,

have a devastating impact on civilians, could be used against terrorists.⁹⁵

The results of the debate and the votes were a surprise, as the leadership faction's proposal received a significant majority, much higher than most had expected. The final vote came down to two proposals from the *realo* perspective—that from the leadership faction, which was eventually adopted, and one from Ralf Fücks. The latter, which was considerably more focused toward an aggressive stance fell under the weight of the compromised form of the leadership's proposal. In a clear rebuke to the traditional pacifists, a proposal that rejected any form of military strikes did not even make it to the second round of voting, meaning it had almost no support among the delegates. A second *fundi* proposal that argued for stopping the attacks in Afghanistan and opposed only the deployment of the Bundeswehr also received no majority.⁹⁶ Such results clearly dictate that after the shocks of the 9/11 attacks and building on the debates of the past decade, the *fundis*, and as such the traditional roots of pacifism, had been drastically shunned within the Party. A new perspective that accepted the multilateral use of force, including German forces, had become acceptable to the majority of the Green membership.

The leadership proposal that was eventually accepted as the four page BDK resolution, entitled "Fight International Terrorism, Act with Critical Solidarity, Continue the Red-Green Coalition," offered a relatively clear decision on the Green position on the use of military force and German participation. As Winfried Hermann noted, this new

<www.gruene.de/aktuell/bdk/rostock/meldung/sa/cstroebele-rede.htm> , accessed 6 December 2001; Hermann, interview by author.

⁹⁵ Körting.

⁹⁶ "Überlegt Euch gut, was Ihr macht!," *Schrägstrich* 11-12/ 2001, <www.gruene-partei.de/rsvgn/rs_dok/0,,2505//00.htm> accessed 17 December 2002.

perspective was in effect a new basis program for the Party.⁹⁷ The resolution began by recognizing that several of the Bundestag members had voted for the coalition instead of voting their conscience in order to prevent the collapse of the Red-Green collation. Harking on the successes of the Party leadership in limiting the mandate to defensive, police, transportation, and medical missions as well as the deployment location of the Bundeswehr the resolution accepted “unfortunately” that military means must not be excluded as a last resort, though the Greens remained a “military critical party.” Though it would not be able to take part in so-called “classic interventions,” the Bundeswehr can now participate in “protection” and “peace rebuilding” (*Wiederherstellung des Friedens*) missions under a UN mandate. Importantly, the Greens now recognized the value of using force at times. As the resolution noted, the Greens “now take note” that the US military led attack had led to the collapse of the Taliban, enabling both the provision of supplies to large portions of the population and development in Afghanistan.⁹⁸

Despite this new acceptance, the resolution argued that the Greens remained wedded to the “pacifist tradition,” though not pacifism itself. With a new, evolved context of the security policy realm, they still had clear goals to establish—nuclear disarmament, the end of the draft, an international law system, and addressing the challenges of global warming. They would continue to push for international integration and an end to political power politics. Moreover, the Party would continue to criticize the US strategy in Afghanistan and work to prevent the escalation of violence in the region. To continue to affect such policies required remaining in the coalition: “Also out of a foreign policy responsibility, we do not want to surrender this country to today’s

⁹⁷ Hermann, interview by author.

⁹⁸ Interestingly there was no mention of the fact that under such a definition, the intervention to save the

opposition.” In the end, the Greens would now accept a greater degree of responsibility in the international realm, would protect the civil population, and work for protecting international security, and use military force at times, though it would all be with “critical solidarity.”⁹⁹

For the base, the reaction was a mixture of varying levels of support and acceptance. Hubert Kleinert, the chair of the Hessen group, noted that with the agreement that “absolute non-violence” could no longer be a part of the Green party, a new clarity was required for the base Party program. Essentially, the new acceptance of the use of military force must be codified in the Party platform, which would not happen until the following year. On the other hand, Astrid Rothe, the chairman of the Thüringen local group, who had clearly opposed the use of military force in Afghanistan, recognized that the traditionalist perspective was now a minority position within the Party. Moreover, he had to “accept” the result of the BDK and work to convince members of the Party to stay rather than leave, especially in light of the upcoming election.¹⁰⁰ Winfried Hermann disagreed with this perspective, instead arguing that since the BDK was only a small representation of the total Party membership the wider base had a significantly different perspective from that agreed to at the BDK.¹⁰¹

In the press, most believed the results were a clear indication of change for the Greens. The large majority that supported the resolution and the fact that the traditionalist proposals found no majority prompted the *taz* to claim that there was “finally clarity” within the Party, as the Greens joined the other major parties in Germany

Kosovo Albanians would never have happened.

⁹⁹ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Internationalen Terrorismus bekämpfen, in kritischer Solidarität handeln, die Rot-Grüne Koalition fortsetzen.”

¹⁰⁰ “Rostock und die Folgen.”

in accepting military means as a “legitimate” method. The *Tagesspiegel* believed that the long learning process that had brought the Greens to Rostock had finally ushered them into the 21st century. The *Frankfurter Rundschau* suggested that in their attempt to change Germany, the Greens were inexorably changed with it. Tissy Bruns of *Die Welt*, invoking the principles of international responsibility, argued that the Greens had learned “under pressure” that governing a state such as Germany meant that it could not deny alliance responsibilities; however, the party had not yet defined a new platform that would codify these new lessons. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*’s Eckart Lohse, contrary to other commentators, believed that the Greens had not actually come to a clear result, believing the final declaration was in fact more a political concession to prevent droves of members from leaving.¹⁰²

The Rostock BDK does clearly represent the victory of the *realo* perspective within the Green Party. That these ideas were later codified in the 2002 election platform and the 2002 base program represents a significant step forward in Green Party thinking and suggests that although the Greens will likely continue to debate any possible use of coercive military force, there is now a greater acceptance of it as an aspect of policy. Moreover, building off of the three years of participation in the German governing coalition, the BDK here was one of the culminating events in the dwindling influence of the traditional pacifists within the Party.¹⁰³ Indeed according to parliament member Monika Knoche, with the BDK decision the Greens had ceased to be the “Parliamentary

¹⁰¹ Hermann, interview by author.

¹⁰² “Die Grünen sind ein Vorbild,” 26 November 2001, <www.gruene-partei.de/rsvgn/rs_dok/0,,2285/00.htm> accessed 17 December 2002.

¹⁰³ Lohse, “Kampfeinätze und die Ost-Erweiterung.”

arm” of the peace movement.¹⁰⁴ There was also no significant exodus from the Greens, offering further evidence of an acceptance, if a bit grudgingly, of the necessity of using military force by the base. As the Greens would remain in the government for another four years, the BDK was a distinct codification of an evolutionary change in the Party’s perspective in reaction to a new world threat matrix and not the collapse of a political party under the weight of its inherent, outmoded ideals.

SUPPORT FOR ISAF

As the combat operations against al Qaida and the Taliban shifted to the remote regions of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the possibility of the deployment of a peacekeeping began to take shape. By early December, as Germany hosted a conference in Bonn on the future of Afghanistan, ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, became ever closer to reality. Eventually based on a UN resolution and undertaken under the auspices of NATO it would be a peacekeeping mission designed to secure the newly freed portions of Afghanistan. Very quickly, the possibility of German participation and even leadership of the ISAF mission around the Kabul area received considerable attention within the press.

From early December, chancellor Schröder argued that Germany would “probably” participate in the deployment, as Germany did not want to “obturate” this task and would wait for a clear definition on location and mandate from the UN before making a decision. In the early discussions on the possible deployment, the two largest issues that busied the political elites were not politics, but rather questions of execution—

¹⁰⁴ “Peace Movement Gains Popularity in Germany.”

who would take leadership of the force and how could Germany pay for it? Germany's defense elites argued that the leadership of the security force was "not Germany's task." On the latter, Defense Minister Scharping had noted publically that Germany had only "limited military means" in personnel, financial and equipment, especially with the deployment of soldiers in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and for Enduring Freedom. Indeed, Germany had "hardly any more capacity" to take on the leadership of the ISAF.¹⁰⁵

From the very beginning the proposal to take part in the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan received wide support within all of the parties, with the exception of the PDS. Even the arch pacifist Ströbele said that this possibility was "by all means possible" as early as the first week of December so long as it had a clearly defined mandate. This was a stark difference from his approach to KFOR deployment in 1999. Ten days later, he believed that these troops would have the right to protect themselves under a Chapter VII mandate. Moreover, the eight Greens that had thrown the coalition into chaos just a few weeks earlier thought positively of deploying peacekeepers. As Ströbele noted, this was "fundamentally something else" when compared to the November deployment of German combat forces.¹⁰⁶

Just before Christmas 2001, Germany offered 1200 personnel for the ISAF contingent. In part because of Green proposals, though pushed by other parties as well, the deployment area was restricted to Kabul and its immediate vicinity, though that could

¹⁰⁵ "Eine Einigung für Afghanistan—Deutschland beteiligt sich an Friedenstruppe," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 December 2001, 1; "Nicht Aufgabe Deutschlands," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 December 2001, 7; "Scharping: Wir haben begrenzte militärische Mittel," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7 December 2001, 1-2; "Fragwürdige Ehre," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 6 December 2001, 10.

¹⁰⁶ "Deutsche Beteiligung stößt auf Zustimmung," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7 December 2001, 10; "H-C Ströbele zum Afghanistan-Einsatz," interview with N-TV, 17 December 2001, <www.n-tv.de/2889251.htm> accessed 14 January 2002.

be expanded in cases of self-defense. Moreover, there would be a strict separation between the peacekeeping operations of ISAF¹⁰⁷ and the continuing combat operations hunting the Taliban. Germany also decried any possible leadership of ISAF, though that condition would also later dissolve. In a tip to his Green brethren, the foreign minister Fischer noted, Germany would work for the rebuilding of the economy, education systems, and engage for women's equality.¹⁰⁸

When the Bundestag debated and voted on the resolution on a special Saturday session on 22 December, the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of deploying German forces as part of ISAF. Of the 581 members that participated, 538 supported it, 35 opposed it and eight withheld their vote. Not one Green member voted against the resolution and only four (Hermann, Knoche, Lemke and Buntenbach), all of which had been a part of the eight earlier opponents, abstained from the vote.¹⁰⁹

In the speeches before the Bundestag, Fischer noted the historic nature of the moment that for the first time offered Afghanistan a chance. He paid special attention, even publically agreeing with the CDU party chairman, to the fact that this situation would not have been possible without the military defeat of the Taliban. It was important, moreover, that Germany be engaged in this mission, in particular given its responsibility to the UN and the necessity to provide humanitarian aid. Rezzo Schlauch followed similar arguments, invoking Germany's international responsibility. He also made note of the important restrictions of the mandate—separation from combat operations against the Taliban, the importance of a Chapter VII mandate for self-defense

¹⁰⁷ Though ISAF would eventually take on more of a combat role several years later as the Taliban resurgence began, at this point in the debate, ISAF was seen as a peacekeeping force.

¹⁰⁸ "Deutschland stellt 1200 Mann—Breite Zustimmung im Bundestag erwartet," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 December 2001, 2; "Deutsche Führung?," *Der Spiegel* 50, 10 December 2001, 28.

of the soldiers, and that ISAF came with the support of the new Afghanistan government.

Ströbele, the lone traditionalist to speak at the debate, argued that because the UN would be overseeing the mandate and because he wanted to see the strengthening of the UN, he would support the proposal. He also offered a strong clarification on the differences between the vote of a month previously and that for the ISAF force. “We decide here today not about the participation in a war, instead we decide today about whether Germany and as such the Bundeswehr will take part in a deployment that serves peace and should help the chances to secure a long lasting peace.”¹⁰⁹ Perhaps no other statement could explain the clear differences that even these arch traditional pacifists saw between coercive combat operations and peacekeeping operations.

Interestingly, the original restriction of no German leadership and a six month limitation on the deployment were eventually lifted. By late January, the government began to argue that leading ISAF was not something they were “aspiring” for, but it was at the same time not “ruled out,” even as few in the Berlin diplomatic circles felt the US was pressuring Germany to acquiesce. By early March 2002, the Bundeswehr had assumed tactical command of Kabul in an effort to assume “more responsibility” as part of the ISAF leadership. The CDU MP Erich Fritz, however, argues that there was significant pressure from outside Germany to take on a leadership role, suggesting that after the shocks wore off, pressure from international partners was not absent. At about the same time, Schröder also began to clarify that the mandate could be extended.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ “‘Ein begrenztes Mandat’—Große Mehrheit für Afghanistan Einsatz,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 December 2001, 2.

¹¹⁰ Plenarprotokoll 14/210.

¹¹¹ “Bundeswehr übernimmt taktische Führung in Kabul,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 March 2002, 6; “Nicht angestrebt, aber auch Nicht ausgeschlossen,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 January 2002, 1; Fritz, interview by author; “Schröder sichert Bush Unterstützung zu,” *Die Welt*, 2 February 2002, 6; “Schröder: ISAF Mandat kann verlängert werden,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 March 2002, 1.

Even years later, after several extensions, numerous leadership rotations and a switch in command to NATO, Germany remains part of ISAF as of 2007 and the Greens continue to remain supportive.

THE GREENS AND THE IRAQ WAR

The decade of significant evolutions from the Gulf War to Afghanistan within the Green Party were in a way brought full circle with the crisis prior to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Even before the ISAF was fully in place in Afghanistan, rhetoric was already emerging from the US that Saddam Hussein would be the next target. President Bush's January 2002 State of the Union address crystallized the apparent intentions for a confrontation with Iraq, as it was the preeminent focus of this three nations "axis of evil."¹¹² The evolution of the position of the German government and the outright hostility from the strong majority of Greens toward a possible war with Iraq, when seen in combination with a looming election the Red-Green Coalition was not expected to fare well in, offer important lessons for understanding not only the German evolution, but the limits and policies of the Green Party on the use of force.

Even at the early stages of the Schröder government, the situation in Iraq had been problematic. Under his leadership, Germany chose not to participate in the US and British bombing of Iraq in December 1998 for expelling UN inspectors. This time Iraq and its defiance of the international community's regarding weapons of mass destruction, however, was under the shadow of the 9/11 attacks, which had fundamentally altered the

¹¹² Of the three states mentioned, Iraq by far received the most attention with five sentences as opposed to one each for North Korean and Iran. See George W. Bush, "The State of the Union," 29 January 2002,

Bush Administration's perception of international security. Indeed, over the next thirteen months the pressure would escalate, eventually embroiling the transatlantic alliance in its most serious crisis.

In the early months of the crisis, there seemed to be some correlation between the goals of the US and Germany, yet distinct opinions on how to approach the problem. As early as November 2001, Schröder had attempted to discourage the US from attacking Iraq, believing that it was not necessary. Both Schröder and Fischer warned the US that expanding the conflict to Iraq would destroy the anti-terror coalition. Indeed, the chancellor even decried any talk of such a possibility.¹¹³ In a February 2002 speech before the Bundestag, foreign minister Joschka Fischer recognized the evils of Saddam Hussein and his attempts to defy UN sanctions. He argued that Iraq must accept the sanctions and permit UN inspectors, who had been thrown out back in 1998, to return to Iraq.¹¹⁴ Germany also supported the unanimous Security Council vote in November 2002 to force Iraq to disarm and open itself to inspections again. Whereas the US spoke of war as a possibility, Fischer and other German leaders suggested that inspections, rather than warfare, were the answer.

As the American rhetoric for confrontation rose, there was little appetite within the Red-Green coalition for deploying German troops to the region. Yet, the chancellor argued that this was not an abdication of Germany's international responsibility; rather

<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>> accessed 20 March 2004.

¹¹³ "Schröder Discourages U.S. From Launching Attack on Iraq," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (English Version)*, 29 Nov 2001, <<http://www.faz.com>> accessed 4 September 2002; "Bundeskanzler: Keine Notwendigkeit für Ausweitung des Krieges," 3 December 2001, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_63957_1499.htm> accessed 6 December 2001. Szandar, 28.

¹¹⁴ Joschka Fischer, "Rede von Außenminister Fischer zur USA-Irak Problematik vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 22.02.2002," 22 February 2002, <<http://www.auswaertiges.amt.de/www/de/Außenpolitik/friedenspolitik>> accessed 8 May 2002. The

Germany would continue to fulfill these obligations, but would determine contribution based on what would be “meaningful and efficient” and “observed historical sensibilities.” Still, he also noted that fighting terrorists required continued cooperation as a “trusted friend” under the guise of the United Nations. Throughout the first half of 2002, Schröder continually spoke of Germany’s “responsibility for peace.”¹¹⁵

By August 2002, the subtle differences in policy between the US and Germany exploded into an active campaign by Schröder against the possibility of war. Faced with election polls that were overwhelmingly predicting his defeat in the September 2002 elections, Schröder gave a speech at an SPD Party rally on 5 August proclaiming a “German way” that rejected participation in any “adventures.” He promised that Germany would not support a possible war against Iraq with either money or soldiers. Moreover, the Fox panzers stationed in Kuwait under the Enduring Freedom mandate would also be withdraw in case of a war.¹¹⁶ Interestingly, Fischer attempted to convince Schröder not to take this path not out of principled reasons, but rather out of the belief that Germany would have to continue to work with the US to have an influence on the evolving debate.¹¹⁷

Schröder’s strong change in position reached out to the majority of the German population in an attempt to gain momentum for the upcoming election.¹¹⁸ Indeed,

inspectors had left in December 1998 after disagreements with the Iraqi government.

¹¹⁵ Gerhard Schröder, “Bundeskündigung von Bundeskanzler Schröder zur Lage im Nahen Osten,” 25 April 2002, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_77677_432.htm> accessed 8 May 2002; Schröder, ““Unsere Verantwortung für den Frieden.””

¹¹⁶ Schröder, “Rede von Bundeskanzler Schröder zum Wahlkampfauftritt.”

¹¹⁷ Fritz, interview by author.

¹¹⁸ At the time, the discussion of the possibility of war was at hypothetical from the international community’s perspective. Schröder, however, argued that Germany needed to make its stance this early because the day after the German elections NATO would hold a summit that would “decide” the policy in Iraq. This argument was rebuffed both by the US as well as German military officers in the Defense Ministry. See “Militärs erbost über Schröder: Offiziere Widersprechen beim Irak-Einsatz,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, 11 August 2002, 2.

throughout the crisis Germans overwhelmingly opposed any war against Iraq. In a survey conducted in late September 2002, 97% of the German population expressed their opposition to the participation of German forces in a possible invasion of Iraq. In addition, 95% were against any type of coercive military attack.¹¹⁹

The opposition and some members of the press, however, greeted Schröder's sudden change in August 2002 with criticism, rejecting this "German way," believing it to be isolationist and harmful to Germany's predictability and reliability. Indeed, in an op-ed article in *The Washington Post*, CDU/CSU leader Angela Merkel argued that Schröder "does not speak for all Germans."¹²⁰ However, the CDU/CSU was also quick to avoid any appearances that they favored war, given the strong opposition among the population. Eventually, the CDU/CSU chancellor candidate, Edmund Stoiber, publicly expressed opposition to unilateral US action, even as his position on the participation of German soldiers continued to evolve. On 29 August, he made any German participation in a war against Iraq conditional on a UN mandate; two weeks later, however, he ruled out any possibility of German participation.¹²¹

For the Greens, there was almost universal unanimity against a possible use of force against Iraq and very strong opposition to using German forces there. In fact, unlike the other instances—Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia or Afghanistan—the Green discussion on the Iraq crisis was significant in that there was no debate on whether to use military forces. Even amid the debates surrounding Operation Enduring Freedom, there had been considerable efforts by the Green leadership to limit its mandate to prevent a

¹¹⁹ "Einigkeit in der Kriegs-Frage," *Die Welt*, 2 October 2002, <<http://www.welt.de/daten/2002/12/02/1002de360014.htm>> accessed 2 October 2002.

¹²⁰ Merke.

¹²¹ "Auch die Union ist gegen einen amerikanischen Alleingang," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29

possible attack on Iraq. Yet, even as they resoundingly rejected the military options, the Party's position showed a developed confidence in their new security identity, as the idea of diplomatic pressure for preventative diplomacy to reduce the threat from Iraq became the centerpiece of their approach.

The traditional pacifists, such as Hermann and Ströbele, were clearly opposed to any use of military force in Iraq. Even those in the leadership and part of the *realo* contingent also expressed significant reservations against the possible use of force in Iraq. The new Chair of the Greens, Fritz Kuhn, called a potential attack against Iraq an "adventure" as early as March of 2002. Angelika Beer, who had been a proponent of the unlimited solidarity offered by Schröder in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, argued in February 2002 that this solidarity did not include support for military actions against Iraq. Instead, the risks posed from Saddam Hussein must be countered through the UN through effective sanctions and the return of the weapons inspectors. Winfried Nachtwei, another prominent security specialist in the Bundestag faction and proponent of the swing group, likewise rejected the possible use of military force against Iraq, instead arguing for a strong German role for conflict prevention under the leadership of the UN.¹²² By late September, the Greens had decisively rejected any military actions in Iraq and forcefully rejected any possibilities of any German participation.¹²³

Even the Bundestag faction of the Greens remained strongly opposed to military

August 2002, 1-2; "Kein deutsches Engagement im Irak," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 September 2002, 2.

¹²² "Kuhn: Angriff auf den Irak wäre Abenteuerertum," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 March 2002, 2; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/219, 219. Sitzung, 22 February 2002; "Pressemitteilung von Winfried Nachtwei," 15 November 2002, <<http://www.nachtwei.de/presse/antikriegstag.rtf>> accessed 15 October 2003.

¹²³ "Grüne gegen Kriegs-Resolution, Roth: Deutschland wird im UN-Sicherheitsrat nicht zustimmen," *Der Tagesspiegel*, 30 August 2002, <<http://archive.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/30.09.2002/238507.asp>> accessed 30 August 2002.

intervention against Iraq. In an August declaration, the faction made it quite clear that they did not believe that an “imminent danger” came from Iraq. Though the faction believed that Iraq had not fulfilled its obligations set out by the UN for disarmament, any military attack against Iraq would bring tremendous risk to the region and indeed to Europe itself. Instead, the faction argued for “continued patient pressure” to give weapons inspections a chance.¹²⁴ Moreover, the faction did not believe that any such coercive attack against Iraq could lead to victory, especially without a clear political plan for a postwar Iraq.¹²⁵ Unlike in past events when the leadership often had a very different opinion from the grass roots on the use of military force, in the case of Iraq, there was strong unanimity within the Party’s leadership as well to oppose any use of military force.

With the majority of the Party firmly opposed to any intervention, it is perhaps most enlightening to examine Fischer’s perspective during this crisis. As the most vocal supporter of using military force when required, the leader of the Party, and the purveyor of the international realm in the Greens, his viewpoint will demonstrate important aspects of the overall party position. His position was quite different from his past acceptance of military force as a possible mechanism; for the first time since becoming part of the ruling coalition, he found himself on the side of war opponents. Throughout 2002, Fischer made it clear that an analysis of the threat emanating from Iraq did not warrant using military forces. As he noted in one interview: “A military action for the purpose of changing the regime in Baghdad in this region is incalculable.”¹²⁶ Though he believed

¹²⁴ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion, “Aktuell: Die Situation in Irak,” 9 August 2002, <www.gruene-fraktion.de/rsvgn/rs_dok/o,,10455,00.pdf> accessed 2 October 2002.

¹²⁵ Hermann, interview by author.

¹²⁶ “Grüne gegen Kriegs-Resolution;” Eckart Lohse, “Plötzlich Wieder auf der Seite der Kriegsgegner,”

the threat did not warrant military forces, he did recognize that it must be confronted. In a 22 February 2002 speech, he noted the brutalities of Saddam Hussein and recognized that Iraq was still looking for ways to have the chance to create weapons of mass destruction. His focus was on returning the inspectors to Iraq with unfettered access to all sites, believing that would reduce the threat.¹²⁷ Moreover, Fischer noted in September 2002 that there was also no need for a threat backed by military force to bring a change in policy, as there had been in Kosovo. The threat situation vis-à-vis Iraq did not warrant it.¹²⁸ Thus, there was no reason for either a military attack or the strong military buildup.

Despite this clear opposition to any war in Iraq and especially any German participation, the Greens voted against a proposition by the PDS during the final vote of the Bundestag session to legally rule out any German participation in a war against Iraq as well as any war at all against Iraq. Only the pacifist Hans-Christian Ströbele chose not to vote with the Party, instead abstaining from the vote on the PDS proposal opposing German participation, while voting for the PDS proposal opposing war against Iraq.¹²⁹ Though supportive of the general nature of the PDS proposals, the rejection by the Greens demonstrates a complete disdain for the absolute pacifism inherent in the PDS while also recognizing the need to act in the international community by preferring not to stake out such a clear position in legal terms.

In December 2002, Fischer caused a slight uproar in the Party when he suggested that there was no way to determine how Germany would vote on any possible forthcoming UN Security Council resolution on using military force against Iraq. Many

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 August 2002, 3.

¹²⁷ Plenarprotokoll 14/219.

¹²⁸ Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 253. Sitzung, 13 September 2002.

¹²⁹ Plenarprotokoll 14/253.

Greens saw this as a change in policy, which Fischer and the chancellor rejected. Indeed the redoubtable pacifist Hans-Christina Ströbele argued at this point that Germany should reject any possible use of force, even if it came with UN support.¹³⁰ As it became increasingly clear that war with Iraq was ever closer on the horizon, there was less willingness even to talk of any possible support for using military force.

As the drums of war beat steadily closer, Fischer saw some successes through international pressure in late 2002 and early 2003 that led him to believe the need for military violence had been even further reduced. Indeed, at the well known February 2003 UN Security Council meeting, he suggested that although Iraq still had much to do before being in compliance with UN resolutions, the threat from Iraq had been “effectively reduced” with the return of the inspectors.¹³¹ Even on the very eve of war on 19 March 2003, Fischer argued for alternatives to war, invoking Germany’s experience with the disastrous consequences of war.¹³²

There are a number of reasons why the Greens as a whole rejected the use of military force to combat Iraq in 2002-2003. While the traditional suspicions of great power politics from the US and the fear that military operations would only escalate tensions in the volatile Middle East offer strong explanative power for the Green stance here, it is useful to examine this case from the variables that had defined the earlier Green support for the use of military force. In particular, what does an analysis of three of the elements of change outlined in this dissertation—the presence of shocks, pressure of

¹³⁰ “Greens Divided on Fischer’s Iraq Stance,” *DW-World.de*, 30 December 2002, <<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,724173,00.html>> accessed 5 August 2007.

¹³¹ Joschka Fischer, “Rede von Bundesaußenminister Fischer im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen in New York am 14. Februar 2003 zur Lage in Irak/Kuwait,” 14 February 2003, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=4074> accessed 30 March 2004.

¹³² Joschka Fischer, “Rede von Bundesaußenminister Fischer vor dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen, New York, 19.03.2003,” 19 February 2003, <<http://www.auswaertiges->

Regierungsfähigkeit in the context of international responsibility, and the leadership of Joschka Fischer—provide to better understand the shift in the Greens' stance?

Unlike the previous cases, there were no clear shocks to spurn the Green Party to rethink its values or adjust its parameters of decision-making. Whereas Srebrenica and the 9/11 attacks in particular led to significant shifts in the Green Party, the absence of such a shock meant that any Green Party decision in the case of Iraq would be based on already existing normative perspectives, which in this cases were decisively opposed to aggressive, unprovoked, or preemptive attacks such as what would be the case in Iraq.

Without a distinct shock to react to, such as genocide or terrorist attacks, the feeling of urgency faded, especially as Germany had never viewed Iraq with any sense of urgency. Moreover, while German leaders were able to overcome some minor public disapproval of German deployment in the war against terrorism, the overwhelming public disdain for any war in Iraq, let alone German participation, effectively limited the options of the government, and the absence of any shocks prohibited any chance of real evolution.

Much like the above absence of shocks, the involvement of the Greens in the Red-Green coalition did not exert any mechanisms of change and reevaluation. Whereas the desire to become a part of the governing coalition in the 1990s had led to a fundamental rethinking of the use of force, and the importance of remaining within the government, exemplified by the support for operations in Kosovo and the clear political decision to save to coalition in November 2001, the SPD exerted no pressure on the Greens to change. Schröder's early rejections for German participation, hardened by his August speech, meant there was no pressure to conform for the Greens and there was zero chance

that the Greens would be influenced by the opposition. Indeed, by March 2002, Fischer was already telling his Party that the Bundestag would never approve German participation in an attack on Iraq.¹³³ Winfried Hermann, moreover, believed that had it come to any form of German participation, the government would have collapsed,¹³⁴ suggesting there was a tacit agreement even early in this crisis that a Red-Green coalition could not even offer the possibility of German participation.

Internationally, moreover, Germany likely did not see significant forms of pressure to fulfill any responsibilities. By August, Germany had gained the support of France and Russia and as the American rhetoric towards war increased, others in the international community also began to fall toward Germany's side. There was, however some opposition from both within and without to Schröder's stark August declaration of non-participation. Klaus-Dieter Frankenburger of the influential *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* suggested that Schröder did Germany "no favors" with his German way. Günter Nonnenmacher, one of the five editors of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, argued that Germany had returned to the "role of a dwarf" with Schröder's Iraq policy.¹³⁵ Former Clinton advisor Ronald Asmus weighed in with a translated op-ed in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, calling Schröder's policy a "new German irresponsibility."¹³⁶

Any pressure from the US became largely irrelevant after relations hit rock bottom just before the 22 September election when the German Justice Minister

¹³³ "German Anxiety over Iraq Plan Grows," *BBC News*, 18 March 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1878395.stm> accessed 5 August 2007.

¹³⁴ Hermann, interview by author.

¹³⁵ Klaus-Dieter Frankenburger, "Kein Ersatz für Politik," 21 August 2002, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12; Klaus-Dieter Frankenburger, "Deutscher Irrweg," 11 August 2002, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1; Günter Nonnenmacher, "Rückfall in die Zwergenrolle," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 September 2002, 1.

¹³⁶ Ronald Asmus, "Die neue deutsche Unverantwortlichkeit," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 September 2002, 2.

reportedly compared the politics of George W. Bush with Adolf Hitler at a local meeting. President Bush apparently took the comments quite personally and after Schröder's victory in the election, in a major diplomatic snub, Bush did not call the reelected chancellor. Several months later, in January 2003, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made the infamous reference to Germany and France as "old Europe" that only cemented this negative personalization. In the end, this spiraling angry personalization made the possibilities of any clear and resonant impact of possible pressure for the US all but non-existent.

Internally within the Greens, there was also no enabler for change in the case of Iraq. During the past seven years, Joschka Fischer's leadership had been paramount to the evolving perspectives on the use of force for the Greens. But in this case, as Eckart Lohse so accurately described, Fischer had returned to the side of the war opponents. Whether out of political choices, which Fischer denied,¹³⁷ or principled choice, it was clear that Fischer's opposition to military action against Iraq prevented redirecting the direction of the Party. Much like the lack of pressure from their coalition partners, there was similarly a lack of pull from the Party's leader to move the Party away from an entrenched position of opposition to a possible war.

From the Green Party's perspective, there were none of the forcing mechanisms that had defined the evolutions during the Bosnian, Kosovo, of 9/11 crises. The perceptions of a potential invasion of Iraq as a method of aggressive warfare created harsh opposition in Germany and especially the Greens in large part due to already ingrained norms and ideals. The Greens, and the Left in general, saw diplomatic means as the primary method to counter the level of threat emanating from Iraq. In many

respects, the Green Party's stance vis-à-vis the Iraq crisis was very much in concert with its security identity that it had developed in the preceding decade; this case merely represented the limits of the Party's stance on the use of force.

CONCLUSION

The shock of the events of 9/11 was an extremely palpable and emotional event for all Germans. It brought significant and practically revolutionary statements from an SPD chancellor and from his Green counterpart. The majority of the Green party indeed recognized the 9/11 attacks as a clear shock that would transform their perspective on security policy. Within a short time after the attacks, the potential for German participation in military actions was at the forefront of debate and, in turn, again brought forth one of the central challenges that had long plagued the coalition. That the coalition had only months before failed to achieve its own governing majority on a vote on the deployment of a contingent of German soldiers to gather weapons in Macedonia, which had been at the behest of both sides and supported by the UN, made it even more challenging.

The overall debate within the Greens before and during the vote in the Bundestag provides considerable insight. Many, such as Fischer, Beer and Volmer, who supported the deployment invoked the necessity of acting based on Germany's responsibility within the international structures. For others, the importance of continuing the coalition was critical. A key component of that desire to continue governing arose out of a conscious decision the Party chairmen, Rezzo Schlauch and Kerstin Müller, had taken to ensure that

¹³⁷ Lohse, "Plötzlich wieder auf der Seite der Kriegsgegner."

Party remained focused on influencing the government course during the first three years of the coalition.¹³⁸ Still, as the statements attached to the written record of the 16 November debate demonstrate, there was also some hesitancy within the swing group, though they never publicly said they would vote against the deployment, suggesting that even before the vote the strategic importance may have been overriding their strict principles.

Several reasons led to the support by both the *realos* and the majority of the swing group early in the process; both intervening variables of change were present here. The reaction to new threats apparent in the shock of 9/11 and the requirements placed on Germany through its international responsibilities, essentially a more mature version of the *Regierungsfähigkeit* that had influenced so many during the Kosovo crisis, were critical. The Greens also had three years as a partner in the governing coalition and had some considerable successes in implementing Green policy that fostered a desire by many, especially in the swing group, to ensure the continuity of the coalition. Indeed, their involvement in government had a clear impact in this case on the mandate for the deployment of the Bundeswehr, particularly in narrowing its location and mission.

Whereas the earlier debate surrounding the Bosnian and Kosovo crises had put the swing group under fire, this occasion focused the attention squarely on the traditional pacifists. There were eight *fundi* MPs that declared a resounding opposition to any use of German forces in the fight in Afghanistan. The flop amid the Macedonia mandate elevated this minor disagreement to a level where they controlled the fate of the Red-Green coalition. In this case, their strong opposition to the deployment was challenged by the linkage of the deployment vote to a vote of confidence on the chancellor; they

¹³⁸ Denkler.

were forced to choose between continuing the government and staying true to their conscience. In the end, a mutually developed political compromise to save the coalition overrode the conscience-based opposition for the eight opponents. A similar decision was supported by the Party as a whole in the Rostock BDK just a few short weeks later. Taken in sum, this suggests that most in the Party would bow to the political needs of the Party rather than the personal convictions of the individual—*Regierungsfähigkeit* was the predominant influence when it came to a choice between strategic vision and pacifist principles.

On the heels of the cantankerous debate in November came two instances of unity in the Party. Despite continued clashes over using German forces in combat operations, the debate about ISAF showed a very different conclusion—that a very majority of the Party accepted using German forces in peacekeeping roles. In the December 2001 vote, not one Green voted against it and in the renewal vote in mid-November 2002, there were only one abstention and two votes against the proposal (Hermann and Ströbele).¹³⁹ Even this was a monumental change relative to the early debates that had resulted in the rejection of the SFOR vote in the 1990s.

On the other end of the spectrum, there was also complete unity within the Party for rejecting the US war in Iraq, to say nothing of any German participation. With no shocks, no governance pressure, and no enabling leadership, there was also no pressure to change the perspective of the Party. While the Party was willing to support deploying combat forces to Afghanistan, supporting what the perceived as the aggressive pursuit of national interests was beyond their established limits.

That the Greens, meaning especially the traditionalist wing, chose to continue the

coalition instead of holding true to the mantra of “never again war” meant a clear withering of the pacifist dictum in the Party. At its most basic level, amid the 9/11 crisis the Greens were more for Joschka Fischer and the continuation of Green foreign and domestic policy, than they were against the war.¹⁴⁰ That shift in the overall identity of the Party had some very clear impacts. In early 2002, the *realos* for all intents and purposes tried to shut out Hans-Christian Ströbele, one of the more vocal left wing pacifists, from the upcoming September 2002 election. Only his direct election within his Berlin district brought him back into the Bundestag. Some pacifists simply left the party, though in small numbers, giving further indications of the changed nature of the Greens.¹⁴¹

The change in the Greens’ security identity, though, did not have disastrous effects on the Green’s electability, suggesting that the reasons for change had some resonance within the Party’s base. Though the memory of almost bringing the coalition to its knees was recent, by the election in September 2002 that had largely been eclipsed by the absolute rejection of any possible support for an invasion of Iraq. With Germany again embroiled in a debate about a potential war, even the veritable *realo* Fischer this time found himself opposing any potential invasion. In fact, after the 2002 election the Greens had increased their percentage of votes from 6.7% to 8.6%, bringing eight additional seats in the Bundestag.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 15/11, 11. Sitzung, 15 November 2002.

¹⁴⁰ Nico Fried, “Gegen den Krieg—und für Joschka Fischer,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 9 November 2001, 2.

¹⁴¹ “Internationalen Terrorismus bekämpfen,” Heribert Prantl, “Ja zu Rot-Grün Oliv,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25 November 2001; “Die Grünen wollen weiter regieren,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 November 2001, 1; “Kölner Grüne wollen neue Partei Gründen,” 2; “Rechts vor Links,” *Der Spiegel* 1, 29 December 2001, 46.

¹⁴² Eckart Lohse, “Ich oder die Dunkelheit,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 September 2002, 3; Lohse, “Plötzlich wieder auf der Seite der Kriegsgegner,” 3; “Wie das Volk gewählt hat,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 September 2002.

The Green Party's reaction to the 9/11 attacks and its acceptance and codification of a new, further evolved security identity suggests that the Green evolution may have reached its apex. Yet, few would have fathomed even in 1998 that the Party would have largely supported using German combat forces abroad. Given the varied threats in the world and an every evolving security environment, it is difficult to predict what future iterations of evolution, and possibly de-evolution could occur. With the departure of the Greens from the governing coalition in 2005, the return to the Opposition could also bring forth some changes. However, the evolutionary changes from 1990-2001 were clear and undeniable and will likely remain a facet of the Green security identity.

This chapter has demonstrated the continued evolution of the Green Party's use of force debate amid the crises in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Like the earlier Bosnian and Kosovo incidents, external shocks, here the terrorist attacks, and the will to govern, most poignantly displayed this time by the *fundis* during the November vote, were the variables of change. With three years of successes in influencing the foreign and domestic policy of Germany, the ideals of *Regierungsfähigkeit* were now even stronger than during Kosovo at both the grass roots and leadership levels. At the same time, the absolute rejection of using force in Iraq demonstrated an apparent limit to the Greens' evolution.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION—SHADES OF GREEN

A comparison of the platforms of the German Green Party from 1990 and 2002 shows nothing short of a complete reversal in the Party's perspective on the use of military force. From a complete rejection of using any force to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1990-91 to a strong majority in support of the deployment of German combat forces to Afghanistan in 2001, the Party's evolution has been one of continuous, acidic debate and slow evolutions as opposed to revolutions. Decisive shocks in the international environment, in particular the massive humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Kosovo and later the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and, primarily, the conscious will to become and remain a part of the governing coalition were the decisive variables for this change. The end of the Cold War, to include the developing German international responsibilities, and the dynamic Green leadership, moreover, provided two enabling elements that provided the background and helped enable the two variables of change to be effective. The decade long evolution introduced a new shade of green to the German Green Party—olive green.

Though the will to govern was the decisive factor in the evolution of the Greens, in fact, without both of them, it is highly unlikely that so complete an evolution would have occurred. Looking at it from a temporal perspective, it is also doubtful that the influence of the will to govern would have had such an impact on the debate without the shocks in the Balkans first providing a reordering of internal priorities for the *realos* in favor of “never again Auschwitz” over “never again war.” The shocks in Bosnia and

Kosovo were “milestones” for the Green evolution, as they caused significant internal strife each time and gave reason for leaders to rethink their philosophical positions.¹ Indeed, the very reaction to the three major shocks, Srebrenica, Kosovo (Racak), and 9/11, clearly demonstrated both of these aspects.

While the effect of the shocks were easy to measure given the considerable debate and obvious shift in individual positions, the impact of the will to govern was not as easy. What is clear, however, is the impact this desire to at first join the governing coalition and later to remain in it had on the swing group during the Kosovo crisis, both at its federal leadership and the grassroots levels, and on the *fundis* in the wake of 9/11. The shift in perspectives and rhetoric during the Kosovo crisis from such key swing group leaders as Ludger Volmer and Angelika Beer after they joined the government demonstrated a quick acceptance of the desire to have influence and in turn the acceptance of Germany’s international responsibilities. Moreover, the very clear decision by four of the eight *fundis* to vote for the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan in November 2001 in order to save the Red-Green coalition offers no better example of the pull of this will to govern. The choice of strategy over principles was quite clear in both cases and gives clear evidence why the will to govern was the decisive reason for the Green Party’s changed perspective on the use of force.

At the heart of this support resulting from the will to govern by the majority of the swing group and to an extent the *fundi* leaders was the SPD requirement outlined before the 1998 election that the Greens must accept the use of German military forces to be capable of governing in a Red-Green coalition. A clear path can be seen between the German international requirements and the Greens’ change in perspective of the use of

¹ “Abmarsch in die Realität.”

force. The logic of appropriate action at the macro level dictated German international responsibilities, while the priorities of the incoming SPD government in 1998 determined the necessity of continuing these priorities including the use of German military force. Thus, those who wished to join that government and have a degree of influence on German policy had to accept these requirements, even if that meant change. The weakness of the Greens electoral prospects in turn gave them little choice—either include the use of force into a new concept of Green security or risk falling into obscurity. Following symmetric mathematic logic then, the power of the logic of appropriate action was linked directly to a distinct acceptance of the use of German military force in the swing group and *fundis*. *Regierungsfähigkeit* thus had a distinct international element to it.

The grass roots of the Party faced the same dilemma of principles over strategy that the leadership did when Party Days were held both during the Kosovo war and just after the deployment of German combat forces to Afghanistan. In October 2001 amid the looming debate on the deployment of German forces, Joachim Raschke argued that the Greens remained a party whose majority in the grass roots was intent on blocking initiatives, intent to remain in step with their principles.² However, much like the federal leadership, they too chose to maintain influence rather than withdraw the mandate of their leaders, especially Joschka Fischer. Though both conferences were extremely tumultuous, and actually violent in the first case, the results indicate a general acceptance, as opposed to an internalization, of the use of force by the Party's base. By 2002, in direct contradiction to Raschke's argument, there was a clear consensus within the Party that accepted the use of force in certain situations, suggesting that their principles could

be overcome by a will to govern.

Over the course of this decade of change, the very idea of “never again war” that had defined the Party’s pacifist lexicon was redefined. As the Berlin Wall fell, this concept had meant opposition to the use of the military at all for the Greens; by 2002, however, it was a more relaxed definition, opposing only aggressive force, invasions of another country, and in particular using military force to achieve selfish national interest goals. No more was “war” as simple as before. Now, targeted military force, to include both select combat operations and almost all peacekeeping operations, was seen as a potential factor for good and not simply as a force of destruction. Indeed, by the end of this evolution, German participation in peacekeeping missions had widespread support within the Green Party, even among the arch pacifists.³

A very stark representation of the overall evolution of individual members of the Party can be seen with the evolution of Kerstin Müller. Originally harshly opposed to Fischer’s suggestion in 1995 that military force should be considered to stop the genocide after the Srebrenica massacre, her position had shifted completely within six years. Speaking at the Rostock Party Day in 2001, she argued that had the international community acted as decisively in 1991 in Bosnia as it had in Macedonia in 2001, then there would “probably still be several hundred thousand people alive.”⁴ No clearer statement of individual change represents the overall evolution of many in the Party—from an absolute refusal to arguing for it as a means of saving lives.

By late 2001 at the Rostock Party Day, the Party chair Claudia Roth had clarified the distinction between “repressive force” and “war,” as the former came to be seen as an

² Raschke, “Sind die Grünen regierungsfähig?”

³ Hermann, interview by author.

“aid,” even though the latter was still widely rejected. The Party remained an anti-war party, though it now was a party with “high peace expertise” (*hoher Friedenskompetenz*) that recognized the potential positive influences of military force.⁵ Even the arch pacifist Hans-Christian Ströbele recognized this difference when he spoke about the deployment of ISAF to Afghanistan in December 2001: “We decide here today not about the participation in a war, instead we decide today about whether Germany and as such the Bundeswehr will take part in a deployment that serves peace and should help the chances to secure a long lasting peace.”⁶

The result of the challenges faced by the Greens and their long learning process was in many ways a re-codification of Green security identity in reaction to the current environment. Pacifism, which had long been the defining theme of the Greens, had lost its prominence as the *casus belli* of the Greens. Indeed, as the Party Base Program approved with a strong majority noted: “We also know that the use of violence in accordance with constitutional and international law cannot always be ruled out.”⁷ With the inability to provide any solutions to post Cold War crises, this traditional pacifism, still locked as it always had been in the Cold War matrix, could no longer be taken seriously.⁸

An integral part of this new version of Green security identity was a focus on conflict prevention. Built on the same basic Green values, this evolved idea nonetheless

⁴ Rede der Fraktionvorsitzenden Kerstin Müller.

⁵ Rede der Parteivorsitzenden Claudia Roth.

⁶ Plenarprotokoll 14/210.

⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Die Zukunft ist Grün: Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen,” 17 March 2002,

<http://www.gruene.de/cms/files/dokbin/68/68425.grundsatzprogramm_die_zukunft_ist_gruen.pdf> accessed 18 July 2007.

⁸ “Was bleibt vom Pazifismus,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7 January 2002, <<http://www.ludger-volmer.de/themen/aktuell/index.htm>> accessed 14 January 2002.

began to incorporate this positive role for military force to achieve the traditional goals of the Party. Ludger Volmer, in a speech on the foundations of German foreign policy in November 2001 argued that Germany's participation in conflict prevention operations, to include deployments of the Bundeswehr, was a "positive change" rather than a formula for worsening the situation. The tenet of "never again war" could not simply be a measure to hold back and watch as other take the responsibility to act, especially amid such crises as in the Balkans and after 9/11.⁹ As Niki Kortvelyessy, a leading member of the Brussels-based European Federation of Green Parties, noted as early as 1999 this shift was merely an adjustment of means: "Our aims have not changed. The strategies have changed."¹⁰ This new Green idea of conflict prevention that had solidified by the 2002 election was now a lesson from the sum of the entire German history, encompassing the Second World War, the *Westbindung* of the Cold War and importantly the reaction to the challenges that beset Europe and the world in the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Though it was quite clear that during the terms of this study, the Greens supported or at least accepted the use of force, an important question that needs to be addressed now is whether this new identity has been internalized completely or whether it was simply a fleeting acceptance to maintain a role in the governing majority. To answer that question, albeit only partially at the moment, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the path of the Greens since they left the governing coalition in 2005. As events will demonstrate, there would be a significant shift in Green Party's perceptions in the use of force.

Much like its predecessors, the 2005 election platform had a small focus on foreign and security policy. The Party recognized the threats in the world, including

⁹ Volmer, "Grundlinien der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik."

¹⁰ Cullen.

terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and argued that it was no longer possible to remain aloof from such challenges, which in itself was a significant change. Moreover, the Greens also engaged for human rights, for example in the case of Sudan, though there was no mention of the need for active military force. Though they firmly rejected preemptive attacks, such as in Iraq, the Greens now clearly recognized the positive influence German soldiers were having in both Kosovo and Afghanistan as part of a force to reduce violence and build peace, even though there were no direct positive statements in the election platform for OEF or ISAF. Finally, they pushed for the continuation of the conflict prevention ideas that had been implemented under the Red-Green coalition.¹¹ Though clearly not as supportive of the use of force as the 2002 election platform, the 2005 platform does indeed suggest a continued acceptance of the policies of the past few years, if a bit diluted. However, a bigger question would be how the Greens would react as events in Afghanistan worsened and their memories of the years in government faded.

As the Greens fell into the opposition, many of their key leaders had also left. Joschka Fischer and Ludger Volmer left the Party; Angelika Beer moved to the European Parliament. The result was a new generation of leaders that had not always directly interacted with the defining events of the 1990s. As events in Afghanistan worsened and amid the necessity of renewing the three German mandates for Afghanistan—OEF, ISAF and a Tornado deployment for reconnaissance in support of ISAF—debate again rose within the Party. There was still a recognition that the military had a role to play, suggesting that the Greens had not reverted to the traditional ways of old. As Winnfried

¹¹ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Eines für Alle: Das Grüne Wahlprogramm 2005," 2005, <http://www.gruene.de/cms/default/dokbin/141/141550.wahlprogramm_2005.pdf> accessed 18 November

Nachtwei, one of the leaders in the security policy debate and an adherent to the swing group, noted in March 2007 the fight against terrorism required a multi-faceted approach, for which the use of military force was both “essential and necessary.”¹² Only this time there would be much more considerable debate on the use of German forces in combat actions, especially OEF in general and the use of the Tornado aircraft in particular.

In September 2007, the Greens held a special Party Day in Göttingen to discuss the Party’s stance on German forces in Afghanistan. Though much more divided than in the past, the Party’s leadership officially argued that all the Afghanistan mandates should be extended. The most contentious issue though was the extension of the Tornado deployment, which had been originally approved by only 26 of the 51 Green MPs in March 2007. The Party Chairman Reinhard Bütikofer, who argued that to give up on Afghanistan was “not an alternative,” received both considerable applause and, like his predecessors, loud protests. Despite his arguments, in a considerable blow to the leadership, the Party’s grass roots firmly rejected the extension of the OEF mandate and argued for an immediate withdraw of the German Tornado contingents, though they continued to support the presence of German troops as part of the ISAF peacekeeping force.¹³

The Greens were now arguing for a “change in strategy” for Afghanistan. The declaration, entitled “Military Escalation is not a Solution,” argued that the war on terror could not be won militarily, as events in both Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated. It issued a “clear rejection” of OEF, arguing that it should be ended immediately as it

2007.

¹² Nachtwei, “Nachtwei zum Einsatz des Kommandos Spezialkräfte in Afghanistan.”

¹³ “Grüne werden für Afghanistan-Beschluss geohrfeigt,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 September 2007, 3; “Grünen-Basis verpasst Parteispitze Denzettel,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15 September 2007, 3.

hindered the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Party sharply criticized the combination of the ISAF mandate and Tornado extension votes, arguing that the ISAF extension was now a “hostage” to the Tornado deployment. Throughout the declaration, there was particular concern of the increasing predominance of the military in Afghanistan. If there was no evolution in this strategy, the Greens also hinted that all German soldiers should be pulled out of Afghanistan.¹⁴

The question then is whether these recent events actually represent a fundamental change in the Green Party’s position. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* argues that the declaration from the Party Day was in fact not a change in direction of the Greens, but rather a way of the Party’s grass roots to express their displeasure with the leadership.¹⁵ Yet, when seen in the context of the earlier positions in late 2001 and early 2002, it is clear that the Party has changed its position, suggesting that the Green position developed from 1990-2002 was not permanent. There was some clear backtracking away from the 2001 perspective on the use of force, perhaps in part due to the opposition to the way the US was prosecuting the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Still, the Party Day’s results continued to show a desire for engagement by the Party and was not a complete rejection of the lessons learned earlier. The distinction between the varying mandates was critical here. There was no doubt that strong majorities of the Greens opposed the extension of the OEF; indeed the MPs unanimously opposed the extension of its mandate in a November 2007 Bundestag vote. Yet, there

¹⁴ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Grüne fordern Strategiewechsel für Afghanistan,” 15 September 2007, <http://www.gruene.de/cms/themen/dok/197/197507.gruene_fordern_strategiewechsel_fuer_afg.htm> accessed 17 November 2007; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, “Militärische Eskalation ist keine Lösung—Mit politischen Mitteln und zivilem Aufbau den Frieden in Afghanistan gewinnen!,” 15 September 2007, <http://www.gruene.de/cms/default/dokbin/197/197532.militaerische_eskalation_ist_keine_loesu.pdf> accessed 17 November 2007.

¹⁵ “Grünen-Basis verpasst Parteispitze Denkkzettel.”

was also strong support for the ISAF peacekeeping force to protect those rebuilding Afghanistan. That continued support, in a distinct difference from the newly created Left Party in Germany, represented a continued desire to continue to accept the responsibility for Afghanistan, a point argued directly in the Green press release on the website.¹⁶

While it is clear there was a shift, the exact reasons for this change are not completely clear. In the intervening six years since the attack, events such as the Abu Ghraib torture scandal, the increased militarization of the conflict, and likely the fading of the impact of the shock, no doubt helped to lead to a shift in perspectives in the Greens. But important questions remain to be studied in more detail. What specific role did being out of the governing coalition have on this shift? Did the lack of a dynamic leader, such as Joschka Fischer, and new federal leaders change the dynamic of intraparty relations? Was there a “reverse shock,” meaning a negative reaction to military events in Iraq and Afghanistan, that rekindled the pacifist norm within the Party? These questions, in particular the first and last, offer extremely interesting areas for further research and indeed a logical follow-on study.

This brief inclusion of the years since the Greens left the governing coalition facilitates a clearer understanding of what the Green view is on the use of force, almost two decades since the end of the Cold War. First, there is a clear acceptance of the use of the Bundeswehr for peacekeeping operations, linking directly to the Green idea of preventive politics. Second, the Greens absolutely reject any use of military force they view as aggressive or supporting nationalist interests; their rejection of all actions in Iraq clearly displays this limitation. Third, preventing genocide remains an important feature

¹⁶ Robert Rossmann, “In der Welt der falschen Jas und Neins,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 14 September 2007, 4; “Grüne fordern Strategiewechsel für Afghanistan.”

of the Greens, but unlike in Bosnia and Kosovo, there has been no argument to send forces to Darfur, suggesting both geography and government participation remain important factors in their choice to accept military force in these cases. Fourth, with the recent shift, it appears that involvement in the governing coalition plays a key role in leadership's perspectives on the use of force. Finally, as much of the evolutions emerged out of reactions to decisive shifts in the international environment, the Green policy on the use of force is not a concrete policy, but rather can still change depending on future events.

The methods outlined here have been quite useful in explaining the evolution of the Green Party between 1990 and 2002. The next step then is to look at other major examples of historical change—at the political party, state, and systemic levels—and see if similar mechanism of change appear. Applying these methods to study other states, such as Japan or other possible hesitant partners, can be fruitful both for academics as well as policymakers. One of the more interesting tangential ideas arising from this work suggests that a political party can survive, if not flourish, even when the governing leadership of a political party ignores its base on passionate issues such as the use of force. A study of this concept in the context of the Republican and Democrat parties in the US as they rush headlong into the 2008 presidential election could offer interesting contrasting perspectives.

For the Greens, there are several areas that must be further studied. First, as more archival records open, the internal mechanisms of the change during the late 1990s as the Greens stood poised to join the coalition will be able to shed more concrete light on the role of Joschka Fischer and the personal opinions on the importance of the strategic

choice to govern in the personal decisions of many of the swing group. Second, it will also be useful to move beyond the strict use of force debate and look for tangential effects on other Green security policies. Third, to expand on a theme only lightly covered in this work, in-depth research at the local level and how they perceived the dwindling power of pacifism can more clearly demonstrate the level of acceptance at the grass roots level as well as explain the continued Green success in elections despite the grass roots hesitance to the Party's acceptance of the use of force. Finally, only as the years of the Red-Green coalition fade into the background even further and future leaders emerge will the exact level of internalization be clear. Though the years 1990-2002 will clearly continue to resonate within the Greens for years to come, as they are now a part of the Party's identity, only if the lessons of using force to protect the innocent or in active support of self-defense outside of Germany continue to remain into the distant future, will the years 1990-2002 be seen as defining moments, rather than fleeting political shifts, for the Green Party.

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